25 April 1996
Supreme Court
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STATE THROUGH ANTI-CORRUPTIONBUREAU, GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASH Vs KRISHANCHAND KHUSHALCHAND JAGTIANI

Bench: JEEVAN REDDY,B.P. (J)
Case number: Appeal Civil 580 of 1996


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PETITIONER: STATE THROUGH ANTI-CORRUPTIONBUREAU, GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KRISHANCHAND KHUSHALCHAND JAGTIANI

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       25/04/1996

BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) PARIPOORNAN, K.S.(J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1910            1996 SCC  (4) 472  JT 1996 (4)   495        1996 SCALE  (4)57

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T B.P.JEEVAN REDDY,J.      Leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties.      Respondent, K.K.Jagtiani,  was an Assistant Engineer in the service of the Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay. On the basis  of a  complaint received,  a trap  was laid.  The respondent was  caught accepting  the money.  The  Municipal Commissioner granted sanction for prosecuting the respondent and another  employee under  Section 5  of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  1947 [the  Act] and Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian  Penal Code on January 4, 1988. On that date, the respondent was  in receipt of basic minimum salary which was less than  Rupees twelve hundred per month. In due course, a charge-sheet was  filed against  the respondent in the court of Special  Judge, Greater Bombay under Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the Act and Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code. The  learned Special  Judge  took  cognizance  of  the offences  and   framed  charges.  The  respondent  raised  a preliminary objection  that  the  sanction  granted  by  the Municipal  Commissioner   without  obtaining   the  previous approval of the Standing Committee of the Corporation is not valid  and  competent  in  law  inasmuch  as  the  Municipal Commissioner by himself was not competent to remove him. The learned Special  Judge over-ruled  the objection, which writ challenged by  the respondent  by way of a writ petition  in the Bombay High Court. A learned Single Judge has upheld the objection and allowed the writ petition.      Section 6(1)(c)  of the  Act,insofar as it is relevant, reads:      "6(1).   No    Court   shall   take      cognizance of an offence punishable      under Section  161  of  the  Indian      Penal Code  or under subsection (2)      of Section  5 of  this Act, alleged      to have  been committed by a public

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    servant, except  with the  previous      sanction-      (c) In the case of any other person      of  the   authority  competent   to      remove him from his office."      Section 83  of the  Bombay  Municipal  Corporation  Act prescribes  the  authorities  competent  to  impose  various punishments upon its employees. It reads:      "83(1) Every  municipal officer and      servant  may   be  fined,  reduced,      suspended  or   dismissed  for  any      breach  of  departmental  rules  or      discipline  or   for  carelessness,      unfitness, neglect of duty or other      misconduct,  by  the  authority  by      whom such  officer  or  servant  is      appointed;      (2) Provided that -      (a) no officer appointed to a post,      ’The   minimum    monthly    salary      exclusive of allowances of which is      rupees one  thousand two hundred or      more’ shall  be  dismissed  by  the      Commissioner, without  the previous      approval of  the standing committee      or  in   the  case  of  an  officer      appointed  for   the  purposes   of      clause (q)  of section  61, of  the      Education Committee;      (b) any  officer appointed  by  the      corporation      under      section      55,56A,74,75, 76B,77,78A or 78C may      be  suspended   by   the   standing      committee and any officer appointed      by the  corporation  under  section      76A  may   be  suspended   by   the      Education  Committee,   pending  in      each   case   an   order   of   the      corporation    and    every    such      suspension and the reasons therefor      shall be  forthwith reported to the      Corporation;      (c) any  officer appointed  by  the      corporation  otherwise  than  under      section 55,56A,74,75,76A,77,78A  or      78C  may,   for   any   breach   of      departmental rules  or  discipline,      or  for   carelessness,  unfitness,      neglect of duty or other misconduct      be fined, reduced or surrendered by      the Commissioner,  or may, with the      previous approval  of the  standing      committee or  in  the  case  of  an      officer appointed  for the purposes      of clause  (q) of section 61 of the      Education Committee,  be  dismissed      by the Commissioner;      (d)   any    officer   or   servant      immediately  subordinate   to   the      Municipal Chief Auditor and drawing      a salary  not exceeding  rupees two      hundred   and   fifty   per   month      exclusive   of    allowances   may,      subject  to   such  conditions  and      limitations,   if   any,   as   the

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    standing committee  may deem fit so      prescribe, and  subject to  a right      of   appeal    to   the    standing      committee,  be  fined,  reduced  or      suspended   for   any   breach   of      departmental rules or discipline or      for    carelessness,     unfitness,      neglect of duty or other misconduct      by the Municipal Chief Auditor."      An analysis  of the  section - a shining example of bad draftsmanship* -  yields the  following propositions:  (i) A municipal  officer   or  servant   may  be  fined,  reduced, suspended or dismissed by the authority by whom ------------------------------------------------------------ *There was  a good  amount of discussion before us regarding the meaning  and ambit  of clause  (a) and clause (c) of the proviso [sub-section  (2)]. It  was also pointed out that to remove the  difficulty -  and ambiguity  - in  understanding these clauses,  clause (a)  has been  amended later  in  the years 1989 and in 1990. such officer  or servant  is  appointed  [Sub-section  (1)]. (2) An  officer holding  a post,  the minimum monthly salary exclusive of  allowances is Rs.1200/- per month or more, can be dismissed by the  Commissioner with the previous approval of the Standing Committee. If he is an officer appointed for the purposes of Section 61(q), he can be a dismissed  by the Commissioner with  the previous  approval of  the  Education Committee [Clause (a) of the proviso which is styled as sub- section (2)].(3)  An officer  appointed by  the  Corporation under  Sections   55,56A,74,75,76B,77,78A  or   78C  can  be suspended by  the Standing  Committee pending  orders of the Corporation.  ["Pending   in  each  case  an  order  of  the Corporation"]. If,  however, he  is an  officer appointed by the Corporation  under Section  76A, he may be suspended  by the  Education   Committee  pending   The  orders   of   the Corporation. In  either case,  the authority  suspending the officer shall  report the  orders of  suspension along  with reasons therefor  to the  Corporation  [Clause  (b)  of  the proviso/sub-section (2)].  (4) In  the case  of  an  officer appointed by  the Corporation  otherwise than under Sections 55,56A,74,75, 76A,77,78A or 78C, he may be fined  reduced or suspended by  the  Commissioner.  Such  an  officer  can  be dismissed by  the Commissioner with the previous approval of the Standing  Committee. If  he is  an officer appointed for the purposes  of Section 61(q), he can be  dismissed  by the Commissioner with  the previous  approval of  the  Education Committee [Clause (c) of the proviso/sub-section (2)].      [We are  not setting  out the  purport of clause (d) of the proviso since it is not relevant herein.]      The respondent  herein  is  an  officer  whose  minimum monthly  salary   exclusive  of  allowances  was  less  than Rs.1200/- at  the relevant  time. If  so, he  does not  fall under clause (a) of the proviso. It is agreed by the counsel for the  parties before  us that  he is  also not an officer appointed under  any of the sections mentioned in clause (b) of the proviso. He falls under clause (c). The contention of the learned  counsel for  the respondent  is that  while the Commissioner can  impose a  fine, reduce  in rank or suspend the respondent  without reference to the Standing Committee, he cannot  dismiss him  without the previous approval of the Standing Committee.  He submits  that in  the  case  of  the respondent, "the  authority competent to remove him from his office" in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act must,  therefore, be  construed as  Commissioner  acting with the previous approval of the standing Committee and not

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the Commissioner acting on his own. Inasmuch as in this case the previous  sanction  was  accorded  by  the  Commissioner without obtaining  the previous  approval  of  the  Standing Committee, it  is submitted,  tho sanction  is  invalid  and ineffective in  law. On  the other  hand,  Sri  K.T.S.Tulsi, learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  appearing  for  the Municipal Corporation,  submits that according to clause (c) of  the   proviso  [sub-section  (2)  of  Section  83],  the Commissioner is  the  competent  authority  to  dismiss  the respondent.  The   requirement  of  obtaining  the  previous approval of the Standing Committee does not make him any the less the  competent authority.  It is  no doubt  a condition which has  to be  complied with  by the  Commissioner before dismissing the  respondent, submits  Sri Tulsi, but the said requirement  does   not  make  the  Standing  Committee  the competent authority within the meaning of Section 6(1)(c) of the Act.  The competent  authority remains  the Commissioner alone who is also the appointing authority of the respondent within the  meaning of  sub-section (1)  of Section  83. The learned  Additional   Solicitor  General   submits  that  an identical question  had  in  fact  arisen  in  the  case  of K.Veeraswami, former  Chief Justice of the Madras High Court in the  decision reported  in K.Veeraswami v. Union of India [1991 (3)  S.C.C.655]  and  that  the  observations  therein support his contention. That was a case where a former,Chief Justice  of   a  High   Court  was  charged  under  offences punishable under  Sections 5 and 6 of the Act. The objection raised by  him was  that since a Judge of the High Court can be removed  only "by  an order  of the  President  of  India passed after  an  address  by  each  House  supported  by  a majority of  the total  membership of  that House  and by  a majority of  not less  than two-third of the members of that House present and voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such removal" [Article 218 read with clause (4) of Article 124 of the Constitution of India]. The sanction  for   his  prosecution  can  be  accorded  by  the President only  on the  basis of an address by each House of Parliament  prescribed  according  to  Article  124(4).  The Constitution Bench  which heard  the case  did discuss  this issue at  some length  though it  was also held that no such previous sanction was necessary in the case of the appellant therein [K.Veeraswami] inasmuch as he had ceased to hold the office of Chief Justice/Judge of a High Court on the date of his prosecution.  [It  was  held  that  the  requirement  of previous sanction contemplated by Section 6(1)(c) of the Act does act  apply in  the case  of a  person who has ceased to hold that office on the date of taking cognizance of offence by the  Court.] The  relevant discussion  is found  at Pages 702-709. [Opinion  of K.Jagannatha  Shetty,J., speaking  for himself  and   M.N.Venkatachaliah,J.  with  whom  B.C.Ray,J. agreed].  The  Constitution  Bench  [majority]  was  of  the opinion that  the previous  sanction contemplated by Section 6(1)(c)  can  be  accorded  by  the  President  without  the necessity  of  the  Parliament  presenting  an  address  [as contemplated by  Article 124(4) of the Constitution]. At the same time, they imposed the requirement of consultation with the Chief  Justice of  India before according such sanction. This requirement  was imposed  out of concern for and with a view to safeguard the independence of judiciary. It would be enough for  the  purpose  of  this  case  if  we  quote  the following observations from the judgment:      "The   construction   which   would      promote  the   general  legislative      purpose underlying the provision in      question, is  to be  preferred to a

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    construction which  would  not.  If      the   literal    meaning   of   the      legislative  language   used  would      lead to  results which would defeat      the purpose  of the  Act, the Court      would be  justified in disregarding      the literal  meaning  and  adopt  a      liberal     construction      which      effectuates  the   object  of   the      legislature. Section  6 with  which      we are concerned indeed requires to      be liberally construed. It is not a      penal provision  but a  measure  of      protection to  public  servants  in      the penal  enactment. It  indicates      the   authorities   without   whose      sanction a public servant cannot be      prosecuted. It  is sufficient  that      the     authorities      prescribed      thereunder  fall  within  the  fair      sense  of   the  language   of  the      section.   The    expression   ’the      authority competent to remove’ used      in clause  (c) of  Section 6(1) has      to be  construed to  mean  also  an      authority without  whose  order  or      affirmation  the   public   servant      cannot be  removed. In  this  view,      the President  can be considered as      the authority to grant sanction for      prosecution of  a Judge  since  the      order  of  the  President  for  the      removal of  a Judge  is  mandatory.      The motion  passed by each House of      Parliament   with    the    special      procedure prescribed  under  clause      (4) of Article 124 will not proprio      vigore operate  against the  Judge.      It will not have the consequence of      removing the  Judge from the office      unless it  is followed  by an order      of the President [Para 45]..... For      the   reasons    which   we    have      endeavored to  outline and  subject      to the  directions issued,  we hold      that for  the purpose of clause (c)      of Section  6(1)  of  the  Act  the      President of India is the authority      competent to give previous sanction      for the  prosecution of  a Judge of      the Supreme  Court and  of the High      Court [Para 61]."      It is  true that  the opinion of the Constitution Bench was also  influenced by  the fact that the Parliament cannot discuss the  conduct of  a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme court  except in a proceeding for impeachment of the Judge, yet  the fact remains that the Constitution Bench did ultimately opine  that the President cen accord sanction for prosecution  of   a  Judge  af  a  High  Court  without  the requirement of  an address being presented by the Parliament as provided  by Section 124(4) of the Constitution. While it is true  that the provisions considered and the very context in which  the said  discussion took place is quite different from the  one concerned  herein, yet  the relevance  of  the approach adopted  by the  majority in K.Veeraswami cannot be

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denied.      On a  consideration of  the relevant provisions and the object underlying the provisions concerned herein, we are of the opinion  that the  previous sanction required by Section 6(1)(c) of  the Act  was validly granted by the Commissioner [without the previous approval of the Standing Committee] in the case of the respondent; it was not necessary that before according  such   sanction,  the  Commissioner  should  have obtained the previous approval of the Standing Committee. It must be remembered that the object of Section 6(1)(C) or for that matter  Section 197  of the  Criminal Procedure Code is that there  should be  no unnecessary  harassment of  public servant; the  idea is  to save  the public  servant from the harassment which  may be  caused to  him if  each and  every aggrieved or  disgruntled person  is allowed  to institute a criminal complaint  against him.  The protection is extended against  prosecution   even  by   a  State  agency  but  the protection is  not absolute or unqualified. If the authority competent to  remove such  public servant  accords  previous sanction, such  prosecution can  be instituted and proceeded with. The  law presumes  - and  the Court  must also presume until the contrary is established - that such authority will act fairly  and objectively  and will  accord sanction  only where he  is satisfied that the charge(s) against the public servant requires  to  be  enquired  into  by  a  Court.  The authority is  presumed to,  and expected  to, act consistent with public interest and the interest of law - both of which demand that  while a  public servant  be  not  subjected  to harassment,  genuine   charges  and  allegations  should  be allowed  to   be  examined   by   the   Courts.   Both   the considerations aforesaid  should be  present in  the mind of the authority  while  deciding  the  question  of  grant  of previous sanction required by Section 6(1)(c) of the Act or, for that matter, Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [See R.S.Nayak  v. A.R.Antulay  (1984 <2) B.C.C.183 at 207]. Looked at  from  this  standpoint,  requiring  the  previous approval of  the Standing  Committee at this stage, when the charges or  allegations are  yet to  be  enquired  into  and established, would be imposing an impractical pre-condition. One can  understand the  Standing Committee  considering the matter   at the  end of a disciplinary enquiry or a criminal trial, when  definite  findings  would  be  available  which would enable  the Standing  Committee  to  take  a  decision whether  or   not  to   accord  previous   approval  to  the Commissioner to  dismiss  the  delinquent  employee/officer. But at the stage of grant of sanction, bringing in  Standing Committee may  not be  consistent with the object underlying the said  provisions. The  Standing Committee  admittedly is not the competent authority; competent authority remains the Municipal  Commissioner.  The    previous  approval  of  the Standing Committee  is only a  pre-condition to the exercise of power  of dismissal  by  the Commissioner. As observed by this Court  in   K.Veeraswami the  provision in Section 6(1) should be  construed liberally  and not  in a  mechanical or pedantic   manner. The  check upon  dismissal  need  not  be extended   to according  of previous  sanction; it  would be more   appropriate to  confine it  to the stage of dismissal only. It  must  also  be  remembered  that  so  far  as  the respondent is  concerned, the  appointing authority for  him is the  Commissioner. [See  Ground (xi) of the Special Leave Petition which  has not been denied by the respondent in his counter]. It  would, therefore, be reasonable and consistent with the  object underlying  the Act  as well  as the Bombay Municipal  Act  to  hold  that  the  previous  sanction  for prosecution contemplated by Section 6(1)(c) of the Act could

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have  been   accorded  and   was  validly  accorded  by  the Commissioner acting  by himself  and that  the said previous sanction is  not invalid or ineffective in law on the ground that it  was not  preceded by  the previous  approval of the Standing Committee.      It is brought to our notice that by two Amendment Acts, Maharashtra Act  33 of  1989 and Act 12 of 1990, the proviso in Section  83 has  been amended.  We need  not refer to the said amendments since in this case we are concerned with the period prior to the commencement of the said Amendment Acts.      The appeal  is accordingly Allowed, the judgment of the High Court  is set  aside and  that of  the learned  Special Judge is restored.