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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  174 of 2008

PETITIONER: SUNITA JAIN

RESPONDENT: PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/01/2008

BENCH: C.K. THAKKER & D.K. JAIN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1362 OF 2004 C.K. THAKKER, J.

1.              Leave granted.

2.              The present appeal is filed against  the judgment and order dated October 30, 2003  in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 1442 of 1999  passed by the High Court of Judicature at  Jabalpur. By the said order, the High Court  allowed the application filed by the  respondents-accused under Section 482 of the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter  referred to as \021the Code\022) and quashed criminal  proceedings initiated by the appellant. 3.              To appreciate the controversy raised  in the present appeal, few relevant facts may  be noted. 4.              The appellant herein is the wife of  Pawan Kumar Jain-respondent No.1. Respondent  Nos. 2 and 3, namely, Poolchand Jain and Smt.  Sarojbai Jain are parents of respondent No.1  and father-in-law and mother-in-law  respectively of the appellant. It is the case  of the appellant that she married to respondent  No.1 on July 8, 1989. After the marriage, she  remained with her husband for few days at  Jabalpur and during that period, her husband  and in-laws harassed her as her father had not  given sufficient amount of dowry.  They taunted  the appellant saying that had the respondent  No.1 married to any other lady, they would have  received dowry amount of Rs.8-10 lakhs. On  September 5, 1990, the appellant gave birth to  twins. According to the appellant, the greed of  the respondents for dowry was so much that in  1991, the first respondent went to the extent  of getting quality of gold ornaments given by  her father tested by a Goldsmith which were  found to be of good quality. It is also the  case of the appellant that on December 14,  1991, marriage of the appellant\022s younger  sister was solemnized at Sagar and respondent  No.1 and his father had come to attend it. At  that time also, the respondents demanded car,  colour TV and more gold. When the demand was  not met with, the first respondent attacked the

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appellant and caused injury to her. In March,  1992, the 1st respondent took the appellant  with him and kept her with his parents at  Jabalpur. Even after giving assurance that she  will not be ill-treated, she was physically and  mentally tortured for dowry. The appellant  informed her father that her husband and in- laws were demanding dowry from her and her  husband assaulted her and her children had been  taken away and they were not allowed to see the  mother (appellant). 5.              The appellant stated that Harish  Chandra and Daya Chandra Jain, who were known  to her father, learnt about the miserable  condition of the appellant and both of them  informed the father of the appellant in  September, 1993 about the plight of the  appellant at her in-laws. One Ram Ratan Jain,  who was also knowing the appellant, persuaded  the respondents to behave properly but in vain.  In May, 1995, again the appellant was assaulted  and severely beaten.  She was also compelled to  sign a document purported to be a compromise  deed between the appellant and the 1st  respondent. The appellant lodged a complaint in  Police Station Civil Lines, Raipur on May 10,  1998 which was registered as Crime No. 738 of  1998. Respondent No.1 was called at the Police  Station and he executed a writing that he would  not ill treat the appellant. The 1st respondent  also gave assurance that he will not use any  writing against the appellant said to have been  signed by her. 6.              In July, 1995, the 1st respondent was  transferred from Raipur to Raigarh and in spite  of the request by the appellant, she was not  taken by her husband along with him. On March  8, 1996, the 1st respondent sent a notice  through advocate to father of the appellant  stating that he had filed a divorce petition.   He further stated that he was ready to pay  maintenance to the appellant. On 17th March,  1996, the appellant\022s father brought the  appellant to Sagar. The appellant had to go  with her father as the 1st respondent did not  take her with him and had also issued notice  for divorce. On March 20, 1996, the appellant  lodged First Information Report (FIR) in Women  Police Station which was registered as Crime  No. 6 of 1996 giving details about physical and  mental torture and dowry demands by respondent  No.1 and his family members. According to the  appellant, on July 10, 1996, non-bailable  warrants were issued. In the High Court,  however, the 1st respondent made a statement  through his advocate that parties had decided  to live together and had settled the dispute  amicably. On that statement being made, bail  was granted to respondent No.1 and his parents.  On September 28, 1996, challan was filed  against the respondents for offences punishable  under Sections 498A, 506, 406 read with Section  34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and also under  Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act,  1961. On January 30, 1997, charges were framed

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against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 (husband,  father-in-law and mother-in-law) and also  against brother and sister of respondent No.1.  All the accused challenged the action of  framing of charge against them in the High  Court by filing a Revision Petition. The High  Court vide its order dated October 22, 1997,  partly allowed the revision and quashed charges  against brother and sister of respondent No.1.  The High Court, however, held that so far as  other respondents were concerned, charges could  not be quashed and dismissed the petition.  Being aggrieved by the said order, the  respondents approached this Court by filing  Special Leave Petition but even this Court  dismissed the SLP on February 23, 1998. The  respondents then once again filed a petition in  the High Court by invoking Section 482 of the  Code on February 23, 1999. The appellant filed  her reply to the said petition. The High Court  vide the impugned order, allowed the petition  holding that there was abuse of process of law  by the appellant in initiating criminal  proceedings. The proceedings were, therefore,  quashed. The said order is challenged in the  present appeal. 7.              Notice was issued by this Court on  April 5, 2004. Several adjournments were taken  by the parties so that the matter can amicably  be settled.  The matter, however, could not be  settled and was ordered to be posted for final  hearing. 8.              We have heard learned counsel for the  parties. 9.              The learned counsel for the appellant  submitted that grave and serious error has been  committed by the High Court in quashing the  proceedings. He submitted that once the  proceedings had been initiated in accordance  with law and the Court was satisfied that prima  facie case was made out, charge was framed and  the said action was upheld by the High Court as  well as by this Court, it was not open to the  High Court to quash the proceedings on the  ground that there was abuse of process of  Court. Such an order could not have been made  by the High Court in the light of the order  passed by this Court. 10.             It was also submitted that the High  Court has virtually reviewed its earlier order.  There is no power of review in a Court  exercising criminal jurisdiction under the Code  and such order is illegal and without  jurisdiction. A grievance was also made that  once this Court upheld framing of charge  against respondent Nos. 1 to 3, the High Court  could not have held that the proceedings were  initiated mala fide or there was abuse of  process of Court. Such order, in the teeth of  order passed by this Court, was totally  illegal, unwarranted and must be set aside. 11.             The learned counsel for respondent  Nos. 1 to 3 supported the order of the High  Court. He submitted that considering the  totality of facts and circumstances, the High

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Court passed the impugned order which is  strictly in consonance with law. It was urged  that taking into account, overall conduct of  the appellant and actions taken by her against  the 1st respondent-husband and his family  members in the light of subsequent facts which  were brought to the notice of the Court, the  Court was satisfied that it was in the interest  of justice to quash the proceedings. Such an  action cannot be said to be illegal or  improper. It was also stated that two children  were born in 1990 but she had never taken  interest nor even seen them after 1990.  Both  the children are with the respondents and they  are very happy. According to the respondents,  there was no demand of dowry either by  respondent No.1 or by his family members and a  totally false and concocted complaint was filed  against them and the Court was convinced that  the action had been taken by the appellant to  harass the respondents and the proceedings were  liable to be quashed. Finally, it was submitted  that this Court may not exercise equitable  jurisdiction under Article 136 of the  Constitution in favour of the appellant. 12.             Having given anxious consideration to  the rival submissions of the parties, in our  view, the High Court was wrong in quashing the  proceedings. From the facts noted hereinabove,  it is clear that a complaint was lodged by the  petitioner against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as  also against other accused for offences  punishable under Sections 498A, 342 and 406,  IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition  Act. The trial Court satisfied that prima facie  case was made out and accordingly charges were  framed against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as well  as against other accused. In a petition  challenging that action, the High Court partly  allowed the petition vide its order dated  October 22, 1997 and quashed charges against  brother-in-law and sister-in-law of the  appellant herein but upheld the order of  framing of charge against the remaining  respondents i.e. respondent Nos. 1 to 3.  Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 challenged the order of  the High Court by approaching this Court. It  was registered as Special Leave Petition (Crl.)  No. 509 of 1998. On December 23, 1998, this  Court dismissed the special leave petition by  passing the following order:                 \023We are not inclined to  interfere with the order of the High  Court dated 22.10.1997 framing charges  against the petitioner. The SLP (Crl.)  No. 509/98 is dismissed. So far as  order dated 28.11.97 is concerned  refusing to transfer the proceedings,  issue notice. Pending proceedings  before the C.J.M. Sagar, is stayed\024.

13.             It is thus, clear that all the Courts  including this Court were of the view that  there was prima facie case for framing of  charge against the respondents herein. It

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appears that thereafter the parties tried for  amicable settlement of the matter again. The  Court was also informed that the parties had  almost settled the matter and negotiations were  going on with regard to amount to be paid to  the wife. The respondent No.1-husband offered  Rs.7.50 lakhs towards full and final  settlement.  According to the respondents, the  petitioner-wife insisted for more amount. The  efforts of settlement thus failed. It has also  come on record that appellant-wife filed a suit  against the husband for compensation of Rs.20  lakhs in the Court of First Addl. Judge, Sagar.  A Revision Petition filed by respondent Nos. 1  to 3 was allowed by the High Court and it was  held that Sagar Court had no territorial  jurisdiction to entertain the suit.  After the  order passed by this Court in August, 1998,  respondent Nos. 1 to 3 again moved the High  Court under Section 482 of the Code for  quashing of criminal proceedings. The High  Court in the impugned order noted that earlier  the respondents had approached the Court  against framing of charge and the said action  was not interfered with even by the Supreme  Court.  But observing that \023a Court of law  cannot be expected to remain a silent spectator  and cannot be made a tool of gratifying  personal vengeance of any party\024, it held that  the case in hand was a fit one to exercise  inherent power under Section 482 and  accordingly the proceedings were ordered to be  quashed. The Court, for coming to the said  conclusion, relied upon certain decisions of  this Court. 14.             In Madhu Limaye v. State of  Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, an interlocutory  order was passed by a Court subordinate to the  High Court against which Revision Petition was  filed. It was contended that sub-section (2) of  Section 397 barred exercise of revisional  powers \023in relation to any interlocutory order  passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or in any  other proceeding\024.  Since the order was  interlocutory in nature, revision petition was  not maintainable. This Court held that even  where an order cannot be challenged in  revision, inherent powers under Section 482 of  the Code could be exercised by the High Court  in appropriate cases.   15.            This Court stated:      \023On a plain      reading  of Section  482, however, it would follow that  nothing  in      the Code,  which  would  include sub-section(2)of        Section 397  also,  \021shall  be  deemed to limit or   affect  the inherent powers of the  High Court\022.  But, if we were to say  that the said  bar is not to operate  in the exercise of the  inherent power   at  all,         it will be setting at naught  one  of  the limitations imposed   upon the exercise        of  the  revisional  powers.  In such a situation, what  is-the harmonious way out? In our

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opinion, a happy solution of this  problem would be to say that the bar  provided in sub-section (2) of Section  397 operates only in exercise of the  revisional power of the High Court,  meaning thereby that the High Court  will have no power of revision in  relation to any interlocutory order.   Then in accordance with one of the  other   principles enunciated above,  the inherent power will come into  play, there being no other provision  in the Code for the redress of the  grievance of the aggrieved party. But  then, if the order assailed is purely  of an interlocutory character which  could be corrected in exercise of the  revisional power of the High Court  under the 1898 Code, the High   Court  will refuse      to exercise its inherent  power.  But in  case     the impugned  order clearly brings about a situation  which is  an abuse  of  the process of  the Court or for the purpose  of  securing the ends of justice  interference by the High  Court is   absolutely necessary, then nothing  contained in Section 397(2) can limit  or affect the exercise  of  the  inherent power  by the High Court. But  such cases would be few and far  between.         The High Court must exercise  the inherent power very sparingly.\024  

16.             The High Court also referred to G.V.  Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 693  wherein this Court considered the object  underlying marriage as sacred ceremony and to  end the dispute amicably between the parties by  pondering over differences and  misunderstandings. It was observed that the  parties should not litigate by instituting  criminal cases which would take long time and  in that process, lose their \021young\022 days in  chasing their cases in different Courts. The  Court, therefore, observed that such matters  should be settled immediately. 17.             In B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of  Haryana & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 675, proceedings  for offences punishable under Sections 498A and  406, IPC were quashed. It was observed that  Section 320 of the Code relating to  \021compounding of offences\022 would not limit the  power of the High Court under Section 482 of  the Code and if the High Court is satisfied  that the proceedings were initiated mala fide  and there is abuse of process of law, they can  be quashed. Referring to earlier judgments, the  Court held that there are special features in  matrimonial matters and it is the duty of the  Court to encourage genuine settlement of  matrimonial disputes.   18.            Discussing the underlying object of  inserting Chapter XXA (Section 498A) in the  Indian Penal Code, the Court stated:

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       \023There is no doubt that the object  of introducing Chapter XX-A containing  Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code  was to prevent torture to a woman by  her husband or by relatives of her  husband. Section 498-A was added with  a view to punishing a husband and his  relatives who harass or torture the  wife to coerce her or her relatives to  satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The  hypertechnical view would be  counterproductive and would act  against interests of women and against  the object for which this provision  was added. There is every likelihood  that non-exercise of inherent power to  quash the proceedings to meet the ends  of justice would prevent women from  settling earlier. That is not the  object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian  Penal Code.\024 19.             In spite of best efforts by the  learned counsel for the respondents, we are  unable to persuade ourselves to hold that after  the order passed by this Court dismissing  Special Leave Petition upholding framing of  charge against respondent Nos. 1 to 3, the High  Court could have exercised power under Section  482 of the Code quashing criminal proceedings  initiated by the appellant. The High Court  observed that even after dismissal of SLP by  this Court, it was open for the Court to  consider the prayer of the accused to quash  prosecution in exercise of inherent powers  because \023the extraordinary jurisdiction under  Section 482 of the Code may be exercised at any  stage\024.  20.             To us, the learned counsel for the  appellant is right that in substance and in  reality, the High Court has exercised power of  review not conferred by the Code on a Criminal  Court. Section 362 of the Code does not empower  a Criminal Court to alter its judgment.  It  reads thus:  362. Court not to alter judgment:-  Save as otherwise provided by this  Code or by any other law for the time  being in force, no Court, when it has  signed its judgment or order disposing  of a case, shall alter or review the  same except to correct a clerical or  arithmetical error.                                  (emphasis supplied)  

21.             The section makes it clear that a  Court cannot alter or review its judgment or  final order after it is signed except to  correct clerical or arithmetical error. The  scheme of the Code, in our judgment, is clear  that as a general rule, as soon as the judgment  is pronounced or order is made by a Court, it  becomes functus officio (ceases to have control  over the case) and has no power to review,  override, alter or interfere with it.  22.             No doubt, the section starts with the

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words \023Save as otherwise provided by this  Code\024. Thus, if the Code provides for  alteration, such power can be exercised. For  instance, sub-section (2) of Section 127.  But  in absence of express power, alteration or  modification of judgment or order is not  permissible.  23.             It is also well settled that power of  review is not an inherent power and must be  conferred on a Court by a specific or express  provision to that effect. [Vide Patel Narshi  Thakershi & Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji  Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844] No power of  review has been conferred by the Code on a  Criminal Court and it cannot review an order  passed or judgment pronounced. 24.             In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh  Bajwa & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 169, this Court held  that a High Court has no jurisdiction to alter  or review its own judgment or order except to  the extent of correcting any clerical or  arithmetical error. It deprecated the practice  of filing Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions  after disposal of main matters and issuance of  fresh directions in such petitions.   25.            The Court said;          Section 362 of the Code mandates  that no court, when it has signed its  judgment or final order disposing of a  case shall alter or review the same  except to correct a clerical or an  arithmetical error. The section is  based on an acknowledged principle of  law that once a matter is finally  disposed of by a court, the said court  in the absence of a specific statutory  provision becomes functus officio and  disentitled to entertain a fresh  prayer for the same relief unless the  former order of final disposal is set  aside by a court of competent  jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by  law. The court becomes functus officio  the moment the official order  disposing of a case is signed. Such an  order cannot be altered except to the  extent of correcting a clerical or an  arithmetical error.  26.             In the case on hand, charges were  framed against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the  said order was affirmed by the High Court and  by this Court. It is no doubt true that  thereafter there was a talk of settlement  between the parties which could not be  materialised. It is also true that the  appellant filed a suit for compensation of  Rs.20 lakhs against the husband and in-laws. In  our considered opinion, however, that would not  confer jurisdiction on the High Court to quash  criminal proceedings when the action of framing  of charge against the respondents had been  upheld by this Court.  The order impugned in  the present appeal is thus clearly illegal,  improper, contrary to law and deserves to be  set aside.

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27.             The learned counsel for the appellant  contended that virtually the High Court sat  over the decision of this Court and exercised  appellate power by upsetting the order of the  Court of framing charge against the  respondents. The counsel, in this connection,  referred to Jharia s/o Mania v. State of  Rajasthan & Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 7. In that case,  the accused was convicted by a Sessions Court  for an offence punishable under Section 302  read with Section 34, IPC.  The order of  conviction and sentence was confirmed by the  High Court as well as by this Court.  Thereafter, a substantive petition under  Article 32 of the Constitution was instituted  by the accused for issuance of a Writ of  Mandamus directing the State to forbear from  giving effect to the judgment of all Courts  including this Court. A declaration was also  sought that the conviction was illegal and his  detention in jail was without the authority of  law and violative of Fundamental Rights. 28.             Dismissing the petition, this Court  observed:       We fail to appreciate the  propriety of asking for a declaration  in these proceedings under Article 32  that conviction of the petitioner by  the High Court for an offence  punishable under Section 302 read with  Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is  illegal, particularly when this court  has declined to grant special leave  under Article 136. Nor can the  petitioner be heard to say that his  detention in jail amounts to  deprivation of the fundamental right  to life and liberty without following  the procedure established by law in  violation of Article 21 read with  Articles 14 and 19. When a special  leave petition is assigned to the  learned Judges sitting in a Bench,  they constitute the Supreme Court and  there is a finality to their judgment  which cannot be upset in these  proceedings under Article 32.  Obviously, the Supreme Court cannot  issue a writ, direction or order to  itself in respect of any judicial  proceedings and the learned Judges  constituting the Bench are not  amenable to the writ jurisdiction of  this court.  29.             Even if we may not go to the extent  that the High Court ventured to sit over the  order passed by this Court in quashing the  proceedings, in our considered opinion, on the  facts and in the circumstances of the case, the  High Court was not justified in invoking  Section 482 of the Code and in quashing  prosecution against the respondents.  30.             Moreover, it is well-settled that  inherent power under Section 482 of the Code  must be exercised in rarest of rare cases.

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Before more than four decades in the leading  case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1960) 3  SCR 388, this Court stated:      It is well-established that the  inherent jurisdiction of the High  Court can be exercised to quash  proceedings in a proper case either to  prevent the abuse of the process of  any court or otherwise to secure the  ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal  proceedings instituted against an  accused person must be tried under the  provisions of the Code, and the High  Court would be reluctant to interfere  with the said proceedings at an  interlocutory stage. It is not  possible, desirable or expedient to  lay down any inflexible rule which  would govern the exercise of this  inherent jurisdiction. However, we may  indicate some categories of cases  where the inherent jurisdiction can  and should be exercised for quashing  the proceedings. There may be cases  where it may be possible for the High  Court to take the view that the  institution or continuance of criminal  proceedings against an accused person  may amount to the abuse of the process  of the Court or that the quashing of  the impugned proceedings would secure  the ends of justice. If the criminal  proceeding in question is in respect  of an offence alleged to have been  committed by an accused person and it  manifestly appears that there is a  legal bar against the institution or  continuance of the said proceeding the  High Court would be justified in  quashing the proceeding on that  ground. Absence of the requisite  sanction may, for instance, furnish  cases under this category. Cases may  also arise where the allegations in  the first information report or the  complaint, even if they are taken at  their face value and accepted in their  entirety, do not constitute the  offence alleged; in such cases no  question of appreciating evidence  arises; it is a matter merely of  looking at the complaint or the first  information report to decide whether  the offence alleged is disclosed or  not. In such cases it would be  legitimate for the High Court to hold  that it would be manifestly unjust to  allow the process of the criminal  court to be issued against the accused  person. A third category of cases in  which the inherent jurisdiction of the  High Court can be successfully invoked  may also arise. In cases falling under  this category the allegations made  against the accused person do

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constitute offence alleged but there  is either no legal evidence adduced in  support of the case or evidence  adduced clearly or manifestly fails to  prove the charge. In dealing with this  class of cases it is important to bear  in mind the distinction between a case  where there is no legal evidence or  where th ere is evidence which is  manifestly and clearly inconsistent  with the accusation made and cases  where there is legal evidence which on  its appreciation may or may not  support the accusation in question. In  exercising its jurisdiction under  Section 561-A the High Court would not  embark upon an enquiry as to whether  the evidence in question is reliable  or not. That is the function of the  trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it  would not be open to any party to  invoke the High Court\022s inherent  jurisdiction and contend that on a  reasonable appreciation of the  evidence the accusation made against  the accused would not be sustained.   (emphasis supplied) 31.             Yet, in another important decision in  State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1  SCC 355, the Court referred to a number of  leading decisions on the point and laid down  the following principles for exercising power  of quashing criminal proceedings. (1)   Where the allegations made in  the first information report or the  complaint, even if they are taken at  their face value and accepted in  their entirety do not prima facie  constitute any offence or make out a  case against the accused.  (2)   Where the allegations in the  first information report and other  materials, if any, accompanying the  FIR do not disclose a cognizable  offence, justifying an investigation  by police officers under Section  156(1) of the Code except under an  order of a Magistrate within the  purview of Section 155(2) of the  Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted  allegations made in the FIR or  complaint and the evidence collected  in support of the same do not  disclose the commission of any  offence and make out a case against  the accused. (4)   Where, the allegations in the  FIR do not constitute a cognizable  offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation  is permitted by a police officer  without an order of a Magistrate as  contemplated under Section 155(2) of  the Code.

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(5)   Where the allegations made in  the FIR or complaint are so absurd  and inherently improbable on the  basis of which no prudent person can  ever reach a just conclusion that  there is sufficient ground for  proceeding against the accused. (6)   Where there is an express legal  bar engrafted in any of the  provisions of the Code or the  concerned Act (under which a criminal  proceeding is instituted) to the  institution and continuance of the  proceedings and/or where there is a  specific provision in the Code or the  concerned Act, providing efficacious  redress for the grievance of the  aggrieved party. (7)   Where a criminal proceeding is  manifestly attended with mala fide  and/or where the proceeding is  maliciously instituted with an  ulterior motive for wreaking  vengeance on the accused and with a  view to spite him due to private and  personal grudge.  32.             Speaking for the Court, Pandian, J.  stated:         \023(T)he power of quashing a  criminal proceeding should be  exercised very sparingly and with  circumspection and that too in the  rarest of rare cases; that the Court  will not be justified in embarking  upon an enquiry as to the reliability  or genuineness or otherwise of the  allegations made in the FIR or the  complaint and that the extraordinary  or inherent powers do not confer an  arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to  act according to its whim or caprice.\024

33.             We are in respectful agreement with  the above observations. On the facts and in the  circumstances of the case, in our judgment, the  High Court was clearly in error in exercising  power under Section 482 of the Code and in  quashing criminal proceedings. The said order,  hence, deserves to be set aside. The matter  will now be decided in accordance with law by  an appropriate Court. 34.             Before parting with the matter, we may  clarify that we have not entered into merits of  the matter or allegations and counter  allegations by the parties and we may not be  understood to have expressed any opinion one  way or the other. All observations made by us  hereinabove have been made only for the limited  purpose of deciding the issue before us.  As  and when the matter will come before the Court,  it will be considered on its own merits without  being inhibited or influenced by the  observations made by the High Court or by us in  the present order.

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35.             The appeal is accordingly disposed of.