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PETITIONER: STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SURENDRA NATH BHATTACHARYA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/04/1980

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1316            1980 SCR  (3) 783  1980 SCC  (3) 237

ACT:      Land Acquisition  Act, 1894  as amended  by Act  31  of 1962, Section  40(aa)-Interpretation of  Section 40(aa)  and also Section  7 of  the Amending  Act of 1962-Acquisition of land for  company engaged  in industry  or work which is for public purpose  is valid  and does  not offend Article 14 of the Constitution-Section  44B of  the Act is prospective and does not relate to acquisition.

HEADNOTE:      Respondent 2  known as  Calcutta Mineral Supply Company having its office at 31, Jackson Lane, Calcutta was carrying on the business of manufacturing sodium silicate, plaster of paris etc.,  which were  formerly imported  on a  very large scale from  foreign countries. The manufactured goods of the Company are  widely used  all over India saving considerable foreign exchange  which otherwise would have had to be spent in importing  these materials.  With a  view to  extend  its business and improve the standard of its manufacture but for want of space for big underground storage tanks, the Company was handicapped,  the Company  applied to  the Collector for acquiring for  public purpose,  the lands  in dispute  which were contiguous  to the  lands on which the existing factory of the  company stood  was best  suited. Consequent  to  the application an agreement was executed between the Government and the Company on the 29th of November 1954. On December 9, 1954, a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  was published  and the first respondent filed his objection  which   was  rejected   and  was  followed  by  a notification under section 9 of the Act.      After the  land acquisition proceedings were complete a writ petition  was filed  by the first respondent before the High Court  on January  14, 1957  which was  dismissed by  a single Judge  of the  High Court  and  therefore  the  first respondent filed an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court on  February 21,  1957. While  the appeal  was pending before the  High Court the Collector made an Award dated 14- 10-1957 and  after taking  possession from the owners of the land, delivered  the same to the company-respondent No. 2 on October 22,  1957. The first respondent filed an application for permission  to urge  additional grounds  before the High Court which  was permitted and ultimately the Division Bench

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of the  High Court  by the  order under  appeal allowed  the appeal and  quashed the  Land acquisition  proceedings taken under the  Act. Hence,  this appeal  before this Court after getting a certificate from the High Court.      Allowing the appeal by certificate, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  Analysing the  ratio of  the decision of this Court in  (Second) R.  L. Arora  v. State  of U.P., [1964] 6 S.C.R. and  followed in Himalayan Tiles & Marbles v. Francis Victor Continho (dead) by 1.rs., [1980] 3 S.C.R. 235, 784 the  following   conditions  must  be  satisfied  before  an acquisition made  prior to July 20, 1962 could be said to be constitutionally valid-           (a)  that the  acquisition had  taken place before                July 20, 1962, the date when the Amending Act                came into force;           (b)  that the  said acquisition  should have  been                fully completed in that property said to have                been acquired  had vested  absolutely in  the                Government;           (c)  that the  acquisition was  made for  purposes                mentioned  in  clause  (aa)  of  the  amended                clause added to s. 40;           (d)  that if these conditions were satisfied, then                any acquisition  proceeding, order, agreement                or action in connection with much acquisition                would be  deemed to have been valid as if the                amended provisions  were in force at the time                when the acquisition was made. [788 E-G]      The facts  of the present case squarely fall within the ambit of  the conditions  laid down  by  section  7  of  the Amending Act  and hence  the challenge  on the ground of the constitutional validity  of the acquisition must necessarily fail. The  proceedings for  acquisition  were  started  long before July  20, 1962  that is, as early as December 9, 1954 when notification  under section  6 of  the Act  was issued. After inviting objections an Award was made by the Collector on October  14, 1957 and after the property in dispute fully rested in  the Government,  the Collector then delivered the same to  the Company-respondent  2 on October 22, 1957. [789 A-B]      Himalayan Tiles and Marbles v. Francis Victor Countinho (dead) by I.rs., [1980] 3 SCR 235; applied.      2. To hold that section 40(aa) of the Act also requires proof of  public purpose  in the restricted sense in that it must be  for the  general good  of the people at large, then the very object sought to be achieved by the amendment would be completely  frustrated and  the provisions  of Section  7 would become otiose. [789 D-F]      3. The words "public purpose" are not to be interpreted in a  restrictive sense  but take  colour from the nature of the industry  itself, the  articles it  manufactures and the benefit to  the people that it subserves. The land should be acquired for  building or  work which would serve the public purpose of  the Company  and not  public purpose  as  it  is generally understood. [791 C-D]      In the  instant  case  the  articles  produced  by  the Company are  used for  the benefit  of the  people and as it saves a  lot of foreign exchange, it is unmistakably for the general good  of the  country particularly from the economic point of  view. The  object of  the Company in extending its operations by  enlarging the  area of its production was for the public purpose of the Company. Taking an overall picture of the  nature of  the products  of the company, its various

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activities, the general public good that it seeks to achieve and  the   great  benefit   that  the   people  derive,  the acquisition was for a public purpose. [791 C-F] 785      4. Section  44B of  the Land  Acquisition Act is purely prospective in  character and  has absolutely no application to acquisition  proceedings taken  before July 20, 1962, the date when the amendment was enacted. [791 F-G]      5. Section  40(aa) of  the Act does not violate Article 14 of  the Constitution,  by permitting  acquisition of land for a Company but not for an individual or a private Company through these  persons may  also be  engaged in  an industry which was for a public purpose. [792 A-B]      P. Girdharan  Prasad Missair and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr.,  A.I.R. 1968 Pat 77; Chhotubhai Babarbhai Patel v. State of  Gujarat and  Anr., I.L.R.  Gujarat  1964  p.  472; approved.      R. L. Arora (II) v. State of U.P., [1964] 6 S.C.R. 784; followed.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1969.      From the  Judgment and  Order  dated  3-5-1966  of  the Calcutta High Court in F.M.A. No. 71/57.      P. K. Chatterjee & Rathin Dass for the Appellant.      V. S.  Desai, S.  C. Majumdar  and Miss Kirobi Banerjee for Respondent No. 1.      P. K. Mukherji for Respondent No. 2.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL  ALI,   J.-This  appeal  is  directed  against  a judgment dated  May 3,  1966  of  the  Calcutta  High  Court quashing the  acquisition  proceedings  taken  as  also  the notifications made  by the  State of  West Bengal  under the provisions of  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894 (hereinafter referred to  as the Act’) in respect of the lands in dispute which comprised 73 acres in village Kanpura, P.S. Dum Dum.      Although the case had a rather chequered career and was preceded by  a full-fledged  litigation  starting  from  the trial court  and ending  with the  High Court  regarding the question of  title, we  are not, however, concerned with the past history  in view  of the  short point  on the  basis of which the  appeal was  decided by  the Division Bench of the High Court.  The case of the Government was that on December 16, 1949,  respondent No. 2 known as Calcutta Mineral Supply Company having  its office  at 31,  Jackson Lane,  Calcutta, applied to  the Collector for acquiring the land in question in order to extend its business. The company was carrying on the business  of manufacturing  sodium silicate,  plaster of Paris, etc.,  which were  formerly imported  on a very large scale from  foreign countries. The manufactured goods of the Company are  widely used  all over India saving considerable foreign exchange  which otherwise would have had to be spent in importing 786 these materials.  The company  pleaded  that  it  wanted  to extend  its  business  and  improve  the  standards  of  its manufacture but  for  want  of  space  for  big  underground storage tanks,  the company  was seriously  handicapped. The company, therefore,  prayed that  the lands in dispute which were contiguous  to the  lands on which the existing factory of the  company stood  was best  suited for this purpose and hence the  Collector was  requested to acquire the lands for

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public purpose.  Consequent to the application, an agreement was executed  between the  Government and the company on the 29th of  November 1954.  On December 9, 1954, a notification under s. 6 of the Act was published and the first respondent filed his objection which was rejected and was followed by a notification  under   s.9  of   the  Act.   After  the  land acquisition proceedings  were complete  a writ  petition was filed by  the first  respondent before  the  High  Court  on January 14,  1957 which  was dismissed  by a single Judge on the High  Court and  therefore the first respondent filed an appeal to  the Division  Bench of the High Court on February 21, 1957. While the appeal was pending before the High Court the Collector  made an  Award  dated  14-10-1957  and  after taking possession from the owners of the land, delivered the same to  the company-respondent  No. 2  on October 23, 1957. The first  respondent filed an application for permission to urge additional  grounds before  the High  Court  which  was permitted and  ultimately the  Division Bench  of  the  High Court by  the Order  under appeal  allowed  the  appeal  and quashed the  land acquisition  proceedings taken  under  the Act. Hence,  this appeal  before this  Court after getting a certificate from the High Court.      The only  point that  has been  canvassed before  us by counsel for  the  parties  is  as  to  whether  or  not  the acquisition of  the land  in dispute  was valid  in law. The appellant contended that in view of the amendment of section 40 by  Act. No.  31 of  1962, acquisition  of land  for  the purpose of  the company  was validated  and all acquisitions made before  the amendment  were  validated  retrospectively provided certain  conditions laid  down under  s. 7  of  the Amending Act were fulfilled.      We might mention here that prior to the amendment, this Court in  R. L.  Arora v.  State of  U.P. had  held that any acquisition under  the Act for purposes of a Private Company would not be a public purpose and would, therefore, be void. It was on the basis of this decision, which is usually known as the ’first Arora case’, that the first respondent filed a petition in the High Court for quashing the land acquisition proceedings. The  legislature, however,  intervened  by  the Amending Act,  as mentioned aforesaid, and removed the basis of the judgment of 787 this Court  by adding  clause (aa) to s. 40 of the Act so as to validate  all acquisitions  of private lands for purposes of a private company provided the conditions laid down in s. 7 were  fulfilled. This amendment was also challenged before this Court  in what  is known  as the  ’second  Arora  case’ where this  Court by majority of 4: 1 held that the Amending Act was  valid and that under s. 40(aa) an acquisition could be made  even for  a private company if it was engaged in an industry  which  was  for  a  public  purpose.  We  are  not concerned with  the other amendments made which do not apply to the facts of the present case.      The High Court undoubtedly referred to the "first Arora case" as  also to  the "second  Arora case"  but,  with  due respect, we  might observe that the High Court relied mainly on the  observations made  in the "first Arora case" and has not correctly  interpreted the  later decision of this Court and the  effect of the amendment which completely superseded the "first  Arora case". The argument of the learned counsel before us  centered round the interpretation of s. 40(aa) as amended by  the amendment  as also s. 7 of the Amending Act. In order  to understand  the scope of the argument it may be necessary to extract both s. 40(aa) and s. 7 of the Amending Act, which run thus:

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         "7.   Validation    of   certain    acquisitions.-      Notwithstanding any  judgment, decree  or order  of any      court, every  acquisition of land for a company made or      purporting to  have been  made under  Part VII  of  the      principal Act  before the 20th day of July 1962, shall,      in so  far as  such acquisition  is not  for any of the      purposes mentioned  in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-      section (1)  of section  40 of  the principal  Act,  be      deemed to  have been  made for the purpose mentioned in      clause (aa)  of the  said sub-section,  and accordingly      every  such  acquisition  and  any  proceeding,  order,      agreement or action in connection with such acquisition      shall be,  and shall  be deemed always to have been, as      valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the      principal Act, as amended by this Act, were in force at      all material  times when  such acquisition  was made or      proceeding was  held or order was made or agreement was      entered into or action was taken.           Explanation-In this section "Company" has the same      meaning as  in clause (e) of section 3 of the principal      Act, as amended by this Act."           "40(aa) that  such acquisition  is needed  for the      construction of  some building  or work  for a  Company      which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself      in any industry or work which is for a public purpose." 788 In this connection, this Court observed as follows:-           "Therefore before s. 7 can validate an acquisition      made before  July 20, 1962, it must first be shown that      the acquisition  is complete  and the land acquired has      vested in Government. This means that the land acquired      has vested in Government either under s. 16 or s. 17(1)      of the  Act. Thus  s. 7  of the Amendment Act validates      such  acquisitions   in  which   property  has   vested      absolutely in  Government either  under  s.  16  or  s.      17(1). Secondly’s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that      where acquisition  has been  made for  a company before      July 20,  1962 or purported to have been made under cl.      (a) or  cl. (b)  of s.  40(1) and  those clauses do not      apply in  view of  the interpretation put thereon in R.      L. Arora’s  case (1962  Supp. 2  SCR 149),  it shall be      deemed  that   the  acquisition  was  for  the  purpose      mentioned in  cl. (aa)  as inserted  in s. 40(1) of the      Act  by  the  Amendment  Act.  Thirdly,  s.  7  of  the      Amendment Act  provides that every such acquisition and      any  proceeding,   order,  agreement   or   action   in      connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be      deemed  always  to  have  been,  as  valid  as  if  the      provisions of ss.40 and 41 of the Act as amended by the      Amendment act  were in force at all material times when      any action  was taken  for such  acquisition.  Finally,      this validity  is given to such acquisitions and to all      actions taken  in connection  therewith notwithstanding      any judgment, decree or order of any court".      Thus, analysing  the ratio  or the "second Arora case", the  following   conditions  must  be  satisfied  before  an acquisition made  prior to July 20, 1962 could be said to be constitutionally valid-      (a)  that the  acquisition had  taken place before July           20, 1962, the date when the Amending Act came into           force;      (b)  that the  said acquisition  should have been fully           completed in  that the  property said to have been           acquired had vested absolutely in the Government;      (c)  that  the   acquisition  was   made  for  purposes

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         mentioned in  clause (aa)  of the  amended  clause           added to s. 40;      (d)  that if  these conditions were satisfied, then any           acquisition proceeding, order, agreement or action           in  connection  with  such  acquisition  would  be           deemed to  have  been  valid  as  if  the  amended           provisions were  in force  at the  time  when  the           acquisition was made.      On this  aspect of  the matter,  the view taken by this Court in  the "second  Arora case"  was followed in a recent decision of this Court in 789 Himalayan Tiles  and  Marbles  v.  Francis  Victor  Coutinho (dead) by  Lrs. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the proceedings  for acquisition  were started  long  before July 20,  1962, that is to say, as early as December 9, 1954 when  notification  under  s.  6  of  the  Act  was  issued. Secondly, it  is  also  not  disputed  that  after  inviting objections, etc.,  an Award  was made  by the  Collector  on October 14,  1957 and  after the  property in  dispute fully vested in  the Government,  the Collector then delivered the same to  the company-respondent  No. 2  on October 23, 1957. For these  reasons, the  facts of  the present case squarely fall within the ambit of the conditions laid down by s. 7 of the Amending  Act and  hence the  challenge on the ground of the  constitutional   validity  of   the  acquisition   must necessarily fail.      Mr. V.  S.  Desai,  appearing  for  respondent  No.  1, however, submitted  that s.  7 itself  was violative of Art. 31(2) of  the Constitution.  It is  not necessary to examine this argument in detail because a similar argument was urged in the "second Arora case" (supra) and rejected.      It was  then contended that even if we assume that s. 7 validated the  present  land  acquisition  proceedings,  the conditions prescribed  in clause  (aa) of  s.  40  were  not fulfilled in this case inasmuch as the acquisition could not be said  to be for a public purpose. It was submitted by the counsel for  respondent No.  1 that  as the  company  was  a private one  and there is nothing to show that there was any direct  connection  or  close  nexus  between  the  articles produced by  the company and the general good of the public, it could  not be  said that  the acquisition  was made for a company which  was engaged  in an  industry  which  was  for public purpose. This argument, in our opinion, is based on a misconception of  the concept  of the  Amending Act  and the introduction of  clauses (aa)  to s. 40. If we are persuaded to hold  that s.  40 (aa)  also requires  proof of  a public purpose in  the restricted sense, in that it must be for the general good  of the  people at  large, then the very object sought to  be achieved  by the amendment would be completely frustrated and the provisions of s. 7 would become otiose. A similar argument  was advanced  in the  "second Arora  case" (supra)  and  was  fully  considered  by  this  Court  which observed as follows:-           "In approaching  the question  of construction  of      this clause,  it cannot be forgotten that the amendment      was made  in consequence  of the decision of this Court      in R.  L. Arora’s  case (1962  Supp. 2 SCR 149) and the      intention of  Parliament was to fill the lacuna, which,      according to  that decision,  existed in the Act in the      matter of  acquisitions for  a company.....  Further, a      literal  interpretation   is  not   always   the   only      interpretation of a provision 790      in a  statute and  the court has to look at the setting

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    in which  the words  are used  and the circumstances in      which the law came to be passed to decide whether there      is something  implicit behind  the words  actually used      which would  control the  literal meaning  of the words      used in a provision of the statute.           Therefore, we have to see whether the provision in      cl. (aa) bears another construction also in the setting      in which  it appears  and in the circumstances in which      it was  put on the statute book and also in view of the      language used in the clause. The circumstances in which      the  amendment  came  to  be  made  have  already  been      mentioned by us and the intention of Parliament clearly      was to  fill up  the lacuna  in the  Act  which  became      evident on  the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora’s      case (1962  Supp. 2 SCR 149)...... It was only for such      a company that land was to be acquired compulsorily and      the  acquisition  was  for  the  construction  of  some      building or  work for  such a  company, i.e., a company      engaged or about to be engaged in some industry or work      which is for a public purpose. In this setting it seems      to  us   reasonable  to  hold  that  the  intention  of      Parliament could  only have  been that  land should  be      acquired for  such building  or work  for a  company as      would subserve  the public  purpose of  the company; it      could not  have been  intended, considering the setting      in which  cl. (aa)  was introduced,  that land could be      acquired  for  a  building  or  work  which  would  not      subserve the  public purpose of the company....Further,      acquisition is for the construction of some building or      work for  a company  and the  nature of that company is      that it  is engaged  or is  taking steps  for  engaging      itself in  any industry  or work  which is for a public      purpose. When  therefore the  building or  work is  for      such a  company it seems to us that it is reasonable to      hold that  the nature  of the  building or  work to  be      constructed takes colour from the nature of the company      for which  it is to be constructed. We are therefore of      opinion that  the literal  and mechanical  construction      for which  the petitioner  contends is neither the only      nor the true construction of cl. (aa) and that when cl.      (aa)  provides  for  acquisition  of  land  needed  for      construction of  some building  or work  it  implicitly      intends that  the building  or  work  which  is  to  be      constructed must  be such  as to  subserve  the  public      purpose of the industry or work in which the company is      engaged or  is about to be engaged. In short, the words      "building or  work" used  in cl. (aa) take their colour      from the adjectival clause which governs the company 791      for which the building or work is being constructed....      It is  only in these cases where the company is engaged      in an  industry or  work of  that kind  and  where  the      building or  work is  also constructed for a purpose of      that kind,  which is a public purpose, that acquisition      can be  made under  cl. (aa).  As we read the clause we      are of  opinion that  the public purpose of the company      for which  acquisition is to be made cannot be divorced      from the  purpose of the building or work and it is not      open for  such a company to acquire land under cl. (aa)      for a  building or  work which  will not  subserve  the      public purpose of the company."      (Emphasis ours)      The effect  of the observations made above leads to the irresistible conclusion  that the words ’public purpose’ are not to  be interpreted in a restricted sense but take colour

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from the nature of the industry itself, the articles that it manufactures  and   the  benefit   to  the  people  that  it subserves. This Court clearly indicated that the land should be acquired  for building  or work  which  would  serve  the public purpose  of the  company and not public purpose as it is generally  understood. In  the instant case, we have also set out  the nature  of the products of the company and have stressed the  fact that the articles produced by the company are used  for the  benefit of the people and as it saves lot of foreign exchange, it is unmistakably for the general good of the country particularly from the economic point of view. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the object of the company  in extending  its operations  by enlarging  the area of its production was not for the public purpose of the company. Taking  an overall  picture of  the nature  of  the products of the company, its various activities, the general public good  that it  seeks to achieve and the great benefit that  the   people  derive,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the acquisition, in  the present  case, was  not  for  a  public purpose. According to the test laid down by this Court it is sufficient if  it is  shown that  the building  sought to be built or the work undertaken subserves the public purpose of the company  which is completely fulfilled in this case. The High Court  seems to  have been  impressed by  the  argument advanced before  it that the land acquisition proceedings in the instant  case are  hit by  s. 44B  of the  Act. The High Court, however, has failed to consider that s. 44B is purely prospective in  character and  has absolutely no application to acquisition  proceedings taken  before July 20, 1962, the date when the amendment was enacted.      The High Court also seems to have accepted the argument of the  first respondent  that s. 40(aa) violates Art. 14 of the Constitution  inasmuch as it permits acquisition of land for a company but 792 not for  an individual  or a  private company  though  these persons may  also be  engaged in an industry which was for a public purpose. This argument was repelled by this Court and it was  held that s. 40(aa) was not violative of Art. 14. In this connection, this Court observed as follows:-           "Therefore  a   distinction  in   the  matter   of      acquisition  of   land  between  public  companies  and      Government  companies  on  the  one  hand  and  private      individuals and  private companies  on the  other is in      our opinion  justified, considering  the object  behind      cl. (aa)  as introduced  into the  Act. The  contention      under this head must therefore also fail."      Some of  the High Courts also have taken a similar view which has  found favour  with us in view of the second Arora case, referred  to above. In the case of P. Girdharan Prasad Missir and Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr. a Division Bench of the Patna  High  Court  while  dealing  with  this  question observed as follows:-           "Thirdly, it  was urged  that the  acquisition was      not for  a public purpose but merely for the purpose of      helping a  person (here  the company)  to make profits.      This argument,  however, is  no longer available. It is      well known  that sugar industry is one of the important      industries of  India engaged  in the  production of  an      essential commodity, and the fostering of the growth of      that industry  is undoubtedly  for a  public purpose. A      company engaged  in the  manufacture  of  sugar  would,      therefore, come  within the scope of clause (a) of sub-      section (1) of section 40 of the Act."      A  Division   Bench  of   the  Gujarat  High  Court  in

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Chhotubhai Babarbhai  Patel v.  State of  Gujarat  and  Anr. while construing  the second  Arora case  referred to  above clearly held  that s.  40(aa) contemplated that the building or work  which the  company intended  to  construct  was  to subserve the  public purpose  of the  industry or  work  for which it  was being  constructed. In  that  case  also,  the company concerned  was  manufacturing  caustic  soda,  dyes, chemicals, colours  and drugs  (caustic soda  is one  of the products of  the company in the instant case also). Dwelling on the  importance of  the public  purpose of  the  industry concerned in that case, Shelat, C. J., observed as follows:-           "Taking all  these factors  into consideration, it      is not  possible to deny that the industry in which the      second respondent  company is  already engaged  and  is      about to be engaged in, and for the 793      buildings or  works for which the lands in question are      being acquired  is such  that it  will  promote  public      purpose and will be in the interest of the public."      We  find  ourselves  in  complete  agreement  with  the aforesaid observations of the learned Chief Justice.      Finally, even in the second Arora case, it would appear that the  company in  question was engaged in the production of textile machinery and its parts which were for the use of the general  public. This  was held  by this  Court to  be a definite public  purpose behind  the  acquisition.  In  this connection, this Court observed as follows:-           "We are  concerned here  with  acquisition  for  a      public purpose, which is undisputed. This is not a case      of a  house  of  one  person  being  requisitioned  for      another; this is a case of constructing some work which      will be  useful to  the public  and will  subserve  the      public purpose  of the  production of textile machinery      and its parts for the use of the general public. In the      circumstances we  are of  opinion that  there  being  a      definite public  purpose behind  the acquisition in the      present case,  the acquisition would be justified under      the Act  irrespective of  the intention of the previous      owner of  the land  to use  it for  some  other  public      purpose."      The industrial  venture in  which respondent  No. 2 was engaged was  undoubtedly of  much greater use than a company producing textile  machinery because apart from being useful to the  people at  large and producing chemicals it has also resulted  in   saving  lot  of  foreign  exchange  and  thus improving the  economy  of  our  country  so  as  to  be  an efficient instrument  of economic  benefit. We are satisfied that all  the conditions of s. 7 of the Amending Act as also that of  s. 40(aa)  have been  fulfilled in the instant case and the  High Court  was wrong  in law  in quashing the said proceedings. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment of the  High Court is quashed and the Award of the Collector as also  the proceedings  before the  Award are restored. In the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  appellant  will  be entitled to costs in this Court against respondent No. 1. S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 794