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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KAILASH CHANDRA KAPUR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       29/11/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have heard learned counsel on both sides.      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the  Division Bench  of the  Calcutta High Court, made on January 19, 1996 in Appeal No.182/95.      The admitted  facts are  that a lease for 999 years was granted by  the Governor  of west  Bengal to one Tapan Kumar Mullick on  July 28,  1983 assigning a plot of land No.CL-10 in Section  II admeasuring  4,195 conttahs  in  Bindhannagar (Salt Lake)  in Calcutta.  The lessee had executed a Will in favour of  the first respondent, a stranger to the family on July 22, 1992 of the lease-hold premises. The lessee died on May 22,  1993. Thereafter,  the first respondent had applied for and  was  granted  without  any  contest  by  the  legal representatives of  the lessee  the probate  to the  Will by order of  the Court dated May 19, 1994. It would, therefore, be  obvious   that  the   bequest  was   after  receipt   of consideration.  Thereafter,  the  legatee  had  applied  for mutation of  his name  in the  record as  lessee  which  was objected to  and met  with rejection.  As a consequence, the respondent had  filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The  learned single  Judge directed  to mutate the name  of the  first respondent  as a  lessee  under  the testamentary disposition  made by  the original lessee which was confirmed  by the  Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Appeal  No.183/95 by  judgment dated  January  19,  1996. Thus, this appeal by special leave.      Shri V.R.  Reddy, learned Additional Solicitor General, has contended  that clauses  7, 8 and 12 of the indenture of the  lease  should  be  read  together  which  manifest  the intention that  the lease was for the enjoyment of leasehold right of  the demised site or a building constructed thereon either by  the lessee  or his  legal representatives and one among  them   alone  should   be  made  responsible  to  and answerable to  the lessor-appellant,  the Government of West Bengal. It  prohibited sub-letting or transfer without prior permission of  the Governor;  thereby, there  is and implied prohibition to  bequeath the leasehold right in the property in favour  of the  strangers. In  that background,  the word

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‘transfer’ employed  in clause  8 of the lease deed would be understood in a broader sense. If so understood, any bequest made  to   a  stranger,   without  the   permission  of  the Government, does  not  bind  the  Governor.  Therefore,  the Government is  not obliged  to recognise  a  stranger  as  a lessee after  the demise  of the original lessee. In support thereof, he  placed strong  reliance on  the judgment  of  a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis vs.  Vasant Pratap Pandit [AIR 1980 Bom. 69]. He also further placed  reliance on  a report given by the Committee constituted in  that behalf  on May 3, 1984 of the misuse of the leasehold right granted by seeking transfer in favour of the distant relations. On receipt thereof, the Governor by a notification specified  that the  near relations  shall mean and  include  the  father,  mother,  brother,  sister,  son, daughter, husband and wife. It prohibited registration under Registration Act by any other relative. It would amplify the intention of  the Government  in  that  behalf  in  granting leasehold interest  of their land for the benefit of use and enjoyment  of  the  demised  premises  for  the  residential purpose by  the members of the family or near relations. The strangers were  not intended  to be  inducted in  and  given enjoyment of  the leasehold interest of the property demised by the  Government. Unless  the Government  gives permission for such  a transfer, it cannot be considered to be valid in law. The  High Court thereby committed grave error of law in directing that  a stranger  be treated  as a  lessee of  the Governor.      Shri  D.P.   Gupta,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the respondents,  on  the  other  hand,  contends  that  we  are concerned in  this case  with the covenants engrafted in the lease-deed. The  relevant covenants  are 7,  8, and 12. Each one deals,  in its own parameters, with restricted covenants thereunder  with   different  situations.   Clause  (12)  is relevant  in  this  behalf.  It  does  not  contemplate  any restriction  to  will  away  the  leasehold  interest  to  a stranger. The  word  ‘person’  used  in  clause  (12)  would include the  stranger also.  The second  Clause in para 2 of clause (12)  would include heirs also. Thus, these covenants contained in  clause (12)  do indicated  that the  lessee is empowered to  bequath his  leasehold interest in favour of a stranger. The  only restrictive  covenant contained  therein was that  in the event of the bequest in favour of more that one person,  one among  them alone should be recognised as a person answerable  to the  Governor for  compliance  of  the covenants contained in the lease deed. The succession may be either testamentary  or intestate  succession. In this case, it is testamentary succession. In support thereof, he placed reliance on  the judgment  of the Constitution Bench in Gian Devi  Anand  vs.  Jeevan  Kumar  [(1985)  2  SCC  683].  He, therefore,  contends  that  there  is  not  prohibition  for testamentary succession  by the  first respondent in respect of the  leasehold interest given to Mullick. Shri V.R. Reddy sought to  distinguish the  judgment in  Gian Devi’s case by relying  upon   Bhavarlal  Labhchand   Shah  vs.  Kanaiyalal Nathalal Intawala  [(1986) 1 SCC 571] wherein this Court had held that  it would not apply to testamentary succession and the landlord  should not  be  trusted  with  a  stranger  as lessee.      In view  of the  diverse contentions, the question that arises for consideration is; what is the meaning of the word "person" in clause (12) of the covenants? It is necessary to read the relevant clauses in the lease deed, namely, clauses 7, 8  and 12  conjointly  or  independently.  They  read  as under:

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    (7) The Lessee shall not sub-divide      or sub-let  the demised land or the      building to  be constructed without      the  consent   in  writing  of  the      Government first  had and  obtained      and the  Government shall  have the      right and be entitled to refuse its      consent at its absolute discretion.      (8) The  Lessee shall not assign or      transfer the  demised land  or  any      part of the demised land and/or the      structure erected  thereon  without      the  previous   permission  of  the      Government in  writing. In  case of      transfer or assignment of the lease      the Lessor  shall have the right of      pre-emption and  upon the  exercise      of   this    right   the   building      constructed by  the lessee  on  the      land shall  be taken  over  by  the      lessor  at   a  valuation   of  the      building made  by the Lessor on the      basis of  the costs of construction      of the  building less  depreciation      at the  usual rate  of  the  market      value thereof,  whichever is  less.      The value  of the  land will be the      amount of  the  salami  or  premium      paid by the Lessee. In the event of      difference between  the parties  as      to the  value of  the building, the      matters   in   dispute   shall   be      referred to  the arbitration  of an      arbitrator if the parties can agree      upon  one   or  otherwise   to  two      arbitrators, one to be appointed by      each  party  with  an  Umpire.  The      award   of    the   arbitrator   or      arbitrators or  the Umpire,  as the      case may  be, shall  be  final  and      binding on both the parties.      Provided however  that in  case the      Lessee  transfers  or  assigns  the      leasehold interest in the leasehold      interest   in   the   land   and/or      structure   standing   thereon   in      favour of  LIC or Nationalised Bank      or  Government  or  Semi-Government      Organisation, or registered Housing      Co-operative Society,  or Statutory      Body  by   creating  mortgage   for      repayment   of   loan   for   house      building  purpose,  Life  Insurance      corporation     of     India     or      Nationalised Bank  or Government or      Semi-Government  Organisation,   or      registered   Housing   Co-Operative      Society, or  statutory Body, as the      case may  be, it may claim priority      over the  Government of West Bengal      in respect  of right of pre-emption      on   the    demised   land   and/or      structure standing  thereon subject      to the  condition that all the dues      of  the   Government  as   provided

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    herein   shall   be   payable   and      recoverable to  the  Government  of      West Bengal  either from the lessee      or   from    the   Life   Insurance      Corporation    of     India,     or      Nationalised Bank  or Government or      Semi-Government  Organisation,   or      registered   Housing   Co-operative      Society, or  Statutory Body, as the      case may  be. provided however such      charge if  created shall be subject      to the  terms and conditions of the      lease.      (12)  If   the  Lessee  dies  after      having made  a bequest of the lease      hold  premises   and  the  building      thereon, if  any, in favour of more      than one  person or  die  intestate      having more  than  one  then  heir,      then in  such case  the persons  to      whom the  leasehold  premises  with      the   building    thereon   be   so      bequeathed  or  the  heirs  of  the      deceased Lessee,  as the  case  may      be, shall  hold the  said partition      of the  same by metes and bounds or      they  shall   nominate  one  person      amongst their  number in  whom  the      same shall vest."      It is  true that the object of grant of leasehold right in the  land belonging to the Government in a long lease for 999 years,  as explained  by the Government in the report of the Committee  and accepted  by the  Governor, was  that the demised land  would be  granted to the lessee and enjoyed by him, a  legal heirs  and  close  relations  of  the  lessee. Thereby, they  would remain  in possession  and enjoyment of the  leasehold   interest   together   with   the   building constructed thereon  to make right to residence as engrafted in Article  19(1)(e)  of  the  Constitution  a  reality  and fundamental  right.  When  the  Government  distributes  its material resources,  as engrafted  in Article  39(b) of  the Constitution, the  object of the policy is to effectuate the mandate  of   the  Constitution   in  the  Preamble  of  the Constitution, viz.,  social Justice  and dignity  of  person with equal status. The lease was in furtherance thereof. But the question  is: whether the lessee has a right to transfer in favour of a stranger in terms of the lease and whether it would frustrate the object thereof?      The  Division   Bench  of   the  Bombay   High   Court, considering Section  15(1) of  the Bombay  Rent Act  and the words "assignment"  or "transfer"  has held  that the  words ‘assign’ or  ‘transfer’ are  not defined under that Act. The dictionary meaning  of the  word would  be considered in the absence of any definition given in the Act. It would suggest that to  transfer or  formality to make over to another. The word  "assign"   denotes  "generally  to  transfer  property especially personal  estate or set over a right to another". In their  generic sense,  the words  ‘assign’ or  ‘transfer’ include every  kind of  transfer of the property from one to another including  testamentary disposition.  The restricted meaning of the word ‘transfer’ denied under Section 5 of the Transfer of  Property Act  requires to  be considered in the light of  a particular  enactment and  its scheme.  It  has, therefore, been  held that  the word  ‘assign’ does  include disposition by  a Will.  Thereby, it would be construed that

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in an  appropriate case  where the  property was assigned by testamentary disposition,  it may  be  a  transfer  for  the purpose of a particular Act or a Regulation, as the case may be.      In  Gian   Devi’s  case  (supra),  this  Court  had  to consider, in  the absence of any restriction under the Delhi Rent Control  Act, the  intestate succession by the heirs of the tenant  of the  leasehold right  of commercial premises. This  Court   had  considered  the  effect  of  the  law  in paragraphs 23, 31 and 36 as under:      "For   an   appreciation   of   the      question,  it   is   necessary   to      understand the  kind of  protection      that is  sought to be afforded to a      tenant under  the Rent Acts and his      status after the termination of the      contractual tenancy  under the Rent      Acts. It  is not in dispute that as      long  as  the  contractual  tenancy      remains subsisting, the contractual      tenancy creates  heritable  rights;      and, on  the death of a contractual      tenant,   the   heirs   and   legal      representatives   step   into   the      position of the contractual tenant;      and, in  the same  way on the death      of landlord  the  heirs  and  legal      representatives   of   a   landlord      become entitled  to all  the rights      and privileges  of the  contractual      tenancy. A valid termination of the      contractual  relationship.  On  the      determination  of  the  contractual      tenancy,   the   landlord   becomes      entitled under  the law of the land      to  recover   possession   of   the      premises from  the  tenant  in  due      process of law and the tenant under      the general  law  of  the  land  is      hardly  in  a  position  to  resist      eviction,  once   the   contractual      tenancy has  been duly  determined.      Because     of      scarcity     of      accommodation and gradual high rise      in the rents due to various favors,      the landlords were in a position to      exploit    the     situation    for      unjustified personal  gains to  the      serious detriment  of the  helpless      tenants. Under  the  circumstances,      it  became   imperative   for   the      legislature to intervene to protect      the tenants  against harassment and      exploitation     by      avaricious      landlords      and      appropriate      legislation came  to be  passed  in      all   the    States    and    Union      Territories  where   the  situation      required  an  interference  by  the      legislature in  this regard.  It is      no doubt  true that  the Rent  Acts      are  essentially   meant  for   the      benefit  of  the  tenants.  It  is,      however, to  be  noticed  that  the      Rent Acts  at the  same  time  also

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    seek   to    safeguard   legitimate      interests  of  the  landlords.  The      Rent Acts  which are  indeed in the      nature    of     social     welfare      legislation are intended to protect      tenants  against   harassment   and      exploitation     by      landlords,      safeguarding at  the same  time the      legitimate   interests    of    the      landlords. The  Rent Acts  seek  to      preserve social harmony and promote      social justice  by safeguarding the      interests of the tenants mainly and      at the  same  time  protecting  the      legitimate   interests    of    the      landlords. Though  the  purpose  of      the various  Rent Acts appear to be      the same, namely, to promote social      justice by  affording protection to      tenants  against  undue  harassment      and  exploitation   by   landlords,      providing  at  the  same  time  for      adequate    safeguards    of    the      legitimate   interests    of    the      landlords,    the     Rent     Acts      undoubtedly lean  more in favour of      the tenants  for whose  benefit the      Rent Acts  are essentially  passed.      It may  also be  noted that various      amendments have  been introduced to      the various  Rent Acts from time to      time  as   and  when  situation  so      required   for   the   purpose   of      mitigating   the      hardship   of      tenants.      We now  proceed to  deal  with  the      further argument advanced on behalf      of the landlords that the amendment      to the  definition of ‘tenant’ with      retrospective effect  introduced by      the Delhi  Rent  Control  Amendment      Act  (Act   18  of  1976)  to  give      personal  protection  and  personal      right of  continuing in  possession      to  the   heirs  of   the  deceased      statutory  tenant   in  respect  of      residential premises  only and  not      with regard  to the  heirs  of  the      ‘so-called  statutory   tenant’  in      aspect  of   commercial   premises,      indicates that  the  heirs  of  so-      called      statutory      tenants,      therefore,   do   not   enjoy   any      protection  under   the  Act.  This      argument proceeds on the basis that      in  the  absence  of  any  specific      right created in favour of the ‘so-      called statutory tenant’ in respect      of his  tenancy, the  heirs of  the      statutory tenant who do not acquire      any  interest   or  estate  in  the      tenanted premises, become liable to      be evicted  as a  matter of course.      The very  premise on  the basis  of      which the argument is advanced, is,

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    in  our   opinion,   unsound.   The      termination  of   the   contractual      tenancy in  view of  the definition      of tenant in the Act does not bring      about any  change in the status and      legal  position   of  the   tenant,      unless    there     are    contrary      provisions in  the  Act;  and,  the      tenant     notwithstanding      the      termination of  tenancy does  enjoy      an estate  or  interest  or  estate      which  the  tenant  under  the  Act      despite    termination    of    the      contractual  tenancy  continues  to      enjoy creates  a heritable interest      in the absence of the any provision      to the  contrary. We  have  earlier      noticed the  decision of this Court      in Damadilal  case. This  view  has      been  taken   by  this   Court   in      Damadilal case  and in  our opinion      this   decision    represents   the      correct  position   in   law.   The      observations of  this Court  in the      decision of  the seven  Judge Bench      in the  case of  V. Hanpal Chettiar      vs. Yesodai  Ammal  which  we  have      earlier quoted  appear to  conclude      the question.  the amendment of the      definition of  tenant by the Act 18      of  1976  introducing  particularly      Section 2(1)(iii)  does not  in any      way mitigate against this view. The      said sub-clause  (iii) with all the      three Explanations  thereto is  not      in any  way  inconsistent  with  or      contrary  to   sub-clause  (ii)  of      Section  2(1)  which  unequivocally      states  that  tenant  included  any      person continuing  possession after      the termination  of his tenancy. In      the  absence   of   the   provision      contained in Section 2(1)(iii), the      heritable interest  of the heirs of      the statutory  tenant would devolve      on all the  heirs of the ‘so-called      statutory tenant’  on his death and      the heirs  of such  tenant would in      law step  into his  position.  This      sub-clause (iii)  of  Section  2(1)      seeks  to   restrict   this   right      insofar as the residential premises      are concerned.  The heritability of      the   statutory    tenancy    which      otherwise flows  from  the  Act  is      restricted in  case of  residential      premises   only    to   the   heirs      mentioned in  Section 2(1)(iii) and      the heirs  therein are  entitled to      remain in  possession and  to enjoy      and protection under the Act in the      manner and  to the extent indicated      in    Section     2(1)(iii).    The      Legislature, which  under the  Rent      Act  affords   protection   against

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    eviction to tenants whose tenancies      have  been   terminated   and   who      continue to  remain  in  possession      and who  are  generally  termed  as      statutory  tenants,   is  perfectly      competent to  lay down  the  manner      and extent  of the  protection  and      the rights  and obligations of such      tenants and  their  heirs.  Section      2(1)(iii)  of   the  Act  does  not      create any  additional or  the ‘so-      called  statutory  tenant’  on  his      death, but  seeks to  restrict  the      right of  the heirs  of such tenant      in respect of residential premises.      As  the   status  and  right  of  a      contractual   tenant   even   after      determination of  his tenancy  when      the tenant is at times described as      the statutory  become  entitled  by      virtue of the provisions of the Act      to inherit  the status and position      of  the  statutory  tenant  on  his      death, the  Legislature  which  has      created this  right has  thought it      fit  in  the  case  of  residential      premises to limit the rights of the      heirs in  the  manner  and  to  the      extent    provided    in    Section      2(1)(iii).  It   appears  that  the      Legislature has  not thought it fit      to put  any such  restrictions with      regard to  tenants  in  respect  of      commercial premises in this Act.           Accordingly, we  hold that  if      the Rent  Act in question defines a      tenant  in  substance  to  mean  ‘a      tenant who  continues to  remain in      possession    even     after    the      termination  of   the   contractual      tenancy till  a decree for eviction      against him  is passed’, the tenant      even after the determination of the      tenancy continues to have an estate      or   interest   in   the   tenanted      premises  and  the  tenancy  rights      both  in   respect  of  residential      premises  and  commercial  premises      are heritable.  The  heirs  of  the      deceased tenant  in the  absence of      any provision  in the  Rent Act  to      the contrary  will  step  into  the      position of the deceased tenant and      all the  rights and  obligations of      the deceased  tenant including  the      protection afforded to the deceased      tenant under  the Act  will devolve      on  the   heirs  of   the  deceased      tenant. As  the protection afforded      by the  Rent Act  to a tenant after      determination of the tenancy and to      his heirs  on  the  death  of  such      tenant is a creation of the Act for      the benefit  of the  tenants, it is      open  to   the  Legislature   which

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    provides  for  such  protection  to      make appropriate  provisions in the      Act with  regard to  the nature and      extent   of    the   benefit    and      protection to  be enjoyed  and  the      manner in  which the  same is to be      enjoyed. If  the Legislature  makes      any provision  in the  Act limiting      or restricting  the benefit and the      nature  of  the  protection  to  be      enjoyed in  a specified  manner  by      any particular  class of  heirs  of      the   deceased    tenant   on   any      condition    laid     down    being      fulfilled,  the   benefit  of   the      protection has  necessarily  to  be      enjoyed on  the fulfillment  of the      condition in  the manner and to the      extent stipulated  in the  Act. The      Legislature which  by the  Rent Act      seeks to  confer the benefit on the      tenants and  to  afford  protection      against  eviction,   is   perfectly      competent   to   make   appropriate      provision regulating  the nature of      protection  and   the  manner   and      extent of enjoyment of such tenancy      rights  after  the  termination  of      contractual tenancy  of the  tenant      including the rights and the nature      of protection  of the  heirs on the      death   of    the   tenant.    Such      appropriate provision  may be  made      by the Legislature both with regard      to  the   residential  tenancy  and      commercial tenancy. It is, however,      entirely  for  the  Legislature  to      decide whether the Legislature will      make such  provision or not. In the      absence of any provision regulating      the right  of inheritance,  and the      manner an extent thereof and in the      absence  of   any  condition  being      stipulated  with   regard  to   the      devolution of tenancy rights on the      heirs on  the death  of the tenant,      the devolution  of  tenancy  rights      must necessarily  be in  accordance      with   the    ordinary    law    of      succession."      It was,  therefore, held  that in  the absence  of  any definition the  legal heirs  of the tenants who succeeded by intestate succession  became the  tenants under the Rent Act for the  purpose of continuance of tenancy rights had by the tenant  even  if  it  is  after  the  determination  of  the contractual tenancy.  The statutory  tenancy  steps  in  and gives protection  to the legal heirs of the deceased tenant. It is true that in that case no distinction was made by this Court   between   testamentary   succession   or   intestate succession. As  far as testamentary succession is concerned, this Court  had considered that question in Bhavarlal’s case (supra). In  that case, Section 5(11) of the Bombay Rent Act defines the  tenant and  clause (c)  defines the "restricted tenancy rights"  in favour  of the  family  members  of  the tenant. In  that context,  the question  arose in  that case

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whether a  tenant  can  bequeath  a  Will  in  favour  of  a stranger? Considering  the ratio in Gian Devi’s case (supra) and the  object of  the Act,  this Court  had held  that the tenant cannot  by a  Will bequeath leasehold right in favour of strangers  and induct  the  stranger  as  tenant  of  the demised premises  against the  will of  the landlord and the landlord is  not bound  by such  a bequest  to recognise the legatee as  a tenant.  It is,  thus, settled law that though lease hold  interest may  be bequeathed  by  a  testamentary disposition, the  landlord is not bound by it nor a stranger be trusted as tenant against the unwilling landlord.      In view  of  the  above  settled  legal  position,  the question is:  whether the  bequest made by Mullick in favour of the  respondent is  valid in law and whether the Governor is bound  to recognise him? It is seen that clauses (7), (8) and (12)  are  independent  and  each  deals  with  separate situation. Clause  (7) prohibits  sub-lease of  the  demised land or  the building  erected thereon without prior consent in writing  of the  Government. Similarly,  clause (8) deals with transfer  of  the  demised  premises  or  the  building erected thereon  without prior  permission in writing of the Government. Thereunder,  the restricted  covenants have been incorporated by  granting or  refusing to  grant  permission with right of pre-emption. Similarly, clause (12) deals with the case of lessee dying after executing a Will. Thereunder, there is no such restrictive covenant contained for bequeath in favour  of a  stranger. The  word ‘person’  has not  been expressly specified  whether it  relates to the heirs of the lessee. On the other hand, it postulates that if the bequest is in  favour of  more than one person, then such persons to whom the leasehold right has been bequeathed or the heirs of the deceased lessee, as the case may be, shall hold the said property  jointly   without  having  any  right  to  have  a partition of  the same  and one  among them  should alone be answerable to  and the  Government would  recognise only one such person.  In the  light of the language used therein, it is difficult  to accept  the contention of Shri V.R., Reddy, that the word ‘person’ should be construed with reference to the heirs  or bequest should be considered to be a transfer. Transfer connotes,  normally,  between  two  living  persons during life;  Will takes  effect after demise f the testator and  transfer   in  that  perspective  becomes  incongruous. Though,  as   indicated  earlier,   the  assignment  may  be prohibited and  Government intended  to be  so, a bequest in favour of a stranger by way of testamentary disposition does not appear  to  be  intended,  in  view  of  the  permissive language used  in clause  (12) of  the covenants. We find no express prohibition  as at  present under  the terms  of the lease. Unless  the Government  amends the  rules or  imposes appropriate restrictive covenants prohibiting the bequest in favour of  the strangers  or by  enacting  appropriate  law. There  would   be  no   statutory  power   to  impose   such restrictions prohibiting  such  bequest  in  favour  of  the strangers. It  is seen  that the object of assignment of the Government land  in favour  of the  lessee is to provide him right to residence. If any such transfer is made contrary to the policy,  obviously, it  would be  defeating  the  public purpose. But  it would be open to the Government to regulate by appropriate  covenants in  the lease  deed or appropriate statutory orders as per law or to make a law in this behalf. But so  long as  that is  not done  and in  the light of the permissive language  used in  clause (12) of the lease deed, it cannot  be said  that the  bequest in favour of strangers inducting a  stranger  into  the  demised  premises  or  the building erected  thereon is  not governed by the provisions

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of  the  regulation  or  that  prior  permission  should  be required in  that  behalf.  However,  the  stranger  legatee should be bound by all the covenants or any new covenants or statutory base so as to bind all the existing lessees.      Under these  circumstances, the  action  taken  by  the respondent cannot be said to be vitiated by an error of law. The High  Courts, therefore,  has not committed any manifest error of  law warranting  interference. As  stated  earlier, this order does not preclude the Government from taking such step as  is warranted  under law  to  prohibit  transfer  in violation of the covenants or defeating the public policy.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.