REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1758 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.  1735 of 2007)

State through Central Bureau of Investigation …Appellant   

Versus

Parmeshwaran Subramani & Anr. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T  

B.SUDERSHAN REDDY,J.

Leave granted.  

2. This appeal, which has come before us by special leave,  

is  directed  against  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  of  

Bombay  at  Goa  dated  23.11.2006  in  Criminal  Revision  

Application  No.  49  of  2006,  by  which  the  learned  Single  

Judge affirmed the conclusion of the learned Special Judge,  

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North Goa, Panaji that previous sanction was necessary to  

prosecute  a  Public  Servant  under  Section  12  of  the  

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.  

3. The brief factual matrix of the case is as under:  

On  source  information  the  Central  Bureau  of  

Investigation, Goa registered a preliminary enquiry being PE  

2(A)/2002/CBI/ACB  against  the  respondent  no.  1  and  

others. The respondent No. 1 was the then Commissioner of  

Customs  and  Central  Excise,  Panaji.  It  was  alleged  that  

respondent no. 1 along with others purchased 48 ready built  

flats for Customs Department from the respective firms at  

an exorbitant price of Rs. 3,55,69,150/-  though the actual  

market  value was much less than the price paid. It  was  

further  alleged  that  undue  favour  of  respondent  no.  1  

caused huge loss of Rs. 1.04 crores to the department. Shri  

Ram Avtar Yadav, Inspector CBI/ ACB/ Goa was conducting  

the enquiry into said allegations.   

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4. The  respondent  No.  2  was  the  Inspector  of  Central  

Excise,  Goa.  It  was  alleged  that  on  24.9.2002,  the  

respondent no. 2 made a request on telephone to Shri Ram  

Avtar Yadav, Inspector to meet him in connection with some  

personal  work.  On  the  next  day  i.e.  25.9.2002,  the  

respondent no. 2 met Shri Ram Avtar Yadav, Inspector and  

during the course of meeting he made a request on behalf of  

the respondent no. 1 to close the case and also conveyed  

that the respondent no. 1 wanted to meet him in connection  

with the said case and to offer some gratification. On the  

same  day,  the  Inspector  (Complainant)  lodged  a  written  

complaint  against  both  the  respondents  before  

Superintendent of Police, CBI/ACB/Goa. Accordingly, RC8(A)  

/20J2  /CBI  /ACB/  Goa,  was  registered  against  both  the  

respondents. Both the respondents met the complainant at a  

restaurant  and  offered  him  a  bribe  of  Rs.  1  lakh.   On  

26.9.2002, the respondent no. 1 withdrew an amount of Rs.  

50,000/- from his savings bank account and handed over  

the same to the respondent no. 2 to deliver the said amount  

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as part of the bribe to the complainant.  A trap was laid in  

the presence of two independent witnesses.  The respondent  

no. 2 was caught red handed while offering and delivering  

bribe on behalf of respondent no. 1 at the residence of the  

complainant. Thereafter on completion of the investigation  

charge sheet was filed in the court of learned Special Judge  

against  both  the  respondents  for  the  offences  punishable  

under Section 120B read with Section 12 of the Prevention  

of  Corruption  Act,  1988  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  

Act”).  

5. The  learned  Special  Judge  having  perused  the  

chargesheet and material on record came to the conclusion  

that previous sanction as required under Section 19 of the  

Act,  was necessary  to  prosecute  a  Public  Servant  for  the  

offence  punishable  under  Section  12  of  the  Act  and  

accordingly  declined  to  take  cognizance  of  the  offence.  

Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Special Judge,  

the appellant filed the Criminal Revision Application No. 49  

of 2006 before the High Court of Bombay at Goa. The High  

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Court dismissed the revision of the appellant and upheld the  

discharge  of  the  respondents  for  want  of  sanction  under  

Section 19 of the Act.  

Hence this appeal.  

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and  

perused the material available on record.  

7.  The short question that arises for our consideration in  

this  appeal  is  whether  any  previous  sanction  as  such  is  

necessary  for  taking  cognizance  of  an  offence  punishable  

under Section 12 of the Act?

8. Shri  H.P.  Rawal,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  

appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  submitted  that  the  

court is not precluded from taking cognizance of an offence  

punishable  under  Section  12  of  the  Act  against  a  public  

servant inasmuch as the said provision does not provide for  

any such previous sanction and the requirement of previous  

sanction  is  only  in  respect  of  offences  punishable  under  

Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act.   

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9. M/s.  Krishnan Venugopal,  learned senior  counsel  and  

Santosh  Kumar,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  

supported the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court  

that previous sanction for taking cognizance against a public  

servant would be equally necessary in respect of the offence  

punishable under Section 12 of the Act also.  

10. In order to appreciate the submissions that were made  

before  us  it  may  be  necessary  to  notice  the  relevant  

provisions of the Act. Section 12 of the Act which provides  

for punishment for abetment of offences defined in Section 7  

or 11 reads as under:

“Section 12 -  Punishment for abetment of  offences  defined  in  section  7  or  11.  -  Whoever  abets  any  offence  punishable  under  Section  7  or  Section  11  whether  or  not  that  offence  is  committed  in  consequence  of  that  abetment,  shall  be  punishable  with  imprisonment for a term which shall be not less  than six months but which may extend to five  years and shall also be liable to fine.

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11. Section 19 of the Act which deals with previous  

sanction for prosecution of an offence punishable under  

Sections 7,  10, 11,  13 and 15 alleged to have been  

committed by a public servant, reads as under:  

“Section 19 - Previous sanction necessary  for prosecution. -   

(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence  punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15  alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  a  public  servant, except with the previous sanction,—

(a) in the case of a person who is employed  in  connection  with  the  affairs  of  the  Union  and  is  not  removable   from his  office  save  by  or  with  the  sanction  of  the  Central  Government,  of  that  Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed  in connection with the affairs of a State  and  is  not  removable  from   his  office  save by or with the sanction of the State  Government, of that Government;  

(c)  in the case of any other person, of the  authority  competent  to  remove  him  from his office.  

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt  arises as to whether the previous sanction as  required under sub-section (1) should be given  by  the  Central  Government  or  the  State  

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Government  or  any  other  authority,  such  sanction shall be given by that Government or  authority which would have been competent to  remove the public servant from his office at the  time when the offence was alleged to have been  committed.  

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), —   

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by  a  special  Judge  shall  be  reversed  or  altered  by  a  Court  in  appeal,  confirmation or revision on the ground  of  the  absence  of,  or  any  error,  omission or irregularity in, the sanction  required  under  sub-section  (1),  unless  in the opinion of that court, a failure of  justice  has  in  fact  been  occasioned  thereby;

(b) no  court  shall  stay  the  proceedings  under  this  Act  on  the  ground  of  any  error,  omission  or  irregularity  in  the  sanction  granted  by  the  authority,  unless  it  is  satisfied  that  such  error,  omission or irregularity has resulted in   a failure of justice;

(c) no  court  shall  stay  the  proceedings  under this Act on any other ground and  no  court  shall  exercise  the   powers  of  revision in relation to any interlocutory  order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal  or other  proceedings.

(4)  In  determining  under  sub-section  (3)  whether the absence of, or any error, omission  

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or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned  or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall  have regard to the fact whether the objection  could  and  should  have  been  raised  at  any  earlier stage in the proceedings.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, —

(a)  error  includes  competency  of  the  authority to grant sanction;     

(b) a  sanction  required  for  prosecution  includes  reference  to  any  requirement  that  the  prosecution  shall  be  at  the   instance of a specified authority or with  the sanction of a specified person or any  requirement of a similar nature.

12. In  the  instant  case,  we  are  not  concerned  with  the  

question as to whether the respondents have committed any  

offence punishable under Section 120B of the Indian Penal  

Code read with Section 12 of the Act. We have to proceed  

on the basis of the allegations made by the appellant against  

the respondents without going into the truth or otherwise of  

the allegations so made in the charge sheet. The issue that  

arises for consideration is whether the learned Special Judge  

as  well  as  the  High  Court  have  committed  any  error  in  

refusing to take cognizance of the offence punishable under  

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Section 12 of the Act alleged to have been committed by the  

respondents on the ground that there has been no previous  

sanction of the Government as required under Section 19 of  

the Act?

13. The courts below relying upon the decision in  Sharad  

Waman Bushake Vs.  State of Maharashtra1  were of the  

view  that  Section  12  cannot  be  treated  as  being  wholly  

distinct  or  independent  from  Section  7  or  11  because  it  

speaks  of  abetment  of  those  offences  punishable  under  

Section 7 or 11 as the case may be. The view taken by the  

High  Court  was  that  though  an  accused  can  be  charged  

independently under Section 12, the existence of an offence  

under  Section  12  is  dependent  upon  Section  7  or  11.  

Therefore, so long as a sanction is required for punishment  

of the principal offence under Section 7 or 11 of the Act,  

sanction  would  equally  be  necessary  in  regard  to  

punishment for abetment of those offences.  

14. In our considered opinion, the interpretation sought to  

be placed by the High Court  on Section  19 of  the  Act  is  1 [1993 Mah. L.J. 284]

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wholly erroneous. The court at that stage cannot go into the  

question whether  there was any abetment of  any offence  

punishable under Section 7 or 11.  Section 12 of the Act, in  

clear and categorical terms, speaks that whoever abets any  

offence punishable  under Section 7 or  11 whether  or  not  

that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment,  

shall  be  punishable  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  as  

provided thereunder.  It is thus clear that abetment of any  

offence punishable under Section 7 or 11 is itself a distinct  

offence.   The  offence  punishable  under  Section  7  or  11  

whether  actually  committed  by  a  public  servant  is  of  no  

consequence. It is precisely for the said reason Section 19 of  

the Act specifically omits Section 12 from its purview. The  

courts by process of interpretation cannot read Section 12  

into  Section  19  as  it  may  amount  to  rewriting  the  very  

Section 19 itself.  It is settled law that where there is no  

ambiguity  and  the  intention  of  the  legislature  is  clearly  

conveyed, there is no scope for the court to undertake any  

exercise  to  read  something  into  the  provisions  which  the  

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legislature  in  its  wisdom  consciously  omitted.  Such  an  

exercise  if  undertaken  by  the  courts  may  amount  to  

amending or altering the statutory provisions.  

15. In a plethora of cases, it has been stated that where,  

the language is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be  

gathered from the language used. It is not the duty of the  

court  either  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  legislation  or  the  

intention  of  the  legislature,  when  the  language  of  the  

provision is plain.  The court cannot rewrite the legislation  

for the reason that it had no power to legislate.   The court  

cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which  

are  not  there.   The court  cannot,  on an assumption  that  

there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the  

legislature,  correct  or  make up assumed deficiency,  when  

the  words  are  clear  and  unambiguous.   Courts  have  to  

decide what the law is and not what it should be.  The courts  

adopt  a  construction  which  will  carry  out  the  obvious  

intention  of  the  legislature  but  cannot  set  at  naught  

legislative  judgment  because  such  course  would  be  

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subversive of constitutional harmony [See: Union of India  

& Anr.  Vs. Deokinandan Aggarwal2].

16. In A.R. Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak3, it so  

happened  that  a  private  complaint  was  made  by  the  

respondent therein against the appellant after the requisite  

sanction  under  Section  6  of  Prevention  of  Corruption  

Act,1947  was  given  by  the  Government.   The  Court  of  

Special Judge took cognizance of the alleged offences under  

Section 8 (1) of  the Criminal  Law Amendment Act,  1952.  

On behalf of the appellant an application was made in that  

court questioning jurisdiction of that court inter alia on the  

ground  that  it  could  not  take  cognizance  of  any  of  the  

offences enumerated in Section 6 (1) (a) and (b)  of the said  

Act  upon  a  private  complaint  of  facts  constituting  the  

offences.  The  courts  below  rejected  the  contention.  This  

Court  observed:  “It  is  well-established  cannon  of  

construction that the court should read the section as it is  

and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any  2 (1992) Supp. (1) SCC 323 3 (1984) 2 SCC 500

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canon of construction permit the court to read the section in  

such manner as to render it to some extent otiose.”  This  

Court further observed:  “Punishment of the offender in the  

interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal  

statutes  enacted  for  larger  good  of  the  society,  right  to  

initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed  

or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus  

standi. To hold that a specific statutory exception exists: the  

court would require an unambiguous statutory provision and  

the  tangled  web  of  argument  for  drawing  a  far  fetched  

implication cannot be a substitute for an express statutory  

provision.”  

17. In  State of Jharkhand & Anr.   Vs.  Govind Singh4  

this Court once again reiterated that where the language is  

clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from  

the language used and the attention should be paid to what  

has been said as also to what has not been said.  In that  

case the Jharkhand High Court held that even though there  4 (2005) 10 SCC 437   

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is no specific provision in Section 52 (3) of the Indian Forest  

Act,  1927 as amended by Bihar  Act 9 of  1990, a vehicle  

seized  for  alleged  involvement  in  commission  of  forest  

offence  can  be  released  on  payment  of  fine  in  lieu  of  

confiscation. The High Court took the view that it would be  

inequitable to direct confiscation and, therefore, it was held  

that to meet the interest of justice the power to impose fine  

in lieu of confiscation can be read into under Section 52(3)  

of the Act. Accordingly, a fine was imposed and the seizing  

authority  was directed  to release  the vehicle  on  payment  

thereof. This Court interfered with the judgment   observing  

that  the  view  taken  by  the  High  Court  was  against  the  

settled principles relating to statutory interpretation. It was  

observed:  

“Where,  however,  the  words  were  clear,  there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity  and the intention of the legislature is clearly  conveyed, there is no scope for the court to  innovate  or  take  upon  itself  the  task  of  amending  or  altering  the  statutory  provisions.  In  that  situation  the  Judges  should  not  proclaim that  they are  playing  the  role  of  a  law-maker  merely  for  an  exhibition  of  judicial  valour.  They  have  to  

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remember that there is a line, though thin,  which  separates  adjudication  from  legislation. That line should not be crossed  or  erased. This can be vouchsafed by "an  alert  recognition  of  the  necessity  not  to  cross it  and instinctive,  as well  as trained  reluctance  to  do  so".  (See:  Frankfurter,  “Some  Reflections  on  the  Reading  of  Statutes”  in  Essays  on  Jurisprudence,  Columbia Law Review, p.51.)”

It was further observed:  

“Two principles  of  construction  one relating  to casus omissus and the other in regard to  reading the statute as a whole  appear to be  well settled. Under the first principle a casus  omissus  cannot  be  supplied  by  the  Court  except  in  the  case  of  clear  necessity  and  when  reason  for  it  is  found  in  the  four  corners of the statute itself but at the same  time a casus omissus should not be readily  inferred and for that purpose all the parts of  a  statute  or  section  must  be  construed  together and every clause of a section should  be  construed  with  reference  to  the  context  and  other  clauses  thereof  so  that  the  construction  to  be  put  on  a  particular  provision  makes  a  consistent  enactment  of  the whole statute. This would be more so if  literal  construction  of  a  particular  clause  leads  to  manifestly  absurd  or  anomalous  results which could not have been intended  by the Legislature.”

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18. Keeping  in  view of  the  aforesaid  legal  principles  the  

inevitable conclusion is that the High Court fell into error in  

reading into Section 19 of  the Act,  the prohibition not  to  

take cognizance of an offence punishable even under Section  

12 of the Act without previous sanction of the Government  

which is not otherwise provided for. The language employed  

in  Section  19  of  the  Act  is  couched  in  mandatory  form  

directing  the  courts  not  to  take cognizance of  an  offence  

punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 only, alleged  

to have been committed by a public servant, except with the  

previous  sanction  of  the  Government.  The  legislature  

consciously in its wisdom omitted the offence of abetment of  

any offence punishable  under  Section  7 or  11 of  the  Act  

thereby making its intention clear that no previous sanction  

as such would be required in cases of  offence punishable  

under Section 12 of the Act. The High Court read something  

into Section 19 on its own thereby including Section 12 also  

into its ambit, which in our opinion is impermissible.

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19.  The judgment of the High Court is clearly erroneous,  

deserves to be set aside which we direct.   

20. The appeal is accordingly allowed.  

……………………………………J.       ( R.V. Raveendran)

……………………………………J.      (B. Sudershan Reddy)

New Delhi;  September 11,  2009.  

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