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PETITIONER: SUKHDEV SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GRAM SABHA BARI KHAD & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/01/1977

BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1003            1977 SCR  (2) 862  1977 SCC  (2) 518

ACT:             Punjab  Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act  1961,  S.         2(g)   proviso (iv), application to land under possession of         owners.

HEADNOTE:             The  appellants filed a suit for a declaration that  the         suit land inherited by them was not "shamlat deh" within the         meaning  of section 2(g) of the Punjab Village  Common  Land         (Regulation)  Act, 1961, because it was excluded  by  virtue         of  proviso  (iv) to the clause.  They  contended  that  the         revenue  records describing the land as "shamlat  deh"  also         stated it to be "in possession of the owners", showing  that         it  was not used as "shamlat deh", and furthermore, that  it         had  been  partly purchased and partly received as  gift  by         their  ancestor before 26th January, 1950, and thereby  came         within  the scope of s. 2(g) proviso (iv) of the  Act.   The         appellants  failed  before the Trial Court, Court  of  first         appeal, and the High Court in second appeal.         Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court,             HELD:  (1) The fact that in 1914-15 it was  recorded  in         the ’jamabandi’ as "shamlat deh", shows that that particular         character  of the land was recognised even so far back,  and         it  could not detract from that nature of  the  land  merely         because it was further stated in the ’jamabandi’ that it was         in the possession of the owners "as per respective shares in         khewat".  [863 F-G]             (2)  Proviso (iv) requires that in order to be  excluded         from  the  category of "shamlat deh", the land  should  have         been  acquired  by purchase or in exchange  for  proprietary         land from a co-sharer in the "shamlat deh", which is not  so         in the case of the appellants.  [863 G]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 527 of 1975.             Appeal  by  Special Leave from the  Judgment  and  Order         dated  the  6-9-74 of the Punjab and Haryana High  Court  in         R.S.A. No. 933 of 1970.             K.L.  Gosain,  N.N. Goswamy and Arvind Minocha  for  the         Appellant.

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           Gokal  Chand Mittal, J.D. Jain, Arun Jain and (Miss)  K.         Miglani for Respondent.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             SHINGHAL, J.--The plaintiffs who have been  unsuccessful         in   the trial court, the court first appeal, and  the  High         Court  in   second appeal, have filed the-present appeal  by         special  leave.   They raised their suit for  a  declaration         that  the  suit land continued to be in their  ownership  in         spite  of the provisions of the Punjab Village Common  Lands         (Regulation)  Act,  1961,  hereinafter referred  to  as  the         Act. They pleaded that the land had been purchased by  their         ancestor  Udham  Singh, who rounded the village,  from  Raja         Sansar  Chand  of Dholwaha, some time before 1884, and  that         some other land   was         863         gifted  to him by one Smt. Dhani.   They claimed  that  what         they  had  thus acquired was not "shamlat  deh"  within  the         meaning of clause (g) of section 2 of the Act because it was         excluded  by  virtue of   subclause (iv) of the  proviso  to         -the  clause.   That  contention  has  been  negatived   all         through, and the short question for decision is whether  any         interference is called for with that view.             It  has  not been disputed before us that  the  land  in         question   was described in the revenue records as  "shamlat         deh", and  -’ excluded "ahadi deh."   That has in fact  been         amply  proved by the ’jamabandi’ of the year  1914-15  which         has  been  produced  by the plaintiffs  themselves  and  its         genuineness  has not been controverted before us.  As  such,         by virtue of the definition of "shamlat deh" in Clause   (g)         of  section 2, the suit land fall within the  definition  of         "shamlat deh". The question remains whether it was  excluded         from  that  definition by virtue of sub-clause (iv)  of  the         proviso to clause (g) which reads as follows .--                       "(iv)  having  been acquired before  the  26th                       January,  1950, by a person by purchase or  in                       exchange for proprietary land from a co-sharer                       in  the  shamilat deh is so  recorded  in  the                       jamabandi or is supported by a valid deed;"             It has been argued by counsel for the appellants that as         the  suit  land was recorded in the aforesaid  Jamabandi  as         "village  shamilat", in possession of the owners, it  should         be  held  that  the land was   not used  as  "shamlat  deh."         Counsel has argued further that as   the land was  purchased         by the plaintiffs’ ancestor Udham Singh who, had founded the         village,  from  Raja  Sansar Chand, and a part  of  it   was         received by way of gift from Smt.  Dhani, before January 26,         1950,  and it was so recorded in the ’jamabandi’,  the  suit         land  was excluded from the definition of "shamlat  deh"  by         virtue  of  the aforesaid subclause (iv’)  of  the  proviso.         The  argument is however untenable because of  two  reasons.         Firstly,  the  entry  in the ’jamabandi’  of  1914-15  which         recorded  that  the land was in possession  of  the  owners,         was quite innocuous, because it was made for the reason that         it  was   in nobody else’s possession.  The fact  that  even         then  it  was recorded in the ’jamabandi’ as  "shamlat  deh"         shows that that particular character of the land was  recog-         nised even as far back as 1914-15, and it could not  detract         from  that nature of the land merely because it was  further         stated  in the ’Jamabandi’ that it was in the possession  of         the owners "as per respective shares in khewat".   Secondly,         the  aforesaid sub-clause (iv) requires that in order to  be         excluded  from    the category of "shamlat  deh",  the  land         should  have  been acquired by purchase or in  exchange  for         proprietary land from a co-sharer in the "shamlat deh."   It         is not in controversy before us, and is not even the case of

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       the  appellants,  that the suit  land was  acquired by  pur-         chase  or  in exchange for  proprietary land from  any   co-         sharer  in  the "shamlat deh."  Then there is  the   further         fact  that  the appellants have not been able to prove  that         the suit land was recorded         864         in the ’Jamabandi’ as having been so acquired; and they have         not  been  able to produce any valid deed  of  purchase  .or         exchange from any such co-sharer.   We are therefore  unable         to think that the view taken in the impugned Judgment of the         High Court requires reconsideration.         The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.         M.R.                                   Appeal dismissed.         865