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PETITIONER: STATE OF WEST BENGAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSE & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/11/1976

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2599            1977 SCR  (2)  71  1976 SCC  (4) 701

ACT:             West  Bengal  Estates  Acquisition  Act   1953---Section         2(h)---Ss.  3, 4, 5--Encumbrance--Meaning of  Interpretation         of  statutes construction of land  reforms  statute--Whether         amplitude can be cut down.

HEADNOTE:             Certain estate in a village was acquired under the  West         Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.  Section 3 of the said         Act  provides  that the provisions of that  Act  shall  have         effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in         any  other law or contract expressed or implied or  any  in-         strument or any usage or custom.  Section 4 authorities  the         State  Government  by  a notification to  declare  that  all         estates  and the rights of every intermediary in  each  such         estate  shall vest in the State free from all  encumbrances.         Section  5 provides that on publication of such a  notifica-         tion the estates to which the declaration applies shall vest         in  the  State  free from all  encumbrances.   Section  2(h)         defines an encumbrance as under:                       "  ’incumbrance’  in relation to  estates  and                       rights  of  intermediaries  therein  does  not                       include  the  rights  of a  raiyat  or  of  an                       under-raiyat  or of a nonagricultural  tenant,                       but shall, except in the case of land  allowed                       to  be retained by an intermediary  under  the                       provisions of section 5, include all rights or                       interests  of  whatever nature,  belonging  to                       intermediaries or other persons, which  relate                       to  lands  comprised  in  estates  or  to  the                       produce thereof."             The  respondents,  some of the villagers, filed  a  suit         against  the appellant in a representative  action  claiming         that  the agrarian community in the village has always  been         enjoying  the  right of pasturage over the suit  estate  and         that  the said right survived in spite of  the  notification         under the Act.  The appellants contended that no such  right         survived  after  the publication of the notice  and  in  any         event,  even if such a right amounted to an  incumbrance  it         came to an end by virtue of section 5 of the Act.  According         to  the  respondents the said right was not  an  incumbrance         within  the  meaning of the said Act and  according  to  the

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       appellant  it was an incumbrance.  The suit and  the  appeal         filed  by the respondents were dismissed.  The High,  Court,         however, allowed the Second Appeal filed by the respondents.         Allowing the appeal by Special Leave,             HELD: (1) The great socio-economic objective of the  Act         if it is to be successful as a land reform measure  requires         that all the rights must vest fully in the State. [74A-C]             (2)  From  the perspective of land reform  objective,  a         specious  meaning  is derived by the  definition  of  incum-         brance.   Ordinarily the court cannot cut down  the  defini-         tional amplitude given in the statute and there is no reason         for  departing from the said golden rule.   The  Legislature         used  the expression incumbrance in its widest amplitude  to         cast  the  net wide so as to catch all rights  and  interest         whatever be their nature.  [74C-G]             (3)  There  is  no substance in the  contention  of  the         respondent  that  the collective, though uncertain  body  of         villagers cannot be brought within the expression "or  other         persons".   The expression "intermediaries or persons  other         than intermediaries" embraces all persons, and the villagers         who seek to exercise the right of grazing over the  interme-         diaries’ lands are plainly "other persons".                                                          [73-G-H]             (4)  The conclusion of the High Court that  the  grazing         right  is a customary right does not carry the case  of  the         respondents any further because the provisions of section  3         operate notwithstanding any usage or custom to the contrary.                                                           [76-D-F]         72             The  Court  observed that the present  appeal  raises  a         human problem and as ’grazing’ right is an important  aspect         of agrestic life the State should try to provide alternative         grazing  grounds  to villagers when such  rights are   taken         away [76A-C]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1753 of 1968             Appeal   by   Special  Leave  from  the   Judgment   and         Order/Decree  dated the 6th September, 1967 of the  Calcutta         High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 689 of 1964)         S.C. Majumdar and G.S. Chatterjee for the Appellant.         Sukumar Ghose for Respondents 1-3.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             KRISHNA IYER, J. This appeal, by special leave, from the         judgment  of  a Single Judge. of the  Calcutta  High  Court,         raises  a  single legal issue with  human  overtones.    The         State of West Bengal is the appellant at this the fourth and         final  deck of the judicial pyramid, having won the case  as         the  5th defendant at the earlier stages of  the  litigation         but  lost in the High Court.  The question, shortly put,  is         whether  the vesting of estates in the State under  ss.3,  4         and 5 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West         Bengal Act I of 1954) (abbreviated for reference hereinafter         as the Act) extinguishes the right of cattle grazing enjoyed         by  villagers  in  the grasslands of such  estates  on  the.         ground  that  such  right amounts  to  ’incumbrance’  within         s.2(h) of the Act.         The facts             An  estate in village Vadurerpati Madhabpur in the  dis-         trict   of Hooghly was among those vested in the State on  a         notification  under  s.4 of the Act, free  from  all  encum-         brances as provided in ss.4 and 5.  The  Plaintiffs-respond-         ents  are some of the denizens of the said village  and,  in

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       this representative action, claim that the agrarian communi-         ty there have always enjoyed the right of pasturage over the         suit estate and pray for the relief of injunction  restrain-         ing  the 5th defendant-appellant from interfering  with  the         exercise  of  the right to graze, as enjoyed  before.    The         State, however, denies the survival of such a right even  if         it  did exist on the score that the fatal impact of s.5  has         terminated  all incumbrances on the estate and the right  to         graze  cattle belonging to the villagers is but  an  "incum-         brance’  as defined in s.2(h) of the Act.  Thus the bone  of         contention  between  the parties is whether  the  collective         claim  of the villagers to graze their cattle on  an  estate         vested  in the State under the Act falls within the  defini-         tion of ’incumbrance’.   If it does, the suit deserves to be         dismissed  but,  if it does not, the High  Court’s  view  is         correct  and the case has to be sent back for  consideration         on  the  merits.   We may mention, for  completeness’  sake,         that  defendants 1 to. 4 are persons in whom the estate  has         been allegedly settled by the State, although this  position         is not clear or perhaps is denied by the State itself.         73             The  issue, in a nut-shell, is as to what is an  ’incum-         brance’.   But this question, in the light of the definition         which we will presently reproduce, resolves itself into  two         issues which will be self-evident as we read the provision:                       "2(h)  In  this Act unless there  is  anything                       repugnant in  the subject or context.--                       x                x                x                       (h)  ’incumbrance’ in relation to estates  and                       rights                       of  intermediaries  therein does  not  include                       the  rights of a raiyat or of an  under-raiyat                       or  of a non-agricultural tenant,  but  shall,                       except   in   the   case   of   land allowed                       to  be retained by an intermediary  under                       the  pro.visions              of  section   6,                       include  all  rights  or  interests  of  what-                       ever  nature, belonging to  intermediaries  or                       other  persons,      which  relate  to   lands                       comprised  in estates or to the        produce                       thereof."                         And so the two gut questions are:                          (i) whether a right to graze cattle in  the                       estate  of another  falls within the sweep  of                       the  comprehensive expression ’all  rights  or                       interests of whatever nature’; and                         (ii) whether the  members of a  village   as                       a  collective, though fluctuating body,    are                       covered by the words ’intermediaries or  other                       persons’.             While the two courts at the ground and first-floor level         decided  the  two points above-mentioned in favour   of  the         State, the  High, Court, after a long and discursive discus-         sion, the labyrinthine course of which need not be traversed         by us, reached the conclusion that the right in question was         a  public  right  belonging to an  unspecified  and  varying         group---not a specific private interest vesting in specified         persons--and  therefore  left untouched by ss. 3  to  5  and         uncovered by s.2(h).   Is that view sustainable on a correct         construction of the provision?             Putting  a literal and teleological construction on  the         definition  of ’incumbrance’ we have hardly any  doubt  that         the  legislature has used language of the widest  amplitude’         to  cast the net wide and to catch all rights and  interests         whatever be their nature.   Indubitably, the right to  graze

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       cattle  in  .an  estate is a  restrictive  interest  clearly         falling  within  the scope of the  provision.    Indeed,  so         designedly  limitless  an area of rights  and  interests  of         whatever  nature  is included in the special  definition  of         ’incumbrance’ for the purposes of the Act, that to deny  the         ’familiar  rurally enjoyed right of pasturage as covered  by         it is to defeat, by judicial construction,  the  legislative         intendment.  Likewise, there is no substance in the  conten-         tion that the collective, though uncertain, body of  villag-         ers  cannot  be  brought within  the  expression  ’or  other         persons’.   The connotation of those words in the context is         ’intermediaries or persons other than intermediaries’.  This         embraces  all  persons  other than  intermediaries  and  the         villagers         74         who seek to exercised the right  of grazing over  the inter-         mediaries’ lands are plainly ’other persons’.   There is  no         warrant  for   the limited signification  imputed  to  those         words by counsel for the respondent when he argues that they         refer to particular, definite   and known individuals.    An         unwarranted narrowing of meaning cannot be attributed  where         there is no contextual compulsion or fulfilment of statutory         purpose  thereby  gained.    On the other  hand,  the  great         socio-economic  objective of the Act argues itself.   If  it         is  to   be successful as a land reform  measure,  the  pre-         condition is that the estates must vest the  intermediaries’         entire   rights  fully--not moth-eaten by carving  out  many         little interests out of the plenary ownership of the  State.         This  intendment is further manifest from ss. 4 and 5  which         we set out below along with s. 3:                       "s.3.   The provisions of this Act shall  have                       effect   notwithstanding   anything   to   the                       contrary contained  in any other law or in                       any  contract  express or implied  or  in  any                       instrument  and notwithstanding any  usage  or                       custom to the contrary:                       x             x             x             x                       "s.4.(1)   The State Government may from  time                       to  time  by notification  declare  that  with                       effect   from  the  date  mentioned   in   the                       notification,  all estates and the  rights  of                       every   intermediary  in  each   such   estate                       situated in any district or part of a district                       specified, in the notification, shall vest the                       State free from all incumbrances.                       X                    X                    X                       "s.5(1)    Upon  the  due  publication  of   a                       notification under section 4, on and from  the                       date of vesting-                       (a)    the   estate   and   the   rights    of                       intermediaries  in the estates, to  which  the                       declaration  applies, shall vest in the  State                       free from all incumbrances; in particular  and                       without  prejudice  to the generality  of  the                       provisions of this clause, every one   of  the                       following  rights  which may be  owned  by  an                       intermediary   shall   vest  in   the   State,                       namely:--                       x             x            x             x         According to ss.4 and 5, the vesting shall be ’free from all         incumbrances’.    In  short, from the perspective  of  land-         reform objectives, a specious  meaning  is derived  by   the         definition   in   s.2(h). Ordinarily, the Court  cannot  cut         down the definitional amplitude given in the statute and  we         see no valid reason for  departing from  this golden rule.

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           The  end product of this discussion is that  the  appeal         must  be allowed and, the suit dismissed.   Even so, we have         been taken on a conducted tour by counsel on both sides more         or  less  covering and controverting the points  which  have         appealed to the High Court.             Shri  Ghose,  for the respondent, pressed  before  us  a         contention  based on rural economics which has  considerable         force in a general         75         way, but has none from the legal angle.   India lives in her         villages not in her cities.   This truth has been highlight-         ed  by the Father of the Nation, but  insufficiently  remem-         bered  by our law-makers.   The agrarian community,  with  a         cattle economy, rates high in the agrestic  scheme the right         of pasturage and so it is a human problem for the  villagers         and their very life if the State snatches the valuable right         of pasturage which makes the village economy viable, in  the         name  of. estate ’abolition, without  providing  alternative         village  commons.While we are moved by this  submission  and         feel  that this is  an unintended consequence of  comprehen-         sive  vesting of estates in the State, we have only  to  ob-         served that the State, in our  expectation, should,  mindful         of its welfare obligation, consider this facet of the  prob-         lem  and  try to provide grazing grounds in  villages  where         the  impact  of the Act has deprived the  community  of  the         right  of pasturage.   Even if the consequence of  abolition         of  intermediary rights leads to a baneful by  product  from         the  economic point of view, we,as Judges, are  functionally         committed  to construction of the statute in the  terms  the         legislature has cast it.            In  this  context our non-legal reaction to the  loss  of         grazing rights by the villagers is reinforced by the  obser-         vations  of Sarada Charan Mitra in his Tagore Law  Lectures,         1895,  on  the Land Law of Bengal.He observed at  p.495  (II         Edition):                            "Pasturage  is, in the large majority  of                       cases  in this country,  public, in the  sense                       that  they belong to or are capable of   being                       used by a community or classes of  individuals                       in  a   village.    Such rights are  necessary                       for the preservation of   society."                       x              x          x          x                       "To  an agricultural population, pasture  land                       is  of  the  utmost importance  and  there  is                       seldom  a village in Bengal ’which has  not  a                       large  piece  of land attached to it  for  the                       grazing    of   cattle   belonging   to    its                       inhabitants."                       The High Court judgment comments:                       "He (Justice Sarada Charan Mitra) then  refers                       to  Verse 237, Chapter VIII in Manu  and  also                       refers  to Yajnavalkya. Hence  such  customary                       right  has been recognised in India from  very                       early times."         Our  conclusion  cannot  therefore   be  deflected   by  the         unfortunate  deprivation,  especially because we  part  with         this  judgment hopefully, counsel for the  appellant  having         assured the Court that these observation will be communicat-         ed to his client.             This simplistic disposal of the disputed points may  not         be  fair to the High Court, especially because  the  learned         Judge  has,  in  an avoidably erudite survey of  Indian  and         English  authorities considered two vital issues.    He  has         discussed  at  some length the plurality  of  legal  issues:         What  is  the nature, in terms of  welt-known  interests  or

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       rights in or over property, of the right of pasturage ?   Is         it an easement under the Indian Easements Act or the  Indian         Limitation Act ?  Is it profit a prendre and, if so, does it         become a right or in-         76         terest within s. 2(h) of the Act ? Can an easement or  right         of  common  pasturage be claimed by a  fluctuating  body  of         persons--the  villagers ? Is such a customary  right  recog-         nised  in Indian Law ?   The learned Judge has  followed  up         the  discussion  on these points with  a  further  eloborate         examination of one other principal issue and two  subsidiary         points which, may be expressed in his own words:                       "The  question  is  whether  customary   right                       ’enjoyed’   by  the  villagers  is   a   right                       belonging  to  other persons relating  to  the                       land compensed in the estate or to the produce                       thereof.  This leads to the  consideration  of                       two  matters:  (a) whether the  villagers  are                       other  persons within the meaning of   section                       2(h)  of the Estates Acquisition Act; and  (b)                       whether such customary right ’belongs’ to  the                       villagers   or  to  any  individual   in   the                       village."         We  have  been taken on a lengthy tour (as we  have  already         mentioned)  of these areas of law by counsel on  both  sides         but  we  do  not think it necessary to cover  them  in  this         judgment at any length.  The conclusion of the learned Judge         is that a grazing right or right of pasturage subject to the         local requirements of a valid custom, is local law in India.         English  and Indian decisions and other text book  citations         have been referred to by the High Court and read before  us,         but whether such a customary right iS law or not  it  cannot         affect the question before us for the simple reason that s.3         of  the  Act expressly says that the provisions of  the  Act         ’shah  have effect notwithstanding anything to the  contrary         contained  in any other law  ....  and  notwithstanding  any         usage or custom to the contrary.’ Undoubtedly,   the plenary         vesting of the entire rights of the intermediary under ss. 4         and  5 is cut  down  by  a  customary  right  which  reduces         the   ambit of the intermediary right and therefore is  con-         trary to the provisions of’ s.5.   Moreover, when ss.4 and 5         declare unmincingly that the vesting shall be free from  all         incumbrances, a customary right  of grazing which clearly is         an  incumbrance runs counter to this clause.  Certainly  the         definition of ’incumbrance’ cannot take in a right or inter-         est  unless  it  is in favour of  intermediaries,  or  other         persons.   The learned Judge has considered whether  villag-         ers  constitute a corporation  or person, whether  fishermen         in  a body living in a village can be  said to  be  persons.         He  has also reasoned that since no compensation is paid  by         the  State  under the Act for the taking  of  the  customary         rights ’such provision for vesting would be void under   the         Constitution’.  Section 161, 183 of the Bengal  Tenancy  Act         and  ss.2(p),  5(aa)and 6(h) have all been considered  in  a         learned  chain of reasoning.  Reliance has also been  placed         on  rulings  and text-books.   As earlier’  stated,  we  are         disinclined to delve into the details of this discussion.             The  villagers are clearly ’other persons’ and  none  of         the  ruling  cited before us or referred to by  the  learned         Judge  has considered this point. especially in the  context         of  the extremely wide language used in s. 2(h) of the  Act.         It  is  inconsequential to say that the customary  right  is         law.   Equally  unhelpful is the finding that the  right  to         graze vested in villagers is a public or quasi-public right.         Even  if  it  is, once it falls  within  the  definition  of

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       ’incumbrance’  paring down  the totally  of  intermediaries’         rights. s. 3 hits it down.         77             The conclusion is irresistible that the State’s  defence         is  impregnable. The appeal therefore deseves to be  allowed         and the suit dismissed which we do, directing the parties to         bear their costs through out.             Once  again we hark back to the human factor  of  taking         away an invaluable right of humble villagers viz., the right         of pasturage and feel confident that a Welfare State, deeply         concerned  with preservation of. village economy,  will  not         hesitate to provide fresh pastures. for the preservation  of         agrestic life and agricultural prosperity.         P.H  P.                                               Appeal         allowed         78