http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: SUBRAMANIA GOUNDAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MADRAS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/09/1957

BENCH: MENON, P. GOVINDA BENCH: MENON, P. GOVINDA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. KAPUR, J.L.

CITATION:  1958 AIR   66            1958 SCR  428

ACT:        Criminal law-Retracted confession-Corroboration, requirement        of--Question by recording magistrate-If an inducement.

HEADNOTE:        The  appellant was charged with murder.  The  eye  witnesses        against  him  were not relied upon.  He  made  a  confession        before a magistrate.  One of the questions put by the magis-        trate to the appellant before recording the confession  was:        "  For what purpose are you going to make a  statement?"  To        this he replied, " Others will be implicated in the case for        murder,  I alone have committed murder." It was argued  that        an  inducement was given by the magistrate by the manner  in        which the question was put.  The next day after the murder "        a drawer, a baniyan and a bed-sheet", all stained with human        blood were recovered from the appellant, for which no expla-        nation  was  given  by him.  The  confession  was  retracted        before the Court of Session.  These recoveries        429        were  used as corroboration of the confession.  It was  con-        tended that this was no corroboration.        Held,  that the confession was voluntary and the putting  by        the  magistrate of a perfectly innocuous question which  was        prescribed by the Madras Criminal Rules of Practice did  not        amount to an inducement to make a confession.        Held,  further,  that  there can be no  absolute  rule  that        retracted  confession  cannot  be acted upon  unless  it  is        corroborated  materially.  But as a matter of  prudence  and        caution,  which has sanctified itself into a rule of law,  a        retracted  confession  cannot be made solely  the  basis  of        conviction  unless it is corroborated.  It is not  necessary        that each and every circumstance mentioned in the confession        regarding the complicity of the accused should be separately        and independently corroborated, nor is it essential that the        corroboration must come from facts and circumstances discov-        ered after the confession was made.  It would be  sufficient        if  the general trend of the confession is substantiated  by        some  evidence which would tally with what is  contained  in        the confession.  In the instant case the recovery of clothes        stained  with  human blood for which the appellant  gave  no        explanation was sufficient corroboration of the confession.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

      Balbir  Singh  v. State of Panjab, A.I.R.  (1957)  S.C.  216        relied on.

JUDGMENT:        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 127  of        1957.        Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated        the 12th February, 1957, of the Madras High Court in  Crimi-        nal  Appeal  No. 728 of 1956 and Referred Trial No.  144  of        1956,  arising out of the judgment and order dated the  23rd        October, 1956, of the Court of the Addl.  Sessions Judge  of        the Coimbatore Division in S. C. Nos. 120 & 135 of 1956.        H.J. Umrigar and T. S. Venkataraman, for the appellant.        P.Rama Reddy and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.        1957.   September 17.  The following Judgment of  the  Court        was delivered by        GOVINDA MENON J.-Before the Additional Judge of the court of        Sessions of Coimbatore Division there were four accused,  of        whom  the first accused Subramania Goundan has now  appealed        to this court against the confirmation by the High Court  of        Madras of the conviction and sentence by the trial court, by        which,                                    430        on  charges Nos. 1 & 2, he was sentenced to death, and  also        sentenced  to rigorous imprisonment for two years on  charge        No. 3. Special leave to appeal was granted by order of  this        court, dated the 6th of May, 1957.  Along with the appellant        were tried three others, of whom the second accused (Marappa        Goundan)  was his father.  The third accused  (Karuppa)  was        the  grandson of the second accused’s paternal uncle,  while        the  fourth  accused (Iyyavu) was an agnate  in  the  fourth        degree of the second accused.  It is thus seen that all        the accused were related to each other.        The learned Sessions Judge framed four charges of which  the        first was against the appellant, that he on June 6, 1956, at        night  in  the  Village of  Vengakalpalayam,  committed  the        murder  of  Marappa Goundan by cutting him with  an  aruval;        while the second charge was that at about the same time  and        place and in the course of the same transaction, he  commit-        ted  the  murder  of Muthu Goundan by stabbing  him  with  a        spear.  The third count of the charge was against the  first        and  the second accused that they conjointly  committed  the        offence  of attempt to murder by stabbing one Munia  Goundan        with a spear and knife, and the last count of the charge was        against accused Nos. 3 & 4 that they abetted the  commission        of  the  offence of attempt to murder of  Munia  Goundan  by        being  -present  on the scene.  The learned  Sessions  Judge        acquitted accused Nos. 2, 3 & 4, but convicted and sentenced        the appellant before us in the manner stated above.        The village, where the offences were committed, was faction-        ridden  in which the appellant, his father and  others  took        one  side, whereas the two deceased individuals  along  with        Munia  Goundan and others, former the leaders of  the  rival        faction.  It was also stated that the appellant’s father was        the  leading man of the village, having been  assigned  that        dignity by the consent of the villagers.        The prosecution case is that the dignity of the  appellant’s        family  had  been offended by certain actions of  the  rival        party  and it was apprehended by the appellants father  that        his prestige and        431        influence,  as  the  chief-man of the  village,  were  being        gradually undermined and usurped by the rival group.   About

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

      three days prior to the occurrence, which took place on  the        night  between  the  6th and the 7th of  June,  1956,  Munia        Goundan is said to have stated to the hearing of the  appel-        lant that he (Munia Goundan) would wipe out the  appellant’s        father and his partisans, and if that were not possible,  in        a  spirit of humiliation, Munia Goundan would shave off  his        moustache.   It  is further alleged that  the  two  deceased        individuals also proclaimed words to that effect.        Angered  at this threat of extermination of his  family  and        inflamed  by the enmity due to the faction that had  already        existed, the appellant, according to the prosecution, having        armed himself with an aruval (a sickle) a spear and a  knife        left  his house on the night of the 6th and 7th June,  1956,        proceeded  to a place known as Chettithottam where  the  de-        ceased  Marappa Goundan was sleeping in his field-shed,  and        cut  him  on the neck with the aruval, and  inflicted  other        injuries on him before leaving the place.  Thereafter  while        on  his  way to the house of Munia Goundan to do  away  with        him,  the appellant met the deceased Muthu Goundan  who  was        coming  in  the opposite direction and thinking  that  Muthu        Goundan  would  catch him, inflicted a stab wound  on  Muthu        Goundan.   After  this the appellant went to  the  house  of        Munia  Goundan (P.  W. 5) and stabbed him also.   Not  being        content  with  committing these crimes, he set fire  to  the        shed of Sennimalai Goundan (P.  W. 4-who was also a partisan        of  the  rival faction) which lay at a distance  about  four        furlongs  from  the village.  Thereafter the  appellant  re-        turned to his own garden and lay down.        Karuppa  Goundan (P.W. 1) hearing cries and noise  from  the        direction  of the house of Munia Goundan, ran  towards  that        place, followed by Sennimalai Goundan (P.W. 4) who similarly        heard  the  same cries.  They found Munia Goundan  (P.W.  5)        with  injuries  on him and also saw the shed  of  Sennimalai        Goundan (P.W. 4) aflame.  At this P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 proceed-        ed to the burning shed and on the way saw Natarajan        432        (P.W. 10), the son of the deceased Marappa Coundan,  weeping        and  lamenting in his field.  Reaching the  place  wherefrom        P.W.  10 was wailing, P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 saw Marappa  Goundan        lying  dead on a cot in s the shed with injuries.  It is  in        evidence  that  the witnesses then saw the shed  of  P.W.  4        completely  burnt  down and after that Karuppa  Goundan  and        Sennimalai  Goundan went to the house of the village  Munsif        who  was living about four miles away from the  village  and        gave  a report about the occurrence at about 5 a.m. on  7-6-        1956  and  which is on record as  Exhibit  P.I.  Information        reached the Sub-Inspector of Police of Avanashi (P.W.17)  at        8-30  a.m.  who reached the place of occurrence at  11  a.m.        Investigation  was then started, the details of which it  is        unnecessary  to mention.  At about 12 noon near a temple  in        the village finding the appellant there, the SubInspector of        Police arrested him after which the appellant made a  state-        ment, the admissible portions of which are marked as Exhibit        P. 13.  From the appellant material objects Nos. 10 and  11,        a bloodstained drawer and a baniyan respectively worn by him        were  seized  and the appellant thereafter took  the  Police        Officer to his garden and took out M. 0. 12, a blood-stained        bed-sheet from a rafter in the garden shed which,  according        to  the prosecution, was used by the appellant for  wrapping        himself  up after he lay down in his shed subsequent to  the        commission of the crime.  Statements were taken by the  Sub-        Inspector  from  a number of  persons,  including  Natarajan        (P.W. 10), son of Marappa Goundan, Nachimuthu Goundan  (P.W.        11) son of Muthu Goundan, Munia Goundan (P.W. 5) and others.        We do not think it necessary to describe the details of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

      investigation and the examination of witnesses regarding the        accusations against the acquitted persons.        On  June 9, 1956, at about 3-50 p.m. the appellant was  pro-        duced  before Sri P. I. Veeraswami, Sub-Magistrate  (P.   W.        7), who administered the necessary warnings under the Crimi-        nal Rules of Practice and being satisfied that the appellant        wanted to make a voluntary statement, he was given two day’s        time for                                    433        reflection  till June 11, 1956, on-which date the  appellant        was  produced  before the same Magistrate at 3-50  p.m.  The        same warnings were again administered to him and the  Magis-        trate was satisfied that the statement about to be made  was        a  voluntary  one.   Thereafter  it  was  recorded  in  the,        appellant’s own words, read over to him and acknowledged  by        him  to be correct.  This statement in which  the  appellant        confessed to having committed the murder of Marappa  Goundan        and  Muthu  Goundan  and also inflicted  injuries  on  Munia        Goundan on the night in question, is exhibited as P. 3/A.        In  order to prove the case against the appellant  the  main        reliance  on  the side of the prosecution was  on  Natarajan        (P.W.  10),  the  eye-witness to the attack  on  his  father        Marappa  Goundan,  and with regard to the  murder  of  Muthu        Goundan,  the  case rested on the  testimony  of  Nachimuthu        Goundan (P.W. 11), son of Muthu Goundan, who is said to have        told  the witness (P.W. 12) that the appellant  had  stabbed        Muthu with a spear.  Subbanna Goundan (P.W. 12), a neighbour        of Muthu Goundan, also spoke to the fact that he heard Muthu        Goundan  saying  that the appellant had stabbed him  with  a        spear.   The assault on Munia Goundan (P.W. 5) is spoken  to        by  himself.  In addition to this evidence, the  prosecution        rested its case on the confession of the appellant-.  Before        the learned Sessions Judge the appellant denied the  offence        and retracted the confession made by him on the ground  that        the Sub-Inspector and the Circle Inspector of Police threat-        ened to implicate the appellant’s father and five others  in        the crime if he did not confess and that was the reason  why        he made a false confession.        The learned Sessions Judge accepted the testimony of Natara-        jan  (P.  W. 10), Nachimuthu Goundan (P.W. 11) and  Subbanna        Goundan  (P.W. 12) with regard to the murders and also  that        of  Munia Goundan (P.W. 5) and Komaraswami Goundan (P.W.  6)        with  regard to the attack on Munia Goundan.  He  also  held        that the confession, Exhibit P. 3/A, was voluntary and  true        and on the footing of the oral evidence,        434        corroborated  amply  by the confession,  the  appellant  was        convicted and sentenced.  In the High Court Somasundaram  J.        who delivered the judgment of the court, was not inclined to        place reliance on the oral testimony of P.W. 5, P.W..10  and        P.W.  1 1. The learned Judge was of the opinion that it  was        not  safe to act on the evidence of Natarajan (P.W. 10)  and        convict  the appellant of the offence of murder  of  Marappa        Goundan.   The  High Court did not accept  the  evidence  of        Nachimuthu Goundan (P.W. 11) and Subbanna Goundan (P.W. 12).        In  the  same strain the judgment of the High  Court  states        that it is not safe to act on the evidence of Munia  Goundan        (P.W.  5) and (P.W. 6) Komaraswami Goundan.  The  conclusion        was  that the oral evidence did not reach that  standard  of        proof  necessary for reliance to sustain a  conviction,  but        the  learned judge upheld the conviction on the ground  that        as the confession was voluntary and true, it can be believed        though  the same was retracted.  Opinion was also  expressed        that  the confession was corroborated by the recovery of  M.        0.  12, as a result of the statement made by  the  appellant

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

      which contained human-blood for which there was no  explana-        tion  whatsoever.   Corroboration was also afforded  by  the        existence  of human-blood on M. Os. 10 & 11.  The  question,        therefore, before us is whether the High Court erred in  law        in agreeing with the trial court regarding the guilt of  the        appellant.        Had the High Court come to the conclusion that the  evidence        of P.Ws. 5, 10 & 11 can be accepted in order to sustain  the        conviction  of the appellant, the question would  have  been        simpler  of  solution,  and alternatively  were  this  court        inclined  to appraise the credibility or otherwise of  their        testimony,  whether a different conclusion would  have  been        arrived  at, is unnecessary to speculate.  On a  perusal  of        the  evidence  of these witnesses, it cannot  be  said  that        their testimony is such as should be relegated to the  realm        of  disbelief  Even so, we have decided to  proceed  on  the        footing  that  the testimony of  the  important  prosecution        witnesses would not be sufficient                                    435        for a conclusion that the appellant is guilty beyond reason-        able doubt.        The ultimate approach, therefore, to the question should  be        whether the confession, Ex.  P. 3/A, is entitled to credence        and  be acted upon.  The learned counsel for the  appellant,        Sri Umrigar, was at pains to show, firstly that the  confes-        sion was not voluntary ; secondly it is not true and  lastly        that  even if these’ two tests are answered in the  affirma-        tive  so  far as the prosecution is concerned, it  would  be        very  unsafe  to  act on this  retracted  confession  which,        according to him, was resiled from as early as an opportuni-        ty  occurred.  Dealing with the first question,  he  pointed        out that the appellant was produced at 3-45 p.m., on June 9,        1956, before the Sub -Magistrate in the court hall which was        cleared  of all police officials, and the Jail Warder  alone        was placed in-charge; thereafter the Sub-Magistrate gave the        necessary warnings and enough time was given for reflection.        The  criticism levelled by the appellant’s counsel  is  that        despite  these beneficient actions, still the  influence  of        the police on the appellant still remained and that even  at        the  time when the confession was given. it cannot  be  said        that  the  appellant  was free from  police  pressure.   Our        attention  was invited to passages in  cross-examination  of        P.W.  7 where he had stated that on both the occasions  when        the appellant was produced for recording of the  confession,        the Police Constable in guard at the Sub-Jail was in  charge        and  further  that there is a gate way  between  the  Police        Station and the court, and that gate way is the approach  to        the  Subjail.  From these circumstances inference is  sought        to  be  drawn that though during the  relevant  periods  the        incarceration  of the appellant was in a Sub-Jail, still  he        was under police custody and influence and, therefore, there        was  no clearance of the supervening police control on  him,        in order to make his mind free from all such influence.   We        have carefully gone through the questions put by the  Magis-        trate,  not  only on June 9, 1956, when  the  appellant  was        given  time  for reflection, but also on those on  June  11,        1956,  when he gave the confessional statement, and  we  are        satisfied        56        436        that  nothing could be said against the procedure  followed.        The  learned Magistrate has clearly conformed to the  proce-        dure prescribed by ss. 164 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure        Code,  as well as to the directions laid down in the  Madras        Criminal Rules of Practice as a preliminary to the recording

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

      of the confession.  The meagre cross-examination of the Sub        Magistrate  has not brought out any  material  circumstances        which  would, in any way, detract from the satisfactory  was        in  which  he has performed his official duty.  In  the  en-        dorsement at the foot of the confessional statement the Sub-        Magistrate (P.W. 7) says that he had explained to the appel-        lant that he (the appellant) was not bound to make a confes-        sion  and if he does so, it may be used as evidence  against        him;  and  the endorsement further goes on to add  that  the        Sub-Magistrate believed that the confession was  voluntarily        made.  The next remark is that it was taken in his  presence        and  hearing and read over to the confessor who admitted  it        to be correct.  But it is urged against the voluntary nature        of  the  confession,  that an inducement was  given  by  the        Magistrate  by the manner in which the questions  were  put.        One  of the questions was ’Why do you want to give a  state-        ment and the answer given was It is suspected that those who        have committed murder are others.  To prove that it is I who        have stabbed, I am giving the statement.’ The above was  the        question put and the answer given on June 9, 1956.  On  June        11, 1956, the question and the answer were as follows:        " Q. For what purpose are you going to make a statement ?        A.   Others  will  be implicated in the case for  murder,  I        alone have committed murder.  I am going to give the  state-        ment to that effect."        When  he resiled from the confession in the Sessions  Court,        the  appellant stated that the Sub-Inspector and the  Circle        Inspector  went to him in Sub-Jail and threatened to  impli-        cate his father, accused No. 2 in the lower court, and  five        others,  unless  he confessed.  Therefore, it  was  on  this        account  that the statement Ex. P. 3/A was made  before  the        Magistrate which the        437        accused alleged was neither true, nor voluntary.  The  argu-        ment  of  the learned counsel is that in order to  save  his        father and some others, the appellant implicated himself and        confessed falsely to an act which he did not commit.  Criti-        cism has been levelled against the mode and manner in  which        the  question was put as directly inducing the appellant  to        immolate himself and thereby save his kith and kin.  We  are        asked  to say that the appellant, being an  emotional  young        man  of noble sentiments and spirit, did not desire to  have        his  father implicated in a crime of this sort and what  may        be  ascribed as a filial obligation was performed in  trying        to  get release of his father from the enmeshes of  the  po-        lice.   Such  an argument, we are afraid, cannot  carry  any        conviction.   The form of the question is prescribed by  the        Criminal  Rules of Practice and if the officer  before  whom        the  confession is made, fails to put it, then  his  failure        will be criticised as blameworthy.  We do not feel that  any        nefarious  object existed in putting a  perfectly  innocuous        and obligatory question to the appellant asking him "Why  he        wants  to make a statement?" Further, P.W. 17, the  Investi-        gating Sub-Inspector, has clearly denied the alleged induce-        ment  by  the  police that if be did  not  confess,  others,        including  his father, would be implicated in the case.   It        is, therefore, difficult to conclude that there was any kind        of inducement or threat as a result of which an  involuntary        confession was made.        A  complaint is made by the learned counsel that before  the        Committing  Magistrate no question under s. 342 Cr.   P.  C.        was put to the appellant with regard to the confession  and,        therefore,  he  had no opportunity to put forward  his  com-        plaint  about the confession until the case came before  the        Sessions court.  No doubt a scrutiny of the statement of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

      accused  before the Sub-Magistrate does not reveal any  spe-        cific questions as having been put to him about the  confes-        sion, but the fact remains that the confession was exhibited        before  the Committing court and the contents were known  to        the  appellant then and there.  Under s. 207-A, sub-cl.  (3)        of the Criminal Procedure Code, even at the commencement  of        the enquiry into a case triable by a        438        Sessions  Court the Committing Magistrate is enjoined,  when        the  accused is brought before him, to satisfy himself  that        the documents mentioned in s. 173 have been furnished to the        accused  and if it is found that they have not so  far  been        furnished,  it  is the duty of the Magistrate to  cause  the        same  to  be furnished.  Section 173, sub-cl. (4)  makes  it        obligatory  upon the Police to furnish the accused  free  of        cost  with a copy of the police report, the F.I.R. under  s.        154 and all other documents on which the prosecution propose        to rely, including statements and confessions if any record-        ed under s. 164.  The result, therefore, is that even before        the commencement of the committal proceedings the’ appellant        had  been provided with the copy of the confessional  state-        ment  sought to be relied upon for justifying a prima  facie        case  against  him.   We do not ,think,  granting  that  the        confession  was not placed in the fore-front as a  piece  of        evidence against the accused in the Committing Court, such a        default if it is one, would in any way show that the confes-        sion was involuntary.        The  second  aspect of the learned counsel’s  contention  is        that  the  confession  is not true.  In  Sarawan  Singh  and        Harbans  Singh  v, The State of Punjab (1)  this  court  ex-        pressed  the  opinion that for the purpose  of  finding  out        whether  a  confession  is true, it would  be  necessary  to        examine the same and compare it with the rest of the  prose-        cution  evidence and the probabilities of the case, and  Mr.        Umrigar  relying on these observations urges that on a  com-        parison of the confession with the other parts of the prose-        cution  evidence, the irresistible conclusion should  follow        that on the face of it the confessional statement is untrue.        The material portions of the confessional document  concern-        ing the actual crime are to the following effect:        " So, on Wednesday night at about 11 O’clock, I took aruval,        spear  and  knife  sharp on both sides and  went  to  Chetty        Thottam,  near our garden.  Marappa Goundan, then was  lying        on the cot in his shed and sleeping.  I cut him with  aruval        on  the  neck.   While coming from there, to  the  house  of        Muniappa Gouildan        (1)  Criminal Appeals NOS. 22 and 23 Of 1957, decided  April        10, 1957.        439        in  our village, Muthu Goundail came opposite to me  in  our        village  street.   Thinking  that he came  to  catch  me,  I        stabbed him.  The aruval fell there itself.        Then,  I went to Muniappa Gouudan’s house, and  stabbed  Mu-        niappa Goundan.        Afterwards, I set fire to the shed of Sennimalai Goundan  at        a distance of four furlongs to our village.  Then I came  to        our garden and lay."        From this, according to the defence counsel, it is seen that        only  one  cut was inflicted with an aruval on the  neck  of        Marappa  Goundan and a single stab was given to Muthu  Goun-        dan.  Similarly Munia Goundan was only stabbed once, but  in        Ex.  P. 4 the postmortem certificate on the body of  Marappa        Goundan there are as many as thirteen injuries of which  the        neck  injuries  were 4, 5 and 6, the others being  on  other        parts of the body.  It is, therefore, urged that the unques-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

      tionable  fact of the existence of a number of  injuries  on        Marappa belies the truth of the confession, in that only one        cut  was given on the neck.  Similarly the  confession  does        not  make any mention of the presence of any One  else  when        Munia  Goundan was stabbed, though both P. W. 5 and  P.W.  6        have  deposed that there were three persons who were  coming        northward from the shed of Marappa Goundan at the time  P.W.        5  was  stabbed.  The statement made by P.W. 5 (Ex.   D.  2)        before the Medical Officer on June 8, 1956, was also to  the        effect  that  more  persons than one were  involved  in  the        attack on him.  The confession also does not make any refer-        ence  to the recovery of the incriminating articles such  as        M. 0. 12 as a result of a statement made by the appellant to        the  police officer.  From these circumstances we are  asked        to  say  that the confession cannot be  true.   Mr.  Umrigar        urges  that  the learned Judges of the High Court  have  not        paid  sufficient attention to this method of  examining  how        far  a  confession is true by comparing it  with  the  other        evidence  in the case in accordance with the test laid  down        by  this court.  Even in the absence of such  comparison  in        the judgment of the High Court we do not think that on  that        ground  it  can  be predicated that the  appellant  made  an        untrue  statement  voluntarily.  After all  the  absence  of        elaborate        440        details in a confession cannot brand it as false.  There  is        no statement in the confession which is contrary to the oral        evidence  though the details put forward when the  witnesses        were  examined  in  court do not appear in  extenso  in  the        confession  and for that reason we are not prepared  to  say        that the confession. in untrue.        The  next question is whether there is corroboration of  the        confession  since it has been retracted.  A confession of  a        crime  by a person, who has perpetrated it, is  usually  the        outcome of penitence and remorse and in normal circumstances        is  the best evidence against the maker.  The  question  has        very  often arisen whether a retracted confession  may  form        the  basis of conviction if believed to be true  and  volun-        tarily made.  For the purpose of arriving at this conclusion        the  court has to take into consideration not only the  rea-        sons  given for making the confession or retracting  it  but        the attending facts and circumstances surrounding the  same.        It may be remarked that there can be no absolute rule that a        retracted confession cannot be acted upon unless the same is        corroborated materially.  It was laid down in certain  cases        one  such being Kesava Pillai alias Koralan and another  and        Kesava  Pillai  alias Thillai Kannu Pillai (1) that  if  the        reasons given by an accused person for retracting a  confes-        sion  are on the face of them false, the confession  may  be        acted upon as it stands and without any corroboration.   But        the  view taken by this court on more occasions than one  is        that  as a matter of prudence and caution which has  sancti-        fied  itself  into  a rule of law,  a  retracted  confession        cannot  be  made solely the basis of conviction  unless  the        same  is corroborated one of the latest cases being  ’Balbir        Singh Versus State of Punjab (2), but it does not necessari-        ly  mean that each and every circumstance mentioned  in  the        confession regarding the -complicity of the accused must  be        separately and independently corroborated, nor is it  essen-        tial that the corroboration must come from facts and circum-        stances discovered after the confession was made.  It  would        be sufficient, in our opinion, that the        (1) I.L.R. 53 Mad. 16o.        (2) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 216.        441

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

      general  trend  of the confession is substantiated  by  some        evidence  which  would tally with what is contained  in  the        confession.   In this connection it would be  profitable  to        contrast  a  retracted confession with the  evidence  of  an        approver  or  an  accomplice.  Though under s.  133  of  the        Evidence  Act a conviction is not illegal merely because  it        proceeds  on  the  uncorroborated  testimony  of  witnesses,        illustration  (b) to s. 114 lays down that a court may  pre-        sume  that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he  is        corroborated in material particulars.  In the case of such a        person  on  his  own showing he is a  depraved  and  debased        individual  who  having  taken part in the  crime  tries  to        exculpate  himself  and  wants to fasten  the  liability  on        another.   In such circumstances it is absolutely  necessary        that  what he has deposed must be corroborated  in  material        particulars.   In contrasting this with the statement  of  a        person  making a confession who stands on a better  footing,        one  need only find out when there is a  retraction  whether        the  earlier  statement, which was the  result  of  remorse,        repentance and contrition, was voluntary and true or not and        it  is  with that object that corroboration is  sought  for.        Not  infrequently one is apt to fall in error in equating  a        retracted  confession  with the evidence  of  an  accomplice        and.therefore,  it  is advisable to clearly  understand  the        distinction between the two.  The standards of corroboration        in  the two are quite different.  In the case of the  person        confessing  who  has  resiled from  his  statement,  general        corroboration  is sufficient while an accomplice’s  evidence        should be corroborated in material particulars.  In addition        the  court must feel that the reasons given for the  retrac-        tion in the case of a confession are untrue.        Applying this test to the present case, we are of the  opin-        ion that when the appellant has given no satisfactory expla-        nation  for the presence of human-blood on material  objects        Nos. 10, 11 & 12, it follows that the blood of the  murdered        was  on these material objects.  The reasons for  retraction        are  also false.  A criticism is levelled that the  Chemical        Examiner’s report does not show the extent of blood on M.O.        442        No.  12, the bed-sheet, in which the appellant wrapped  him-        self  after  the offence.  All that the document  states  is        that  among other items it is also stained with  humanblood,        but Mr. Umrigar argues that this description only shows that        there would have been only a speck or a spot of blood on the        bed sheet, for according to him, as a matter of fact,  there        should  have been a large quantity of blood on the hands  of        the appellant if he had, without washing, used a  bed-sheet,        thereafter  large patches of blood are likely to be  present        on  the  bed-sheet.  If that is so, the mere fact  that  the        presence of blood is described as stains would show that the        prosecution case cannot be true.  We do not feel inclined to        put  such  a  restricted  meaning  on  the  word  I  stain’.        ’Stained  with human blood’ is an expression commonly  found        in  Chemical Examiner’s reports and it does not  necessarily        refer  to specks of blood alone.  We do not think  that  any        inference  can be drawn from the use of the word ’stain’  in        the  Chemical Examiner’s report, that there was  not  suffi-        cient  blood on the bed-sheet.  The appellant has  given  no        explanation  as to how blood came to be present on  material        objects  Nos. 10 to 12.  Agreeing with the High  Court  that        this  is corroboration of the confession made by the  appel-        lant, we are of the opinion that the confession can be acted        upon.  If that is so, the appellant’s guilt has been  proved        beyond reasonable doubt.                    The appeal is dismissed.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

                                   Appeal dismissed.