NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7277 OF 2002   

Subhan Rao and others ……..Appellants

Versus

Parvathi Bai and others …….Respondents

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi,  J.

1. Whether  Smt.  Sundrabai  wife of Ramchandra  Rao, who was given  

right  to  enjoy  certain  lands  belonging  to  Shiddoji  Rao  (predecessor-in-

interest of the appellants) in lieu of maintenance became full owner thereof  

in terms of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short, `the  

Act’) and the sale deeds executed by her were valid are the questions which  

arise for consideration in this appeal filed against judgment dated 26.9.2001  

of  the  learned  Single  Judge  of  Karnataka  High  Court,  who  declined  to  

interfere with the concurrent dismissal of the suit filed by the appellants.  

2. The relationship of the parties is depicted in the chart given below:

Shiddoji Rao Yeshwant Rao             Gangubai (Mistress/Concubine) (died on 16.01.1942)

       Sadashiv Rao  (son of Shiddoji Rao) married to Prafulladevi (Plaintiff No.2) (Appellant No.2)

(Plaintiff No.1)         Subhan Rao                              (Appellant No.1)

                 Sadashiv Rao Shiddoji Rao Appellant No.2 (b)                Appellant No.2 (a)

                                                  Miss Pretam Appellant No.2 (c)

                        3. Shiddoji Rao was Pargana Watandar of Nagarmanoli, Chikkodi Taluk.  

He owned agricultural lands in  Belagali and Kabbur villages of Chikkodi  

Taluk, Belgam District.   He kept Gangubai as his mistress.   Ramchandra  

Rao  was  born  from that  relationship.   Shiddoji  Rao  died  on  16.1.1942.  

About  four  months  before his  death,  Shiddoji  Rao executed maintenance  

deed Ex.P-1 (his son Sadasiv Rao joined his father in executing the deed),  

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(Adopted  son  of  Sadashiv Rao)  

Ramchandra  Rao  Shiddoji Rao (Son  born  from  the  relationship  of  Shiddoji Rao, died in  1957)  

Sundrabai (Wife of Ramchandra  Rao, died on  22.7.1979)

whereby  possession  of  Rayatawa  lands  situated  at  Belagali  and  Kabbur  

villages  was  given  to  Ramchandra  Rao  for  his  maintenance  with  a  

stipulation that in case of his death without having natural male issue, his  

wife shall enjoy the lands for her maintenance till her life time and the same  

shall  revert  to the executants after  her death.   The deed also contained a  

condition that Ramchandra Rao, his wife and natural heirs shall not create  

any encumbrance or alienate the lands.  The relevant portions of Ex.P-1 are  

extracted below:

“Deed  of  maintenance  in  respect  of  Rayatawa  lands  situated at Belagali and Kabbur.  Lands valued at Rs.5000/-.

Deed  of  maintenance  executed  in  favour  of  Chi.  Ramachandra Siddojirao Parwatrao, caste Lingayat, occupation:  agriculture,  age  45  years,  resident  of  Nagarmunoli  by  (1)  Siddojirao  Yeshwantrao  Parvatrao  and  (2)  Sadashivarao  Siddojirao  Parvatrao,  both  Lingayasts  by  caste,  occupation  Zamindari,  aged  72  and  22  years  respectively  resident  of  Nagaramonoli, taluka Chikodi is as under:

You are  the  son of  Gangabai  concubine of  the  person  No.1 out of us, and are born from him (No.1), and the person  No.1 himself has been maintaining you will uptil now.  As you  too have been behaving well and affectionately with us, and as  both of us have been behaving well and affectionately with you,  and as both of us have affection for you and think it proper to  make  some  arrangements  for  maintenance  of  you  and  your  natural  issue and as you too have made this demand to us –  through the panchas, we have in pursuance thereof given into  your  possession  this  day  for  your  maintenance  the  below  mentioned lands which have been of our ownership and in our  wahiwat.  Particulars of these lands are as follows:

Description  of  the  Rayatawa  lands  situate  within  the  limits of the Inam village, namely Belgali and Kabbur, within  

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the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar  of Taluka Chikodi,  Sub- District Chikodi, Dist. Belgaum.

R.S.  No.

Area Assessment Rs.

3

12

  9.8

26.31

9

12

These  lands  of  entire number are  situate  at  the  village Belgali

334 262

20.32 14.-3

14-2-0

12-3-0

The  lands  of  entire  numbers  are  situate  at  Kabbur  Kasaba  Kabbur

Thus,  as  the  above  mentioned  immovable  property  is  given into your possession today for the maintenance of your  and your natural male issue, you should live happily by happily  enjoying the said property from today.  In case you die without  having any natural male issue, your wife Sundrabai shall, after  your death, enjoy the said lands for her maintenance only till  her life time.  After her death the said lands shall return to us.

Neither you, nor your wife and your natural heirs shall  have any right whatever for laying encumbrance upon and for  alienating the said lands in any manner whatsoever.   In case  none of your natural male issue survives after your death, the  said entire property shall return to our family.  No contention  whatsoever of anyone shall be maintainable in this behalf.

As the above mentioned property, is as per your demand  made through the panchas, given to you and your natural heirs  for your proper maintenance as mentioned above, there is no  right title and interest of yours left in any manner with regard to  us.  The valuation of the said property, is Rs.5000/- as per the  market value.   

To the above effect the deed of maintenance is duly executed.

Dated 1st September 1941, handwriting of ..”

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4. Ramchandra  Rao  died  in  1957  and  Smt.  Sundrabai  died  in  1979.  

During her life time, Smt. Sundrabai executed sale deeds  in favour of Smt.  

Parvathi  Bai (defendant No.1 – respondent No.1) and S/Shri  Deepak and  

Vinayak (defendant Nos. 2 and 3 – respondent Nos.2 and 3) in respect of  

some of the lands specified in Ex. P-1.

5. Subhan Rao (adopted son of Sadashiv Rao) (appellant No.1 herein)  

and Smt. Prafulla Devi wife of Sadashiv Rao who is now represented by her  

legal representatives, filed O.S. No. 62/1974 for declaration of title and for  

setting aside the sale deeds executed by Smt. Sundrabai, who was impleaded  

as  defendant  No.4  in  the  suit.   After  the  death  of  Smt.  Sundrabai,  Smt.  

Ningawwa and Prakash Virupaksh Mahajan (respondent Nos. 4 and 5) were  

brought on record as her legal representatives on the basis of registered Will  

executed by the deceased.  Appellant Nos.1 and 2 filed another suit being  

O.S. No. 116/1982 for grant of injunction to restrain the defendants from  

alienating the suit lands.

6. The thrust of the case set up by the appellants was that Shiddoji Rao  

and  Sadashiv  Rao  executed  deed  of  maintenance,  which  has  also  been  

described  as  `potagi  patra’  with  a  view  to  provide  maintenance  to  

Ramchandra  Rao  (illegitimate  son  of  Shiddoji  Rao)  and  his  wife  Smt.  

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Sundrabai during their lifetime and as both of them died issueless, the lands  

automatically reverted to the family of the executants.  They also pleaded  

that in view of the express bar contained in Ex.P-1 against alienation of the  

lands  mentioned  therein,  the  sale  deeds  executed  by  Smt.  Sundrabai  in  

favour of respondent Nos.1 to 3 were nullity and they did not acquire any  

right on the basis of such alienation.    

7. In the written statements filed on behalf of the defendants in the suit,  

it  was  pleaded that  `potagi  patra’  executed  by  Shiddoji  Rao and his  son  

Sadashiv Rao was in the nature of settlement deed whereby they recognized  

the antecedent rights of Ramchandra Rao in the co-parcenary property and  

the restriction contained against alienation of the property was not binding  

on them.  It was further pleaded that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act,  

Smt. Sundrabai became full owner of the lands specified in Ex.P-1 and she  

was entitled to deal with and alienate the same.

8. The trial Court framed as many as 18 issues in O.S. No. 62/1974 and  

5 issues in O.S. No. 116/1982.  After considering the pleadings and evidence  

of the parties, the trial Court dismissed both the suits and held that two items  

of  agricultural  land situated  at  Belagali  village  were  part  of  watan lands  

regranted in favour of Ramchandra Rao and the other two items of land in  

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Kabbur village were his absolute property.  The trial Court further held that  

Ex.P-1 was in the nature of settlement deed executed by Shiddoji Rao in  

recognition  of  the  pre-existing  rights  of  his  illegitimate  son  and  the  

conditional  estate created in his favour was contrary to the provisions of  

Transfer of Property Act.  The trial Court further held that Smt. Sundrabai  

had a pre-existing right of maintenance from the family of Shiddoji Rao and  

in view of Section 14(1) of the Act, she became full owner of the lands after  

the death of her husband and, as such, the alienations  made by her were  

legal and valid.   

9. The lower appellate Court held that Ex.P-1 was not in the nature of  

settlement deed in recognition of any pre-existing right of Ramchandra Rao  

and he did not get anything more than life estate in the property mentioned  

therein.  However, the finding of the trial Court that by virtue of Section  

14(1) of the Act Smt. Sundrabai became absolute owner of the property and  

she was entitled to alienate the same was affirmed by the lower appellate  

Court.

10. While admitting the second appeal, the learned Single Judge of the  

High Court framed the following question:

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“Whether the right of maintenance conferred on defendant No.4  under the document Ex.P.1 had enlarged into an absolute right  under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?”  

After hearing the counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge framed the  

following additional question:

“Whether the Courts below were justified in declaring title of  the two watan lands of Belagali village when the very regrant is  being agitated before the competent authorities?.”

11. The learned Single Judge considered the arguments of the counsel for  

the parties in detail, referred to `Classical and Modern Hindu Law’ (Vol.3)  

by J.  Duncan M. Derett,  `Hindu Dharamshastra’  (Vol.  2)  by P.V.  Kane,  

`Digest  of  Hindu  Law  on  Contracts  and  Successions’  by  Cole  Brooke,  

`Manual  on  Hindu  Law’  (Vol.  1)  by  S.T.  Strang,  and  several  judicial  

pronouncements and observed:

“What  emerges  from  Ex.P.1  is  Siddoji  Rao  had  recognized  Ramachandra Rao as his son and Sundari Bai as his daughter- in-law though not in the legal sense but at least in the biological  sense.  It is not improbable that he realized that he was obliged  to maintain the family of Ramachandra Rao morally even if it is  said that he thought that he was not legally bound.  After the  death of Siddoji Rao, this moral liability for maintenance of the  family  of  Ramachandra  Rao  and  his  wife  got  matured  into  “legal liability” in respect of the property of Siddoji Rao in the  hands of Sadashiva Rao, Hindu Law has recognized the moral  duty of a father-in-law to maintain the widowed daughter-in- law from his self acquired property and on his death, the said  moral  liability  ripens  into  a  legal  liability,  in  respect  of  the  property of the  father-in-law, (See the decision of Madras High  Court in APPAVU UDAYAN Vs. NALLAMMA 1948(1) Mad.  L.J.,  110).   No doubt this principle of Hindu Law applies to  cases where the widowed daughter-in-law was the wife of the  

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legitimate son of the father-in-law.  I am only referring to this  case  to  appreciate  how  the  Hindu  Law  viewed  the  duty  to  maintain persons who are related even morally also.  In a case  like the one on hand where this duty is felt by Siddoji Rao to  maintain,  his  son  and  his  family  members  it  may  not  be  improper to  extend the above reasoning of  the  Madras  High  Court to this case on the peculiar facts.  There is nothing in the  Hindu  Law  which  was  applicable  prior  to  the  adoption  and  maintenance  act  or  in  the  provisions  of  the  Adoption  and  Maintenance Act which prohibits the application of the above  reasonings.

In my view the combined reasoning of what is stated above,  leads to the conclusion that Sudari Bai had a right or interest to  be maintained in whatever way or form earlier to the execution  of Ex.P.1 and Ex.P.1 can be related to this right.”

The  learned  Single  Judge  then  referred  to  Section  14  of  the  Act,  the  

judgments of this Court in  V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC  

99, Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh (1987) 3 SCC 674  and held:

“In this case I have held that Sundari Bai prior to execution of  Ex.P.1 had certainly a claim, interest or a right for maintenance  in the properties of Siddoji Rao.  Ex.P.1 can only be relatable to  this interest and the life estate created in her favour under Ex.  P.1 fructifies and matures into an absolute estate after coming  into force of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act Sundari  Bai became an absolute owner of the suit properties viz., lands  in Kobbur village and the findings of the Court below though  on a different reasoning cannot be held to be illegal or against  the provisions of Hindu Law.”

The learned Single Judge then noticed that the regrant order made in favour  

of Ramchandra Rao was challenged by Sadashiv Rao by filing an appeal  

before Assistant Commissioner, Chikkodi, which was pending and held that  

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finding recorded by the trial Court on the issue of title of the property was  

pre-mature.   Accordingly, he reversed the conclusion of the courts below  

that  Ramchandra  Rao  had  acquired  title  of  two watan  lands  of  Belagali  

village and held that the parties shall abide by the decision of the authorities  

under  the  Kulkarni  Watan  Abolition  Act  before  whom  the  matter  was  

pending.   

12. Shri Shyam Divan, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the  

concurrent finding recorded by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court  

that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, Smt. Sundrabai became owner of  

the lands specified in Ex.P-1 is liable to be set aside because the executors  

had created only life estate in favour of Ramchandra Rao and his wife Smt.  

Sundrabai.  To buttress this argument, the learned senior counsel relied upon  

the contents of Ex.P-1.  Shri Diwan then referred to the judgment of the  

Division  Bench  of  Mysore  High  Court  in  Ramachandra  Rao  v.  

Sadashivarao Shiddojirao Parvatrao (1967) 2 Mysore Law Journal, page  

303,  to  show  that  the  suit  filed  by  Ramchandra  Rao  for  partition  and  

possession of 1/4th share in the properties belonging to the family of Shiddoji  

Rao  was  dismissed  by  the  three  courts  including  the  High Court  on  the  

premise that the plaintiff was an illegitimate son of Shiddoji Rao.   Learned  

senior counsel argued that in view of that judgment Ramchandra Rao or for  

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that reason his wife Smt. Sundrabai could not claim absolute right over the  

lands mentioned in Ex.P-1 and the courts below as well as the High Court  

committed serious error by refusing to nullify the sale deeds executed by  

her.   

13. Shri  V.N.  Ganpule,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

contesting respondents supported the impugned judgment and argued that  

the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to interfere with the  

concurrent  finding recorded by the two courts  that after  the death of  her  

husband, Smt. Sundrabai became full owner of the lands in relation to which  

life interest was created in her favour.  Shri  Ganpule  argued  that  

dismissal of the suit filed by Ramchandra Rao did not have any impact on  

the  right  of  Smt.  Sundrabai,  who  became  full  owner  of  the  lands  by  

operation of law.  Learned senior counsel laid emphasis on the language of  

the explanation appearing below Section 14(1) of the Act and submitted that  

the learned Single Judge of the High Court rightly declined to interfere with  

the concurrent finding recorded by the two courts that Smt. Sundrabai had  

become full owner of the suit lands and the sale deeds executed by her were  

valid.   Learned  senior  counsel  then  argued  that  once  Smt.  Sundrabai  

acquired absolute right over the lands, the restriction contained in Ex.P-1  

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against alienation thereof became redundant and she was entitled to sell the  

same.

14. We have considered the respective arguments and submissions.  The  

nature of the right created in favour of Hindu female by Section 14 of the  

Act was considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in  V. Tulasamma  

and others v. Sesha Reddy  (supra).   Fazal Ali, J.  analysed Section 14,  

referred to the views of several jurists and judicial precedents and recorded  

the following conclusions:

“(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an empty  formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter  of  grace and generosity,  but  is  a tangible right  against  property  which  flows  from  the  spiritual  relationship  between  the  husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure  Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even by the  earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a  right  may not  be a right  to property but  it  is  a  right  against  property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain  his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the  legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for  the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally  enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim  for  maintenance  is  doubtless  a  pre-existing  right  so  that  any  transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer  any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing  rights.

(2) Section  14(1)  and  the  Explanation  thereto  have  been  couched  in  the  widest  possible  terms  and  must  be  liberally  construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object  of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends sought to  be achieved by this long needed legislation.

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(3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso  and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation  of  Section  14(1)  materially.  The  proviso  should  not  be  construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main  provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way  so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

(4) Sub-section  (2)  of  Section  14  applies  to  instruments,  decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new  titles  in  favour  of  the  females  for  the  first  time  and has  no  application  where  the  instrument  concerned  merely  seeks  to  confirm,  endorse,  declare  or  recognise  pre-existing  rights.  In  such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally  permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in this sphere.  Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a  pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or  share  to  which  the  female  is  entitled,  the  sub-section  has  absolutely  no  application  and  the  female’s  limited  interest  would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force  of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the  document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is  allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a  share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of  sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite  any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.

(5) The use  of  express  terms like  ‘property  acquired  by a  female Hindu at a partition’,  ‘or in lieu of maintenance’,  ‘or  arrears of maintenance’, etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1)  clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories  which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub- section (2).

(6) The  words  ‘possessed  by’  used  by  the  Legislature  in  Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include  the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in  actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a widow  gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or  

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at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been  given actual possession under a final decree, the property would  be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1)  she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well  settled  that  the  possession  of  the  widow,  however,  must  be  under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section  does  not  contemplate  the  possession  of  any  rank  trespasser  without any right or title.

(7) That the words ‘restricted estate’ used in Section 14(2)  are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and  they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of  limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”

Bhagwati, J. recorded concurring opinion on his own behalf and on behalf of  

Gupta, J. in paragraph 70 of the judgment, the relevant portion of which is  

extracted below:-

“This line of approach in the construction of sub-section (2) of  Section 14 is amply borne out by the trend of judicial decisions  in this Court. We may in this connection refer to the decision in  Badri Pershad case. The facts in that case were that one Gajju  Mal owning self-acquired properties died in 1947 leaving five  sons and a widow. On August 5, 1950, one Tuisi Ram Seth was  appointed by the parties as an arbitrator for resolving certain  differences  which  had  arisen  relating  to  partition  of  the  properties left by Gajju Mal. The arbitrator made his award on  October 31, 1950 and under clause 6 of the award, the widow  was awarded certain properties and it was expressly stated in  the  award  that  she  would  have  a  widow’s  estate  in  the  properties awarded to her. While the widow was in possession  of the properties, the Act came into force and the question arose  whether on the coming into force of the Act, she became full  owner of the properties under sub-section (1) or her estate in the  properties  remained a  restricted  one under  sub-section (2)  of  Section  14.  This  Court  held  that  although the  award  gave  a  restricted estate to the widow in the properties allotted to her, it  was  sub-section  (1)  which  applied  and  not  sub-section  (2),  

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because inter alia the properties given to her under the award  were on the basis of a pre-existing right which she had as an  heir  of  her  husband  under  the  Hindu  Women’s  Right  to  Property Act, 1937 and not as a new grant made for the first  time. So also in  Nirmal Chand v.  Vidya Wanti  (dead) by her  legal representatives there was a regular partition deed made on  December  3,  1945  between  Amin  Chand,  a  coparcener  and  Subhrai Bai, the widow of a deceased coparcener, under which  a  certain  property  was  allotted  to  Subhrai  Bai  and  it  was  specifically  provided  in  the  partition  deed  that  Subhrai  Bai  would be entitled only to the user of the property and she would  have no right to alienate it in any manner but would only have a  life interest. Subhrai Bai died in 1957 subsequent to the coming  into  force  of  the  Act  after  making  a  will  bequeathing  the  property  in  favour  of  her  daughter  Vidyawanti.  The right  of  Subhrai Bai to bequeath the property by will was challenged on  the ground that she had only a limited interest in the property  and her case was covered by sub-section (2) and not sub-section  (1). This contention was negatived and it was held by this Court  that  though  it  was  true  that  the  instrument  of  partition  prescribed  only  a  limited  interest  for  Subhrai  Bat  in  the  property,  that  was in recognition of  the  legal  position which  then prevailed and hence it did not bring her case within the  exception contained in sub-section (2) of Section 14. This Court  observed:

“If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a share in her husband’s  properties then the suit properties must be held to have  been allotted to her in accordance with law. As the law  then stood she had only a life interest in the properties  taken  by  her.  Therefore  the  recital  in  the  deed  in  question that she would have only a life interest in the  properties allotted to her share is merely recording the  true legal position. Hence it is not possible to conclude  that the properties in question were given to her subject  to  the  condition  of  her  enjoying  it  for  her  lifetime.  Therefore the trial court as well as the first appellate  court were right in holding that the facts of the case do  not fall within Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession  Act, 1956.”

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It  will  be seen from these observations that  even though the  property was acquired by Subhrai Bai under the instrument of  partition,  which  gave  only  a  limited  interest  to  her  in  the  property, this Court held that the case fell within sub-section (1)  and  not  sub-section  (2).  The  reason  obviously  was  that  the  property was given to Subhrai Bai in virtue of a pre-existing  right  inheriting  in  her  and  when  the  instrument  of  partition  provided  that  she  would  only  have  a  limited  interest  in  the  property,  it  merely  provided  for  something  which  even  otherwise would have been the legal position under the law as it  then stood.  It  is  only when property  is  acquired by a Hindu  female  as  a  new grant  for  the  first  time and the instrument,  decree, order or award giving the property prescribes the terms  on which it  is to be held by the Hindu female,  namely, as a  restricted  owner,  that  sub-section  (2)  comes  into  play  and  excludes the applicability of sub-section (1). The object of sub- section (2) as pointed out by this Court in Badri Pershad case  while  quoting  with  approval  the  observations  made  by  the  Madras High Court in Rangaswami Naicker v.  Chinnammal is  “only to remove the disability of women imposed by law and  not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of  which a  woman’s right  was  restricted”  and,  therefore,  where  property is acquired by a Hindu female under the instrument in  virtue of a pre-existing right, such as a right to obtain property  on partition or a right to maintenance and under the law as it  stood prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  Act,  she  would have no  more than limited interest  in the property,  a  provision in the  instrument giving her limited interest in the property would be  merely  by  way  of  record  or  recognition  of  the  true  legal  position and the restriction on her interest being a “disability  imposed by law” would be wiped out and her limited interest  would be enlarged under sub-section (1).”

15. In  Gulwant  Kaur  and  another  v.  Mohinder  Singh  and  others  

(supra),  a  two-Judge  Bench  again  considered  the  scope  of  Section  14,  

referred  to  some  earlier  judgments  including  Tulasamma’s case  and  

observed:

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“It is obvious that Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions  or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full  owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession is  traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige of  a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired  by  inheritance  or  devise  or  at  a  partition  or  in  lieu  of  maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own  skill  or  exertion or  by purchase or  by prescription or  in any  other manner whatsoever.  The explanation expressly refers to  property  acquired in  lieu  of  maintenance  and we do not  see  what further title the widow is required to establish before she  can  claim  full  ownership  under  Section  14(1)  in  respect  of  property  given  to  her  and  possessed  by  her  in  lieu  of  maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient  title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if  she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Sub- section (2)  of  Section 14 is  in the nature of  an exception to  Section 14(1)  and provides  for  a  situation where  property  is  acquired by a  female  Hindu under  a  written  instrument  or  a  decree of court and not where such acquisition is traceable to  any antecedent right.

We do not understand the court as laying down that what was  enlarged by sub-section (1) of Section 14 into a full estate was  the Hindu woman’s estate known to Hindu law. When the court  uses the word “limited estate”, the words are used to connote a  right  in  the  property  to  which  the  possession  of  the  female  Hindu may be legitimately traced, but which is not a full right  of ownership. If a female Hindu is put in possession of property  pursuant to or in recognition of a right to maintenance, it cannot  be denied that she has acquired a limited right or interest in the  property and once that position is accepted, it follows that the  right gets enlarged to full ownership under Section 14(1) of the  Act. That seems to us to follow clearly from the language of  Section 14(1) of the Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether concurrent  

finding recorded by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court that by  

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virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, Smt. Sundrabai became full owner of the  

lands over which she was given right of enjoyment in lieu of maintenance  

was  vitiated  by  any  patent  legal  infirmity  warranting  interference  under  

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and whether the learned Single  

Judge  was  right  in  answering  question  No.1  against  the  appellants.   A  

reading of Ex.P-1, the relevant portions of which have been extracted in the  

earlier part of the judgment makes it  clear that Shiddoji Rao and his son  

Sadashiv Rao had executed deed of  maintenance  in  respect  of  Rayatawa  

lands situated in Belagali and Kabbur villages in favour of Ramchandra Rao  

and Smt. Sundrabai because they believed that it was the duty of the family  

to maintain them.  In their pleadings before the trial Court, the appellants did  

not dispute that Smt. Sundrabai was entitled to get maintenance from the  

family of her father-in-law, Shiddoji Rao.  Not only this, the parties went to  

the  trial  on  an  agreed  premise  that  she  had  a  pre-existing  right  of  

maintenance and she was given the right to enjoy the lands in lieu of her  

maintenance.  If Parliament had not enacted Section 14(1) of the Act, Smt.  

Sundrabai would have, in view of the plain language of Ex.P-1, enjoyed the  

property during her life time only and after her death the same would have  

reverted to  the family of  the  executants.   However,  by virtue of  Section  

14(1) of the Act, Smt. Sundrabai acquired absolute right over the lands in  

respect  of  which  she  was given  right  of  enjoyment  and she  became full  

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owner thereof without any restriction on her right to deal with the property  

in the manner she liked.  Therefore, the sale deeds executed by her were  

legal and the courts below as well as the High Court did not commit any  

error by declining to nullify the same.

17. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.  However, the parties are left to  

bear their own cost.

………………………….…J. [G.S. Singhvi]

……………………………..J. [Asok Kumar Ganguly]

New Delhi September 14, 2010.

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