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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  117 of 2001

PETITIONER: Sumtibai & others

RESPONDENT: Paras Finance Co. Mankanwar W/o Parasmal Chordia (D)& Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/2007

BENCH: A. K. Mathur & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

MARKANDEY KATJU, J.

1.      This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order  dated 7.1.2000 in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 835of 1997.          2.      Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

        3.      The Revision Petition was filed in the High Court against an order  dated 6.8.1997 passed by the trial court whereby the application filed by the  revisionists under Order 22 Rule 4(2) CPC read with Order 1 Rule 10 CPC  was rejected.

4.      The appellants are the legal representatives of late Kapoor Chand.  A  suit was filed by the respondent herein against Kapoor Chand for specific  performance of a contract for sale. It was alleged that Kapoor Chand had  entered into an agreement to sell the property in dispute to the plaintiff- respondent, M/s. Paras Finance Co.  In that agreement Kapoor Chand stated  that the property in dispute was his self acquired property.  During the  pendency of the suit Kapoor Chand died and his wife, sons etc. applied to be  brought on record as legal representatives.  After they were impleaded they  filed an application under Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with Order 1 Rule 10  CPC praying inter alia, that they should be permitted to file additional  written statement and also be allowed to take such pleas which are available  to them.  The trial court rejected this application against which a revision  was filed by the appellant which was also dismissed by the High Court.   Hence this appeal by special leave.     

5.      We are of the opinion that a party has a right to take whatever plea  he/she wants to take, and hence the view taken by the High Court does not  appear to be correct.   

6.      Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in view of Order 22  Rule 4(2) a person who has been made a party can only take such pleas  which are appropriate to his character of legal representative of the  deceased.   Learned counsel also submitted that two of the applicants/legal  representatives of deceased Kapoor Chand, i.e. Narainlal and Devilal, had  applied to the court under Order 1 Rule 10 to be impleaded, but their  applications were rejected.  An application was also filed by late Kapoor  Chand praying that his sons be impleaded in the suit but that application was  also rejected.  Hence, the learned counsel submitted that the appellants  cannot be permitted to file an additional written statement in this suit.              7.      Before adverting to the question involved in this case, it may be noted

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that in the registered sale deed dated 12.8.1960 the shop in dispute has been  mentioned and the sale was shown in favour of Kapoor Chand and his sons,  Narainlal, Devilal and Pukhraj.  Hence, the registered sale deed itself shows  that the purchaser was not Kapoor Chand alone, but also his sons as co- owners.   Hence, prima facie, it seems that the sons of Kapoor Chand  are  also co-owners of the property in dispute.  However, we are not expressing  any final opinion on the question whether they are co-owners as that would  be decided in the suit.  But we are certainly of the opinion that the legal  representatives of late Kapoor Chand have a right to take this defence by  way of filing an additional written statement and adduce evidence in the suit.  Whether this defence is accepted or not, of course, is for the trial court to  decide.  Hence, in our opinion, the courts below erred in law in rejecting the  applications of the heirs of Kapoor Chand to file an additional written  statement.

8.      Every party in a case has a right to file a written statement.  This is in  accordance with natural justice.  The Civil Procedure Code is really the rules  of natural justice which are set out in great and elaborate detail.  Its purpose  is to enable both parties to get a hearing.  The appellants in the present case  have already been made parties in the suit, but it would be strange if they are  not allowed to take a defence.  In our opinion, Order 22 Rule 4(2) CPC  cannot be construed in the manner suggested by learned counsel for the  respondent.

9.      Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a three-Judge Bench  decision of this Court in Kasturi  vs. Iyyamperumal and others  - (2005) 6  SCC 733.  He has submitted that in this case it has been held that in a suit for  specific performance of a contract for sale of property a stranger or a third  party to the contract cannot be added as defendant in the suit.  In our  opinion, the aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable.  In our opinion, the  aforesaid decision can only be understood to mean that a third party cannot  be impleaded in a suit for specific performance if he has no semblance of  title in the property in dispute.    Obviously, a busybody or interloper with no  semblance of title cannot be impleaded in such a suit.  That would  unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings in the suit.  However, the  aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some  semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute.   In the present case,  the registered sale deed dated 12.8.1960 by which the property was  purchased shows that the shop in dispute was sold in favour of not only  Kapoor Chand, but also his sons.  Thus prima facie it appears that the  purchaser of the property in dispute was not only Kapoor Chand  but also his  sons.  Hence, it cannot be said that the sons of Kapoor Chand have no  semblance of title and are mere busybodies or interlopers.  

10.     As observed by this Court in State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu  Sekhar  Misra (AIR 1968 SC 647 vide para 13):-

\023A decision is only an authority for what  it actually decides.  What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every   observation found therein nor what logically  follows from the  various observations made  in it.   On this topic this is what Earl  of  Halsbury, LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495:

\023Now before discussing the case of  Allen v. Flood  (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two   observations of a general character which I wish to make,  and one is to repeat what I have very often said before,  that every judgment must be read as applicable to the  particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since  the generality of the expressions which may be found  there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law,  but governed and qualified by the particular  facts of the  case in which such expressions are to be found. The other   is that a case is only an authority for  what it actually  decides.  I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a

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proposition that may seem to follow logically from it.   Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is  necessarily a  logical Code,  whereas every lawyer must  acknowledge that the law is not always  logical at  all.\024

11.     In Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat  &  others  (1987) 1  SCC 213  (vide para 18) this Court observed:-

\023The ratio of any decision must be understood in the  background of the  facts of that case.  It has been said long  time ago that a case is only an authority for what it  actually decides, and not what  logically follows from it.\024         12.     In Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd (2003)  2 SC 111 (vide para 59), this Court observed:-

    \023It is well settled that a little difference in facts or  additional facts may make a lot of difference in the  precedential value of a decision.\024

13.     As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & another vs.  N.R.Vairamani & another (AIR 2004 SC 4778), a decision cannot be  relied on without disclosing the factual situation.  In the same Judgment this  Court also observed:-

\023Court should not place reliance on decisions without  discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the  fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.   Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid‘s  theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too  taken out of the context.  These observations must be  read in the context in which they appear to have been  stated.  Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as  statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a  statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark  into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to  explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they  do not interpret judgments.  They interpret words of  statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.

In London Graving dock co. Ltd.  vs. Horton (1951 AC  737 at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

\023The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by  treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J. as though  they were part of an Act of Parliament and  applying the rules of interpretation appropriate  thereto.  This is not to detract from the great  weight to be given to the language actually used by  that most distinguished judge.\024

    In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970  (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, \023Lord Atkin‘s  speech \005.  is not to be treated as if it was a statute  definition it will require qualification in new  circumstances.\024  Megarry, J. in (1971)1 WLR  1062 observed: \023One must not, of course, construe  even a reserved judgment of Russell L. J. as if it  were an Act of Parliament.\024 And, in Herrington v.  British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537)  Lord  Morris said:

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\023There is always peril in treating the words  of a speech or judgment as though they are  words in a legislative enactment, and it is to  be remembered that judicial utterances are  made in the setting of the facts of a  particular case.\024

       Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or  different fact may make a world of difference  between conclusions in two cases.  Disposal of  cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is  not proper.

       The following words of Lord Denning in the  matter of applying precedents have become locus  classicus:  

    \023Each case depends on its own facts and a  close similarity between one case and another is  not enough because even a single significant detail  may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases,  one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as  said by Cardozo, J. ) by matching the colour of one  case against the colour of another. To decide  therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the  broad resemblance to another case is not at all  decisive.\024                                                    ***         ***         ***   

    \023Precedent should be followed only so far as  it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the  dead wood and trim off the side branches else you  will find yourself lost in thickets and branches.   My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of  obstructions which could impede it.\024               14.     In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi\022s  case (supra) is clearly distinguishable.   In our opinion it cannot be laid down  as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is  filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit.  In  our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can  certainly file an application for impleadment.  To take a contrary view would  lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a  decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree  on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute.  Clearly, such a  view cannot be countenanced.

15.     Also, merely because some applications have been rejected earlier it  does not mean that the legal representatives of late Kapoor Chand should not  be allowed to file an additional written statement.  In fact, no useful purpose  would be served by merely allowing these legal representatives to be  impleaded but not allowing them to file an additional written statement.  In  our opinion, this will clearly violate natural justice.

16.     For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned orders of the High  Court dated 7.1.2000 as well as the trial court dated 6.8.1997, are set aside.   

The appellants shall be allowed to file additional written statement and  thereafter the suit should proceed expeditiously in accordance with law.       17.     The appeal is allowed.  There shall be no order as to costs.