Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 492 of 2007

Smt. Sulochana Chandrakant Galande           ..Appellant  

Versus

Pune Municipal Transport & Ors.                   ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  Judgment  

and order of Bombay High Court dated 20th February, 2006,  

passed  in  Writ  Petition  No.  1018  of  1999,  filed  by  the  

respondent herein setting aside the order passed by the State  

Government withdrawing the proceedings under the provisions  

of  the  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,  1976  

(hereinafter called as, “Act, 1976”).   

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present case  

are that the Act, 1976 was enacted to provide for imposition of  

a  ceiling  on  vacant  land  in  urban  agglomerations  for  the

acquisition  of  such  land  in  excess  of  the  ceiling  limit,  to  

regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for  

matters  connected  therewith.   The  said  Act  prescribed  the  

maximum ceiling to which the land can be retained by the  

owner  and  determination  of  the  surplus  land  and  transfer  

thereof in favour of the State after drawing the final statement  

under Section 9 of the Act, 1976, and the State would acquire  

the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit under Section 10  

of the Act, 1976.  The Act came into force on 17th February,  

1976.  On the said date, the suit land was not within urban  

limits, however it was included in the urban area residential  

zone only with effect from 17.05.1976, by extending the limits  

of  the  Municipal  Corporation.   The  suit  land  was  acquired  

under  the  Act,  1976,  in  the  years  1978-1979  and  its  

possession  was  taken  and  handed  over  to  Pune  Municipal  

Transport  (for  short  PMT)  for  establishing  a  bus depot  and  

staff quarters.  In 1988, the bus depot was constructed on a  

part  of  the  suit  land,  however,  the  appellant  preferred  a  

revision under  Section 34 of  the Act,  1976,  dated 6.4.1998  

contending  that  the  land  ought  not  to  have  been  acquired  

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under  the  Act,  1976,  on  the  ground  that  on  the  date  of  

commencement of the Act, 1976, i.e. 17.2.1976, the suit land  

was  not  within  the  limits  of  urban  area.   In  order  to  

substantiate the claim, reliance was placed on the Judgment  

of this Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum Vs. State of U.P. &  

Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2465, wherein it has been held that for the  

purpose of the Act, 1976, the categorization of the land in the  

Master Plan in existence at the time of commencement of the  

Act  into  force  was  a  relevant  factor  and  any  subsequent  

change in the Master Plan cannot be taken into consideration.  

The  said  application  was  allowed  by  the  Hon’ble  Minister,  

exercising his  revisional powers by order dated 29.09.1998.  

3. Being aggrieved, the PMT filed writ petition No. 1018 of  

1999 before the High Court of Maharashtra and the said writ  

petition  has  been  allowed  vide  Judgment  and  order  dated  

20.02.2006  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Act,  1976  stood  

repealed by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal  

Act,  1999  (hereinafter  called  ‘Act  1999’)   with  effect  from  

18.03.1999.  Subsequent thereto, this Court in State of A.P.  

&  Ors. Vs.  N. Audikesava  Reddy & Ors.,  AIR  2002  SC 5  

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overruled the Judgment in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra).  

Hence, this appeal.           

4. Sh.  A.K.  Ganguly,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

appellant,  has  submitted  that  the  High  Court  erred  in  

interfering with the order of the Revisional Authority,  which  

was fully justified being in consonance with the law laid down  

by  this  Court  in  Atia  Mohammadi  Begum (Supra).   The  

provisions of Section 34 of the Act, 1976, do not provide for  

any  limitation  and  in  case,  proceedings  had  been  initiated  

against the appellant in contravention of the Act, 1976 itself,  

the order passed by the prescribed authority dated 23.05.1979  

was  a  nullity,  and,  therefore,  was  unenforceable  and  

inexecutable.   It  has also been pointed out by Mr. Ganguly  

that originally, the land was allotted to PMT for establishing a  

bus  depot,  though  the  land  was  earmarked  for  residential  

purposes,  thus,  it  was  not  permissible  for  the  respondent  

authority to change the user of the land.  If the land is vested  

in the State free from all encumbrances without any authority  

of  law,  the  original  tenure  holder  is  entitled  to  possession  

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thereof.  The Act, 1976, itself stood repealed and is no more in  

force.  Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.   

5. On the  contrary,  Sh.  Sanjay  V.  Kharde  and Sh.  Amol  

Chitale,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  respondents,  have  

submitted  that  the  judgment  in  Atia Mohammadi  Begum  

(supra)  has been overruled by this Court  in  N. Audikesava  

Reddy (supra).   Therefore,  it  cannot  be  held  that  Atia  

Mohammadi Begum (supra) laid down the correct law.  The  

order  passed  by  the  prescribed  authority  dated  23.05.1979  

attained finality as it was not challenged by the appellant by  

filing  an  appeal  under  Section  12  before  the  Urban  Land  

Tribunal,  though the  Act,  1976,  also  provides  for  a  second  

appeal to the High Court.  The appellant could not maintain  

the  Revision  after  expiry  of  about  two  decades.   The  

Government  of  Maharashtra  could not  have  entertained the  

Revision at such belated stage.  The revision was liable to be  

rejected only on the ground of delay.  The land, after being  

declared  surplus  under  the  Act,  1976,  was  acquired  under  

Section  10  of  the  Act,  1976,  and  it  vested  in  the  State  

absolutely free from all encumbrances.  The land once vested  

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cannot  be divested.   After  vesting the  land in the  State,  in  

case,  the  State  authority  allots  the  land  to  any  other  

department or corporation for a specific purpose, it does not  

loose the competence to change the user of the land and in  

case, it is changed, the original tenure holder cannot be heard  

raising  any  grievances  whatsoever.   The  Act,  1976,  stood  

repealed, but this fact would have no bearing on this case for  

the reason that possession of the suit land had been taken in  

1979  itself.   The  appeal  lacks  merit  and  is  liable  to  be  

dismissed.   

6. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  

learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.  The  

Scheme of the Act, 1976 provides that the prescribed authority  

shall  make an order  declaring  the  surplus  land.   The  land  

would be acquired by the State and tenure holder is entitled to  

have an amount of compensation.  Section 10(3) of the Act,  

1976,  provides that  after  acquisition and publication  of  the  

Notification  under  Section  10(1)  of  the  Act,  1976  “the  land  

shall  be  deemed  to  have  vested  absolutely  in  the  State   

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Government  free  from all  encumbrances  with  effect  from the   

date so specified”.   

7. Section 11 of  the  Act,  1976,  provides  for  the  Mode of  

Payment of the amount for vacant land acquired.  Any  person  

aggrieved,  has  a  right  to  file  an  appeal  before  the  Land  

Tribunal and a second appeal before the High Court.   

8. The  provisions  of  Section  10(3)  of  the  Act,  1976  are  

analogous  to  Section  16  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  

(hereinafter  called  the  ‘Act  1894’).  Acquisition  proceedings  

cannot  be  withdrawn/abandoned  in  exercise  of  the  powers  

under Section 48 of the Act 1894 or Section 21 of the General  

Clauses Act, 1897 once the possession of the land has been  

taken.    (Vide  The  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  &  Ors.  Vs.  

Vishnu  Prasad  Sharma  &  Ors.,  AIR  1966  SC  1593;  LT.  

Governor  of  Himachal  Pradesh  &  Anr. Vs.  Sri  Avinash  

Sharma,  AIR  1970  SC  1576; Pratap  &  Anr.  Vs.  State  of  

Rajasthan & Ors.,  AIR 1996 SC 1296;   Mandir Shree Sita  

Ramji alias Shree Sitaram Bhandar Vs.  Land Acquisition  

Collector  & Ors.,  AIR  2005  SC  3581; Bangalore  

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Development Authority & Ors. Vs.  R. Hanumaiah & Ors.,  

(2005)  12  SCC  508;  and  Hari  Ram  &  Anr.  Vs.  State  of  

Haryana & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 621).   

9. The meaning of the word ‘vesting’ has been considered by  

this  Court  time  and  again.  In  The  Fruit  &  Vegetable  

Merchants  Union Vs.  The Delhi  Improvement  Trust, AIR  

1957  SC  344, this  Court  held  that  the  meaning  of  word  

‘vesting’ varies as per the context of the Statute in which the  

property vests.  While considering the case under Sections 16  

and 17 of the Act 1894, the Court held as under:–

“…the property acquired becomes the  property  of  Government without  any  condition or limitations either as to title or   possession.  The  legislature  has  made  it   clear that vesting of the property is not for  any limited  purpose or  limited  duration.”   (Emphasis added).

10. “Encumbrance” actually means the burden caused by an  

act  or  omission  of  man and not  that  created  by  nature.  It  

means a burden or charge upon property or a claim or lien on  

the  land.  It  means  a  legal  liability  on  property.  Thus,  it  

constitutes a burden on the title which diminishes the value of  

the land.  It may be a mortgage or a deed of trust or a lien of  

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an easement. An encumbrance, thus, must be a charge on the  

property. It must run with the property.  (Vide  Collector of  

Bombay Vs.  Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Ors., AIR 1955  

SC 298;  H.P.  State Electricity  Board & Ors. Vs.  Shiv K.  

Sharma  &  Ors.,  AIR  2005  SC  954;  and  AI  Champdany  

Industries Ltd. Vs. Official Liquidator & Anr., (2009) 4 SCC  

486).

11. In  State  of Himachal  Pradesh Vs.  Tarsem  Singh  &  

Ors., AIR 2001 SC 3431, this Court held that the terminology  

‘free  from all  encumbrances’  used in  Section  16 of  the  Act  

1894,  is  wholly  unqualified  and  would  en-compass  the  

extinguishing  of   “all  rights,  title  and  interests  including  

easementary rights” when the title vests in the State.  

Thus, “free from encumbrances” means vesting of land in  

the State without any charge or burden in it. Thus, State has  

absolute title/ownership over it.  

12.   In  Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors.  Vs.  State of U.P. &  

Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2517, this Court held that once land vests  

in the State free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested.  

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The same view has been reiterated in Awadh Bihari Yadav &  

Ors.   Vs.  State of Bihar & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31; U.P. Jal  

Nigam,  Lucknow Vs. M/s.  Kalra  Properties  (P)  Ltd.,  

Lucknow & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1170; Pratap & Anr. (Supra);  

Chandragauda  Ramgonda  Patil  &  Anr.  Vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra  &  Ors., (1996)  6  SCC  405;   Allahabad  

Development Authority Vs.  Nasiruzzaman & Ors., (1996) 6  

SCC 424; State of Kerala & Ors. Vs.  M. Bhaskaran Pillai &  

Anr., AIR 1997 SC 2703;  M. Ramalinga Thevar Vs. State of  

Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 322; Printers (Mysore) Ltd.  

Vs.  M.A.  Rasheed  &  Ors.,  (2004)  4  SCC  460;  Bangalore  

Development Authority & Ors.  Vs. R. Hanumaiah & Ors.,  

(2005) 12 SCC 508; and  Government of Andhra Pradesh &  

Anr. Vs. Syed Akbar, AIR 2005 SC 492.

13. So far as the change of user is concerned, it is a settled  

legal proposition that once land vests in the State free from all  

encumbrances, there cannot be any rider on the power of the  

State Government to change user of the land in the manner it  

chooses.    

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In a similar situation, in Gulam Mustafa & Ors. Vs. The  

State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 448, this Court  

held as under:–

“Once the original acquisition is valid and  title has vested in the Municipality, how it   uses the excess land is no concern of the   original owner and cannot be the basis for  invalidating  the  acquisition.  There  is  no  principle  of  law  by  which  a  valid   compulsory  acquisition  stands  voided  because long later the requiring Authority   diverts it  to  a public purpose other than   the one stated in the.......declaration.”

14. Re-iterating  a  similar  view  in  C.  Padma  &  Ors. Vs.  

Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors.,  

(1997) 2 SCC 627, this Court held that if by virtue of a valid  

acquisition of land, land stands vested in the State, thereafter,  

claimants are not entitled to restoration of possession on the  

grounds that either the original public purpose is ceased to be  

in  operation  or  the  land  could  not  be  used  for  any  other  

purposes.

15. In Bhagat Singh etc. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1999  

SC 436; Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja Vs.  State of West  

Bengal, AIR  2002  SC  2532; and  Northern  Indian  Glass  

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Industries Vs. Jaswant Singh & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335, this  

Court  held  that,  the  land  user  can  be  changed  by  the  

Statutory Authority after the land vests in the State free from  

all encumbrances.

16. In view of the above,  the law can be summarised that  

once the land is acquired, it vests in the State free from all  

encumbrances. It is not the concern of the land owner how his  

land  is  used  and  whether  the  land  is  being  used  for  the  

purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He  

becomes persona non grata once the land vests in the State.  

He has a right  to get  compensation only for  the same. The  

person interested cannot claim the right of restoration of land  

on any ground, whatsoever.

17. In the instant case, there is no pleading by the appellant  

in  respect  of  the  receipt  of  compensation.   No  explanation  

could be furnished as to under what circumstances the appeal  

was not filed if the appellant was so aggrieved by the order of  

final assessment under Section 9 of the Act, 1976.   

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18. The  suit  land  was  acquired  in  1979.   Revision  was  

preferred in 1998, after expiry of about two decades.  Section  

34 reads as under :-

“The State  Government  may,  on its  own  motion, call for and examine the records of   any  order  passed  or  proceeding  taken   under  the  provisions  of  this  Act  and  against  which  no  appeal  has  been  preferred under Section 12 or Section 30  or Section 33 for the purpose of satisfying  itself as to the legality or propriety of such  order  or  as  to  the  regularity  of  such  procedure  and  pass  such  order  with   respect thereto as it may think fit ……….”   

19. Undoubtedly,  Section  34  does  not  prescribe  any  

limitation during which the Revisional power can be exercised  

by the State Government either on application or suo moto.  

The question does arise as to whether absence of limitation in  

Section  34  confers  unfettered  power  to  vary  or  revoke  the  

order  of  the  prescribed  authority  without  any  outside  

limitation in point of duration i.e. does it confer an everlasting  

or  interminable  power  in  point  of  time.    If  the  contention  

raised by Mr. Ganguly that such provisions of Section 34 do  

not prescribe any limitation,  and it  confers an interminable  

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power upon the State Government in point of time to exercise  

the Revisional power, is accepted, there will be no finality of  

the proceedings taken under the Act, 1976.

20. In State of Gujarat Vs. Patel Raghav Natha & Ors. AIR  

1969 SC 1297, this Court considered a similar provision in  

Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, which also did not provide  

any  limitation  for  exercising  the  Revisional  power  by  the  

Commissioner under Sections 65 and 211 of the Code.  The  

Court held that in spite of the fact that the provisions do not  

prescribe  for  any  limitation  for  exercising  such  Revisional  

powers,  “this power must be exercised in reasonable time and  

the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the   

facts of the case and the nature of the order, which is being   

revised”.  The Court further explained that if the power is not  

exercised  within  the  reasonable  time,  it  may  disturb  the  

possession  of  the  person after  an inordinate  delay  and the  

occupant  who  had  spent  his  life  savings  in  developing  the  

land, may lose the benefit  thereof.   Therefore,  the authority  

must not entertain revisions at a belated stage.   

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21. In  Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie  Sangham  

Vs.  K. Suresh Reddy & Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 667, this Court  

considered the provisions of  the Andhra Pradesh (Tilangana  

Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, wherein the  

provisions  contained  in  Section  50-B(4)  empowered  the  

statutory authority to exercise suo moto revisional power at  

any time.  The Court held as under :-

Use  of  the  words  "at  any  time"  in  sub- Section (4)  of Section 50-B of the Act only  indicates  that  no  specific   period  of  limitation  is  prescribed  within  which  the   suo  moto  power  could  be  exercised  reckoning  or  starting  from  a  particular   date  advisedly  and  contextually.   Exercise of suo moto power depended on  facts and      circumstances of each case.   In  cases  of  fraud,  this   power  could  be  exercised within  a  reasonable  time  from  the date of detection or discovery of fraud.  While   exercising  such  power,  several   factors need to be kept  in mind such as   effect  on  the  rights  of  the  third  parties   over  the  immovable  property  due  to  passage of    considerable time, change of   the  provisions  of  other     Acts  (such  as  Land Ceiling Act).........

Use of the words "at any time" in sub- section  (4)  of  Section  50-B  of  the  Act  cannot  be  rigidly  read  letter   by letter.  It  must be read and construed  contextually and reasonably. If one has to   

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simply  proceed  on  the  basis  of  the  dictionary meaning of the words "at  any  time",  the  suo  moto  power  under  sub- Section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could  be  exercised  even  after  decades  and  then  it  would  lead  to  anomalous position  leading to uncertainty   and complications seriously    affecting the  rights  of  the  parties,  that  too,  over  immovable  properties.  Orders  attaining  finality and  certainty of the rights of the  parties accrued in the light  of the orders  passed  must  have  sanctity.  Exercise  of   suo moto power "at any time" only means  that  no  specific  period  such  as  days,   months  or  years  are  not  prescribed  reckoning from a particular date. But, that   does not mean that "at any time" should  be unguided and arbitrary.  In  this  view,   "at  any  time"  must  be  understood  as   within  a  reasonable  time  depending  on  the facts and circumstances of each case  in  the  absence  of  prescribed  period  of   limitation."

22. The said  judgment  was approved  and followed  by  this  

Court  in  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  & Anr.  Vs.  T.Yadagiri  

Reddy & Ors., (2008) 16 SCC 299.   

23. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix a time limit for  

exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words “at any  

time” in Section 34 of the Act, 1976.  It does not mean that the  

legislature intended to leave the orders passed under the Act  

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open to variation for an indefinite period inasmuch as it would  

have  the  effect  of  rendering  title  of  the  holders/allottee(s)  

permanently  precarious  and  in  a  state  of  perpetual  

uncertainty.  In case, it is assumed that the legislature has  

conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of  

time, the title over the declared surplus land, in the hands of  

the State/allottee, would forever remain virtually insecure.  

The Court has to construe the statutory provision in a  

way  which  makes  the  provisions  workable,  advancing  the  

purpose and object of enactment of the statute.  

In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion  

that  the  Revisional  powers  cannot  be  used  arbitrarily  at  

belated stage for the reason that the order passed in Revision  

under Section 34 of the Act, 1976, is a judicial order.  What  

should be reasonable time, would depend upon the facts and  

circumstances of each case.   

24. If some person has taken a relief from the Court by filing  

a  Writ  Petition  immediately  after  the  cause  of  action  had  

arisen, petitioners cannot take the benefit thereof resorting to  

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legal  proceedings  belatedly.  They  cannot  take  any  benefit  

thereof at such a belated stage for the reason that they cannot  

be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the  

behest of some diligent person.

25. In State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. S.M. Kotrayya & Ors.,  

(1996) 6 SCC 267, this Court rejected the contention that a  

petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches,  

on the ground that the petitioner therein filed the petition just  

after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a  

similar case, as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation  

for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is  

wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring  

delay and laches.  

26. The  same  view  has  been  reiterated  by  this  Court  in  

Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs.  State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997  

SC 2366, observing as under:–

“Suffice it to state that appellants may be  sleeping  over  their  rights  for  long  and  elected  to  wake-up  when  they  had  impetus  from Veerpal  Chauhan  and  Ajit   Singh’s  ratio..........desperate  attempts  of  the appellants to re-do the seniority, held  

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by  them  in  various  cadre.......are  not  amenable  to  the  judicial  review  at  this   belated stage.  The High Court,  therefore,  has rightly dismissed the writ petition on  the ground of delay as well.”

27. In  M/s. Rup Diamonds & Ors.  Vs.  Union of India &  

Ors., AIR 1989 SC 674, this Court considered a case where  

petitioner wanted to get relief on the basis of the judgment of  

this Court wherein a particular law had been declared ultra  

vires. The Court rejected the petition on the ground of delay  

and laches observing as under:–

“There is one more ground which basically   sets  the  present  case  apart.  Petitioners  are  re-agitating  claims  which  they  have  not pursued for several years. Petitioners  were  not  vigilant  but  were  content to  be  dormant and close to sit on the fence till   somebody  else’s  case  came  to  be  decided.”          

28. However, it will be a different case altogether, where the  

law, under which an order has been passed, is declared ultra  

vires/unconstitutional and the order, thus, passed is rendered  

a nullity. The party may ask for appropriate relief as property  

had been acquired under the law, later so declared void. [See  

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Amrit Bhikaji Kale & Ors. Vs.  Kashinath Janardhan Trade  

& Anr., AIR 1983 SC 643; and M/s. Rup Diamonds (supra)].  

29. Be that as it may, the law laid down by this Court in Atia  

Mohammadi Begum (supra)  has not been approved by this  

Court  in  subsequent  Judgment  i.e.  N.  Audikesava  Reddy  

(supra), wherein it has clearly been held as under :-

“The observations that  the authorities by  their  subsequent  action  after  17th  February,  1976 cannot alter  or introduce   the  master  plan  which  has the  effect of   increasing the area of excess vacant land  do not represent the correct view of law.   The aforesaid explanation to Section  6(1),   inter alia,  provides that where any land,  not being vacant land, situated in a State   in which this Act is in force has becomes  vacant  land  by  any  reason  whatsoever,   the  date  on  which  such  land  becomes  vacant  land  would  be  the  date  of  the  commencement of the Act as regards such  land.

Development  and  town  planning  are  ongoing  processes  and  they  go  on  changing  from  time  to  time  depending  upon  the  local  needs.  That  apart,  the  definition of  the  "master  plan"  in Section   2(h) is very significant. It reads as under:

"2(h) 'master plan', in relation to  an  area  within  an  urban  agglomeration  or  any  part  

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that  proceeding  pending  in  any  Court  relating  to  the  Act,  

1976, stood abated, provided the possession of the land had  

not been taken from the owner.  Therefore, in a case, where  

the possession has been taken, the repeal of the Act would not  

confer any benefit on the owner of the land. [Vide Pt. Madan  

Swaroop Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust Vs. State of U.P.  

& Ors., (2000)  6 SCC 325;  Ghasitey Lal  Sahu & Anr.  Vs.  

Competent Authority, (2004)  13 SCC 452;  and  Mukarram  

Ali Khan Vs.  State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2007) 11 SCC  

90].

32. From the above, the following factual situation emerges:  

(I) The  land  was  declared  surplus  under  the  Act,  

1976, and acquired in 1979.

(II) Possession of the land was taken in 1979 by the  

State of Maharashtra and it was handed over to  

PMT for construction of the residential quarters  

for the staff.

(III) Appellant  has  not  stated  anywhere  in  the  

pleadings  as  to  whether  any  amount/  

compensation as provided under the Act, 1976,  

had been received/accepted by her.

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(IV)   Appellant, for the reason best known to her, did  

not file appeal before the Land Tribunal, though  

Act, 1976 provides for two appeals.  

(V) Appellant woke up from deep-slumber only after  

five years of the judgment of this Court in  Atia  Mohammadi  Begum (supra)  and  filed  revision  under Section 34 of the Act, 1976,  in 1998.  

(VI) The  State  Government  allowed  the  revision  

without  taking  into  consideration  the  point  of  

delay; rather it relied upon its own circulars.  

(VII) The  State  Government  did  not  consider  the  

consequences and particularly the issue of  dis-

possession  of  the  appellant  from  the  land  in  

dispute in 1978 itself.  

(VIII) The  judgment  in  Atia  Mohammadi  Begum  (supra) has been over-ruled by this Court in  N.  Audikesava Reddy (supra).

33. Therefore,  the law, as exists today, is  that the land in  

dispute could be subjected to the provisions of the Act, 1976,  

with effect from 17.5.1976, i.e. the date on which the suit land  

came within the limits of the Municipal Corporation.  The Act  

stood repealed in 1999, but the proceedings pending in any  

court would stand abated provided the tenure-holder was in  

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possession of the land on the date of the commencement of  

the Act 1999.  The High Court has taken note of the fact that  

the appellant’s revision had been entertained only on the basis  

of  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Atia Mohammadi Begum  

(supra), which stood over-ruled by the  subsequent judgment  

in  N. Audikesava Reddy (supra).  

34. The  aforesaid  factual  position  makes  it  clear  that  the  

appellant is not entitled for any relief whatsoever as per the  

law,  as  it  exists  today.   The land once  vested in  the  State  

cannot be divested. Once the land is vested in the State it has  

a  right  to  change  the  user.  The appellant  cannot  be  heard  

raising grievance on either of these issues.  

35. Thus, in view of the above, the appeal lacks merit and is  

accordingly dismissed.  No order as to costs.   

…………………………….J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

……………………..… …..J. New Delhi, (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

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August 3, 2010

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