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PETITIONER: SUNDER LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PARAMSUKHDAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/08/1967

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. SHAH, J.C. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  366            1968 SCR  (1) 362  CITATOR INFO :  E          1980 SC1118  (8)  F          1988 SC1478  (8)

ACT: Land  Acquisition  Act  (1  of  1894),  ss.  3(b),  20   and 21--Person  interested  in  compensation  but  not  land--If entitled to be made party to a reference to Civil Court. Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), s.  115--Revisional Jurisdiction--Scope of.

HEADNOTE: The  land  of  the appellant was  acquired  under  the  Land Acquisition  Act, 1894 and the compensation was  apportioned between the appellant and his lessee.  The appellant claimed that be was entitled to the whole of the compensation  while his,  lessee  claimed a larger share.   At  their  instance, references  were made to the Civil Court under s. 18 of  the Land Acquisition Act, But, before the references were  made, the respondent, who was a decree holder against the  lessee, attached  the lessee’s share of the compensation  amount  in execution  of  his  decree.   Subsequently  the   respondent withdrew  the lessee’s share of the compensation  amount  in execution  of  his decree.  The appellant  and  his  lessee, filed  a compromise petition before the Civil Judge and  the respondent  also  applied to be impleaded as  party  to  the References.   The  Civil Judge  dismissed  the  respondent’s applications.   The  respondent  thereupon,  filed  revision petitions in the High Court.  The High Court, held: (1) that the  respondent was a person interested in the  compensation within  the meaning of s. 3 (b) of the Land Acquisition  Act and  was  therefore  entitled to claim  that  he  should  be allowed  to  join  as a party; and (ii)  that  the  revision petitions were competent.  In appeal, this Court, Held: (i) The respondent was a ’person interested’ within s. 3(b) of the Act, because, he was claiming an interest in the compensation.   He  was also interested  in  the  objections which  were pending before the Court in the references  made to  it and was a person whose interest would be affected  by the  objections. within s. 21 of the Act.   Accordingly,  he was entitled to be made a party. [367H; 371C-D] The  definition  of ’Person interested’ in s. 3  (b)  is  an

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inclusive  definition and in order to fall within it  it  is not necessary that a person should claim an interest in  the acquired  land.  It is sufficient  if he claims an  interest in  the compensation to be awarded.  A person  claiming  art interest in the compensation would be a person interested in the  objections to be determined under s. 20 of the Act,  if the objection is to the amount of compensation or the appor- tionment  of compensation, and if his claim is likely to  be affected by the decision on the objection.  Under s. 21  the interest-, of a person who is not affected by the  objection are not to be considered but if he is affected, there is  no restriction  on  the grounds which can be raised by  him  to protect  his  interest.   Therefore, a  person  claiming  an interest  in the compensation is entitled to be heard  under Ss. 20 and 21.  The sections do not prescribe that his claim to an interest in compensation should be as  ’compensation’. A  person  who  has  no interest in  land  can  never  claim compensation  qua  compensation, for what he  claims  is  an interest in the compensation, to be. 363 awarded.   That  is  not to say that a  person  claiming  an interest  in  the  compensation  may  not  claim  that   the compensation  awarded  for the acquired land is low,  if  it affects his interests. [367G-H; 368D-H] Grant v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 237, followed. Golap  Khan  v. Bholanath Marick, 12, Cal.  L.J.  545,  Siva Prasad  Bhattadu  v. A.E.L. Mission, A.I.R.  1926  Mad.  307 approved. Manjoor  Ahmed  v. Rajlaxmi Dasi, A.I.R. 1956 Cal.  263  Abu Bakar v. Peary Mohan Mukherjee, I.L.R. 34, Cal. 451, Gobinda Kumar Roy v. Debendra Kumar Roy 12 C.W.N. 98.  Mahammad Safi v.  Haran  Chandra 12 C.W.N. 985 and Karuna Sindhu  Dhar  v. Panna Lai Paramanik 65 C.W.N. 802, distinguished. (ii) The High Court was right in holding that the orders  of the Civil Judge were not awards within the meaning of s.  54 of the Land Acquisition Act; and as they were not awards and no  appeals lay, the revisions were competent and  the  High Court  was  justified  in interfering  as  the  Civil  Judge refused to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him. [371F]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.  1003  and 1004 of 1964. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated January  7, 1963 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur  Bench  in Civil Revision Applications Nos. 294 and 295 of 1962. S.   T. Desai, G. L. Sanghi and O. C. Mathur, for the appel- lant (in both the appeals). C.   B.  Agarwala,  S.  K.  Gambhir  and  Ganpat  Rai,   for respondent     No. 1 (in both the appeals). R.   N. Sachthey, S. P. Nayar for R. H. Dhebar, for the res- pondent   No. 3 (in both the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. These two appeals, by special leave, are  directed against  the judgment of High Court of Judicature at  Bombay (Nagpur  Bench), dated January 7, 1963, allowing  two  Civil Revision  applications  Nos. 294 of 1962 and  295  of  1962, filed  by  Paramsukhdas, a respondent before us.   The  High Court, by this judgment, quashed orders dated April 9, 1962, in  the Land Acquisition Cases No. 189 of 1961. and No.  190 of  1961  (as  amended subsequently on  July  6,  1962)  and remitted the matter to the Court of the Civil Judge,  Akola, for  a  fresh  decision on merits  with  advertence  to  the

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remarks  in the judgment.  The High Court  further  directed that  Paramsukhdas  be  allowed to be impleaded  as  a  non- applicant  in  the two proceedings and all parties  will  be allowed  to  amend their pleadings or make  fresh  pleadings with  respect to the alleged compromise as filed before  the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960. Mr. S. T. Desai, the learned counsel for the appellant, con- tends: (1)That the High Court has no jurisdiction under s. 115.  to interfere with the orders of the Civil Judge, dated April 9, 1962; 364 (2)  That  Paramsukhdas, respondent No. 1, is not  a  person interested  in  the compensation and is not entitled  to  be impleaded  as a party to the references under s. 18  of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (I of 1894)-hereinafter referred to as the Act-, (3) That, if at all, no revision but appeal lay to the  High Court. Before dealing with the above contentions it is necessary to state the relevant facts.  Sunderlal, appellant, owned  some land  (field  No.  22) in Monza Umari,  Taluq  and  District Akola.  This field had been leased to Khushal Singh under  a registered lease for 5 years commencing from April 1,  1954. The  field  was  acquired  by  the  Government.   The   Land Acquisition Officer made his award on January 30, 1960,  and assessed  the  total  compensation  at  Rs.  26,105.58,  and apportioned the amount equally between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh.   On February 17, 1960, the Land Acquisition  Officer noted the following regarding Khushal Singh:               "2. Khushalsing s/o Tolaram               (a)  According to letter No. 154 / 60 of  15th               February  1960 from the Court of  Civil  Judge               (Sr.  Dn.) Khamgaon, and the attachment  order               issued  by that Court, in C.S.  No.  4-B/1958,               the  amount to be paid to Khushalsing  Tolaram               be kept in Revenue Deposit.               (b)   One  Sunderlal  minor  guardian   father               Madanlal Harjimal, of Akola, has presented  an               objection-petition against this payment." Sunderlal filed an application for reference under S. 18  of the Act, claiming more compensation and also complaining  in regard  to the apportionment of the amount  of  compensation between  him and Khushal Singh.  According to  him,  Khushal Singh  was  not a protected tenant and his period  of  lease having expired, he was not at all entitled to any portion of the  amount  of compensation.  A reference under s.  18  was made on June 27, 1961, and this reference was numbered  Land Acquisition  Case  No.  189 of  1961.   Khushal  Singh  also applied  for  a  reference and  he  claimed  enhancement  of compensation  and  challenged  the  basis  of  apportionment adopted by the Land Asquisition Officer.  The Collector made the  reference and it was numbered Land Acquisition No.  190 of 1961. Before we deal with what happened before the Civil Judge, it is necessary to give some facts about the litigation between Sunderlal  and Khushal Singh.  ’On July 21, 1956,  Sunderlal filed a suit (Civil Suit No. 133-B of 1956) against  Khushal Singh for rent due on January 1, 1955, and January 1,  1956, in the, Court of Civil Judge, Akola.  On July 22, 1957,  the Civil  Court referred the matter to the Revenue Court  under S. 16-A of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases  Act, 1951.  On July 25, 1958, the Sub-Divisional Officer,  Akola, answered the reference 365

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Revenue  Case No. 79 of 1957-58) holding that Khushal  Singh was   not  a  protected  lessee.   On  appeal,  the   Deputy Collector.   Akola, held, on October 8, 1959,  that  Khushal Singh  was a protected lessee.  The Bombay Revenue  Tribunal confirmed  the  order of the Deputy Collector on  March  22, 1960.   Sunderlal  filed a petition before  the  High  Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.  It was numbered Special Civil  Application No. 232 of 1960.  On February 8, 1961,  a compromise petition (Civil Application No. 163 of 1961)  was filed  in the High Court, in Special Civil  Application  No. 232 of 1960.  It was stated in. the compromise petition that Khushal Singh did not wish to dispute Sunderlal’s contention that the land was leased for horticulture purposes and  that he  had  not acquired the status of a protected  lessee,  as defined in the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases  Act, 1951.  Khushal Singh further stated that he had no objection to the quashing of the orders of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal dated  March  22, 1960, and of the  Deputy  Collector  dated October 8, 1959. On March 11, 1961, Paramsukhdas filed an application  (Civil Application  No. 246 of 1961) in the High Court  in  Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960, claiming to be heard.  He alleged that he had obtained a decree against Khushal  Singh and  started execution proceedings for Rs. 20,013/- and  the amount of Rs. 13,644.27 ordered to be paid to Khushal  Singh as   compensation   had  been  attached  by  him   for   the satisfaction  of his decree.  He alleged that Khushal  Singh and  Sunderlal had mala fide entered into an  agreement  and had  filed a compromise application asking for  quashing  of the  orders  of the Revenue Courts with the sole  object  of setting  at  naught  the attachment  and  execution  of  his decree.   He prayed, therefore, for leave to appear  in  the case as a party vitally interested.  He further prayed  that the  compromise application should not be  entertained  and, should be dismissed in the interest of justice. It appears that on March 20, 1961, this application came  up for  hearing before the High Court.  Paramsukhdas,  however, took  three weeks’ more time from the High Court, which  was granted  to  him.   It  further  appears  that  Paramsukhdas withdrew   the   said  amount  of  Rs.   13,644-27   towards satisfaction  of  his decree.  On April 18, 1961,  he  filed another  application (Civil Application No. 365/61)  wherein he stated that he had withdrawn the amount and alleged  that he was now an interested party, and, therefore, he should be joined  as  a party.  On the same date,  his  Advocate,  Mr. Sohoni gave an undertaking in the following terms:               "Mr.   Sohoni  undertakes to hold  the  moneys               withdrawn ’by his client subject to the orders               of this Court ’on this application." On August 3, 1961, the High Court disposed of Civil Applica- tion No. 163 of 1961, Civil Application No. 246 of 1961  and Civil Application No. 365 of 1961.  The High Court held that in L/S5SCI--10 366 the  circumstances  "we  do not  consider  it  advisable  to proceed  in this matter ourselves.  The parties will  be  at liberty  to file the compromise petition in the Civil  Court where proceedings are pending on reference under section  18 of  the Land Acquisition Act." The High Court, in  order  to safeguard   the  interests  of  the  parties,   kept   these proceedings  pending  till the decision on  the,  compromise petition  by the Civil Court.  The compromise  petition  was directed to be returned to Sunderlal. On  September  18, 1961, Sunderlal and Khushal  Singh  filed

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applications  for  compromise in both the  Land  Acquisition references.   Paramsukhdas filed applications under 0.  XXII r.  10, read with s. 151, C.P.C., praying that his  name  be substituted  or  added as an applicant.He alleged  that  the compromise  was  fraudulent  and  that  Khushal  Singh   was abandoning  the case, and as an attaching creditor,  he  was entitled  to  be added a party to the  case.   Both  Khushal Singh and Sunderlal objected, and by two orders dated  April 9,  1962,  the  Civil Judge  rejected  the  applications  of Paramsukhdas.  He framed the issue:               "Whether  Paramsukhdas can be permitted to  be               substituted  or added as a party to these  two               references." He held that admittedly Paramsukhdas had not approached  the Land  Acquisition  Officer in the proceedings in  which  the award  was passed on January 30, 1960.  He had not  appeared before  the Land Acquisition Officer as a person  interested in the land or the compensation that would be determined  by the   authorities.    He  further  held   that   under   the circumstances  Paramsukhdas  was  not  one  of  the  persons interested in the acquired land before the Collector, and he also  could  not be one, of the persons  interested  in  the objections  under s. 20.(b) of the Act.  After referring  to Manjoor  Ahmad v. Rajlaxmi Dasi (1) and Abu Bakar  v.  Peary Mohan Mukherjee (2), he hold that the scope of the reference under s. 18 was limited and new questions not covered by the reference could not be entertained.  He reviewed his  orders on  July 6, 1962, but nothing turns on that in  the  present appeals. Paramsukhdas filed two revisions, Nos. 294 and 295 of  1962, before the High Court on June 30, 1962.  On August 22, 1962, Sunderlal  filed  an application for withdrawal  of  Special Civil  Application  No.  232 of 1960.  The  High  Court,  on September 24, 1962, ordered:               "Allowed,    main   petition   dismissed    as               withdrawn.  No costs.". Before the High Court a preliminary objection was raised  in Civil  Revisions  Nos. 294 and 295 of 1962,  that  revisions were not competent because appeals lay against the orders of the Civil (1) A.I.R, 1956 Cal, 263.     (2) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 451. 367 Judge.  The High Court overruled this objection.   Regarding the ,claim of Paramsukhdas to be added as a party, the  High Court  ;held  that his application showed that  he  was  not claiming  any interest in the lands themselves but was  only claiming an interest in the compensation for the land  which had  been deposited in the Court for payment to the  persons concerned,  and as such was a person interested, as  defined in  s.  3  (b)  of the Act, and  he.  would,  therefore,  be entitled  to  claim that he should be allowed to join  as  a party. Mr.  Desai  contends  that  an  attaching  creditor  is  not interested  in the amount of compensation  as  compensation. His  interest, he urges, is only to get moneys belonging  to the  judgment-debtor  in  enforcement  of  his  rights,  and accordingly  he  is not entitled to be made a party  to  the reference under s. 18 of the Act.  He further contends  that the Court in hearing a reference under s. 18 of the Act  can only  deal  with an objection, which has been  referred  and cannot  go  into any matter beyond the reference.   He  con- cludes: if this is so, even if Paramsukhdas is ordered to be added  a  party  he  would not  be  able  to  challenge  the compromise between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh.  The learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. C. B. Agarwala,  controverts

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these  submissions. ,He says that Paramsukhdas is  a  person interested  in the objection within s. 20, and is  a  person affected by the objection within s. 21 of the Act.  He  also relies on 0. XXII r. 10(2), C.P.C., which is made applicable by s. 53 of the Act. Before  examining  the authorities cited at the Bar,  it  is necessary  to examine the scheme and the provisions  of  the Act  insofar  as  they  are  relevant  to  the  question  of determination of compensation, the question of apportionment of the compensation, and the question as to the persons  who are  entitled  to  be  heard.   Section  3(b)  defines   the expression "person interested" as follows:               "the expression person interested includes all               persons  claiming an interest in  compensation               to  be made on account of the  acquisition  of               land  under  this Act, and a person  shall  be               deemed  to  be  interested in land  if  be  is               interested in an easement affecting the land." It  will be noticed that it is an inclusive definition.   It is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a  person should claim an interest in land, which  has  been acquired.  A person becomes a person interested if he claims an  interest in compensation to be awarded.  It seems to  us that Paramsukhdas is a "person interested" within s. 3(b) of the Act because he claims an interest in compensation.   But before  he can be made a party in a reference it has  to  be seen whether he comes within s, 20(b) and s.21 of the Act. L/S5SCI--10(a) 368 The scheme of the Act seems to be to first deal with persons who  are interested in land.  These persons are heard  under s.  5A  of  the Act.  The ordinary meaning  of  "the  person interested  in  land"  is  expanded by  s.  5A(3),  for  the purposes  of this section, to include a person who would  be entitled to claim an interest in compensation.  It would  be strange  to come to the conclusion that the  Legislature  is keen  that  a person claiming an  interest  in  compensation should  be  heard  before the land is acquired  but  is  not interested  in  him  after the land  is  acquired.   On  the contrary, it follows from s. 5A(3) that a person claiming an interest  in compensation would be one of the persons  whose interests are meant to be safeguarded.  It appears from  ss. 6  to 10 that a person claiming an interest in  compensation is  not expressly mentioned.  But in s. 11 he  is  expressly mentioned,  and  it  is directed that  the  Collector  shall inquire  into respective interests of the  persons  claiming the compensation and shall make an award.  Section 12  makes the   award   final  and  conclusive  as   between   persons interested, i.e., including persons claiming an interest  in compensation.   Under s. 14 the Collector has  power,  inter alia, to summon the parties interested. Under s. 18 any person interested can claim a reference.   A person  claiming an interest in compensation would  also  be entitled  to claim a reference.  After a reference  is  made the  Court  is  enjoined  under  s.  20  to  determine   the objections, and serve, among others, all persons  interested in  the  objection.   A  person  claiming  an  interest   in compensation  would, it seems to us, be a person  interested in  the  objection  if the objection is  to  the  amount  of compensation  or the apportionment of compensation,  and  if his  claim is likely to be affected by the decision  on  the objection.   Section 21 restricts the scope of enquiry to  a consideration  of the interests of the persons  affected  by the objection.  But it does not follow from s. 21 that there is  any restriction on the grounds which can be raised by  a

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person  affected by the objection to protect his  interests. The  restriction  that  is  laid  is  not  to  consider  the interests of a person who is not affected by the  objection. Section  29  deals with apportionment  of  compensation,  if there is agreement, and s. 30 enables the Collector to refer disputes  as to apportionment to the Court.  From the  above discussion it follows that a person claiming an interest  in compensation is entitled to be heard under ss. 20 and 21  of the  Act.  The provisions of the Act, including ss.  20  and 21,  do  not  prescribe that his claim  to  an  interest  in compensation  should be "as compensation", as urged  by  Mr. Desai.   This is really a contradictory statement.   For,  a fortiori,  he has no interest in land, and  compensation  is given   for   interests  in  land.   He  can   never   claim compensation  qua  compensation  for what he  claims  is  an interest in the compensation to be awarded.  This is not  to say  that a person claiming an interest in compensation  may not  claim  that the compensation awarded for  the  acquired land is low, if it affects his interests, 369 In  the view we have taken we are supported by  some  autho- rities.   Shah,  J., speaking for the majority in  Grant  v. State of Bihar,(1) observed:               "The right of the State of Bihar arose on  May               22, 1952 when the title to the land vested  in               it by virtue of the notification issued  under               the Bihar Land Reforms Act.  There is  nothing               in  the Land Acquisition Act  which  prohibits               the Collector from making a reference under s.               30  for  determination  of the  title  of  the               person  who  has since the date of  the  award               acquired  a  right to  the  compensation.   If               after  a  reference is made to the  Court  the               person interested dies and his title  devolves               upon  another person, because of  inheritance,               succession, insolvency, forfeiture, compulsory               winding   up  or  other  form   of   statutory               transfer, it would be open to the, party  upon               whom  the title has devolved to prosecute  the               claim which the person from whom the title has               devolved  could have prosecuted.  In  Promotha               Nath Mitra v. Rakshal Das Addy(2) it was  held               that  a reference made by the Collector  under               s.  30 of the Land Acquisition Act at the  in-               stance   of  a  proprietor  of  land  may   be               prosecuted  by  the purchaser  of  his  rights               after the award at a revenue auction.  If  the               right to prosecute a reference by a person  on               whom  the title of the person  interested  has               devolved  be granted, there is no  reason  why               the  right to claim a reference of  a  dispute               about the person entitled to compensation  may               not  be  exercised by the person on  whom  the               title  has  devolved  since the  date  of  the               award.               The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is that               all disputes about the quantum of compensation               must  be  decided by resort to  the  procedure               prescribed  by  the Act; it is  also  intended               that  disputes about the rights of  owners  to               compensation being ancillary to the  principal               dispute  should  be decided by  the  Court  to               which power is entrusted.  Jurisdiction of the               Court  in  this behalf is  not  restricted  to               cases   of  apportionment,  but   extends   to

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             adjudication of disputes as to the person  who               are  entitled  to  receive  compensation,  and               there  is  nothing in s. 30 which  excludes  a               reference to the Court of a dispute raised  by               a  person  on whom the title of the  owner  of               land has, since the award, devolved." In  Golap Khan v. Bholanath Marick(3) an attaching  creditor was  directed to be made a party to the reference under  the Land (1)   A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 237.    (2) 11 Cal.  L.J. 420. (3)  12 Cal.  L.J. 545. 370 Acquisition  Act,  before the Civil Court.   Mookerjee,  J., observed:               "The petitioner was entitled to be added as  a               party,  not under Rule 10, but on  the  ground               that  he  was  a  person  interested  in   the               subject-matter  of the litigation and that  no               order ought to have been made for its disposal               without  any  opportunity afforded to  him  to                             establish his claim." In  Siva Pratapa Bhattadu v. A.E.L. Mission(1) an  attaching creditor  was held to be a person interested within s.  3(b) of the Act. Mr.  Desai  relies on Manjur Ahmed v. Rajlakshmi(2)  but  in that case the point decided by the Court was different.   It was  held  there  that  if a party  to  a  land  acquisition proceeding before the Collector had not obtained a reference under  s.  18 of the Act, its representative  could  not  do indirectly  what they did not do directly, i.e.  they  could not be added a party in a reference pending at the  instance of  other  parties in order that the nil award  against  the party  might  be reversed and in order that  they  might  be awarded  a  share of the compensation money.  Here  no  such point has been raised.  It has not been urged before us that Paramsukhdas  was  a  party before the  Collector  and  that having  not  applied for a reference under s. 18 he  is  now debarred from being added as a party. The  case of Gobinda Kumar Roy Chowdhury v.  Debendra  Kumar Roy  Chowdhury(3)  was  also  decided  on  the  same  lines. Similar  view  was  reiterated in  Mahammad  Safi  v.  Haran Chandra(4).   Both  these cases had followed  Abu  Bakar  v. Peary  Mahan  Mukerjee(5).   Maclean,  C.  J.,  observed  as follows in Abu Bakar v. Peary Mohan Mukerjee(5).               "If  we read that section in  connection  with               section  20  and  section 18, I  think  it  is               impossible  to avoid the conclusion  that  the               Legislature  intended that all that the  Court               could  deal with was the objection  which  had               been  referred to it; and this seems to  be  a               view consistent with commonsense and with  the               ordinary  method of procedure in civil  cases.               The  zemindar  here could, if he  liked,  have               raised  the  objection as to  the  whole  com-               pensation  for  the trees being given  to  the               tenants,  but  he  did not do  so.   He  must,               therefore, be taken to have accepted the award               in  that respect; and it would be little  less               than  dangerous  if we were to hold  that  the               Judge to (1)  A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 307.     (2) A.I.R. 1956 Cal. 263. (3)  C.W.N. 98.                (4) 12 C.W.N. 985. (5)  34 Cal. 451. 371

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             whom only one objection was referred could  go               into  all  sorts of questions  and  objections               which had not been referred to him." These  three cases are distinguishable inasmuch as they  are dealing with the cases of persons who having a right to seek a  reference  failed to claim that reference  but  ought  to raise  the  point in a, reference made at  the  instance  of another party. The  case  of Karuna Sindhu Dhar v. Panna  Lal  Paramanik(1) also does not assist the appellant.  The High Court held  in that  case  that  as  Rajmohan  never  claimed  the   entire compensation   money   before  the   Collector,   the   Land Acquisition  Judge was not entitled to vary the awards by  a declaration  that  Rajmohan alone was entitled  to  get  the compensation. It  seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a  person  in- terested  in  the objections which were pending  before  the Court  in the references made to it and that he was  also  a person  whose interest would be affected by the  objections, within  s.  21.  He was accordingly entitled to  be  made  a party.   In the result we uphold the order made by the  High Court in this respect. Mr.  Desai says that at any rate direction should  be  given that  Paramsukhdas should not be entitled to  challenge  the compromise entered into between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh. We  are unable to accept this submission.   Paramsukhdas  is entitled to raise all points to protect his interests  which were affected by the objections.  It is also in the interest of justice that there should not be multifarious proceedings and all points arising which are not expressly barred  under s. 21 should be gone into by the Court. This  leaves only the two points regarding the  jurisdiction of  the  High Court.  In our view, the High Court  is  quite right  in holding that the orders of the Civil Judge,  dated April 9, 1962, were not awards within s. 54 of the Act.  The awards  had  still to be made.  If no appeal lay,  then  the revisions  were  competent and the High Court was  right  in entertaining  the  revisions  because the  Civil  Judge  had either  refused to exercise jurisdiction vesting in  him  or had acted with material irregularity in the exercise of  his jurisdiction. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with  costs in favour of Respondent No. 1; one hearing fee. Y.P.                          Appeal dismissed. (1) 65 C.W.N. 802. 372