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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1394-1395 of 2004

PETITIONER: State through SPE & CBI, AP

RESPONDENT: M. Krishna Mohan & Anr

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/10/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

1.      Correctness of a judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court of  Judicature at Andhra Pradesh is in question in this appeal whereby and  whereunder an appeal from a judgment of conviction dated 13.12.1996 by  Special Judge, FO CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam in C.C. No.11 of 1994 has  been allowed.   2.      Respondents herein were Manager and Field Officer of Chaitanya  Grameena Bank, Penumaka Branch, Guntur District. Allegations against  them were that they conspired with each other in the matter of sanctioning  and disbursing loans of Rs.5,000/- each under Crop Loan A/c. No.85/23,  86/221, 87/10, 85/95, 86/224 and 87/12 as contained in Exhibits P-1 to P-6  in the names of fictitious persons by forging signatures and thumb  impressions of the proposed borrowers in the documents resulting in  misappropriation of the proceeds of Rs.30,000/-.  The offences in question  allegedly took place during the period 7.12.1984 to 14.8.1986.  Respondent  No.2 herein joined his services on 7.12.1984 as a Field Officer on probation.   He was allegedly transferred to another branch on 15.8.1986.  The First  Information Report was lodged on 31.12.1991 under Sections 409, 420 467  and 477-A read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5  read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.   3.      Investigations were made into the said allegations.  The prosecution,  in support of its case, examined as many as 22 witnesses.   4.      PW-21, K.V.V. Satyanarayana and PW-22, Kolluri Seetha are  husband and wife.  They purported to have applied for loan which was  sanctioned on the same day.  The loan granted to both of them was renewed  for two subsequent years.  It was the prosecution case that they were  residents of Ramamindaram Street, Satyanarayana Puram, Vijayawada,  whereas they were shown to be residents of Penumaka in the District of  Guntur.  PW-4, Meka Kotireddy, was the village Sarpanch who proved that  the loans were granted in the name of fictitious persons and that Exhibits  marked as P-1, P-2 and P-5 were not the residents of village Seethanagaram.   PW-3, U. Jayaprada Kumari, was the accountant of the bank who had paid  the amount of loan in cash to respondent No.1.  PW-5, M. Mallikarjuna Rao,  was another accountant who said that the amount of loan was paid in cash to  Respondent No.1.  PW-7, B.M.S. Peter, was the post man who also proved  that loan was sanctioned in the name of fictitious persons.  PW-17, is a  finger print expert who proved that thump impressions appearing on the loan  account were that of accused No.1.   5.      The learned Trial Judge on analyzing the evidences brought on  records opined : "As per the addresses given in the loan  applications covered by Exs. P.1 to P.6 the loanees  are the residents of Seethanagaram village.  But  the evidence of P.Ws. 21 and 22 show that they are

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residing at Vijayawada and they have no lands.  As  per the evidence of P.W.1, A.2 recommended the  loans in the loan documents Exs.P.1 and P.2 and  A.1 sanctioned.  P.W.3, U. Jayapradaha Kumari,  who worked as Cashier for about 3 years along  with A.1 and A.2 has stated that the debit voucher  for Rs.1,000/- dated 5.5.87 in Ex.P.3 loan  documents passed for payment by A.1 and she  paid the amount.  She received the debit voucher  for Rs.1,000/- and put her initial on the relevant  entry marked as Ex.P26 and A.1 put his initial  against the entry in respect of crop loans A/c.  No.87/10.  She entered the payment in respect of  crop loan 87/10 in the rough chitta.  Ex.P.27 is the  relevant entry.  In Ex.P.6 loan documents both  appraisal report and the sanctioning authority  signed by A.1 and the debit voucher for Rs.1000/-  passed by A.1 and the amount was paid by her.   Ex.P.28 is the relevant entry in the payment scroll  and contains her initials and A.1.  She paid the  cash of Rs.1000/- each under two debit vouchers in  the loan documents Exs. P.3 and P.6 to A.1.   P.W.5, M. Mallikarjunarao who worked as Clerk- cum-Cashier, when A.1 and A.2 worked, has  stated that the crop loans covered by Exs. P.1, P.2,  P.4 and P.5 were sanctioned by A.1 and the  appraisal report was signed by A.1.  He paid the  amount to A.1 in respect of said loans. XXX                          XXX                         XXX So the entire evidence referred above show that the  persons whose photos affixed to the loan  applications and the names of the persons  mentioned in the loan applications were never  resided in Seethanagaram Village and the evidence  of P.Ws. 21 and 22 the husband and wife, who  originally took the gold loans from Panumaka  Branch of Chaitanya Grameena Bank is  corroborated by the evidence referred  abovewitnesses that they never resided in  Seethanagaram Village."

6.      Before the learned Trial Judge, a contention was raised that the  departmental proceeding has been initiated against respondent No.2 herein  resulted in exoneration and, thus, he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal.   The said contention of accused No.2 was rejected by the learned Trial Judge  opining that the report of the enquiry officer who enquired into the charges  had not been brought on record.   7.      The High Court, however, reversed the said judgment of the learned  Trial Judge holding that the procedure adopted for obtaining fingerprints  being contrary to the fundamental rights of the accused, the same was not  admissible in evidence.  It was observed that the Bank did not receive any  complaint from the loanees and the prosecution having not brought any  corroborative material on record, the impugned judgment of the Trial Judge  cannot be sustained.  Furthermore respondent No.2 having been exonerated  in the departmental proceeding, a different view could not be taken by the  criminal court.   8.      We may notice the views of the High Court in this behalf which is in  the benefit to the following effect : "The procedure as adopted by the prosecution  especially during the investigation by the  investigation officer by taking the signatures and  thumb impressions of the Manager itself is not  valid and inadmissible in evidence.  Except the  report of the officer of the Bank, there is no

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complaint of whatsoever nature from the loanees  as to non-receipt from any proper quarters at any  point of time.  Therefore, in the absence of proper  evidence being available, it is too difficult to  accept the mere statement of P.W.4, the Sarpanch  especially for showing the non-existence of the  loanees and draw any presumption as to falsifying  the record and misappropriation of the amounts by  the appellants herein.  There is absolutely no  acceptable evidence to show that at the time of  verification, the loanees were not present before  the Field Officer.  In the absence of any  documentary evidence in its support, it is not safe  to simply place reliance on the oral testimony of  P.W.4.  Admittedly, as per the cashier, she has  made due entries and a rough chitta in regard to the  receipt of the payments."

9.      Mr. Amerendra Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor General,  appearing on behalf of the appellants, interalia, would submit that : 1.      In view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of  Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad [AIR 1961 SC 1808], the High Court  committed a serious error in opining that accused persons could not  have asked to give their specimen left thumb impression or signatures. 2.      Keeping in view the fact that the loan had been sanctioned in form of  non-existing persons, the question of their coming forward to lodge  any complaint in relation thereto did not arise and, in fact, PW-21 and  PW-22, in whose name, the loans were sanctioned, came forward and  deposed before the learned Trial Judge stating that they had not  obtained any loan. 3.      The High Court furthermore committed a serious error in passing the  impugned judgment in so far as it failed to take into consideration that  the prosecution had proved, beyond all reasonable doubts, its case on  the basis of the testimonies of PW3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-7, PW-17,  PW-21 and PW-22.   4.      Exoneration of Respondent No.2 in the departmental enquiry could  not have been a ground for recording a judgment of acquittal. 10.     Mr. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent  No.1, on the other hand, submitted : 1.      PW-3 and PW-5 were not trustworthy witnesses as both of them had  accepted that there was no documentary evidence to show that they  had paid the amount to accused No.1.   2.      Accused No.1 being the Manager of the Bank, could not have  sanctioned the loan save and except on the basis of appraisal report  issued by Accused No.2, who was the Field Officer.   3.      The amount of loan being only Rs.5,000/- purported to have been paid  each to PW-21 and PW-22 and the same having been only renewed in  subsequent years, this Court should draw the presumption that the  loanees have been repaying the loan amount. 4.      The report of the fingerprint expert should not have been accepted by  the learned Trial Judge as the thumb impression of the right middle  finger had been taken and not the left thumb impression. 11.     Mr. Nageshwar Rao, senior counsel appearing on behalf of accused  No.2, urged that respondent No.2 was entitled to a judgment of acquittal  inasmuch as : 1.      The prosecution case is that all acts of forgeries which had been done  by accused No.1 and the accused No.2 was only a witness thereto. 2.      The only charge against Respondent No.2 being that he was the one  who prepared the appraisal report, which being only a procedural  requirement, he could not have been convicted for the offence of  forgery.   3.      Respondent No.2 having joined the services only in the year 1984 and  having been transferred on or about 14.8.1986 and subsequent  renewal of loans having been processed in 1987, he must be held to be

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wholly innocent. 4.      The departmental proceedings against Respondent No.2 having  resulted in his exoneration, he could not have been convicted in the  criminal case.   12.     Following facts emerge from the records :         On 20.5.1985 one K.Venkata Satyanarayana (PW-21) applied for crop  loan of Rs.5,000/-.  In the said application, he was shown to be the resident  of village Seetanagaram, district Guntur.  In his deposition, PW-21 stated  that he was a resident of District Vijayawada.  The appraisal report was prepared by the Field Officer on 20.5.1985  itself whereupon the Manager made recommendations and sanctioned the  loan on the very same day, i.e., 20.5.1985.  The amount of loan was also  disbursed on the same day.   On 14.6.1986, loan of K. Venkata Satyanarayana was renewed and all  the formalities, i.e., from the stage of filing application to disbursement on  renewal were completed on the very same day.   On 14.6.1986, Mrs. K. Seeta (PW-22) wife of K. Venkata  Satyanarayana, also purported to have applied for a crop loan of Rs.5,000/-.   In her application also, her residence was shown as village Seetanagaram,  District Guntur, while in her deposition, she stated that she was a resident of  District Vijayawada.  On this occasion also, all the formalities for grant of  loan were completed on 14.6.1986 itself and amount of the loan was  disbursed on the very same day.   On 4.5.1987, loan of K. Venkata Satyanarayana was again renewed.   On the basis of the existing appraisal report, sanction of loan was granted by  the Manager and the loan amount was also disbursed on the same day.   Evidently, the formalities required to be complied with for grant of  loan, appraisal report recommendation, sanction and disbursement of loan  were completed on the very same day on which application for grant of loan  was filed.   PW-4, the village Sarpanch, in his deposition also stated that PW-21  and PW-22 in whose favour the abovesaid loans were sanctioned were not  the resident of village Seetanagaram. 13.     Both PW-3 and PW-5, in their depositions before the learned Trial  Court stated about the procedure for grant of loan followed in the bank.  It  appears that the accused No.1 for all intent and purport used to do  everything himself which were required offering for the purpose of grant of  loan.  It has furthermore been brought on record that PW-21 and PW-22  were known to the Manager of the Bank, i.e. Respondent No.1.  They were  residents of a different district, namely, Vijayawada.  They had taken loan  from the said bank on deposit of gold ornaments on an earlier occasion.   They redeemed the said loan and took their ornaments back.  They were  known to the respondent No.1 since then. 14.     The modus operandi of respondent No.1 appeared to be that he had  affixed his own thumb impression instead of the those of the loanees, viz.  PW-21 and PW-22 respectively.  Upon sanction of the said loan, the  accountant concerned paid the amount of loan to accused No.1.  Loan was  purported to have been sanctioned either on the same day or within a few  days from the date of purported applications.  The said loans, as noticed  hereinbefore, were also renewed for the years 1986 and 1987. 15.     The finger print expert, in his evidence, proved that specimen  fingerprints marked as S-1 to S-4 in Exhibit P-38 tallied with the disputed  fingerprints marked as Q-166, Q-169, Q-170, Q-171 and Q-172 with the  specimen right middle finger impressions marked as S-4-11 on the F.P. slip  marked as S-4.   16.     Our attention, however, has been drawn by Mr. Prabhakar to the  statement that the finger impressions marked as S-4 were more clear than the  finger impressions marked as S-1 to S-3, to contend that the said specimen  impressions were not clear. 17.     PW-17, Mr. Venkateswara Rao, is a fingerprint expert.  He had been  working in Finger Bureau as Finger Print Searcher since 1971.  He had  passed All India Finger Print Expert’s Examination conducted by Central  Finger Print Bureau, Calcutta.  He was promoted as Finger Print Expert in  the year 1975 and was furthermore promoted as Finger Print Inspector in  1979.  He had deposed in a number of civil and criminal cases as an expert.  

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18.     We do not find any reason to discredit the testimony of the said  expert.  He was a qualified Finger Print Examiner.  Apart from the  fingerprints, the prosecution had also obtained the specimen handwritings of  Respondent No.1. Handwritings on the said loan documents/applications for  grant of loan was found to be that of accused No.1. 19.     PW-3, U. Jayaprada Kumari, in her deposition, stated : "Both myself and A-2 were directly appointed to  Penumaka branch.  After receiving the loan  documents from the borrowers all the documents  will be filled up by the bank officials during lunch  hour.  The loan documents will be filled up after  the disbursement the loan amounts to the  borrowers.  The Branch Manager used to obtain  the signatures and that thumb impression of the  borrowers on loan application."

20.     PW-5, Mallikarjuna Rao, also stated that debit vouchers of Rs.4,000/-  in Exhibit P-6 loan document contained only one stamp showing as cash  paid but it did not contain his signature although, it purported to have been  shown to be his.  Ext. P-6 was, therefore, was a forged document. 21.     It may be true, as has been contended by Mr. Prabhakar that there was  no documentary evidence to show that the amount had actually been paid in  cash to the accused No.1.  But then no documentary evidence would be  available as it was for the respondent No.1, as Manager of the Bank to hand  over the amount in cash to the loanees upon receiving the same from PW-3.   22.     The aforementioned two witnesses who had been working in the same  branch of the bank with the respondents herein have proved the procedures  adopted in the matter of grant of loan.  There cannot, therefore, be any doubt  whatsoever that ample materials have been brought on record by the  prosecution which led to only one conclusion that the accused were  responsible therefor.   23.     It may be true that no act of forgery and misappropriation has been  attributed to Respondent No.2, but he was the one who had prepared the  appraisal report.  After preparation of such appraisal report, the loan amount  having been sanctioned and the amount of loan purported to have been paid  to the loanees and, hence, we are of the opinion that he was also guilty of  commission of the said offence.   24.     Documents pertaining to the loan transactions bear the same date, i.e.,  process of application, technical recommendation, preparation of appraisal  report, sanction and disbursement of loan.  All transactions, therefore, took  place on the same date which clearly establishes that they were manipulated  by Respondent No.1.   25.     PW-3, in her deposition, in no uncertain line, stated that all  transactions right from application to disposal took place in the afternoon of  a day and all the documents used to be processed during the lunch hour,  whereas as per to the procedure, the disbursement of loan could take place  only upon proper verification thereof.   26.     The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, completely misdirected  itself in passing a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondents.  The  learned Trial Judge had assigned cogent reasons in support of its findings.   The High Court did not meet the said reasonings.   27.     It purported to have laid emphasis on exoneration of respondent No.2  in departmental enquiry. 28.     The departmental enquiry was completed even before the  investigation in this case started.  The Investigating Officer (PW-23), in his  evidence, stated : "I am not aware whether the Departmental enquiry  was conducted against A.2 and it was completed  even before I started my investigation."

29.     Furthermore, the enquiry report has not been brought on record.  The  factum of exoneration of respondent No.2 in the departmental proceedings  was raised by way of defence.  It was, therefore, obligatory on his part to

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bring on record all the relevant documents, namely, the charge-sheet, the  other materials brought on record by the department and the findings of the  Enquiry Officer.  If the statement of the Investigating Officer (PW-23) is to  be accepted and there is absolutely no reason as to why it should not be;  there was no occasion for the enquiry officer to have the benefit of the  depositions of the purported loanees, namely, PW-21 and PW-22, the  opinion of the fingerprint expert and other material brought on record by the  prosecution which clearly established the involvement of the respondents  herein. 30.     Mr. Nageshwar Rao relied upon a decision of this Court in P.S. Rajya  v. State of Bihar [(1996) 9 SCC 1].  The fact situation obtaining therein was  absolutely different.  In that case, in the vigilance report, the delinquent  officer was shown to be innocent.  It was at that juncture, an application for  quashing of the proceedings was filed before the High Court under Section  482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was allowed relying on State  of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335], holding : "23. Even though all these facts including the  Report of the Central Vigilance Commission were  brought to the notice of the High Court,  unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the  issues raised had to be gone into in the final  proceedings and the Report of the Central  Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant  of the same charge in departmental proceedings  would not conclude the criminal case against the  appellant. We have already held that for the  reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the  criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant  cannot be pursued." (Underlining is ours for emphasis)

31.     The said decision was, therefore, rendered on the facts obtaining  therein and cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that  exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso facto would lead to a judgment  of acquittal in a criminal trial 32.     In Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary & Ors.  [(1995) 6 SCC 225], this Court while considering a matter of sanction, vis-‘- vis, exoneration in a departmental proceedings, held : "We find force in the contention. The grant of  sanction is only an administrative function, though  it is true that the accused may be saddled with the  liability to be prosecuted in a court of law. What is  material at that time is that the necessary facts  collected during investigation constituting the  offence have to be placed before the sanctioning  authority and it has to consider the material. Prima  facie, the authority is required to reach the  satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute  the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant  sanction. The grant of sanction, therefore, being  administrative act the need to provide an  opportunity of hearing to the accused before  according sanction does not arise. The High Court,  therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the  order of sanction is vitiated by violation of the  principles of natural justice."

33.     In a case of this nature where departmental proceeding was initiated  only as against respondent No.2, the enquiry officer did not have the benefit  to consider all the materials which could be brought on record by the  Department in the light of the investigation made by a specialized  investigating agency, the evidence of experts and deposition of witnesses to  show that forgery of document has been committed by forging thumb  impression and handwriting, we are of the opinion that exoneration of  respondent No.2 in the departmental proceedings cannot lead to the

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conclusion that he was not guilty of commission of the offences wherefor he  was charged. 34.     The High Court also committed a manifest error in purporting to hold  that the specimen fingerprints and handwritings could not have been taken  from Respondent No.1.   35.     Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 clearly  provides for such a contingency and read as under : "5. Power of Magistrate to order a person to be  measured or photographed.\027If  a Magistrate is  satisfied that, for the purposes of any investigation  of proceeding under the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) it is expedient to  direct any person to allow his measurements or  photograph to be taken, he may make an order to  that effect, and in that case the person to whom the  order relates shall be produced or shall attend at  the time and place specified in the order and shall  allow his measurements or photograph to be taken,  as the case may be, by a police officer: Provided that no order shall be made directing any  person to be photographed except by a magistrate  of the first class: Provided further, that no order shall be made under  this section unless the person has at some time  been arrested in connection with such investigation  or proceeding. 6. Resistance to the taking measurements, etc.\027 (1)  If any person who under this Act is required to  allow his measurements or photograph to be taken  resists or refuses to allow the taking of the same, it  shall be lawful to use all means necessary to secure  the taking thereof. (2) Resistance to or refusal to allow taking of  measurements or photograph under this Act shall  be deemed to be an offence under section 186 of  the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)."

36.     A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu  Oghad [AIR 1961 SC 1808], examined the question in regard to the  application of the aforementioned provisions, vis-‘-vis the constitutional  mandate that nobody shall be compelled to be a witness against himself as  contemplated in Article 20 of the Constitution of India in great details.  It  was clearly held : "10. "To be a witness" may be equivalent to  "furnishing evidence" in the sense of making oral  or written statements, but not in the larger sense of  the expression so as to include giving of thumb  impression or impression of palm or foot or fingers  or specimen writing or exposing a part of the body  by an accused person for purpose of identification.  "Furnishing evidence" in the latter sense could not  have been within the contemplation of the  Constitution makers for the simple reason that \027  though they may have intended to protect an  accused person from the hazards of self- incrimination, in the light of the English law on the  subject \027 they could not have intended to put  obstacles in the way of efficient and effective  investigation into crime and of bringing criminals  to justice. The taking of impressions of parts of the  body of an accused person very often becomes  necessary to help the investigation of a crime. It is  as much necessary to protect an accused person  against being compelled to incriminate hims elf, as

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to arm the agents of law and the law courts with  legitimate powers to bring offenders to justice.  Furthermore it must be assumed that the  Constitution-makers were aware of the existing  law, for example, Section 73 of the Evidence Act  or Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of  Prisoners Act (33 of 1920). Section 5 authorises a  Magistrate to direct any person to allow his  measurements or photographs to be taken, if he is  satisfied that it is expedient for the purposes of any  investigation or pro ceeding under the Code of  Criminal Procedure to do so: "Measurements"  include finger impressions and foot-print  impressions. If any such person who is directed by  a Magistrate, under Section 5 of the Act, to allow  his measurements or photographs to be taken  resists or refuses to allow the taking of the  measurements or photographs, it has been declared  lawful by Section 6 to use all necessary means to  secure the taking of the required measurements or  photographs. Similarly, Section 73 of the Evidence  Act authorises the court to permit the taking of  finger impression or a specimen handwriting or  signature of a person present in court, if necessary  for the purpose of comparison.    11.     When an accused person is called upon by  the court or any other authority holding an  investigation to give his finger impression or  signature or a specimen of his handwriting, he is  not giving any testimony of the nature of a  "personal testimony". The giving of a "personal  testimony" must depend upon his volition. He can  make any kind of statement or may refuse to make  any statement. But his finger impressions or his  handwriting, in spite of efforts at concealing the  true nature of it by dissimulation cannot change  their intrinsic character. Thus, the giving of finger  impressions or of specimen writing or of  signatures by an accused person, though it may  amount to furnishing evidence in the larger sense,  is not included within the expression "to be a  witness".  

37.     For the views we have taken, the impugned judgment of the High  Court cannot be sustained.  We are not oblivious of the fact that presumption  of innocence is a human right and when an accused is acquitted by a court,  such presumption becomes stronger.  We are furthermore not oblivious that  a superior court, ordinarily, would not interfere with a finding of acquittal, if  two views are possible as has been held by this Court in State of Haryana v.  Sher Singh & Ors. [(2002) 9 SCC 356]; Narender Singh & Anr. v. State of  M.P. [(2004) 10 SCC 699] and Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. [(2006) 9  SCC 731] whereupon Mr. Nageshwar Rao has placed strong reliance. 38.     It is, however, a trite law that an appellate court, while entertaining an  appeal from a judgment of acquittal, would also be entitled to consider the  evidences brought on record by both the prosecution and the defence and  arrive at its own decision.  Interference with a judgment of acquittal may not  be made when two views are possible to be taken, but when on appraisal  thereof, only one view is possible, the appellate court would not hesitate to  interfere with the judgment of acquittal.           In this case, we are firmly of the view that no two views are possible  to be taken.   39.     Mr. Rao, however, would submit that involvement of respondent No.2  is minimal.  He had proposed an appraisal report but there is nothing to show  that he had obtained any monetory benefit.  

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40.     The entire prosecution case relating to charges of forgery and  misappropriation has been attributed to respondent No.1 alone.  He was the  one who had put on shelves all the procedural requirements.  Not only he,  during the luncheon hours, filled up the application forms, but even prior  thereto he had purported to have received the documents, sanctioned the  loan and obtained the amount of loan in cash.  PW-21 and PW-22 were  known to him and not to the respondent No.2. 41.     We, therefore, are of the opinion that a case has been made out to  invoke the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in the case of respondent No.2   Furthermore, he worked in the bank for a short period and was still  undergoing probation.  Forgery and misappropriation was committed by  respondent no.1 even thereafter.  The appraisal reports prepared by  respondent No.2 were used by respondent No.1 also for the subsequent  period, namely, 1987 when respondent No.2 was no longer working in the  said branch.  42.     For the reasons aforementioned, while upholding the conviction and  sentence as awarded by learned Trial Judge as against respondent No.1  (accused No.1), in view of the special reasons recorded hereinbefore,  we  impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three months on respondent  No.2.  He shall, however, be liable to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees  twenty thousand only) and in default shall undergo a sentence of three  months. 43.     Accordingly, the appeals are allowed with the aforementioned  directions.  The respondents may be taken into custody for serving out the  respective remaining sentences.