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PETITIONER: SUKHWANT SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/03/1995

BENCH: MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J) BENCH: MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 1380            1995 SCC  Supl.  (2) 262  JT 1995 (3)   506        1995 SCALE  (2)496

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: DR. ANAND, J.: 1.   The  appellant was tried for an offence  under  Section 302 IPC in connection with the murder of one Ajmer Singh  on 11.7.1984  at  about  7.30 p.m. The  learned  Judge  Special Court,  Ferozepur  convicted him for the  said  offence  and sentenced  him  to suffer life imprisonment.   Through  this appeal,  under Section 14 of the Terrorists  Affected  Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984, the appellant has challenged his conviction and sentence. 2.   According  to  the prosecution case, the  appellant  is married to the sister of Pal Singh.  An engagement had  been brought  about through the instrumentality of the  appellant between  the daughter of Pal Singh and Lakhmir Singh son  of Kashmir  Singh.  The deceased, Ajmer Singh and his  brother, Gurmej Singh PW 3 were on friendly terms with Kashmir  Singh but  for  some  reason or the  other,  that  engagement  was snapped  and  Lakhmir Singh was married to some  other  girl about  3  days  prior  to  the  occurrence.   The  appellant suspected  that Ajmer Singh deceased and his brother  Gurmej Singh   PW  were  responsible  for  the  snapping   of   the engagement.  On 11.7.1984 at about 7.30 p.m., Gurmej  Singh, PW 3 accompanied by Ajmer Singh, deceased and Raghbir Singh, PW4  were going to the fields to answer the call  of  nature and  when they reached near the bridge on the village  pond, the appellant came from the opposite side wearing the  robes of  a Nihang and exhorted that he would teach them a  lesson for getting the engagement snapped.  Immediately  thereafter the  appellant took out a pistol from underneath  the  chola (robes) that he was wearing and fired a shot at Ajmer Singh. On  alarm  being  raised by Ajmer Singh, PW3  and  PW4,  the appellant fled away alongwith the pistol.  One Major  Singh, PW5 who was also present in the nearby field also  witnessed the  occurrence.  Ajmer Singh was removed to the haveli  and while he was being shifted to the Hospital at Malout, in the

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tractor  trolley of Kashmir Singh, he expired.  On  reaching the  hospital, the doctor pronounced Ajmer Singh  dead.   On information being sent by Dr. Sant Singh, Ex.  P-5 about the arrival  of  Ajmer  Singh deceased at the  hospital  to  the police  station, Shri Raghubir Singh, ASI PW6  proceeded  to the hospital and recorded the statement of Gurmej Singh, Ex. P-4 at about 11.45 p.m. The statement was sent to the police station  for registration of a case and on its basis  formal FIR Ex.P-4/B was drawn up.  A case under Section 302 IPC and Section  25  Arms  Act  was  registered  at  12.10  a.m.  on 12.7.1984.:    A copy of the special report was sent to the Ilaqa magistrate and was received by    him on 12.7.1984  at about 6.30 499 a.m.  After  preparing the inquest report Ex.P-2,  the  dead body  was dispatched for postmortem which was  performed  by Dr. Sant Parkash Singh, Sr.  Medical Officer PW1 on July 12, 1984 at about 11.00 a.m. The doctor found fire arm  injuries on  the deceased and opined that the death had  been  caused due  to shock and haemorrhage as a result of injury  No.  1, which  was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course  of nature  to  cause death.  During the  investigation  by  ASI Raghubir  Singh,  PW6the  rough site plan of  the  place  of occurrence was prepared.  From the spot, blood stained earth as well as an empty were collected vide memo Ex.  P-8.   The same were secured in separate sealed parcels.  The appellant was  arrested on 8.8.1984 and at the time of his arrest,  he was  found to be carrying with him a pistol and 7 live  car- tridges which were seized by the police. 3.   At the trial, the prosecution examined Dr. Sant Parkash Singh,  PW1 Draughtsman Ajit Sharma, PW2, Gurmej Singh,  PW3 and  Raghubir Singh, ASI PW6.  Raghubir Singh PW4 and  Major Singh  PW5,  the two other eye witnesses were  tendered  for cross   examination   only.   The   appellant   denied   the prosecution  allegations against him in his statement  under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The appellant was thereafter,  convicted and  sentenced for the offence under Section 302  IPC.   The case under Section 25 Arms Act was separately tried. 4.   Learned counsel for the appellant submitted  that   the solitary eyewitness examined at    the    trial    by    the prosecution  Gurmej Singh, PW3 could not be relied upon,  as not only he being the brother of the deceased was interested in the prosecution case but also because his evidence  stood belied by the medical evidence which showed that the stomach and  the  bladder of the deceased were  empty  thereby  sug- gesting that the injuries had been received by the  deceased after  he had answered the call of nature and not before  as suggested  by  Gurmej  Singh,  PW3.   Learned  counsel  also submitted  that  in  Rukka Ex.  P-5 which was  sent  by  the doctor to the police station, it was recorded that the  dead body  had been brought to the hospital by Raghbir Singh  and Major Singh and the name of Gurmej Singh was conspicuous  by its absence which went to show that Gurmej Singh PW3 was not present  at the time of occurrence or when the deceased  was removed to the hospital.  According to the learned  counsel, the non-examination of Raghbir Singh, PW 4 and Major  Singh, PW5  by the prosecution, who were only tendered  for  cross- examination, is a serious infirmity in the prosecution  case and  renders  it  unsafe to uphold  the  conviction  of  the appellant  on the basis of the uncorroborated  testimony  of Gurmej Singh, PW3. 5.Gurmej  Singh, PW3, is the elder brother of the  deceased. lie is the solitary eye witness examined by the prosecution. The  absence  of his name from rukka Ex.  P-5, sent  by  the doctor  to the police station immediately after the  arrival

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of  the dead body in the hospital creates some  doubt  about the  presence of Gurmej Singh at the place of occurrence  at the  time when the deceased would have accompanied  the  in- jured  to the hospital.  The identification of the  deceased by  Gurmej  Singh  and  Major  Singh  PWs  at  the  time  of postmortem examination of the deceased which has been relied upon  by  learned counsel for the State, can  not  cure  the defect of the absence of the name of PW3 from Ruqqa 500 Ex.P-5 because the postmortem examination was conducted  the next  day on 12-71984 at 11.00 a.m. There is no  explanation available on the record, nor has any been offered before  us to explain the absence of the name of PW3 from Ruqqa  Ex.P-5 in which it was recorded that Raghbir Singh and Major  Singh had brought the deceased to the hospital. 6.   That the deceased died as a result of fire arm injuries is not disputed but what has been challenged is whether  the occurrence  took  place in the manner  described  by  Gurmej Singh  PW3 and whether Gurmej Singh PW3 is an  eye  witness. The first information report was recorded by Raghubir  Singh PW6  on the basis of the statement of Gurmej  Singh,  Ex.P-4 which  was recorded at the hospital at about 11.45  p.m.  on 11.7.1984. The possibility that Gurmej Singh PW3 might  have arrived  at the hospital later on after learning  about  the removal  of his deceased brother to the hospital by  Raghbir Singh  and  Major Singh cannot be ruled out.   Moreover,  we find that the special report reached the Ilaqa magistrate on the next day at 6.30 a.m. There is no explanation, available on  the  record about the delay in receipt  of  the  special report  by the Ilaqa Magistrate.  When admittedly the  court of  the  Ilaqa Magistrate and the police station  are  quite close to each other.  The fact that at thetimeof  postmortem examination  the stomach and the bladder were  found  empty, though  suggestive  of the position that  contrary  to  what Gurmej  Singh,  PW3 deposed, the deceased had  answered  the call  of  nature  before  he was  shot  at,  but  cannot  be conclusive of it, as the possibility that the deceased might have  defalcated and urinated after the receipt of  injuries and before his death cannot ruled out. 7.The prosecution in this case came up with a positive  case that besides Gurmej Singh, PW3, Raghbir Singh PW4 and  Major Singh  PW5 had also witnessed the occurrence.  The names  of these two witnesses are also mentioned in the rukka Ex.  P-5 as  the  persons  who  had brought  the  dead  body  to  the hospital.   Their evidence in the circumstance of  the  case was  essential for unfolding of the prosecution  case.   The prosecution  however did not examine them and tendered  them for  cross-examination by the accused at the trial but  they were not cross-examined by the accused.  From the record  of the trial court we find that both PW4 and PW5 had been  ten- dered   for   cross  examination  "in  the  light   of   the observations  of the Supreme Court in the case of Jaggo  AIR 197 1, SC 1586.  " We are at a loss to appreciate how a wit- ness could be cross-examined, when he has not been  examined in  chief that is to say, when there is nothing in  relation to which he could be cross-examined. 8.It will be pertment at this stage to refer to Section  138 of the Evidence Act which provides :               "138.  Order of examinations.  Witnesses shall               be  first examined-chief then (if the  adverse               party, so desires) crossexamined, then (if the               party calling him so desires) re-examined.               The  exmination  and  cross-examination   must               relateto   relevant  facts  but   the   cross-               examination need not be confined to the  facts

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             to   which  the  witness  testified   on   his               examination-in chief.               Direction   for   re-examination.    The   re-               examination  shall  be  directed  to  the  ex-               planation  of  matters referred to  in  cross-               examination;  and  if new matter is,  by  per-               mission of Court, introduced in re-exami-               501               nation, the adverse part), may further  cross-               examine upon that matter. 9. It would, thus be seen that Section 138 (supra) envisages that  a  witness would first be examined in chief  and  then subjected   to   cross-examination  and  for   seeking   any clarification,  the  witness  may  be  re-examined  by   the prosecution.   There  is,  in our  opinion,  no  meaning  in tendering a witness for cross examination only.   ’rendering of  a  witness for cross-examination, as a matter  of  fact, amounts to giving up of the witness by the prosecution as it does  not  choose  to  examine him  in  chief  however,  the practice  of  tendering  witness  for  cross-examination  in Session Trials had been frequently resorted to since the en- actment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.  The reason behind taking recourse to such a practice, which undoubtedly is  inconsistent  with Section 138 (supra), is  not  for  to seek.  Under that Code as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 26 of 1955 a full-fledged magisterial enquiry was to  be held,  in a case which was triable exclusively by the  Court of  Sessions  or  the High Court,  in  accordance  with  the procedure  laid  down in Chapter XVIII thereof and  in  that enquiry  prosecution  was required to examine all  its  wit- nesses.  Under Section 288 of that Code the evidence of  the witnesses so recorded by the Committing Magistrate could  be treated,  at  the  discretion  of  the  Session  Judge,   as substantive evidence at the trial.  More often than not, the prosecution tak ing advantage of the above provision, use to asks for and obtain leave of the Sessions Court to treat the depositions  of thesr witnesses whom they did not intend  to examine  afresh,  recorded in the committal enquiry  as  its evidence  in  the  trial and then  tender  them  for  cross- examination.   In  other words, the prosecution  brought  on record of the trial court and relied upon the testimonies of some  of the witnesses recorded at its instance  before  the Committing  Magistrate as its evidence during the trial  and then  tendered them for cross-examination by  the  defences. It  will  be pertinent to mention here that Act 26  of  1955 which amended the Code of 1898 restricted the examination of prosecution witnesses in the committal enquiry in respect of cases instituted on police report only to those who were  to give an ocular version of the incident only. 10.The question as to whether such a practice was legal  and valid  in  view of Section 138 (supra) and, if  so  to  what extent  and in what manner it could be adopted came  up  for consideration by different High Courts. 11. In Veera Koravan and others v. Emperor [AIR 1929 Madras, 906]  a Division Bench of the Madras High Court opined  that merely  tendering  of  a  prosecution  witness  for   cross- examination  is  not a practice which should  be  encouraged specially in a murder case as the procedure would be  unfair to an accused. 12.  In Sadeppa Cireppa Mutgi and others v.  Emperor    (AIR 1942  Bombay, 37) Beaumont, C.J. speaking for  the  Division Bench of the Bombay High Court opined :               "’The  other  Kakeri witness is  Shambu,  (Ex.               34),  and a very irregular course was  adopted               with  regard  to  him.  He  way  tendered  for

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             cross-examination.  The practice of  tendering               witnesses  for cross-examination which  is  no               doubt  often  adopted,  is  inconsistent  with               S.138,  Evidence Act, which says that  witness               shall  be first examined-in-chief and then, if               ad-               502               verse  party so desires,  cross-examined,  and               if,  the  party  calling him  so  desire,  re-               examined.  It is obvious that if a witness  is               examined  by the defence without having  given               any evidence-in-chief, he is not being  cross-               examined, by whatever name the process may  be               described.   The  practice  of  tendering  for               cross-examination  should only be  adopted  in               cases  of witnesses of  secondary  importance.               Where the prosecution have already got  suffi-               cient  evidence on a particular point, and  do               not want to waste time by examining a  witness               who  was examined in the lower Court,  but  at               the  same  time  do not want  to  deprive  the               accused  of the right of cross-examining  such               witness,   they   tender   him   for    cross-               examination.  But, I think, strictly speaking,               the   witness  ought  to  be  asked   by   the               prosecution,  with the consent, of course,  of               the pleader for the accused, and the leave  of               the  Judge, whether his evidence in the  lower               Court, is true.  If he gives a general  answer               as  to the truth of his evidence in the  lower               Court, he can be cross-examined on that.   But               he  must  in  some  way  be  examined-in-chief               before he can be cross-examined.  However, the               practice  of  tendering a witness  for  cross-               examination  certainly should not be  employed               in  the  case of  an  important  eye-witness."               Emphasis supplied) 13.A  Full  Bench  of the Bombay High Court  in  Emperor  v. Kasamally  Mirzalli  (AIR  1942  Bombay,  71)  approved  the opinion  of  Beaumont,  C.J. (supra) and  "  condemned"  the practice of tendering a witness for cross-examination in  no uncertain terms. 14.A Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kesar  Singh and  another  v.  the State (AIR  1954  Punjab,  286)  after analysing  the  provisions of Sections 137 and  138  of  the Evidence  Act, followed the law laid down by the Full  Bench of  the  Bombay High Court in Kasamalli’s case  (supra)  and observed :               "The  other  witness of this fact is  Jai  Ram               P.W.21 who was tendered for cross-examination,               but he was not cross-examined.  That again  in               my opinion is no evidence.  The law in  regard               to  examination of witnesses is  contained  in               Section  137 and 138, Evidence Act.  There  is               no  provision  in that Act  for  permitting  a               witness  to be tendered for  cross-examination               without  his being examined-in-chief and  this               practice  is opposed to S. 138 of the Act.   "               (Emphasis ours) 15.  In Dhirendra Nath v. State (AIR 1952 Calcutta, 621),  a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held:               "There is a type of case where witnesses of  a               secondary  importance who have  been  examined               before  the  Committing  Magistrate  arc   not               called before the Sessions Court, because  the

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             prosecution considers that it has already  had                             a  sufficient  body of  evidence  on  the poin t               concerned and then in fairness to the defence,               it those witnesses for cross-examination.  But               the  fact  that the witness  is  tendered  for               cross-examination means and implies that there               has been some examination-in-chief.  As far as               I  can see, the only Practical way in which  a               witness can   be   tendered   for    cross-               examination is  by asking  him  generally,               may be bya single question, in the  sessions               court as to whether the statements  made    by               him before the committing      Magistrate were               true and on his answering in the  affirmative,               tendering the evidence given in the committing               Magistrate’s   court which would   then  serve               as  the   examination-in-chief.   Unless   the               examination-in-chief     is  brought  on   the               record in that fashion, I cannot understand on               what   the  defence  will  cross-examine   the               witness tendered for cross-ex-               503               amination.  It does not appear from the record               in this case that the evidence of the  witness               before  the Committing Magistrate was  brought               on the record at all.  In these circumstances,               tendering for cross-examination seems to me to               have been almost meaningless." 16.  In  Chotta  Singh v. State (AIR 196 Punjab,  120),  the Punjab High Court held:               "Tendering a witness for cross-examination. is               almost  tantamount  to giving  up  a  witness.               There is nothing in law that justifies such  a               course.  The trial courts adopt this manner of               examining  witnesses simply to  lighten  their               burden,  but  it  is not realised  that  in  a               serious case like the present murder case when               the  learned  trial Judge  failed  to  examine               Wazira P.W.5, he was very seriously remiss  in               his duty." 17.   A  Division  Bench  of  the  Kerala  High   Court   in Thazhathethil  Hamsa v. State Kerala (AIR 1967  Kerala,  16) observed:               "In  this  connection we wish to  clarify  the               mistaken  impression  which the  teamed  Judge               seems to have entertained about the  propriety               of the procedure adopted by the prosecution in               tendering eye-witnesses for cross-examination.               PW10 who had given evidence in the  Committing               Court  as  an  eye-witness  was  tendered  for               cross-examination in the Sessions Court  after               he made a bald statement that he has correctly               stated  all he knew about the incident in  the               enquiry,   Court.   The  learned   Judge   has               evidently relied on an observation made by the               Patna High Court in Manzurul Haque v. State of               Bihar,  AIR 1958 Pat 422 to find that  such  a               procedure  is proper.  But it is  really  not.               The  very  decision relied on by  the  learned               Judge  started  by enunciating  the  principle               thus :               " The practice of tendering witnesses leads to               considerable   confusion   and   is   to    be               deprecated.  A material witness should not  be

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             merely tendered but should be sworn and  asked               to   give   evidence   by   the   prosecution.               Tendering  if  at all should  be  confined  to               witnesses of secondary importance.  " 18.  Thus,  it  is seen that the  Bombay  Kerala,  Calcutta, Madras  and  Punjab  High Courts  have  notwithstanding  the provisions of Sections 288 of the Code of 1898  consistently taken  the  view  that there is  no  procedure  whereby  the prosecution  is permitted to tender a witness for  cross-ex- amination only, without there being any examination-in-chief in relation to which, such a witness can be cross  examined. The  practice of tendering a witness  for  cross-examination has  been  consistently discouraged and  even  condemned  by those High Courts and in our opinion rightly.  Our attention has  not been drawn to any judgment of any other High  Court which may have taken the contrary view. 19.In  the State of U.P. and another v. Jaggo alias  Jagdish and  others (AIR 1971 SC, 1586) which has been  referred  to and  relied upon by the prosecution and the trial court  for adopting  the procedure of tendering PW4 and PW5  for  cross examination  only  in  our opinion, has  not  been  properly appreciated  and has been misapplied.  That judgment  cannot be read to lay down, as a matter of legal preposition,  that a  witness  can  be "tendered"  for  cross-examination  even without  there  being any examination in chief If  there  is some  earlier  statement  of  the  witness  recorded  by   a competent court or an affidavit filed in the trial court and the  witness  testifies to the correctness of  that  earlier statement at the trial, it (in certain cases of witnesses of a formal nature) as noticed earlier be per- 504 missible  to  tender him for cross-examination after  he  is sworn  to the correctness of the earlier statement,  because in   thateventhat  earlier  statement  is  treated  as   the examination-in-chief of the witness but that is not the same thing  as  tendering a witness for  cross-examination  only, without there being any cxamination-in-chief on the  record. In   Jaggo’s  case  (supra)  a  Bench  of  this  court   was considering the question whether the mere presentation of an application by the prosecution to the effect that a  certain witness had been "won over" was conclusive of the allegation that  he  had  been so "won over" and  the  prosecution  was therefore  relieved of its obligation to examine him at  the trial.   The  preposition was negatived and it was  in  that context, that this court observed :               "On  behalf of the appellant it was said  that               Ramesh  Chand  wa won over and  therefore  the               prosecution  could not call Ramesh.  The  High               Court rightly said that the mere  presentation               of an application to the effect that a witness               had  been won over was not conclusive  of  the               question  that the witness has been won  over.               In.such a case Ramesh could have been produced               for  cross-examination by the  accused.   That               would  have  elicited the correct  facts.   If               Ramesh  were an eye-witness the  accused  were               entillwd  to  test his  evidence  particularly                             when Lalu was alleged to be talking with Rames h               at the time of the occurrence."                                          (Emphasis ours) 20.  The   Division  Bench,  therefore  was  considering   a peculiar  fact  situation  in that case  and  even  in  that context  it was observed that the witness "could  have  been produced for cross-examination by the accused" and that "the

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accused   were   entitled  to  test   his   evidence."   The observations   of  the  Division  Bench  in  Jaggo’s   case, therefore,  do not support the view that a material  witness can   be   "tendered"  for  cross-examination   only.    The observations from a judgment of this Court cannot be read in isolation  and divorced from the context in which  the  same were  made  and it is improper for any Court to take  out  a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from  the context  in which it was given, and treat such  an  isolated sentence  as the complete enunciation of law by this  Court. The  judgment  in Jaggo.v (supra) has in  our  opinion  been misappreciated  and that judgment cannot beinterprcted as  a sanction from the Supreme Court to the prosecution to  adopt the  practice of tcndering a witness  for  cross-examination only,   without   there   being   any   examinationin-chief, inrelation  to which the witness has to  be  cross-examined. All that the judgment In Jaggo’s case (supra) emphasises  is that the mere ipsi dixat of the prosecutor that a particular witness  has  been  won  over  is  not  conclusive  of  that allegation  and  the  Court  should  not  accept  the   same mechanically and relieve the prosecutor o his obligation  to examine such a witness.  It was for this reason suggested by the   Bench  that  where  the  prosecution  makes  such   an allegation,  it  must  keep the witness  in  attendance  and produce  him to enable the defence to cross examine  such  a witness  to test his evidence as well as the allegations  of the  prosecution  and  bring out the truth  on  the  record. After the coming into force of the Criminal Procedure  Code, 1973, which replaced the Code of 1998, recording of evidence in  commitment proceedings have been totally dispensed  with and   section   299   of  that  Code   has   been   emitted. Consequently,  the  course  suggested by some  of  the  High Courts in the earlier quoted judgments 505 regarding  tendering of a witness for cross-examination  who had  been examined in the committal court, is also  no  more relevant or available.  The Jaggo’s case, which was  decided when the Code of 1898 was operating in the field could  not, therefore, be pressed into service by the trial court  while dealing with the instant case tried according to the Code of 1973.  Thus, considered it is obvious that the trial  court, wrongly permitted the prosecution to tender PW4 and PW5  for cross-examination only.  Both PW4 and PW5 were, according to the prosecution case itself, eye witnesses of the occurrence and  had removed the deceased to the hospital.   Their  evi- dence was, of a material nature which was necessary for  the unfolding  of  the prosecution story.  The effect  of  their being  tendered  only for cross examination amounts  to  the failure  of  the prosecution to examine them at  the  trial. Their non-examination, in our opinion, seriously affects the credibility of the prosecution case and detracts  materially from its reliability. 21.  There  is yet another infirmity in this case.  We  find that  whereas  an  empty  had been  recovered  by  PW6,  ASI Raghubir  Singh  from the spot and a pistol  alongwith  some cartridges were seized from the possession of the  appellant at the time of his arrest, yet the prosecution, for  reasons best  known to it, did not send the recovered empty and  the seized  pistol to the ballistic expert for  the  examination and  expert  opinion.  Comparison could have  provided  link evidence  between the crime and the accused.  This again  is an omission on the part of the prosecution for which no  ex- planation  has been furnished either in the trial  court  or before  us.  It hardly needs to be emphasised that in  cases where  injuries are caused by fire arms, the opinion of  the

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Ballistic Expert. is of a considerable importance where both the  fire arm and the crime cartridge are  recovered  during the  investigation  to connect an accused  with  the  crime. Failure to produce the expert opinion before the trial court in  such  cases affects the creditworthiness  of  the  pros- ecution case to a great extent. 22.From  a critical analysis of the material on the  record, we  find  that it would not be safe to rely  upon  the  sole testimony of PW3 Gurmej Singh, the brother of the  deceased, without independent corroboration in view of the infirmities pointed  out by us above which render his testimony  as  not wholly  reliable  and  since in the  present  case  no  such independent  corroboration  is available on the  record,  it would  be unsafe to rely upon the testimony of PW3  only  to uphold the conviction of the appellant.  The prosecution has not  been able to establish the case against  the  appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.  The trial court, therefore, fell in  error in convicting and sentencing the  appellant.   His conviction  and sentence cannot be sustained.   This  appeal consequently  succeeds and is allowed.  The  conviction  and sentence of the appellant is set aside.  The appellant is on bail.  His bail bonds shall stand discharged. 507