IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 638 OF 2005

STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. .......APPELLANTS  

Versus

BIRESWAR DUTTA ESTATE PVT. LTD. &  ORS.

.....RESPONDENTS

O R D E R

Premises  No.32A,  Brabourne  Road,  Kolkata,  which  had  

been requisitioned for housing the Headquarters of Traffic  

Police  Guard  in  the  year  1958  was  derequisitioned  on  

25.3.1992. The possession of the property continued with  

the police department and it was proposed to be acquired  

and  Preliminary  Notification  dated  28.9.1994  was  issued  

under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  

('Act' for short). The said acquisition proceedings lapsed  

as the final declaration was not issued within one year.  

Subsequently  another  preliminary  notification  dated  

4.3.1996 was issued under section 4(1) of the Act. The said

notification  was  published  in  the  State  Gazette  dated  

25.3.1996.   The  notification  was  published  in  two  

newspapers  circulating  in  the  locality  on  9.3.1996  and  

10.3.1996.  As  there  was  a  misprint  in  the  date  of  the  

Gazette,  an  erratum  notification  was  published  in  the  

Calcutta  Gazette  on  1.4.1997.  Public  Notice  of  the  

substance  of  the  said  notification  was  published  in  the  

locality  on  30.6.1997.  The  final  declaration  dated  

11.8.1997 under Section 6 of the Act was published in the  

Gazette on 12.8.1997.

2. Respondents 1 and 2, who are the owners of property  

filed Civil Suit No.235 of 1996 in the Calcutta High Court  

against  the  State  of  West  Bengal  on  22.8.1996  seeking  

possession of the said property and mesne profits.  In the  

said Suit, the High Court issued an interim order dated  

25.9.1997 directing the parties to maintain status quo as  

on  that  date.   Ultimately,  the  Suit  was  decreed  by  a  

learned Single Judge of the High Court on 9.9.1998, with a  

direction  to  the  defendant  in  the  suit  to  deliver  

possession  and  declaring  the  final  Notification  gazetted  

on  12.8.1997,  issued  under  section  6  of  the  Act  to  be  

invalid.  The  learned  Single  Judge  held  that  the  final

declaration  published  on  12.8.1997  was  made  after  the  

expiry  of  one  year  from  the  date  of  publication  of  the  

preliminary notification and therefore it was invalid. The  

State filed an appeal against the said judgment and in the  

said  appeal  a  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  granted  

interim stay of the judgment dated 9.9.1998 of the learned  

single Judge, on 15.2.1999. Ultimately, the Division Bench  

allowed the appeal by judgment dated 29.7.1999 affirming  

the finding that appellant was bound to deliver possession,  

but however holding that the final declaration published on  

12.8.1997  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  was  valid.   The  

appellants issued a notice under section 9 and 10 of the  

Act  on  20.9.1999.  The  Award  was  made  on  24.2.2000.  

Possession of the premises was taken under section 16 of  

the Act on 24.2.2003.  

3. The acquisition was challenged by respondents 1 and 2  

by  filing  a  writ  petition  (W.P.  No.1225  of  2000),  

contending that (i) the final notification under section 6  

of  the  Act  made  more  than  one  year  from  the  date  of  

publication  of  the  preliminary  notification  was  invalid;  

and (ii) the acquisition had lapsed under section 11A of  

the  Act,  as  award  was  no  made  within  two  years  of

publication of the declaration. A learned Single Judge, by  

judgment  dated  18.11.2002,  dismissed  the  writ  petition.  

Respondents 1 and 2 filed an appeal before the appellate  

Bench of the Calcutta High Court.  The appellate Bench, by  

the impugned judgment dated 2.9.2003, allowed the appeal on  

the following two grounds: (i) The final declaration under  

Section 6 of the Act was invalid, as it was published after  

the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the  

preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act; and  

(ii)  The  Award  dated  24.2.2000  by  the  Land  Acquisition  

Officer was passed beyond a period of two years from the  

date  of  the  publication  of  the  final  declaration  dated  

11.8.1997 and consequently, the acquisition lapsed.

4. Feeling  aggrieved  the  appellants  have  filed  this  

appeal  by  special  leave.  The  appellants  have  challenged  

both  the  findings  of  the  Division  Bench.  Therefore,  two  

questions arise for our consideration.

(i) Whether  the  final  declaration  was  made  after  the  

expiry  of  one  year  from  the  date  of  publication  of  

preliminary notification?

(ii) Whether the Award was made beyond two years from the

date of the publication of the final declaration?

Re : Question (i)

5. Section  4(1)  of  the  Act  provides  that  whenever  it  

appears  to  the  appropriate  Government  that  land  in  any  

locality is needed for any public purpose or for a company,  

a notification to that effect shall be published in the  

Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in  

locality and the Collector shall cause public notice of the  

substance of such notification to be given at convenient  

places in the said locality, the last of the dates of such  

publication  and  the  giving  of  such  public  notice,  being  

referred to as date of the publication of the notification.  

In this case the date of publication of the preliminary  

notification would be 30.6.1997, as that was the date of  

the  public  notice  of  the  substance  of  the  preliminary  

notification given at convenient places in the locality,  

and  that  was  the  last  of  the  dates  of  publication  and  

public notice.   

6. In view of the above, though the date of preliminary  

notification is 4.3.1996 and was published in the Gazette

on 25.3.1996, as public notice of the substance of the said  

notification was given in the locality only on 30.6.1997,  

the  date  of  publication  of the notification for the  

purpose of Section 4(1) of the Act,  would be 30.6.1997 -  

the  date  on  which  the  public  notice  was  given  in  the  

locality. Final declaration was made on 12.8.1997 within  

two months from the date of publication of the preliminary  

notification.  The  contention  that  the  final  notification  

was made beyond one year from the date of publication of  

the preliminary notification is therefore, without basis.   

7. The High Court proceeded on a wrong assumption that  

the  public  notice  of  the  substance  of  the  preliminary  

notification should be published in the locality within one  

year from the date of publication in the Gazette. We find  

that there is no such requirement under Section 4(1) of the  

Act.  Section 4(1) does not specify the period within which  

public notice of the substance of the notification should  

be put up in convenient places of the locality. The one  

year period referred to in Section 6 of the Act is the  

period within which the final declaration has to be made  

from  the  date  of  publication  of  the  preliminary  

notification. Publication of the notification under section

4(1) of the Act is defined as the last of the three dates,  

that is (i) publication in the Gazette, (ii) publication in  

two newspapers, and (iii) public notice of the substance of  

the notification in convenient places in the locality. If  

there is a gap of more than one year from the date of  

publication of preliminary notification in the Gazette and  

issue  of  public  notice  of  the  substance  of  such  

notification  in  the  locality,  it  would  not  affect  the  

validity  of  the  preliminary  notification  but  will  only  

postpone  the  date  of  preliminary  notification  for  other  

purposes like determination of market value under section  

23 of the Act. As 30.6.1997 is the date of publication of  

the preliminary notification and not 4.3.1996, the first  

ground on which the appellate Bench of the High Court has  

invalidated the acquisition cannot be sustained.  

Re : Question (ii)

8. It is not in dispute that the High Court had issued an  

order of status quo in regard to the acquisition of land on  

25.9.1997 and the said order of status quo came to an end  

when the suit itself was decreed on 9.9.1998 in favour of  

respondents 1 and 2.  If the period between 25.9.1997 and

9.9.1998,  during  which  the  order  of  status  quo  was  in  

effect,  is  excluded,  it  is  seen  that  the  Award  dated  

24.2.2000 was made within two years from 12.8.1997 - the  

date  of  publication  of  the  final  declaration.  The  total  

period  that  elapsed  between  date  of  publication  of  

declaration and the date of award is 2 years 6 months and  

12 days.  The order of status quo was in force for a period  

of 11 months and 14 days. If that period is deducted, we  

find that the Award was made within 1 year 6 months and 28  

days.

9. One  incidental  question  that  is  raised  by  

respondents  1  and  2  is  whether  the  order  of  status  quo  

could be considered to be an interim stay of proceedings to  

be taken in pursuance of the declaration, for the purpose  

of Section 11A of the Act.  In this context we may refer to  

the decision of the this Court in  M. Ramalinga Thevar Vs.  

State of T.N. & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 322 wherein this Court  

held that if there is a stay of dispossession, that would  

amount to stay of the declaration.  This Court observed :

“As per the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 the period of exclusion from the  time  is  the  period  during  which  'any  action  or  proceedings'  to  be  taken  in  pursuance  of  the  said  declaration  is  stayed.   Undoubtedly,  one  of  the  actions  contemplated  pursuant  to  the  declaration  is

taking possession of the land, though such action is a  post-award step in normal circumstances, in emergent  circumstances  it  can  as  well  be  a  pre-award  step.  Nonetheless, taking possession is one of the actions  to be adopted as a follow-up measure pursuant to the  declaration envisaged in Section 6 of the Act.  The  consequence  mentioned  in  Section  11-A  is  a  self- operating statutory process and, therefore,  it  can  operate   only   when  the  conditions  specified  therein conjoin together.  The consequence would  step  in  only  when  there  is  fusion  of  all  the  conditions  stipulated  therein.  If  there  is  any  stay  regarding  any  of  the  actions  to  be  taken  pursuant to the declaration then the consequence  of lapse would not happen.”

10. The  validity  of  the  final  declaration  published  

on 12.8.1997 was the subject matter of the civil suit for  

possession  of  the  property  in  question,  filed  by  

respondents 1 and 2. As noticed above, the learned Single  

Judge, while decreeing the said suit for possession, held  

that the declaration gazetted on 12.8.1997 was invalid. The  

appellate  bench  however  upheld  the  validity  of  the  said  

declaration. In such a suit, when the High Court directed  

status  quo,  it  meant  that  respondents  1  and  2  as  the  

plaintiffs-owners and the State as the defendant, could not  

do  any  act  with  reference  to  the  property  in  question.  

Apparently in view of the status quo order, the State did  

not do any act or make the award in regard to the property  

from  25.9.1997  till  9.9.1998,  as  it  was  prohibited  from  

making an award by the status quo order. Thus when there

was  an  order  of  status  quo,  for  all  purposes,  the  

appellants  were  prohibited  from  taking  any  further  

proceedings in pursuance of the declaration in regard to  

the  property  in  question.  Therefore,  the  said  period  of  

status quo will have to be excluded, for calculating the  

two years period under Section 11A of the Act. Therefore,  

even the second ground on which the High Court found the  

acquisition to be invalid cannot be sustained.  

11. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the order dated  

2.9.2003 of the Division Bench of the High Court is set  

aside  and  the  order  dated  18.11.2002  of  learned  single  

Judge dismissing the writ petition of respondents 1 and 2  

is upheld.

  ......................J.                ( R.V. RAVEENDRAN )

New Delhi;    ......................J. October 21, 2010.                ( H.L. GOKHALE )