REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1134-1135 OF 2002

State of Uttaranchal   .. Appellant

Versus

Balwant Singh Chaufal & Others .. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. These  appeals  have  been  filed  by  the  State  of  

Uttaranchal  (now  Uttarakhand)  against  the  orders  dated  

12.7.2001  and 1.8.2001 passed by the Division Bench of the  

High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Civil Miscellaneous  

Writ Petition No. 689 (M/B) of 2001.

2. The appointment of L. P. Nathani was challenged before  

the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation on the ground  

that  he  could  not  hold  the  august  Office  of  the  Advocate  

General  of  Uttarakhand  in  view  of  Article  165  read  with  

Article 217 of the Constitution.  According to the respondent,  

Mr. Nathani was ineligible to be appointed as the Advocate  

General  because  he  had  attained  the  age  of  62  years  much  

before he was appointed as the Advocate General.  The High  

Court  entertained  the  petition  and  directed  the  State  

Government to take decision on the issue raised within 15 days  

and apprise the same to the High Court.

3. The  State  of  Uttaranchal  preferred   special  leave  

petitions before this Court on 6.8.2001. This Court vide order  

dated 9.8.2001 stayed the operation of the impugned judgment  

of  the  High  Court.   Thereafter  on  11.2.2002,  this  Court  

granted leave and directed that the stay already granted shall  

continue.   

4. It  may  be  pertinent  to  mention  that,  despite  the  

service of notice, the respondents who had initially filed the  

writ  petition  before  the  High  Court  challenging  the  

appointment of Nathani as the Advocate General did not appear  

before  this  Court.  This  clearly  demonstrates  the  non-

seriousness and non-commitment of the respondents in filing  

the petition.

5. Before we proceed to examine the controversy involved  

in this case, we deem it appropriate to set out Articles 165  

and  217  of  the  Constitution  dealing  with  the  post  of  the  

Advocate  General  and  the  qualifications  for  appointment  to  

this post in the Constitution.  Article 165 which deals with  

the  appointment  of  the  Advocate  General  for  the  States  is  

reproduced as under:

“165.  The  Advocate-General  for  the  State.-(1)  The  Governor  of  each  State  shall  appoint  a  person who is qualified to be appointed a Judge  of a High Court to be Advocate-General for the  State.

(2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General  to give advice to the Government of the State  upon such legal matters, and to perform such  other duties of a legal character, as may from

time to time be referred or assigned to him by  the  Governor,  and  to  discharge  the  functions  conferred on him by or under this Constitution  or any other law for the time being in force.  

(3)  The  Advocate-General  shall  hold  office  during the pleasure of the Governor, and shall  receive such remuneration as the Governor may  determine.

6. Article 217 which deals with the appointment and the  

conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court is set out  

as under:  

217 - Appointment and conditions of the office  of a Judge of a High Court .- (1) Every Judge of  a High Court shall be appointed by the President  by  warrant  under  his  hand  and  seal  after  consultation  with  the  Chief  Justice  of  India,  the Governor of the State, and, in the case of  appointment  of  a  Judge  other  than  the  Chief  Justice, the Chief Justice of the High court,  and  shall  hold  office,  in  the  case  of  an  additional  or  acting  Judge,  as  provided  in  article 224, and in any other case, until he  attains the age of  sixty-two years:

Provided that--  

(a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand  addressed to the President, resign his office;

(b)  a Judge may be removed from his office  by  the  President  in  the  manner  provided  in  clause (4) of article 124 for the removal of a  Judge of the Supreme Court;

(c)   the office of a Judge shall be vacated by  his being appointed by the President to be a  Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  or  by  his  being  transferred by the President to any other High  Court within the territory of India.

(2) A  person  shall  not  be  qualified  for  appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he  is a citizen of India and—  

(a) has  for  at  least  ten  years  held  a  judicial office in the territory of India; or

(b) has  for  at  least  ten  years  been  an  advocate of a High Court or of two or more such  courts in succession;  

Explanation: For the purposes of this clause—

(a) in computing the period during which a  person has held judicial office in the territory  of India, there shall be included any period,  after he has held any judicial office, during  which the person has been an advocate of a High  Court or has held the office of a member of a  tribunal  or  any  post,  under  the  Union  or  a  State, requiring special knowledge of law;  

(aa) in computing the period during which a  person has been an advocate of a High Court,  there shall be included any period during which  the  person  has  held  judicial  office  or  the  office of a member of a tribunal or any post,  under the Union or a State, requiring special  knowledge of law after he became an advocate;  

(b) in computing the period during which a  person has held judicial office in the territory  of  India  or  been  an  advocate  of  High  Court,  there shall be included any period before the  commencement of this Constitution during which  he has held judicial office in any area which  was  comprised  before  the  fifteenth  day  of  August,  1947,  within  India  as  defined  by  the  Government  of  India  Act,1935,  or  has  been  an  advocate of any High Court in any such area, as  the case may be.

(3) If any question arises as to the age of  a Judge of a High Court, the question shall be  decided by the President after consultation with  the Chief Justice of India and the decision of  the President shall be final.”

7. The Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned  

judgment observed that the first clause of Article 165 insists  

that  the  Governor  shall  appoint  a  person  as  the  Advocate  

General who is qualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High  

Court.  The qualifications for the appointment of a Judge of a  

High Court are prescribed in the second clause of Article 217.  

It is true that the first clause of Article 217 says that a

Judge of a High Court “shall hold office until he attains the  

age of 60 years” (at the relevant time the age of retirement  

of a Judge of the High Court was 60 years and now it is 62  

years).     The  Division  Bench  further  held  that  the  real  

question then was whether this provision is to be construed as  

one  prescribing  a  qualification  or  as  one  prescribing  the  

duration of the appointment of a Judge of a High Court.  It  

was further held that as the provision does not occur in the  

second clause, it can only be construed as one prescribing the  

duration of the appointment of a Judge of a High Court.   The  

Court further observed that the provisions about duration in  

the first clause of Article 217 cannot be made applicable to  

the  Advocate  General  because  the  Constitution  contains  a  

specific provision about the duration of the appointment of  

the Advocate General in the third clause of Article 165 which  

says that the Advocate General shall hold office during the  

pleasure of the Governor.   This provision does not limit the  

duration of the appointment by reference to any particular  

age, as in the case of a Judge, it is not permissible to  

import into it the words “until he attains the age of sixty  

years”.   The specific provision in the Constitution must,  

therefore, be given effect to without any limitation.   If a  

person is appointed as an Advocate General, say at the age of  

fifty-five years, there is no warrant for holding that he must  

cease to hold his office on his attaining sixty two years  

because it is so stated about a Judge of a High court in the  

first clause of Article 217.   If that be a true position, as

we hold it is, then the appointment is not bad because the  

person  is  past  sixty  two  years,  so  long  as  he  has  the  

qualifications prescribed in the second clause of Article 217.  

8. Shri  Dinesh  Dwivedi,  the  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing for the State of Uttarakhand submitted that, over  

half a century ago, in  G.D. Karkare v. T.L. Shevde & Others  

AIR 1952 Nagpur 330, this controversy has been settled by the  

Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court and the said judgment  

was approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case  

of  Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. Sonepat v. Their Workmen  1962  

Supp. (3) SCR 89.  In Karkare’s case (supra), it was observed  

as follows:

“25. It is obvious that all the provisions  relating to a Judge of a High Court cannot be  made applicable to the Advocate-General.  The  provisions about remuneration are different for  the two offices.  A Judge of the High Court is  governed by Art. 221.  The Advocate-General is  governed by clause (3) of Art. 165 and receives  such remuneration as the Governor may determine.

26. What  the  first  clause  of  Art.  165  insists  is  that  the  Governor  shall  appoint  a  person who is qualified to be appointed a Judge  of a High Court to be Advocate-General for the  State.  The qualifications for the appointment  of a Judge of a High Court are prescribed in the  second clause of Art. 217. It is true that the  first clause of Art 217 says that a Judge of a  High Court “shall hold office until he attains  the age of 60 years”.  The real question then is  whether this provision is to be construed as one  prescribing  a  qualification  or  as  one  prescribing the duration of the appointment of a  Judge of a High Court.  As the provision does  not occur in the second clause, it can only be  construed as one prescribing the duration of the  appointment of a Judge of a High Court.

27. The  provision  about  duration  in  the  first  clause  of  Art.  217  cannot  be  made

applicable to the Advocate-General because the  Constitution contains a specific provision about  the duration of the appointment of the Advocate- General in the third clause of Art. 165 which  says that the Advocate-General shall hold office  during the pleasure of the Governor.   As this  provision  does  not  limit  the  duration  of  the  appointment by reference to any particular age,  as in the case of a Judge, it is not permissible  to import into it the words “until he attains  the age of sixty years”.  The specific provision  in  the  Constitution  must  therefore  be  given  effect to without any limitation.  If a person  is appointed Advocate-General, say at the age of  fifty-five, there is no warrant for holding that  he  must  cease  to  hold  his  office  on  this  attaining sixty years because it is so stated  about  a  Judge  of  a  High  Court  in  the  first  clause  of  Art.  217.   If  that  be  the  true  position, as we hold it is, then the appointment  is  not  bad  because  the  person  is  past  sixty  years,  so  long  as  he  has  the  qualifications  prescribed  in  the  second  clause  of  Art.  217.  It was not suggested that the non-applicant does  not  possess  the  qualifications  prescribed  in  that clause.

28. The provision that every Judge of a High  Court “shall hold office until he attains the  age of sixty years” has two aspects to it. While  in one aspect it can be viewed as a guarantee of  tenure  during  good  behaviour  to  a  person  appointed as a Judge of a High Court until he  attains the age of sixty, in another aspect it  can be viewed as a disability in that a Judge  cannot  hold  his  office  as  of  right  after  he  attains the age of sixty years.

29. We say as of right because under Art.  224 a person who has retired as a Judge of a  High Court may be requested to sit and act as a  Judge of a High court.  The attainment of the  age of sixty by a person cannot therefore be  regarded  as  a  disqualification  for  performing  the  functions  of  a  Judge.   But  the  learned  counsel for the applicant tried to distinguish  between the case of a person qualified to be  appointed a Judge of a High Court under Article  217 and the case of a person requested to sit  and act as a Judge under Article 224.

The distinction between the case of a  person qualified to be appointed a Judge of a  High Court under Article 217 and the case of a

person requested to sit and act under Article  224 is not with respect to the qualifications  for  performing  the  functions  of  a  Judge,  but  with respect to the matters provided by Article  221, 222, 223, etc.  In the language of the  Constitution  a  Judge  does  not  lose  the  qualifications prescribed in the second clause  of Article 217 on the attainment of the age of  sixty  years.   A  person  who  attains  that  age  cannot be appointed as a Judge not because he is  not  qualified  to  be  so  appointed  within  the  meaning of the second clause of Article 217, but  because  the  first  clause  of  that  Article  expressly  provides  that  a  Judge  shall  hold  office until he attains the age of sixty years.

(30) If the provision in the first clause of  Article 217 viewed as a guarantee of tenure of  office until the age of sixty is not available  to the Advocate-General because he holds office  during the pleasure of the Governor, we see no  compelling  reason  why  the  same  provision  construed  as  a  disability  should  be  made  applicable to him.  We are, therefore, of the  view that the first clause of Article 217 cannot  be read with the first clause of Article 165 so  as to disqualify a person from being appointed  Advocate-General after the age of sixty years.  We  have  no  doubt  on  the  point.  Even  if  the  question be considered as not free from doubt,  as the applicant desires to construe the first  clause of Article 217 as a disabling provision  against the non-applicant, we cannot forget that  provisions  entailing  disabilities  have  to  be  construed  strictly:  ‘Parameshwaram  Pillai  Bhaskara Pillai v. State’, 1950-5 Dom L R (Trav)  382.   The  canon  of  construction  approved  by  their Lordships of the Privy Council is that if  there be any ambiguity as to the meaning of a  disabling provision, the construction which is  in  favour  of  the  freedom  of  the  individual  should be given effect to : ‘David v. De’silva’,  (1934) A C 106 at p. 114.

(31) There is no force in the contention that  the non-applicant could not have been appointed  Advocate-General  because  he  had  retired  as  a  Judge of the High Court.  The learned counsel  referred us to Clause (4)(a) of Article 22 of  the  Constitution  and  submitted  that  the  Constitution  makes  a  distinction  between  a  person  who  has  been  a  Judge  and  one  who  is  qualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High  Court.  The provision in our view only makes an

exhaustive enumeration of the classes of persons  who  can  constitute  an  Advisory  Board.   Such  persons must either be or must have been or must  be qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High  Court.  The provision has therefore no bearing  on  the  question  whether  the  first  clause  of  Article 165 has to be read with the first clause  of Article 217, which question we have already  answered in the negative.  The case of the non- applicant  is  unique.   Article  220  is  not  applicable to him because he did not hold office  as  a  Judge  of  the  High  Court  after  the  commencement  of  the  Constitution.  So  the  bar  contained in that Article also does not come in  his way.”

9. Despite the fact that the controversy has been fully  

settled by a judgment of this Court, it has been raised from  

time to time in a number of writ petitions before the various  

High Courts.  We would reproduce some of the judgments to  

demonstrate  that  after  the  controversy  has  been  finally  

settled by this Court, the filing of indiscriminate petitions  

with  the  same  relief  creates  unnecessary  strain  on  the  

judicial system and consequently leads to inordinate delay in  

disposal of genuine and bona fide cases.

10. The following cases would demonstrate that, in how many  

High Courts, the similar controversy has been raised after the  

matter was finally settled by this Court:

11. In Ghanshyam Chandra Mathur v. The State of Rajasthan  

& Others 1979 Weekly Law Notes 773, the appointment of the  

Advocate General was once again challenged.  The court held  

that “…no age of superannuation has been mentioned in Article  

165 of the Constitution of India.  This clearly means that the  

age of superannuation which applies to a High Court Judge,

does not apply to the office of the Advocate General”.

12. In  Dr.  Chandra  Bhan  Singh  v.  State  of  Rajasthan  &  

Others AIR 1983 Raj. 149, the question regarding the validity  

of the appointment of the Advocate General was challenged.  

The Court in this case had held that the age of superannuation  

of  a  High  Court  Judge  did  not  apply  to  the  post  of  the  

Advocate General.  The court noted that all provisions in the  

Constitution for High Court Judges, such as remuneration and  

tenure of office do not apply to the post of the Advocate  

General.   

13. In  Manendra Nath Rai & Another v. Virendra Bhatia &  

Others AIR  2004  All.  133,  the  appointment  of  the  Advocate  

General was yet again challenged. The Court held as under:

“The argument that the provision of Sub-clause (1)  of  Article  217  of  the  Constitution  should  be  followed in the matter of appointment of Advocate  General is wholly misconceived. Article 217 of the  Constitution  deals  with  the  appointment  and  conditions  of  the  office  of  a  Judge  of  a  High  Court. The consultation with the Chief Justice of  the State in the matter of appointment of a Judge  of the High Court cannot be made a requirement in  the matter of the appointment of Advocate General.  The  appointment  of  Advocate  General  is  not  governed by the aforesaid Article which falls in  Chapter-V  Part-6  of  the  Constitution  whereas  Article 165, which deals with the appointment of  Advocate General for the State falls in Chapter II  of Part 6. The scheme of the Constitution for the  appointment  of  Advocate  General  as  well  as  for  appointment  of  a  Judge  of  the  High  Court  is  totally different.”

14. In  a  Division  Bench  judgment  dated  4.2.2005  of  the  

Allahabad High Court in Prem Chandra Sharma & Others v. Milan  

Banerji  &  Others in  writ  petition  No.  716  (M/B)  of  2005

reported in 2005 (3) ESC 2001, the appointment of the Attorney  

General for India was challenged and a prayer was made to  

issue a writ in the nature of quo warranto, because according  

to the petitioner, the respondent Milan Banerji had already  

attained the age of 65 years and he could not be appointed as  

the Attorney General for India.  In that case, the Division  

Bench relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the  

Nagpur High Court in G.D. Karkare’s case (supra).  The Court  

held as under:

“Having  examined  various  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  Constitution  of  India  does  not  provide  the  retirement  age  of  various  constitutional  appointees. No outer age limit has been provided  for  the  appointment  of  the  Attorney  General,  Solicitor  General  and  Advocate  General  in  the  State. In the democratic system, prevailing in our  country the Attorney General is appointed on the  recommendation  of  the  Prime  Minister  by  the  President of India and traditionally, he resigns  along with the Prime Minister. Learned Counsel for  the petitioner could not show any law relating to  the  age  of  retirement  of  Attorney  General  or  embargo provided in Constitution on appointment of  a  person  as  Attorney  General,  who  has  already  attained  the  age  of  65  years.  We  are  of  the  considered opinion that the letter and spirit of  the  Constitution  as  far  as  appointment  of  the  Attorney  General  is  concerned,  looking  to  significance,  responsibility  and  high  status  of  the post, it lays down certain requirements for a  Member of Bar to be appointed as Attorney General  of India. It is in this backdrop that the framers  of  the  Constitution  thought  it  necessary  to  prescribe  minimum  requisite  qualification  by  laying  that  a  person  who  is  qualified  to  be  appointed as Judge of the Hon'ble Court can be  appointed  as  Attorney-General  of  India.  This  situation,  however,  cannot  lead  us  to  the  conclusion by any stretch of imagination that the  Attorney General cannot hold his office after the  age of 65 years. As already indicated herein-above  there  are  various  constitutional  functionaries  where no outer age limit is provided to hold the

office.”

15. In  view  of  the  clear  enunciation  of  law  in  the  

aforesaid judgments, the controversy has been fully settled  

that the Advocate General for the State can be appointed after  

he/she attains the age of 62 years.  Similarly, the Attorney  

General for India can be appointed after he/she attains the  

age of 65 years.   In a number of other cases regarding the  

appointment of other authorities, the Courts have consistently  

taken the similar view.

16. This Court in  Binay Kant Mani Tripathi v. Union of  

India & Others (1993) 4 SCC 49 has re-affirmed this position.  

The Court pointed out that the decision of appointing D.K.  

Aggarwal to the position of the Vice-chairman of the Central  

Administrative Tribunal could not be held to be illegal or  

wrong on the ground that he was more than sixty two years old.  

17. In  Baishnab Patnaik & Others v. The State AIR 1952  

Orissa 60, the appointment of a person to the Advisory Board  

under  the  Preventive  Detention  Act  was  challenged  on  the  

grounds  that  he  was  older  than  60  years  (the  age  of  

superannuation for High Court judges at that time). The court  

pointed out:

“If the makers of the Constitution thought that  the age limit was one of the qualifications for  appointment as a Judge of a High Court they would  not have specified it in Clause (1) of Article 217  but would have included it in Clause (2) of the  said Article.”

18. In  Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab & Others (2005) 5

SCC 136, the appointment of the appellant as Auction Recorder  

was  challenged.    The  Court  held  that  the  scope  of  

entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation  

and  locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters  

involving service of an employee has been examined by this  

Court  in  various  cases.  The  Court  observed  that  before  

entertaining the petition, the Court must be satisfied about  

(a)  the  credentials  of  the  applicant;  (b)  the  prima  facie  

correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the  

information being not vague and indefinite. The information  

should show gravity and seriousness involved.  The court has  

to  strike  balance  between  two  conflicting  interests;  (i)  

nobody  should  be  allowed  to  indulge  in  wild  and  reckless  

allegations  besmirching  the  character  of  others;  and  (ii)  

avoidance  of  public  mischief  and  to  avoid  mischievous  

petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable  

executive actions.   

19. The aforementioned cases clearly give us the picture  

how the judicial process has been abused from time to time and  

after the controversy was finally settled by a Constitution  

Bench of this Court, repeatedly the petitions were filed in  

the various courts.

20. In the instant case, one of the petitioners before the  

High  Court  is  a  practicing  lawyer  of  the  court.   He  has  

invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court in  

this matter.  It was expected from a Hon’ble member of the

noble profession not to invoke the jurisdiction of the court  

in a matter where the controversy itself is no longer  res  

integra.   

21. Similarly,  it  is  the  bounden  duty  of  the  court  to  

ensure that the controversy once settled by an authoritative  

judgment should not be reopened unless there are extraordinary  

reasons for doing so.   

22. In the instant case, the High Court entertained the  

petition despite the fact that the controversy involved in the  

case  was  no  longer  res  integra.    In  reply  to  that  writ  

petition, the Chief Standing Counsel of Uttrakhand also filed  

a  Miscellaneous  Application  before  the  High  Court.   The  

relevant portion of the application reads as under:

“3. That  the  following  Attorney  Generals  appointed  under  Article  76  of  the  Constitution  were  appointed  when  they  were  appointed  as  Attorney General were beyond prescribed age for  appointment as Supreme Court of India.

(I) Sri M. C. Setalvad (II) Sri C. K. Dapatary (III)Shri Niren De (IV) Sri Lal Narain Singh (V) Sri K. Parasaran (VI) Sri Soli Sorabjee

4. That the appointment of present Attorney  General (Mr. Milon Banerjee) was challenged before  the  Delhi  High  Court  and  the  petition  was  dismissed in limine.  The appointment of Mr. R.P.  Goel, Advocate General of U.P. who has passed the  age of  62 at  the time  of appointment  was also  dismissed.

5. That  in  the  Hon’ble  High  Court  of  Judicature at Allahabad Sri JV. K.S. Chaudhary,  Sir Rishi Ram, Pt. Kanhaiya Lal Mishra, Sri Shanti  Swaroop  Bhatnagar  and  several  others  were  appointed as Advocate General after crossing the

age  of  62  years.   There  were  several  Advocate  Generals  in  India  who  were  appointed  after  62  years.”

23. The State of Uttrakhand was a part of the State of U.P.  

a few years ago.  In the State of U.P., a large number of  

Advocate Generals appointed were beyond 62 years of age at the  

time of their appointment.  The petitioner, a local practicing  

lawyer, ought to have bestowed some care before filing this  

writ  petition  in  public  interest  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution.

24. The controversy raised by the petitioner in this case  

was decided 58 years ago in the judgment of  Karkare  (supra)  

which was approved by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme  

Court way back in 1962.  Unfortunately, the same controversy  

has been repeatedly raised from time to time in various High  

Courts.  When the controversy is no longer res-integra and the  

same controversy is raised repeatedly, then it not only wastes  

the precious time of the Court and prevent the Court from  

deciding  other  deserving  cases,  but  also  has  the  immense  

potentiality  of  demeaning  a  very  important  constitutional  

office and person who has been appointed to that office.    

25. In our considered view, it is a clear case of the abuse  

of  process  of  court  in  the  name  of  the  Public  Interest  

Litigation.  In order to curb this tendency effectively, it  

has now become imperative to examine all connected issues of  

public interest litigation by an authoritative judgment in the  

hope that in future no such petition would be filed and/or

entertained by the Court.

26. To settle the controversy, we deem it appropriate to  

deal  with  different  definitions  of  the  Public  Interest  

Litigation in various countries.   We would also examine the  

evolution of the public interest litigation.

DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC INTERST LITIGATION

27. Public  Interest  Litigation  has  been  defined  in  the  

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition) as under:-

“Public Interest - Something in which the public,  the  community  at  large,  has  some  pecuniary  interest, or some interest by which their legal  rights or liabilities are affected. It does not  mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as  the interests of the particular localities, which  may  be  affected  by  the  matters  in  question.  Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs  of local, state or national government....”

28. Advanced  Law  Lexicon  has  defined  ‘Public  Interest  

Litigation’ as under:-

“The  expression  ‘PIL’  means  a  legal  action  initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of  public interest or general interest in which the  public or a class of the community has pecuniary  interest  or  some  interest  by  which  their  legal  rights or liabilities are affected.”

29. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford  

Foundation in USA defined "public interest litigation" in its  

report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:

“Public Interest Law is the name that has recently  been given to efforts provide legal representation  to previously unrepresented groups and interests.  Such  efforts  have  been  undertaken  in  the  recognition that ordinary market place for legal  services  fails  to  provide  such  services  to  significant  segments  of  the  population  and  to  significant interests. Such groups and interests

include the proper environmentalists,  consumers,  racial  and  ethnic  minorities  and  others.”  (M/s  Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra  & Ors. – AIR 2008 SC 913, para 19).

30. This court in  People’s Union for Democratic Rights &  

Others v. Union of India & Others  (1982) 3 SCC 235 defined  

‘Public  Interest  Litigation’  and  observed  that  the  “Public  

interest litigation is a cooperative or collaborative effort  

by  the  petitioner,  the  State  of  public  authority  and  the  

judiciary  to  secure  observance  of  constitutional  or  basic  

human rights, benefits and privileges upon poor, downtrodden  

and vulnerable sections of the society”.

ORIGIN OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:  

31. The  public  interest  litigation  is  the  product  of  

realization of the constitutional obligation of the court.

32. All these petitions are filed under the big banner of  

the public interest litigation.  In this view of the matter,  

it has become imperative to examine what are the contours of  

the  public  interest  litigation?   What  is  the  utility  and  

importance of the public interest litigation?  Whether similar  

jurisdiction  exists  in  other  countries  or  this  is  an  

indigenously developed jurisprudence?  Looking to the special  

conditions  prevalent  in  our  country,  whether  the  public  

interest litigation should be encouraged or discouraged by the  

courts?   These  are  some  of  the  questions  which  we  would  

endeavour to answer in this judgment.   

33. According  to  our  opinion,  the  public  interest

litigation is an extremely important jurisdiction exercised by  

the Supreme Court and the High Courts.  The Courts in a number  

of cases have given important directions and passed orders  

which  have  brought  positive  changes  in  the  country.   The  

Courts’  directions  have  immensely  benefited  marginalized  

sections of the society in a number of cases.  It has also  

helped in protection and preservation of ecology, environment,  

forests,  marine  life,  wildlife  etc.  etc.  The  court’s  

directions to some extent have helped in maintaining probity  

and transparency in the public life.

34. This  court  while  exercising  its  jurisdiction  of  

judicial  review  realized  that  a  very  large  section  of  the  

society because of extreme poverty, ignorance, discrimination  

and illiteracy had been denied justice for time immemorial and  

in fact they have no access to justice.  Pre-dominantly, to  

provide access to justice to the poor, deprived, vulnerable,  

discriminated and marginalized sections of the society, this  

court  has  initiated,  encouraged  and  propelled  the  public  

interest litigation.   The litigation is upshot and product of  

this court’s deep and intense urge to fulfill its bounded duty  

and constitutional obligation.     

35. The  High  Courts  followed  this  Court  and  exercised  

similar jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution.  

The courts expanded the meaning of right to life and liberty  

guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution.  The rule of  

locus  standi was  diluted  and  the  traditional  meaning  of

‘aggrieved person’ was broadened to provide access to justice  

to a very large section of the society which was otherwise not  

getting any benefit from the judicial system.  We would like  

to term this as the first phase or the golden era of the  

public  interest  litigation.   We  would  briefly  deal  with  

important cases decided by this Court in the first phase after  

broadening the definition of ‘aggrieved person’.   We would  

also deal with cases how this Court prevented any abuse of the  

public interest litigation?

36. This Court in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh  

(Railway) v. Union of India & Others AIR 1981 SC 298 at page  

317, held that our current processual jurisprudence is not of  

individualistic  Anglo-Indian  mould.   It  is  broad-based  and  

people-oriented,  and  envisions  access  to  justice  through  

‘class  actions’,  ‘public  interest  litigation’,  and  

‘representative proceedings’.  Indeed, little Indians in large  

numbers  seeking  remedies  in  courts  through  collective  

proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality  

of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in  

our democracy.  We have no hesitation in holding that the  

narrow concepts of ‘cause of action’, ‘person aggrieved’ and  

individual  litigation  are  becoming  obsolescent  in  some  

jurisdictions.

37. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Others AIR  

1984  SC  802,  this  court  entertained  a  petition  even  of  

unregistered  Association  espousing  the  cause  of  over  down-

trodden or its members observing that the cause of “little  

Indians” can be espoused by any person having no interest in  

the matter.   

38. In the said case, this court further held that where a  

public interest litigation alleging that certain workmen are  

living in bondage and under inhuman conditions is initiated it  

is  not  expected  of  the  Government  that  it  should  raise  

preliminary  objection  that  no  fundamental  rights  of  the  

petitioners or the workmen on whose behalf the petition has  

been  filed,  have  been  infringed.   On  the  contrary,  the  

Government should welcome an inquiry by the Court, so that if  

it is found that there are in fact bonded labourers or even if  

the workers are not bonded in the strict sense of the term as  

defined in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 but  

they are made to provide forced labour or any consigned to a  

life of utter deprivation and degradation, such a situation  

can be set right by the Government.

39. Public  interest  litigation  is  not  in  the  nature  of  

adversary litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity  

to the government and its officers to make basic human rights  

meaningful  to  the  deprived  and  vulnerable  sections  of  the  

community and to assure them social and economic justice which  

is the signature tune of our Constitution.  The Government and  

its officers must welcome public interest litigation because  

it would provide them an occasion to examine whether the poor  

and the down-trodden are getting their social and economic

entitlements or whether they are continuing to remain victims  

of  deception  and  exploitation  at  the  hands  of  strong  and  

powerful  sections  of  the  community  and  whether  social  and  

economic justice has become a meaningful reality for them or  

it has remained merely a teasing illusion and a promise of  

unreality,  so  that  in  case  the  complaint  in  the  public  

interest litigation is found to be true, they can in discharge  

of their constitutional  obligation root out exploitation and  

injustice and ensure to the weaker sections their rights and  

entitlements.

40. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd., Sindri  

& Others v. Union of India & Others  AIR 1981 SC 844, this  

court observed that “public interest litigation is part of the  

process  of  participative  justice  and  ‘standing’  in  civil  

litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the  

judicial doorsteps”.

41. In Ramsharan Autyanuprasi & Another v. Union of India  

& Others AIR 1989 SC 549, this court observed that the public  

interest  litigation  is  for  making  basic  human  rights  

meaningful  to  the  deprived  and  vulnerable  sections  of  the  

community and to assure them social, economic and political  

justice.  

EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA

42. The origin and evolution of Public Interest Litigation  

in  India  emanated  from  realization  of  constitutional  

obligation by the Judiciary towards the vast sections of the

society  -  the  poor  and  the  marginalized  sections  of  the  

society.   This jurisdiction has been created and carved out  

by the judicial creativity and craftsmanship.  In M. C. Mehta  

& Another v. Union of India & Others  AIR 1987 SC 1086, this  

Court observed that Article 32 does not merely confer power on  

this  Court  to  issue  direction,  order  or  writ  for  the  

enforcement of fundamental rights.  Instead, it also lays a  

constitutional  obligation  on  this  Court  to  protect  the  

fundamental rights of the people. The court asserted that, in  

realization  of  this  constitutional  obligation,  “it  has  all  

incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge  

new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce  

the fundamental rights”.  The Court realized that because of  

extreme poverty, a large number of sections of society cannot  

approach the court.  The fundamental rights have no meaning  

for them and in order to preserve and protect the fundamental  

rights  of  the  marginalized  section  of  society  by  judicial  

innovation, the courts by judicial innovation and creativity  

started giving necessary directions and passing orders in the  

public interest.

43. The development of public interest litigation has been  

extremely significant development in the history of the Indian  

jurisprudence.   The  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  

1970’s loosened the strict locus standi requirements to permit  

filing of petitions on behalf of marginalized and deprived  

sections  of  the  society  by  public  spirited  individuals,  

institutions and/or bodies.  The higher Courts exercised wide

powers  given  to  them  under  Articles  32  and  226  of  the  

Constitution.  The sort of remedies sought from the courts in  

the public interest litigation goes beyond award of remedies  

to the affected individuals and groups.  In suitable cases,  

the courts have also given guidelines and directions.   The  

courts have monitored implementation of legislation and even  

formulated guidelines in absence of legislation.  If the cases  

of the decades of 70s and 80s are analyzed, most of the public  

interest litigation cases which were entertained by the courts  

are  pertaining  to  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights  of  

marginalized and deprived sections of the society.  This can  

be termed as the first phase of the public interest litigation  

in India.

44. The Indian Supreme Court broadened the traditional rule  

of standing and the definition of “person aggrieved”.   

45. In this judgment, we would like to deal with the origin  

and development of public interest litigation.  We deem it  

appropriate to broadly divide the public interest litigation  

in three phases.

 Phase-I: It deals with cases of this Court  where  directions  and  orders  were  passed  primarily to protect fundamental rights under  Article  21  of  the  marginalized  groups  and  sections  of  the  society  who  because  of  extreme  poverty,  illiteracy  and  ignorance  cannot  approach  this  court  or  the  High  Courts.

 Phase-II: It deals with the cases relating to  protection,  preservation  of  ecology,  environment, forests, marine life, wildlife,  mountains, rivers, historical monuments etc.  etc.

 Phase-III: It deals with the directions issued  by  the  Courts  in  maintaining  the  probity,  transparency and integrity in governance.  

46. Thereafter, we also propose to deal with the aspects of  

abuse of the Public Interest Litigation and remedial measures  

by which its misuse can be prevented or curbed.

DISCUSSION OF SOME IMPORTANT CASES OF PHASE-I

47. The  court  while  interpreting  the  words  “person  

aggrieved” in  Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji  

Bashir Ahmed & Others (1976) 1 SCC 671 observed that “the  

traditional rule is  flexible enough to take in those cases  

where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act  

or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary  

or  even  a  fiduciary  interest  in  the  subject-matter.   That  

apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who  

was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but  

has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter  

of the proceedings will be covered by this rule”.

48. The rule of locus standi was relaxed in Bar Council of  

Maharashtra v.  M. V. Dabholkar & Others 1976 SCR 306.  The  

court observed as under:

“Traditionally used to the adversary system, we  search for individual persons aggrieved. But a new  class  of  litigation  public  interest  litigation- where  a  section  or  whole  of  the  community  is  involved  (such  as  consumers'  organisations  or  NAACP-National  Association  for  Advancement  of  Coloured  People-in  America),  emerges  in  a  developing  country  like  ours,  this  pattern  of  public oriented litigation better fulfils the rule  of law if it is to run close to the rule of life.  

xxx xxx xxx

“The  possible  apprehension  that  widening  legal  standing with a public connotation may unloose a  flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges  is  misplaced  because  public  resort  to  court  to  suppress  public  mischief  is  a  tribute  to  the  justice system.”

49. The  court  in  this  case  observed  that  “procedural  

prescriptions  are  handmaids,  not  mistresses  of  justice  and  

failure of fair play is the spirit in which Courts must view  

procession deviances.”    

50. In  The  Mumbai  Kamgar  Sabha,  Bombay v.  Abdulbhai  

Faizullabhai  &  Others  AIR  1976  SC  1455,  this  Court  made  

conscious  efforts  to  improve  the  judicial  access  for  the  

masses by relaxing the traditional rule of locus standi.   

51. In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & OthersAIR 1978  

SC  1675,  the  Court  departed  from  the  traditional  rule  of  

standing  by  authorizing  community  litigation.   The  Court  

entertained a writ petition from a prisoner, a disinterested  

party, objecting to the torture of a fellow prisoner.  The  

Court  entertained  the  writ  after  reasoning  that  “these  

'martyr' litigations possess a beneficent potency beyond the  

individual  litigant  and  their  consideration  on  the  wider  

representative  basis  strengthens  the  rule  of  law.”  

Significantly, citing “people's vicarious involvement in our  

justice system with a broad-based concept of locus standi so  

necessary in a democracy where the masses are in many senses  

weak,”  the  Court  permitted  a  human  rights  organization  to  

intervene in the case on behalf of the victim.

 52. In  Hussainara  Khatoon  &  Others v.  Home  Secretary,  

State of Bihar, Patna AIR 1979 SC 1369, P. N. Bhagwati, J. has  

observed that “today, unfortunately, in our country the poor  

are priced out of the judicial system with the result that  

they are losing faith in the capacity of our legal system to  

(sic) about changes in their life conditions and to deliver  

justice to them. The poor in their contact with the legal  

system have always been on the wrong side of the line. They  

have always come across 'law for the poor" rather than law of  

the poor'. The law is regarded by them as something mysterious  

and forbidding--always taking something away from them and not  

as a positive and constructive social device for changing the  

social economic order and improving their life conditions by  

conferring rights and benefits on them. The result is that the  

legal system has lost its credibility for the weaker section  

of the community.

53. In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration AIR 1980  

SC 1535, a prisoner sent a telegram to a judge complaining of  

forced  handcuff  on  him  and  demanded  implicit  protection  

against humiliation and torture.   The court gave necessary  

directions by relaxing the strict rule of locus standi.    

54. In  Municipal Council, Ratlam v.  Vardhichand & Others  

AIR 1980 SC 1622, Krishna Iyer, J. relaxed the rule of locus  

standi:

“The  truth  is  that  a  few  profound  issues  of  processual  jurisprudence  of  great  strategic  significance to our legal system face us and we

must zero-in on them as they involve problems of  access  to  justice  for  the  people  beyond  the  blinkered rules of 'standing' of British Indian  vintage. If the center of gravity of justice is to  shift,  as  the  Preamble  to  the  Constitution  mandates,  from  the  traditional  individualism  of  locus  standi  to  the  community  orientation  of  public interest litigation, these issues must be  considered…..

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

Why drive common people to public interest action?  Where  Directive  Principles  have  found  statutory  expression in Do's and Don’ts the court will not  sit  idly  by  and  allow  municipal  government  to  become  a  statutory  mockery.  The  law  will  relentlessly  be  enforced  and  the  plea  of  poor  finance will be poor alibi when people in misery  cry for justice……”

55. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (supra) Krishna  

Iyer, J. and Bhagwati, J. had to answer in affirmative as to  

whether the workers in a factory owned by government had locus  

standi to question the legality of sale of the factory. They  

concluded with a quote: ‘Henry Peter Brougham: Nieman Reports,  

April 1956 as under:

“It was the boast of Augustus that he found Rome  of  brick  and  left  it  of  marble.  But  how  much  nobler will be the sovereign's boast when he shall  have it to say that he found law dear and left it  cheap; found it a sealed book and left it a living  letter; found it the patrimony of the rich and  left it the inheritance of the poor; found it the  two-edged sword of craft and oppression and left  it  the  staff  of  honesty  and  the  shield  of  innocence.”

56. In  People’s  Union  for  Democratic  Rights  &  Others  

(supra), this Court observed as under:

“that  public  interest  litigation  which  is  a  strategic arm of the legal aid movement and which  is intended to bring justice within the reach of

the poor masses, who constitute the low visibility  area of humanity, is a totally different kind of  litigation  from  the  ordinary  traditional  litigation which is essentially of an adversary  character  where  there  is  a  dispute  between  two  litigating parties, one making claim or seeking  relief against the other and that other opposing  such  claim  or  resisting  such  relief.  Public  interest litigation is brought before the court  not for the purpose of enforcing the right of one  individual against another as happens in the case  of  ordinary  litigation,  but  it  is  intended  to  promote  and  vindicate  public  interest  which  demands that violations of constitutional or legal  rights of large numbers of people who are poor,  ignorant  or  in  a  socially  or  economically  disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and  un-redressed.  That  would  be  destructive  of  the  Rule  of  Law  which  forms  one  of  the  essential  elements of public interest in any democratic form  of government. The Rule of Law does not mean that  the protection of the law must be available only  to  a  fortunate  few  or  that  the  law  should  be  allowed to be prostituted by the vested interests  for protecting and upholding the status quo under  the  guise  of  enforcement  of  their  civil  and  political  rights.  The  poor  too  have  civil  and  political rights and the Rule of Law is meant for  them also, though today it exists only on paper  and not in reality. If the sugar barons and the  alcohol kings have the Fundamental Right to carry  on their business and to fatten their purses by  exploiting  the  consuming  public,  have  the  'chamars'  belonging  to  the  lowest  strata  of  society  no  Fundamental  Right  to  earn  an  honest  living through their sweat and toil? The former  can approach the courts with a formidable army of  distinguished lawyers paid in four or five figures  per day and if their right of exploit is upheld  against  the  government  under  the  label  of  Fundamental  Right,  the  courts  are  praised  for  their boldness and courage and their independence  and fearlessness are applauded and acclaimed. But,  if the Fundamental Right of the poor and helpless  victims of injustice is sought to be enforced by  public  interest  litigation,  the  so  called  champions of human rights frown upon it as waste  of time of the highest court in the land, which,  according  to  them,  should  not  engage  itself  in  such small and trifling matters. Moreover, these  self-styled  human  rights  activists  forget  that  civil  and  political  rights,  priceless  and  invaluable as they are for freedom and democracy,  simply do not exist for the vast masses of our

people. Large numbers of men, women and children  who  constitute  the  bulk  of  our  population  are  today living a sub-human existence in conditions  of  abject  poverty:  utter  grinding  poverty  has  broken their back and sapped their moral fibre.  They  have  no  faith  in  the  existing  social  and  economic system. What civil and political rights  are these poor and deprived sections of humanity  going to enforce?

57. Justice Bhagwati of this court in his judgment in S.P.  

Gupta  v.  President  of  India  &  Others AIR  1982  SC  149  

altogether  dismissed  the  traditional  rule  of  standing,  and  

replaced it with a liberalized modern rule.  In this case, the  

Court awarded standing to advocates challenging the transfer  

of judges during Emergency.  Describing the traditional rule  

as an “ancient vintage” of “an era when private law dominated  

the legal scene and public law had not been born,” the Court  

concluded that the traditional rule of standing was obsolete.  

In  its  place,  the  Court  prescribed  the  modern  rule  on  

standing:  

“where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused  to a person or to a determinate class of persons  by reason of violation of any constitutional or  legal  right  or  any  burden  is  imposed  in  contravention  of  any  constitutional  or  legal  provision or without authority of law or any such  legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is  threatened and such person or determinate class of  persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or  disability  or  socially  or economically  disadvantaged  position,  unable  to  approach  the  Court for relief, any member of the public can  maintain  an  application  for  an  appropriate  direction, order or writ, in the High Court under  Article  226,  and  in  case  of  breach  of  any  fundamental  right,  in  this  Court  under  Article  32.”

58. Finding  that  the  practicing  advocates  “are  vitally

interested in the maintenance of a fearless and an independent  

Judiciary,” the Court granted standing to the advocates under  

the modern rule to bring cases challenging the transfer of  

judges  during  Emergency. In  this  case,  this  Court  further  

observed as under:

“……it must now be regarded as well settled law  where a person who has suffered a legal wrong or a  legal  injury  or  whose  legal  right  or  legally  protected  interest  is  violated,  is  unable  to  approach the Court on account of some disability  or it is not practicable for him to move the Court  for  some  other  sufficient  reasons,  such  as  his  socially  or  economically  disadvantaged  position,  some  other  person  can  invoke  assistance  of  the  Court  for  the  purpose  of  providing  judicial  redress to the person wronged or injured, so that  the legal wrong or injury caused to such person  does not go un-redressed and justice is done to  him.   

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

……Today a vast revolution is taking place in the  judicial process; the theatre of the law is fast  changing and the problems of the poor are coming  to the forefront. The Court has to innovate new  methods and devise new strategies for the purpose  of providing access to justice to large masses of  people who are denied their basic human rights and  to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. The  only  way  in  which  this  can  be  done  is  by  entertaining writ petitions and even letters from  public  spirited  individuals  seeking  judicial  redress  for  the  benefit  of  persons  who  have  suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose  constitutional or legal right has been violated  but who by reason of their poverty or socially or  economically disadvantaged position are unable to  approach  the  Court  for  relief.  It  is  in  this  spirit  that  the  Court  has  been  entertaining  letters for Judicial redress and treating them as  writ petitions and we hope and trust that the High  Courts of the country will also adopt this pro- active, goal-oriented approach.”

  59. In Anil Yadav & Others v. State of Bihar and Bachcho

Lal Das, Superintendent, Central Jail, Bhagalpur, Bihar (1982)  

2 SCC 195, a petition was filed regarding blinding of under-

trial prisoners at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar.  According  

to the allegation, their eyes were pierced with needles and  

acid poured into them.  The Court had sent a team of the  

Registrar and Assistant Registrar to visit the Central Jail,  

Bhagalpur and submit a report to the Court. The Court passed  

comprehensive orders to ensure that such barbarous and inhuman  

acts are not repeated.    

60. In Munna & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others,  

(1982) 1 SCC 545, the allegation was that the juvenile under-

trial  prisoners  have  been  sent  in  the  Kanpur  Central  Jail  

instead of Children’s Home in Kanpur and those children were  

sexually exploited by the adult prisoners.  This Court ruled  

that in no case except the exceptional ones mentioned in the  

Act, a child can be sent to jail.  The Court further observed  

that the children below the age of 16 years must be detained  

only in the Children’s Homes or other place of safety.  The  

Court also observed that “a Nation which is not concerned with  

the welfare of the children cannot look forward to a bright  

future.”

61. Thereafter, in a series of cases, the Court treated  

Post Cards and letters as writ petitions and gave directions  

and orders.   

62. In  Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra  AIR 1983 SC  

378,  Sheela  Barse,  a  journalist,  complained  of  custodial

violence  to  women  prisoners  in  Bombay.    Her  letter  was  

treated as a writ petition and the directions were given by  

the court.

63. In  Dr. Upendra Baxi (I) v.  State of Uttar Pradesh &  

Another 1983 (2) SCC 308 two distinguished law Professors of  

the  Delhi  University  addressed  a  letter  to  this  court  

regarding  inhuman  conditions  which  were  prevalent  in  Agra  

Protective Home for Women.  The court heard the petition on a  

number  of  days  and  gave  important  directions  by  which  the  

living conditions of the inmates were significantly improved  

in the Agra Protective Home for Women.  

64. In  Veena Sethi (Mrs.) v.  State of Bihar & Others AIR  

1983 SC 339, some prisoners were detained in jail for a period  

ranging from 37 years to 19 years.  They were arrested in  

connection with certain offences and were declared insane at  

the time of their trial and were put in Central Jail with  

directions to submit half-yearly medical reports.  Some were  

convicted, some acquitted and trials were pending against some  

of them.  After they were declared sane no action for their  

release was taken by the authorities.  This Court ruled that  

the prisoners remained in jail for no fault of theirs and  

because  of  the  callous  and  lethargic  attitude  of  the  

authorities.  Even if they are proved guilty the period they  

had undergone would exceed the maximum imprisonment that they  

might be awarded.

65. In  Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project v.  State

of Jammu & Kashmir & Others AIR 1984 SC 177, on the basis of a  

news item in the Indian Express regarding condition of the  

construction workers, this Court took notice and observed that  

the construction work is a hazardous employment and no child  

below  the  age  of  14  years  can  therefore  be  allowed  to  be  

employed in construction work by reason of the prohibition  

enacted in Article 24 and this constitutional prohibition must  

be enforced by the Central Government.

66. In  Shri Sachidanand Pandey & Another v.  The State of  

West  Bengal  &  Others (1987)  2  SCC  295,  in  the  concurring  

judgment,   Justice  Khalid,  J.  observed  that  the  public  

interest litigation should be encouraged when the Courts are  

apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group  

or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or  

when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial  

conscience  that  the  courts,  especially  this  Court,  should  

leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and  

extend  its  jurisdiction  under  all  available  provisions  for  

remedying  the  hardships  and  miseries  of  the  needy,  the  

underdog and the neglected.

67. The case of B. R. Kapoor & Another v. Union of India &  

Others AIR 1990 SC 752 relates to public interest litigation  

regarding mismanagement of the hospital for mental diseases  

located at Shahdara, Delhi.  This Court appointed a Committee  

of Experts which highlighted the problems of availability of  

water,  existing  sanitary  conditions,  food,  kitchen,  medical

and  nursing  care,  ill-treatment  of  patients,  attempts  of  

inmates  to  commit  suicide,  death  of  patients  in  hospital,  

availability of doctors and nurses etc.  The Court went on to  

recommend the Union of India to take over the hospital and  

model it on the lines of NIMHANS at Bangalore.

68. In Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera  v.  State  

of  Orissa  &  Others AIR  1993  SC  1960,  this  Court  gave  

directions  that  for  contravention  of  human  rights  and  

fundamental freedoms by the State and its agencies, a claim  

for monetary compensation in petition under Article 32 of 226  

is justified.    In a concurring judgment, Anand, J. (as he  

then was) observed as under:

“The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to  the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the  courts too much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasible  rights of the citizens.  The courts have the obligation to  satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the  courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond  to their aspirations.”

69. In  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  Bar  Association,  

Chandigarh through its Secretary v.  State of Punjab & Others  

(1994)  1  SCC  616,  the  allegation  was  that  a  practicing  

advocate,  his  wife  and  a  child  aged  about  two  years  were  

abducted and murdered.  This Court directed the Director of  

the CBI to investigate and report to the Court.   

70. In Navkiran Singh & Others v. State of Punjab through  

Chief  Secretary  &  Another (1995)  4  SCC  591,  in  a  letter  

petition the advocates from the Punjab & Haryana High Court  

expressed  concerned  about  the  kidnapping/elimination  of

advocates in the State of Punjab.   This Court directed the  

CBI to investigate the matter and also directed the State of  

Punjab to provide security to those advocates who genuinely  

apprehend  danger  to  their  lives  from  militants/anti-social  

elements.   The Court also observed that if the request for  

security is recommended by the District Judge or the Registrar  

of the High Court, it may treated as genuine and the State  

Government may consider the same sympathetically.

71. In  Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v.  Union of  

India & Others (1995) 1 SCC 14, the Court expressed serious  

concern  about  the  violence  against  women.   The  Court  gave  

significant  directions  and  observed  that  compensation  for  

victims shall be awarded by the court on conviction of the  

offender  and  by  the  Criminal  Injuries  Compensation  Board  

whether or not a conviction has taken place.  The Board will  

take into account pain, suffering and shock as well as loss of  

earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of child birth if  

this occurred as a result of the rape.

72. In Citizens for Democracy  v. State of Assam & Others  

(1995) 3 SCC 743, this Court held that handcuffing and tying  

with ropes is inhuman and in utter violation of human rights  

guaranteed  under  the  international  law  and  the  law  of  the  

land.  The Court in para 15 observed as under:

“15. ….. The handcuffing and in addition tying  with ropes of the patient-prisoners who are lodged  in the hospital is, the least we can say, inhuman  and  in  utter  violation  of  the  human  rights  guaranteed  to  an  individual  under  the  international law and the law of the land. We are,

therefore,  of  the  view  that  the  action  of  the  respondents  was  wholly  unjustified  and  against  law.  We direct that the detenus – in case they  are  still  in  hospital  –  be  relieved  from  the  fetters and the ropes with immediate effect.”

73. In  Paramjit Kaur (Mrs.) v. State of Punjab & Others  

(1996) 7 SCC 20, a telegram was sent to a Judge of this Court  

which  was  treated  as  a  habeas  corpus petition.    The  

allegation was that the husband of the appellant was kidnapped  

by some persons in police uniform from a busy residential area  

of Amritsar.  The Court took serious note of it and directed  

the  investigation  of  the  case  by  the  Central  Bureau  of  

Investigation.

74. In M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others (1996) 6  

SCC 756, the Court was dealing with the cases of child labour  

and  the  Court  found  that  the  child  labour  emanates  from  

extreme poverty, lack of opportunity for gainful employment  

and intermittency of income and low standards of living.  The  

Court observed that it is possible to identify child labour in  

the organized sector, which forms a minuscule of the total  

child labour, the problem relates mainly to the unorganized  

sector where utmost attention needs to be paid.   

75. In D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416,  

this Court observed that the custodial death is perhaps one of  

the worst crimes in a civilized society governed by the rule  

of law.  The rights inherent in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the  

Constitution  require  to  be  jealously  and  scrupulously  

protected.   The  expression  “life  or  personal  liberty”  in

Article 21 includes the right to live with human dignity and  

thus it would also include within itself a guarantee against  

torture and assault by the State or its functionaries.  The  

precious right guaranteed by Article 21 cannot be denied to  

convicts, undertrials, detenus and other prisoners in custody,  

except  according  to  the  procedure  established  by  law  by  

placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted by law.  

The Court gave very significant directions which are mandatory  

for all concerned to follow.

76. In  Vishaka & Others v.  State of Rajasthan & Others  

(1997)  6  SCC  241,  this  Court  gave  directions  regarding  

enforcement of the fundamental rights of the working women  

under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.  The Court  

gave  comprehensive  guidelines  and  norms  and  directed  for  

protection and enforcement of these rights of the women at  

their workplaces.

77. In a recently decided case Prajwala v. Union of India  

& Others (2009) 4 SCC 798, a petition was filed in this Court  

in  which  it  was  realized  that  despite  commencement  of  the  

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of  

Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, disabled people are  

not  given  preferential  treatment.   The  Court  directed  the  

State Governments/local authorities to allot land for various  

purposes indicted in section 43 of the Act and various items  

indicated in section 43, preferential treatment be given to  

the  disabled  people  and  the  land  shall  be  given  at

concessional rates.  The percentage of reservation may be left  

to the discretion of the State Governments.  However, total  

percentage of disabled persons shall be taken into account  

while deciding the percentage.

78. In Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India & Others (2009) 6  

SCC  398,  a  public  interest  litigation  was  filed,  when  93  

children were burnt alive in a fire at a private school in  

Tamil Nadu.  This happened because the school did not have the  

minimum  safety  standard  measures.   The  court,  in  order  to  

protect future tragedies in all such schools, gave directions  

that it is the fundamental right of each and every child to  

receive education free from fear of security and safety, hence  

the  Government  should  implement  National  Building  Code  and  

comply with the said orders in constructions of schools for  

children.

79. All  these  abovementioned  cases  demonstrate  that  the  

courts,  in  order  to  protect  and  preserve  the  fundamental  

rights of citizens, while relaxing the rule of  locus standi,  

passed a number of directions to the concerned authorities.

80. We  would  not  like  to  overburden  the  judgment  by  

multiplying  these  cases,  but  brief  resume  of  these  cases  

demonstrate  that  in  order  to  preserve  and  protect  the  

fundamental rights of marginalized, deprived and poor sections  

of the society, the courts relaxed the traditional rule of  

locus standi and broadened the definition of aggrieved persons  

and gave directions and orders.   We would like to term cases

of  this  period  where  the  court  relaxed  the  rule  of  locus  

standi  as the first phase of the public interest litigation.  

The Supreme Court and the High Courts earned great respect and  

acquired great credibility in the eyes of public because of  

their  innovative  efforts  to  protect  and  preserve  the  

fundamental  rights  of  people  belonging  to  the  poor  and  

marginalized sections of the society.

PHASE-II  –  DIRECTIONS  TO  PRESERVE  AND  PROTECT  ECOLOGY  AND  ENVIRONMENT

81. The second phase of public interest litigation started  

sometime  in  the  1980’s  and  it  related  to  the  courts’  

innovation  and  creativity,  where  directions  were  given  to  

protect ecology and environment.

82. There are a number of cases where the court tried to  

protect forest cover, ecology and environment and orders have  

been passed in that respect.  As a matter of fact, the Supreme  

Court has a regular Forest Bench (Green Bench) and regularly  

passes orders and directions regarding various forest cover,  

illegal mining, destruction of marine life and wild life etc.  

Reference of some cases is given just for illustration.

83. In the second phase, the Supreme Court under Article 32  

and  the  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  

passed a number of orders and directions in this respect.    

84. The  recent  example  is  the  conversion  of  all  public  

transport in the Metropolitan City of Delhi from diesel engine

to CNG engine on the basis of the order of the High Court of  

Delhi to ensure that the pollution level is curtailed and this  

is being completely observed for the last several years.  Only  

CNG vehicles are permitted to ply on Delhi roads for public  

transport.

85. Louise Erdrich Bigogress, an environmentalist has aptly  

observed that “grass and sky are two canvasses into which the  

rich details of the earth are drawn.”  In 1980s, this court  

paid special attention to the problem of air pollution, water  

pollution, environmental degradation and passed a number of  

directions  and  orders  to  ensure  that  environment  ecology,  

wildlife should be saved, preserved and protected.  According  

to court, the scale of injustice occurring on the Indian soil  

is catastrophic.  Each day hundreds of thousands of factories  

are functioning without pollution control devices.  Thousands  

of Indians go to mines and undertake hazardous work without  

proper  safety  protection.  Everyday  millions  of  litres  of  

untreated  raw  effluents  are  dumped  into  our  rivers  and  

millions   of tons of hazardous waste are simply dumped on the  

earth.    The environment has become so degraded that instead  

of nurturing us it is poisoning us. In this scenario, in a  

large number of cases, the Supreme Court intervened in the  

matter and issued innumerable directions.

86. We give brief resume of some of the important cases  

decided by this court.  One of the earliest cases brought  

before  the  Supreme  Court  related  to  oleum  gas  leakage  in

Delhi.   In  order  to  prevent  the  damage  being  done  to  

environment and the life and the health of the people, the  

court passed number of orders.  This is well-known as  M.C.  

Mehta & Another v. Union of India & Others AIR 1987 SC 1086.  

The  court  in  this  case  has  clearly  laid  down  that  an  

enterprise  which  is  engaged  in  a  hazardous  or  inherently  

dangerous  industry  which  poses  a  potential  threat  to  the  

health and safety of the persons working in the factory and  

residing in the surrounding area owes an absolute and non-

delegable duty to the community to ensure that no such harm  

results  to  anyone  on  account  of  hazardous  or  inherently  

dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken.  The  

court  directed  that  the  enterprise  must  adopt  highest  

standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such  

activity,  the  enterprise  must  be  absolutely  liable  to  

compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the  

enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and  

that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part.

87. In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun &  

Others v. State of U.P. & Others AIR 1985 SC 652 the Supreme  

Court ordered closure of all lime-stone quarries in the Doon  

Valley taking notice of the fact that lime-stone quarries and  

excavation in the area had adversely affected water springs  

and environmental ecology. While commenting on the closure of  

the  lime-stone  quarries,  the  court  stated  that  this  would  

undoubtedly  cause  hardship  to  owners  of  the  lime-stone  

quarries,  but  it  is  the  price  that  has  to  be  paid  for

protecting and safeguarding the right of the people to live in  

healthy  environment  with  minimal  disturbance  of  ecological  

balance  and  without  avoidable  hazard  to  them  and  to  their  

cattle, homes and agricultural land and undue affectation of  

air, water and environment.  

88. Environmental PIL has emerged because of the court’s  

interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution.  The court  

in Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P.  

& Others AIR 1990 SC 2060 observed that every citizen has  

fundamental right to have the enjoyment of quality of life and  

living as contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution of  

India.   Anything  which  endangers  or  impairs  by  conduct  of  

anybody either in violation or in derogation of laws, that  

quality of life and living by the people is entitled to take  

recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution.

89. This court in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar & Others  

AIR  1991  SC  420  observed  that  under  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution people have the right of enjoyment of pollution  

free water and air for full enjoyment of life.  If anything  

endangers or impairs that quality of life in derogation of  

laws, a citizen has right to have recourse to Article 32 of  

the Constitution for removing the pollution of water or air  

which may be detrimental to the quality of life.

90. The case  of  M.C.  Mehta v. Union of  India &  Others  

(1988) 1 SCC 471, relates to pollution caused by the trade  

effluents discharged by tanneries into Ganga river in Kanpur.

The court called for the report of the Committee of experts  

and gave directions to save the environment and ecology.  It  

was held that “in Common Law the Municipal Corporation can be  

restrained by an injunction in an action brought by a riparian  

owner who has suffered on account of the pollution of the  

water in a river caused by the Corporation by discharging into  

the river insufficiently treated sewage from discharging such  

sewage into the river.  But in the present case the petitioner  

is  not  a  riparian  owner.   He  is  a  person  interested  in  

protecting the lives of the people who make use of the water  

flowing  in  the  river  Ganga  and  his  right  to  maintain  the  

petition  cannot  be  disputed.   The  nuisance  caused  by  the  

pollution of the river Ganga is a public nuisance, which is  

widerspread in range and indiscriminate in its effect and it  

would not be reasonable to expect any particular person to  

take proceedings to stop it as distinct from the community at  

large.  The petition has been entertained as a Public Interest  

Litigation.   On the facts and in the circumstances of the  

case, the petitioner is entitled to move the Supreme Court in  

order to enforce the statutory provisions which impose duties  

on the municipal authorities and the Boards constituted under  

the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974”.

91. In Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India &  

Others AIR 1996 SC 2715, this court ruled that precautionary  

principle  and  the  polluter  pays  principle  are  part  of  the  

environmental  law  of  the  country.   This  court  declared  

Articles 47, 48A and 51A(g) to be part of the constitutional

mandate to protect and improve the environment.

92. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others AIR 1988 SC  

1037,  this  court  observed  that  the  effluent  discharged  in  

river Ganga from a tannery is ten times noxious when compared  

with the domestic sewage water which flows into the river from  

any urban area on its banks.  The court further observed that  

the financial capacity of the tanneries should be considered  

as  irrelevant  without  requiring  them  to  establish  primary  

treatment  plants.   Just  like  an  industry  which  cannot  pay  

minimum wages to its workers cannot be allowed to exist, a  

tannery which cannot set up a primary treatment plant cannot  

be permitted to continue to be in existence for the adverse  

effect on the public at large.

93. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others AIR 1997 SC  

734, this court observed that in order to preserve and protect  

the ancient monument Taj Mahal from sulphurdioxide emission by  

industries near Taj Mahal, the court ordered 299 industries to  

ban the use of coke/coal.  The court further directed them to  

shift-over to Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) or re-locate them.

94. In A. P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M. V. Nayadu  

(Retd.)  &  Others (1999)  2  SCC  718,  this  Court  quoted  A.  

Fritsch,  “Environmental  Ethics:  Choices  for  Concerned  

Citizens”.  The same is reproduced as under:

“The basic insight of ecology is that all living  things  exist  in  interrelated  systems;  nothing  exists in isolation. The world system in weblike;  to pluck one strand is to cause all to vibrate;  whatever happens to one part has ramifications for

all the rest. Our actions are not individual but  social;  they  reverberate  throughout  the  whole  ecosystem".  [Science  Action  Coalition  by  A.  Fritsch,  Environmental  Ethics:  Choices  for  Concerned Citizens 3-4 (1980)] : (1988) Vol. 12  Harv. Env. L. Rev. at 313).”

95. The  court  in  this  case  gave  emphasis  that  the  

directions of the court should meet the requirements of public  

interest, environmental protection, elimination of pollution  

and  sustainable  development.  While  ensuring  sustainable  

development, it must be kept in view that there is no danger  

to the environment or to the ecology.

96. In Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti & Others AIR  

2004 SC 1834, while maintaining the balance between economic  

development and environmental protection, the court observed  

as under:

“26.  Certain  principles  were  enunciated  in  the  Stockholm Declaration giving broad parameters and  guidelines for the purposes of sustaining humanity  and its environment.  Of these parameters, a few  principles are extracted which are of relevance to  the present debate. Principle 2 provides that the  natural resources of the earth including the air,  water,  land,  flora  and  fauna  especially  representative samples of natural eco-systems must  be  safeguarded  for  the  benefit  of  present  and  future  generations  through  careful  planning  and  management as appropriate. In the same vein, the  4th principle says "man has special responsibility  to  safeguard  and  wisely  manage  the  heritage  of  wild life and its habitat which are now gravely  imperiled  by  a  combination  of  adverse  factors.  Nature  conservation  including  wild  life  must,  therefore,  receive  importance  in  planning  for  economic  developments".  These  two  principles  highlight the need to factor in considerations of  the  environment  while  providing  for  economic  development. The need for economic development has  been dealt with in Principle 8 where it is said  that "economic and social development is essential  for  ensuring  a  favourable  living  and  working

environment for man and for creating conditions on  earth that are necessary for improvement of the  quality of life".”

97. On sustainable development, one of us (Bhandari, J.) in  

Karnataka  Industrial  Areas  Development  Board v.  Sri  C.  

Kenchappa & Others AIR 2006 SC 2038, observed that there has  

to be balance between sustainable development and environment.  

This  Court  observed  that  before  acquisition  of  lands  for  

development, the consequence and adverse impact of development  

on environment must be properly comprehended and the lands be  

acquired for development that they do not gravely impair the  

ecology  and  environment;  State  Industrial  Areas  Development  

Board  to  incorporate  the  condition  of  allotment  to  obtain  

clearance  from  the  Karnataka  State  Pollution  Control  Board  

before  the  land  is  allotted  for  development.  The  said  

directory condition of allotment of lands be converted into a  

mandatory condition for all the projects to be sanctioned in  

future.

98. In another important decision of this Court in the case  

of  M.C. Mehta v.  Kamal Nath & Others (2000) 6 SCC 213, this  

Court was of the opinion that Articles 48A and 51-A(g) have to  

be considered in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution.  

Any disturbance of the basic environment elements, namely air,  

water  and  soil,  which  are  necessary  for  "life",  would  be  

hazardous to "life" within the meaning of Article 21. In the  

matter of enforcement of rights under Article 21, this Court,  

besides  enforcing  the  provisions  of  the  Acts  referred  to

above,  has  also  given  effect  to  Fundamental  Rights  under  

Articles  14  and  21  and  has  held  that  if  those  rights  are  

violated by disturbing the environment, it can award damages  

not only for the restoration of the ecological balance, but  

also  for  the  victims  who  have  suffered  due  to  that  

disturbance.  In  order  to  protect  the  "life",  in  order  to  

protect "environment" and in order to protect "air, water and  

soil"  from  pollution,  this  Court,  through  its  various  

judgments has given effect to the rights available, to the  

citizens and persons alike, under Article 21.  

  99. The  court  also  laid  emphasis  on  the  principle  of  

Polluter-pays. According to the court, pollution is a civil  

wrong.  It  is  a  tort  committed  against  the  community  as  a  

whole.    A  person,  therefore,  who  is  guilty  of  causing  

pollution has to pay damages or compensation for restoration  

of the environment and ecology.  

100. In  Managing  Director,  A.P.S.R.T.C. v.  S.  P.  

Satyanarayana AIR 1998 SC 2962, this Court referred to the  

White  Paper  published  by  the  Government  of  India  that  the  

vehicular pollution contributes 70% of the air pollution as  

compared  to  20%  in  1970.   This  Court  gave  comprehensive  

directions to reduce the air pollution on the recommendation  

of an Expert Committee of Bhure Lal appointed by this Court.

101. In Re. Noise Pollution AIR 2005 SC 3136, this Court was  

dealing with the issue of noise pollution.   This Court was of

the opinion that there is need for creating general awareness  

towards  the  hazardous  effects  of  noise  pollution.  

Particularly,  in  our  country  the  people  generally  lack  

consciousness of the ill effects which noise pollution creates  

and how the society including they themselves stand to benefit  

by preventing generation and emission of noise pollution.    

102. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of  

India & Others (1996) 5 SCC 281 the main grievance in the  

petition  is  that  a  notification  dated  19.2.1991  declaring  

coastal stretches as Coastal Regulation Zones which regulates  

the activities in the said zones  has not been implemented or  

enforced.  This has led to continued degradation of ecology in  

the  said  coastal  areas.   The  court  observed  that  while  

economic development should not be allowed to take place at  

the  cost  of  ecology  or  by  causing  widespread  environment  

destruction and violation; at the same time, the necessity to  

preserve ecology and environment should not hamper economic  

and other developments.  Both development and environment must  

go  hand  in  hand,  in  other  words,  there  should  not  be  

development at the cost of environment and vice versa, but  

there should be development while taking due care and ensuring  

the protection of environment.

103. In S. Jagannath v. Union of India & Others (1997) 2 SCC  

87, this Court dealt with a public interest petition filed by  

the Gram Swaraj Movement, a voluntary organization working for  

the upliftment of the weaker section of society, wherein the

petitioner sought the enforcement of Coastal Zone Regulation  

Notification  dated  19.2.1991  and  stoppage  of  intensive  and  

semi-intensive  type  of  prawn  farming  in  the  ecologically  

fragile  coastal  areas.   This  Court  passed  significant  

directions as under:

1. The Central Government shall constitute an  authority conferring on the said authority  all  the  powers  necessary  to  protect  the  ecologically  fragile  coastal  areas,  seashore,  waterfront  and  other  coastal  areas  and  specially  to  deal  with  the  situation  created  by  the  shrimp  culture  industry in coastal States.    

2. The  authority  so  constituted  by  the  Central  Government  shall  implement  "the  Precautionary principle" and "the Polluter Pays"  principles.

3.  The shrimp culture industry/the shrimp ponds  are covered by the prohibition contained in para  2(i) of the CRZ Notification. No shrimp culture  pond  can  be  constructed  or  set  up  within  the  coastal  regulation  zone  as  defined  in  the  CRZ  notification.  This  shall  be  applicable  to  all  seas,  bays,  estuaries,  creeks  rivers  and  backwaters.  This  direction  shall  not  apply  to  traditional  and  improved  traditional  types  of  technologies  (as  defined  in  Alagarswami  report)  which  are  practised  in  the  coastal  low  lying  areas.

4.  All  acquaculture  industries/shrimp  culture  industries/shrimp  culture  ponds  operating/set  up  in the coastal regulation zone as defined under  the  CRZ  Notification  shall  be  demolished  and  removed from the said area before March 31, 1997.  

5.  The  agricultural  lands,  salt  pan  lands,  mangroves,  wet  lands,  forest  lands,  land  for  village  common  purpose  and  the  land  meant  for  public purposes  shall not  be used/converted  for  construction of the shrimp culture ponds.

6.  No  acquaculture  industry/shrimp  culture  industry/shrimp  culture  ponds  shall  be  constructed/set  up  within  1000  meter  of  Chilka  lake and Pulicat lake (including Bird Sanctuaries  namely Yadurapattu and Nelapattu).

7.  Acquaculture  industry/shrimp  culture  industry/shrimp  culture  ponds  already  operating  and functioning in the said area of 1000 meter  shall be closed and demolished before March 31,  1997.  

8.  The  Court  also  directed  that  the  shrimp  industries functioning within 1000 meter from the  Coastal  Regulation  Zone  shall  be  liable  to  compensate the affected persons on the basis of  the "polluter pays" principle.

9.   The  authority  was  directed  to  compute  the  compensation under two heads namely, for reversing  the ecology and for payment to individuals.  

10.  The  compensation  amount  recovered  from  the  polluters shall be deposited under a separate head  called "Environment Protection Fund" and shall be  utilised for compensating the affected persons as  identified by the authority and also for restoring  the damaged environment.

104. The  Court  also  granted  substantial  costs  to  the  

petitioners.  

105. The courts because of vast destruction of environment,  

ecology,  forests,  marine  life,  wildlife  etc.  etc.  gave  

directions in a large number of cases in the larger public  

interest. The courts made a serious endeavour to protect and  

preserve ecology, environment, forests, hills, rivers, marine  

life, wildlife etc. etc.   This can be called the second phase

of the public interest litigation in India.

THE TRANSPARENCY AND PROBITY IN GOVERNANCE – PHASE-III OF THE  PUBLIC INTERST LITIGATION

106. In the 1990’s, the Supreme Court expanded the ambit and  

scope of public interest litigation further.  The High Courts  

also under Article 226 followed the Supreme Court and passed a  

number  of  judgments,  orders  or  directions  to  unearth  

corruption and maintain probity and morality in the governance  

of the State.  The probity in governance is a sine qua non for  

an efficient system of administration and for the development  

of  the  country  and  an  important  requirement  for  ensuring  

probity in governance is the absence of corruption.  This may  

broadly be called as the third phase of the Public Interest  

Litigation.  The  Supreme  Court  and  High  Courts  have  passed  

significant orders.   

107. The case of Vineet Narain & Others v. Union of India &  

Another AIR 1998 SC 889 is an example of its kind.   In that  

case, the petitioner, who was a journalist, filed a public  

interest  litigation.   According  to  him,  the  prime  

investigating  agencies  like  the  Central  Bureau  of  

Investigation and the Revenue authorities failed to perform  

their legal obligation and take appropriate action when they  

found,  during  investigation  with  a  terrorist,  detailed  

accounts  of  vast  payments,  called  ‘Jain  diaries’,  made  to  

influential politicians and bureaucrats and direction was also  

sought in case of a similar nature that may occur hereafter.

A number of directions were issued by the Supreme Court.  The  

Court in that case observed that “it is trite that the holders  

of  public  offices  are  entrusted  with  certain  power  to  be  

exercised in public interest alone and, therefore, the office  

is held by them in trust for the people.”   

108. Another significant case is Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’  

& Another v. Union of India & Others (2006) 6 SCC 613.  This  

public  interest  litigation  relates  to  the  large  scale  

defalcation  of  public  funds  and  falsification  of  accounts  

involving hundreds of crores of rupees in the Department of  

Animal Husbandry in the State of Bihar.  It was said that the  

respondents had interfered with the appointment of the public  

prosecutor.  This  court  gave  significant  directions  in  this  

case.

109. In yet another case of M. C. Mehta v. Union of India &  

Others (2007) 1 SCC 110, a project known as “Taj Heritage  

Corridor Project” was initiated by the Government of Uttar  

Pradesh.   One  of  the  main  purpose  for  which  the  same  was  

undertaken was to divert the River Yamuna and to reclaim 75  

acres of land between Agra Fort and the Taj Mahal and use the  

reclaimed  land  for  constructing  food  plazas,  shops  and  

amusement  activities.   The  Court  directed  for  a  detailed  

enquiry  which  was  carried  out  by  the  Central  Bureau  of  

Investigation (CBI).   On the basis of the CBI report, the  

Court  directed  registration  of  FIR  and  made  further  

investigation in the matter.   The court questioned the role

played by the concerned Minister for Environment, Government  

of Uttar Pradesh and the Chief Minister, Government of Uttar  

Pradesh.  By the intervention of this Court, the said project  

was stalled.

110. These  are  some  of  the  matters  where  the  efficacy,  

ethics and morality of the governmental authorities to perform  

their statutory duties was directed under the scanner of the  

Supreme Court and the High Courts.

111. In  M. C. Mehta v.  Union of India & Others (2007) 12  

SCALE 91, in another public interest litigation, a question  

was  raised  before  the  court  whether  the  Apex  Court  should  

consider the correctness of the order passed by the Governor  

of Uttar Pradesh refusing to grant sanction for prosecution of  

the Chief Minister and Environment Minister after they were  

found responsible in ‘Taj Heritage Corridor Project”.    It  

was held that the judiciary can step in where it finds the  

actions on the part of the legislature or the executive to be  

illegal or unconstitutional.    

112. In  Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of  

India & Another AIR 2003 SC 3277, two writ petitions were  

filed  in  public  interest  by  the  petitioner  calling  in  the  

question of decision of the government to sell majority of  

shares in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Bharat  

Petroleum  Corporation  Limited  to  private  parties  without  

Parliamentary approval or sanction as being contrary to and

violative  of  the  provisions  of  the  ESSO  (Acquisition  of  

Undertaking in India) Act, 1974, the Burma Shell (Acquisition  

of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976 and Caltex (Acquisition of  

Shares  of  Caltex  Oil  Refining  India  Limited  and  all  the  

undertakings in India for Caltex India Limited) Act, 1977.  

The court upheld the petitions until the statutes are amended  

appropriately.

113. These are some of the cases where the Supreme Court and  

the  High  Courts  broadened  the  scope  of  public  interest  

litigation and also entertained petitions to ensure that in  

governance  of  the  State,  there  is  transparency  and  no  

extraneous considerations are taken into consideration except  

the  public  interest.  These  cases  regarding  probity  in  

governance  or  corruption  in  public  life  dealt  with  by  the  

courts can be placed in the third phase of public interest  

litigation.

114. We would also like to deal with some cases where the  

court gave direction to the executives and the legislature to  

ensure that the existing laws are fully implemented.   

115. In Pareena Swarup v. Union of India (2008) 13 SCALE 84,  

a member of the Bar of this court filed a public interest  

litigation  seeking  to  declare  various  sections  of  the  

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 as ultra vires to the  

Constitution as they do not provide for independent judiciary  

to decide the cases but the members and chairperson to be  

selected  by  the  Selection  Committee  headed  by  the  Revenue

Secretary.   According to the petitioner, following the case  

of L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India & Others (1997) 3 SCC 261  

undermines  separation  of  powers  as  envisaged  by  the  

Constitution.   

116. We have endeavoured to give broad picture of the public  

interest litigation of Ist, IInd and IIIrd phases decided by  

our courts.

117. We would briefly like to discuss evolution of the  

public interest litigation in other judicial systems.

EVOLUTION  OF  PUBLIC  INTERST  LITIGATION  IN  OTHER  JUDICIAL  SYSTEMS NAMELY, USA, U.K., AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH AFRICA.   AUSTRALIA

118. In  Australia  also  for  protecting  environment,  the  

Australian  court  has  diluted  the  principle  of  ‘aggrieved  

person’.

119. In Australia, Public Interest Litigation has been a  

method  of  protecting  the  environment.  The  courts  have  not  

given a definition of ‘Public Interest Litigation’, but in  

Oshlack v Richmond River Council  (1998) 193 CLR 72 : (1998)  

152 ALR 83, the High Court of Australia (apex court) upheld  

the concept and pointed out the essential requirements. McHugh  

J., quoted Stein J., from the lower court:

“In summary I find the litigation to be properly  characterised as public interest litigation. The  basis  of  the  challenge  was  arguable,  raising  serious  and  significant  issues  resulting  in  important  interpretation  of  new  provisions  relating to the protection of endangered fauna.  The  application  concerned  a  publicly  notorious

site  amidst  continuing  controversy.  Mr.  Oshlack  had nothing to gain from the litigation other than  the  worthy  motive  of  seeking  to  uphold  environmental  law  and  the  preservation  of  endangered fauna.”

120. To the court it was important that the petitioner did  

not have any other motive than the stated one of protecting  

the environment. The test therefore in Australia seems to be  

that the petitioner when filing a public interest litigation,  

should not stand to gain in some way.

U.S.A.

121. The  US  Supreme  Court  realized  the  constitutional  

obligation of reaching to all segments of society particularly  

the  black  Americans  of  African  origin.  The  courts’  

craftsmanship and innovation is reflected in one of the most  

celebrated path-breaking judgment of the US Supreme Court in  

Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483,  

489-493  (1954).   Perhaps,  it  would  accomplish  the  

constitutional obligation and goal. In this case, the courts  

have carried out their own investigation and in the judgment  

it is observed that “Armed with our own investigation” the  

courts held that all Americans including Americans of African  

origin can study in all public educational institutions. This  

was  the  most  significant  development  in  the  history  of  

American judiciary.

122. The US Supreme Court dismissed the traditional rule of  

Standing  in  Association  of  Data  Processing  Service  

Organizations v.  William B. Camp 397 U.S. 150 (1970).  The

court  observed  that  a  plaintiff  may  be  granted  standing  

whenever he/she suffers an “injury in fact” – “economic or  

otherwise”.

123. In another celebrated case  Olive B. Barrows v.  Leola  

Jackson 346 U.S. 249 (1953), 73 S.Ct. 1031 the court observed  

as under:-

“But in the instant case, we are faced with a  unique situation in which it is the action of the  state  court  which  might  result  in  a  denial  of  constitutional  rights  and  in  which  it  would  be  difficult if not impossible for the persons whose  rights  are  asserted  to  present  their  grievance  before  any  court.   Under  the  peculiar  circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons  which underlie our rule denying standing to raise  another’s  rights,  which  is  only  a  rule  of  practice, are outweighed by the need to protect  the fundamental rights which would be denied by  permitting the damages action to be maintained.”

124. In environment cases, the US Supreme Court has diluted  

the stance and allowed organizations dedicated to protection  

of environment to fight cases even though such societies are  

not directly armed by the action.

125. In  United States   v.  Students Challenging Regulatory  

Agency Procedures (SCRAP) 412 US 669 (1973), the court allowed  

a group of students to challenge the action of the railroad  

which would have led to environmental loss.

126. In Paul J. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance  

Company 409 U.S. 205 (1972) the Court held that a landlord’s  

racially discriminatory practices towards non-whites inflicted  

an  injury  in  fact  upon  the  plaintiffs,  two  tenants  of  an

apartment complex, by depriving them of the “social benefits  

of living in an integrated community.”

127. Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has  

granted  standing  in  certain  situations  to  a  plaintiff  to  

challenge injuries sustained by a third party with whom he/she  

shares a “close” relationship.   

128. In Thomas E. Singleton v. George J. L. Wulff 428 U.S.  

106  (1976),  the  Court  granted  standing  to  two  physicians  

challenging the constitutionality of a state statute limiting  

abortions.   Similarly, in  Caplin v. Drysdale 491 U.S. 617,  

623-24 n. 3 (1989), the Court granted standing to an attorney  

to  challenge  a  drug  forfeiture  law  that  would  deprive  his  

client of the means to retain counsel.

129. The  Supreme  Court  has  also  granted  organizational  

standing.  In  Robert Warth v. Ira Seldin  422 U.S. 490, 511  

(1975), the Court declared that “even in the absence of injury  

to  itself,  an  association  may  have  standing  solely  as  the  

representative  of  its  members.”   This  judgment  had  far  

reaching consequence.  In  James B. Hunt v. Washington State  

Apple Advertising Commission,  432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), the  

Court  elaborated  the  parameters  for  organizational  standing  

where an organization or association “has standing to bring  

suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would  

otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the  

interests  it  seeks  to  protect  are  germane  to  the  

organization’s purpose; (c) neither the claim asserted, nor

the relief requested, requires the participation of individual  

members in the lawsuit”.

ENGLAND

130. The use of PIL in England has been comparably limited.  

The limited development in PIL has occurred through broadening  

the rules of standing.   

Broad Rules of Standing

131. In  Re.  Reed,  Bowen  &  Co. (1887)  19  QBD  174  to  

facilitate  vindication  of  public  interest,  the  English  

judiciary  prescribed  broad  rules  of  standing.   Under  the  

traditional  rule  of  standing,  judicial  redress  was  only  

available to a ‘person aggrieved’ – one “who has suffered a  

legal  grievance,  a  man  against  whom  a decision  has  been  

pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or  

wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his  

title to something.”  However, the traditional rule no longer  

governs standing in the English Courts.

132. One of the most distinguished and respected English  

Judge Lord Denning initiated the broadening of standing in the  

English Courts with his suggestion that the “words ‘person  

aggrieved’ are of wide import and should not be subjected to a  

restrictive interpretation.” – Attorney-General of the Gambia  

v. Pierre Sarr N’Jie (1961) AC 617.   

133. The Blackburn Cases broadened the rule of standing in

actions seeking remedy through prerogative writs  brought by  

individuals against public officials for breach of a private  

right. (e.g., mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari).  Under  

the  Blackburn standard,  “any  person  who  was  adversely  

affected” by the action of a government official in making a  

mistaken policy decision was eligible to be granted standing  

before the Court for seeking remedy through prerogative writs  

- Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte  

Blackburn [1968] 2 W.L.R. 893 (“Blackburn I”).   

134. In  Blackburn I, the Court of Appeal granted standing  

to  Blackburn to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Police  

Commissioner to enforce a betting and gambling statute against  

gambling clubs.    

135. In Blackburn II, the Court of Appeal found no defects  

in Blackburn’s standing to challenge the Government’s decision  

to join a common market. Blackburn v. Attorney-General [1971]  

1 W.L.R. 1037).  

 136. In Blackburn III, the Court of Appeal granted standing  

to  Blackburn  to  seek  a  writ  of  mandamus  to  compel  the  

Metropolitan  Police  to  enforce  laws  against  obscene  

publications.  Regina  v. Commissioner of Police of  the  

Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn [1973] Q.B. 241.   

137. In Blackburn IV, the Court of Appeal granted standing  

to Blackburn to seek a writ of prohibition directed at the  

Greater  London  Council  for  failing  to  properly  use  their

censorship powers with regard to pornographic films.  Regina  

v. Greater London Council ex parte. Blackburn [1976] 1 W.L.R.  

550.  

138. The English judiciary was hesitant in applying this  

broadened rule of standing to actions seeking remedy through  

relator claims -  Relator claims are remedies brought by the  

Attorney General to remedy a breach of a public right. (e.g.,  

declaration and injunction).  Initially, Lord Denning extended  

the  broadened  rule  of  standing  in  actions  seeking  remedy  

through prerogative writs to actions seeking remedy through  

relator  claims.   In  Attorney  General  Ex  rel  McWhirter  v.  

Independent Broadcasting Authority, (1973) Q.B. 629 the Court  

stipulated that, “in the last resort, if the Attorney-General  

refuses leave in a proper case, or improperly or unreasonably  

delays in giving leave, or his machinery works too slowly,  

then a member of the public who has a sufficient interest can  

himself apply to the court.” This rule was promptly overturned  

by  the  House  of  Lords  in  Gouriet v. Union of Post Office  

Workers [1978] A.C. 435.   In this case, the House of Lords  

held  that  in  relator  claims,  the  Attorney  General  holds  

absolute discretion in deciding whether to grant leave to a  

case.  Thus, the English judiciary did not grant standing to  

an individual seeking remedy through relator claims.

139. Finally,  an  amendment  to  the  Rules  of  the  Supreme  

Court  in  1978  through  Order  53  overcame  the  English  

judiciary’s  hesitation  in  applying  a  broadened  rule  of

standing to relator claims.  Order 53 applied the broadened  

rule  of  standing  to  both  actions  seeking  remedy  through  

prerogative writs and actions seeking remedy through relator  

claims.  Rule 3(5) of Order 53 stipulates that the Court shall  

not grant leave for judicial review “unless it considers that  

the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which  

the applicant relates.” - ORDER 53, RULES OF THE SUPT. CT. (1981).  

In Inland  Revenue Commissioners v. National  Federation  of  

Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] A.C. 617, the  

Court explained that “fairness and justice are tests to be  

applied”  when  determining  if  a  party  has  a  sufficient  

interest.   

140. In Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment,  

Ex parte Rose Theatre Trust Co. (1990) 1 Q.B. 504, the Court  

elaborated that “direct financial or legal interest is not  

required” to find sufficient interest. Thus, under the new  

rule  of  standing  embodied  in  Order  53,  individuals  can  

challenge actions of public officials if they are found to  

have “sufficient interest” – a flexible standard.

SOUTH AFRICA

141. The  South  African  Constitution  has  adopted  with  a  

commitment to “transform the society into one in which there  

will  be  human  dignity,  freedom  and  equality.”  –  See:  

Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 (1) SA  

765  (CC),  p.  5.   Thus,  improving  access  to  justice  falls  

squarely  within  the  mandate  of  this  Constitution.   In

furtherance  of  this  objective,  the  South  African  legal  

framework takes a favorable stance towards PIL by prescribing  

broad rules of standing and relaxing pleading requirements.

(A)  Broad Rules of Standing

142. Section 38 of the Constitution broadly grants standing  

to approach a competent court for allegations of infringement  

of a right in the bill of rights to:  

“(a) anyone acting in their own interest;  

(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person  who cannot act in their own name;  

(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the  interest of, a group or class of persons;  

(d) anyone acting in the public interest;  

(e) an association acting in the interest of  its members.”  

143. In expressly permitting class actions and third-party  

actions, Section 38 prescribes broad rules of standing for  

constitutional claims.  Interpreting the language of Section  

38, the Constitutional Court elaborated in  Ferreira v. Levin  

NO & Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), p. 241 that a broad approach  

to  standing  should  be  applied  to  constitutional  claims  to  

ensure that constitutional rights are given the full measure  

of  protection  to  which  they  are  entitled.   In  the  said  

judgment by a separate concurring judgment, Justice O’Regan  

suggested that a “wider net for standing” should be extended  

to all “litigation of a public character.”

(B)   Relaxing Formal Requirements of Pleadings

144. The  Constitutional  Court  has  been  prompt  to  relax  

formal pleading requirements in appropriate cases.  In  S v.  

Twala  (South  African  Human  Rights  Commission  Intervening),  

2000 (1) SA 879, the President of the Court directed that a  

hand written letter received from a prisoner complaining about  

his frustration in exercising his right to appeal be treated  

as an application for leave to appeal.  

145. In Xinwa & Others v. Volkswagen of South Africa (PTY)  

Ltd.  2003 (4) SA 390 (CC), p. 8 the Court cemented the Twala  

principle that “form must give way to substance” in public  

interest  litigation.  The  Court  explained  that  “pleadings  

prepared by lay persons must be construed generously and in  

the  light  most  favourable  to  the  litigant.   Lay  litigants  

should not be held to the same standard of accuracy, skill and  

precision  in  the  presentation  of  their  case  required  of  

lawyers.  In construing such pleadings, regard must be had to  

the purpose of the pleading as gathered not only from the  

content of the pleadings but also from the context in which  

the pleading is prepared.”  

IMPACT OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

146. The development of public interest litigation in India  

has  had  an  impact  on  the  judicial  systems  of  neighbouring  

countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan and  

other countries.  

PAKISTAN:

147. By a recent path-breaking historical judgment of the  

Pakistan  Supreme  Court  at  Islamabad  dated  31st July,  2009  

delivered in public interest litigation bearing Constitution  

Petition  No.9  of  2009  filed  by  Sindh  High  Court  Bar  

Association  through  its  Secretary  and  Constitution  Petition  

No.8 of 2009 filed by  Nadeem Ahmed Advocate, both petitions  

filed  against  Federation  of  Pakistan  through  Secretary,  

Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad & Others, the entire  

superior judiciary which was sacked by the previous political  

regime has now been restored.

148. Another path breaking judgment delivered very recently  

on 16th December, 2009 by all the 17 judges of the Pakistan  

Supreme Court in Constitution Petition Nos.76 to 80 of 2007  

and 59 of 2009 and another Civil Appeal No.1094 of 2009 also  

has far-reaching implications.    

149. In this judgment, the National Reconciliation Ordinance  

(No.XV) 2007 came under challenge by which amendments were  

made  in  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1898  and  the  

Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1976  and  the  National  

Accountability Ordinance of 1999. The National Accountability  

Ordinance, 1999 (for short, NAO) was designed to give immunity  

of  the  consequences  of  the  offences  committed  by  the  

constitutional authorities and other authorities in power and  

(NRO)  was  declared  void  ab  initio being  ultra  vires and  

violative  of  constitutional  provisions  including  4,  8,  25,

62(f), 63(i)(p), 89, 175 and 227 of the Constitution.  This  

judgment was also delivered largely in public interest.

  150. In an important judgment delivered by the Supreme Court  

of Pakistan in  General Secrerary, West Pakistan Salt Miners  

Labour Union (CBA) Khewra, Jhelum v. The Director, Industries  

and Mneral Development, Punjab, Lahore reported in 1994 SCMR  

2061 (Supreme Court of Pakistan) in Human Right Case No.120 of  

1993 on 12th July, 1994 gave significant directions largely  

based on the judgments of this court.   

151. The petitioners in the said petition sought enforcement  

of the rights of the residents to have clean and unpolluted  

water.  Their apprehension was that in case the miners are  

allowed to continue their activities, which are extended in  

the water catchment area, the watercourse, reservoir and the  

pipelines would get contaminated.  According to the court,  

water  has  been  considered  source  of  life  in  this  world.  

Without water there can be no life.  History bears testimony  

that due to famine and scarcity of water, civilization have  

vanished, green lands have turned into deserts and arid goes  

completely destroying the life not any of human being, but  

animal life as well.  Therefore, water, which is necessary for  

existence of life, if polluted, or contaminated, will cause  

serious threat to human existence.

152. The  court  gave  significant  directions  including  

stopping the functioning of factory which created pollution  

and environmental degradation.

153. Another significant aspect which has been decided in  

this  case  was  to  widen  the  definition  of  the  ‘aggrieved  

person’.   The  court  observed  that  in  public  interest  

litigation, procedural trappings and restrictions of being an  

aggrieved person and other similar technical objections cannot  

bar the jurisdiction of the court.  The Supreme Court also  

observed that the Court has vast power under Article 183(3) to  

investigate into question of fact as well independently by  

recording evidence.

154.     In another important case Ms. Shehla Zia v. WAPDA  

PLD 1994 Supreme Court 693, a three-Judge Bench headed by the  

Chief  Justice  gave  significant  directions.   In  the  said  

petition  four  residents  of  Street  No.  35,F-6/1,  Islamabad  

protested to WAPDA against construction of a grid station in  

F-6/1, Islamabad. A letter to this effect was written to the  

Chairman  on  15.1.1992  conveying  the  complaint  and  

apprehensions  of  the  residents  of  the  area  in  respect  of  

construction of a grid station allegedly located in the green-

belt of a residential locality.  They pointed out that the  

electromagnetic  field  by  the  presence  of  the  high  voltage  

transmission lines at the grid station would pose a serious  

health hazard to the residents of the area particularly the  

children, the infirm and the Dhobi-ghat families that live;  

the  immediate  vicinity.   The  presence  of  electrical  

installations  and  transmission  lines  would  also  be  highly  

dangerous to the citizens particularly the children who play

outside in the area.  It would damage the greenbelt and affect  

the environment.  It was also alleged that it violates the  

principles of planning in Islamabad where the green belts are  

considered  an  essential  component  of  the  city  for  

environmental and aesthetic reasons.

155. The Supreme Court observed that where life of citizens  

is degraded, the quality of life is adversely affected and  

health hazards created are affecting a large number of people.  

The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may grant  

relief to the extent of stopping the functioning of such units  

that create pollution and environmental degradation.   

SRI LANKA:

156. There  has  been  great  impact  of  Public  Interest  

Litigation on other countries.  In Bulankulama and six others  

v.  Secretary,  Ministry  of  Industrial  Development  and  seven  

others (Eppawala case), the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka gave  

significant directions in public interest litigation. In the  

said case, Mineral Investment Agreement was entered between  

the Government and the private company for rapid exploitation  

of  rock  phosphate  reserves  at  Eppawala  in  Sri  Lanka’s  

agriculture  rich  North  Central  Province  –  High  intensity  

mining operation plus establishment of a processing plant on  

Trincomalee coast was set up which would produce phosphoric  

and  sulphuric  acid.   Six  residents  of  the  area  of  whose  

agricultural  lands  stood  to  be  affected  filed  a  petition  

before the court in public interest.  It was stated in the

petition that the project was not for a public purpose but for  

the  benefit  of  a  private  company  and  would  not  bring  

substantial  economic  benefit  to  Sri  Lanka.  The  petitioners  

claimed  imminent  infringement  of  their  fundamental  rights  

under  various  provisions  of  the  Constitution.   The  court  

invoked  the  public  trust  theory  as  applied  in  the  United  

States and in our country in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal  

Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388.  The court upheld the petitioners’  

fundamental  rights.   The  respondents  were  restrained  from  

entering into any contract relating to the Eppawala phosphate  

deposit. The court allowed the petition and the respondents  

were directed to give costs to the petitioners.  The Supreme  

Court  of  Sri  Lanka  protected  environmental  degradation  by  

giving important directions in this case.   

NEPAL:

157. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal in  

Surya Prasad Sharma Dhungle v.  Godawari Marble Industries in  

writ petition No.35 of 1992 passed significant directions.  It  

was alleged in the petition that Godawari Marble Industries  

have  been  causing  serious  environmental  degradation  to  

Godawari forest and its surrounding which is rich in natural  

grandeur and historical and religious enshrinement are being  

destroyed  by  the  respondents.   In  the  petition  it  was  

mentioned  that  the  illegal  activities  of  the  respondent  

Godawari Marble Industries have caused a huge public losses.  

158. The Supreme Court of Nepal gave significant directions

to protect degradation of environment and ecology.  The court  

adopted the concept of sustainable development.   

159. The Indian courts may have taken some inspiration from  

the group or class interest litigation of the United States of  

America  and  other  countries  but  the  shape  of  the  public  

interest  litigation  as  we  see  now  is  predominantly  

indigenously developed jurisprudence.  

160. The public interest litigation as developed in various  

facets  and  various  branches  is  unparalleled.   The  Indian  

Courts by its judicial craftsmanship, creativity and urge to  

provide access to justice to the deprived, discriminated and  

otherwise vulnerable sections of society have touched almost  

every aspect of human life while dealing with cases filed in  

the label of the public interest litigation. The credibility  

of the superior courts of India has been tremendously enhanced  

because of some vital and important directions given by the  

courts.   The  courts’  contribution  in  helping  the  poorer  

sections of the society by giving new definition to life and  

liberty and to protect ecology, environment and forests are  

extremely significant.

ABUSE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:

161. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such  

an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out,  

created  and  nurtured  with  great  care  and  caution  by  the  

courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions

with oblique motives.  We think time has come when genuine and  

bona  fide public  interest  litigation  must  be  encouraged  

whereas  frivolous  public  interest  litigation  should  be  

discouraged.         

162. In  our  considered  opinion,  we  have  to  protect  and  

preserve this important jurisdiction in the larger interest of  

the people of this country but we must take effective steps to  

prevent and cure its abuse on the basis of monetary and non-

monetary directions by the courts.

163. In BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India &  

Others AIR 2002 SC 350, this Court recognized that there have  

been, in recent times, increasing instances of abuse of public  

interest litigation.   Accordingly, the court has devised a  

number of strategies to ensure that the attractive brand name  

of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used  

for suspicious products of mischief.  Firstly, the Supreme  

Court  has  limited  standing  in  PIL  to  individuals  “acting  

bonafide.”  Secondly, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the  

imposition  of  “exemplary  costs”  as  a  deterrent  against  

frivolous and vexatious public interest litigations.  Thirdly,  

the Supreme Court has instructed the High Courts to be more  

selective in entertaining the public interest litigations.    

164. In  S. P. Gupta’s case (supra), this Court has found  

that this liberal standard makes it critical to limit standing  

to  individuals  “acting  bona  fide.   To  avoid  entertaining  

frivolous and vexatious petitions under the guise of PIL, the

Court  has  excluded  two  groups  of  persons  from  obtaining  

standing  in  PIL  petitions.  First,  the  Supreme  Court  has  

rejected  awarding  standing  to  “meddlesome  interlopers”.  

Second, the Court has denied standing to interveners bringing  

public interest litigation for personal gain.

165. In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti (supra),  

the Court withheld standing from the applicant on grounds that  

the applicant brought the suit motivated by enmity between the  

parties.  Thus, the Supreme Court has attempted to create a  

body of jurisprudence that accords broad enough standing to  

admit genuine PIL petitions, but nonetheless limits standing  

to thwart frivolous and vexations petitions.

166. The  Supreme  Court  broadly  tried  to  curtail  the  

frivolous public interest litigation petitions by two methods  

– one monetary and second, non-monetary.  The first category  

of cases is that where the court on filing frivolous public  

interest  litigation  petitions,  dismissed  the  petitions  with  

exemplary costs.  In  Neetu v. State of Pubjab & Others AIR  

2007  SC  758,  the  Court  concluded  that  it  is  necessary  to  

impose exemplary costs to ensure that the message goes in the  

right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do  

not have the approval of the Courts.  

167. In S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda & Others AIR 1997 SC  

272, the Court warned that it is of utmost importance that  

those  who  invoke  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  seeking  a  

waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in

moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not  

well-versed.    

168. In  Sanjeev Bhatnagar v. Union of India & Others AIR  

2005 SC 2841, this Court went a step further by imposing a  

monetary penalty against an Advocate for filing a frivolous  

and vexatious PIL petition.  The Court found that the petition  

was  devoid  of  public  interest,  and  instead  labelled  it  as  

“publicity interest litigation.”  Thus, the Court dismissed  

the petition with costs of Rs.10,000/-.

169. Similarly,  in  Dattaraj  Nathuji  Thaware  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra  &  Others  (2005)  1  SCC  590,  the  Supreme  Court  

affirmed the High Court’s monetary penalty against a member of  

the Bar for filing a frivolous and vexatious PIL petition.  

This  Court  found  that  the  petition  was  nothing  but  a  

camouflage to foster personal dispute.  Observing that no one  

should be permitted to bring disgrace to the noble profession,  

the Court concluded that the imposition of the penalty of Rs.  

25,000  by  the  High  Court  was  appropriate.   Evidently,  the  

Supreme  Court  has  set  clear  precedent  validating  the  

imposition  of  monetary  penalties  against  frivolous  and  

vexatious PIL petitions, especially when filed by Advocates.

170. This  Court,  in  the  second  category  of  cases,  even  

passed harsher orders.   In Charan Lal Sahu & Others v. Giani  

Zail  Singh  &  Another AIR  1984  SC  309,  the  Supreme  Court  

observed  that,  “we  would  have  been  justified  in  passing  a  

heavy order of costs against the two petitioners” for filing a

“light-hearted  and  indifferent”  PIL  petition.   However,  to  

prevent “nipping in the bud a well-founded claim on a future  

occasion,” the Court opted against imposing monetary costs on  

the petitioners.”   In this case, this Court concluded that  

the  petition  was  careless,  meaningless,  clumsy  and  against  

public interest.  Therefore, the Court ordered the Registry to  

initiate prosecution proceedings against the petitioner under  

the Contempt of Courts Act.   Additionally, the court forbade  

the Registry from entertaining any future PIL petitions filed  

by the petitioner, who was an advocate in this case.

171. In J. Jayalalitha v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Others  

(1999) 1 SCC 53, this court laid down that public interest  

litigation can be filed by any person challenging the misuse  

or improper use of any public property including the political  

party in power for the reason that interest of individuals  

cannot  be  placed  above  or  preferred  to  a  larger  public  

interest.  

172. This court has been quite conscious that the forum of  

this court should not be abused by any one for personal gain  

or for any oblique motive.

173. In BALCO (supra), this court held that the jurisdiction  

is being abused by unscrupulous persons for their personal  

gain.  Therefore, the court must take care that the forum be  

not abused by any person for personal gain.   

174. In  Dattaraj  Nathuji  Thaware  (supra),  this  court

expressed its anguish on misuse of the forum of the court  

under the garb of public interest litigation and observed that  

the public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be  

used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has  

to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil  

of public interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest  

and/or publicity seeking is not lurking.  It is to be used as  

an  effective  weapon  in  the  armoury  of  law  for  delivering  

social justice to the citizens.  The court must not allow its  

process to be abused for oblique considerations.

175. In  Thaware’s  case (supra), the Court encouraged  the  

imposition of a non-monetary penalty against a PIL petition  

filed by a member of the bar.  The Court directed the Bar  

Councils and Bar Associations to ensure that no member of the  

Bar becomes party as petitioner or in aiding and/or abetting  

files frivolous petitions carrying the attractive brand name  

of Public Interest Litigation.  This direction impels the Bar  

Councils and Bar Associations to disbar members found guilty  

of filing frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions.   

176. In Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra &  

Others AIR 2008 SC 913, this Court observed as under:

‘It is depressing to note that on account of such  trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts,  innumerable  days  are  wasted,  the  time  which  otherwise could have been spent for disposal of  cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no  efforts in fostering and developing the laudable  concept  of  PIL  and  extending  our  long  arm  of  sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed  and  the  needy,  whose  fundamental  rights  are

infringed  and  violated  and  whose  grievances  go  unnoticed,  un-represented  and  unheard;  yet  we  cannot avoid but express our opinion that while  genuine  litigants  with  legitimate  grievances  relating  to  civil  matters  involving  properties  worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal  cases in which persons sentenced to death facing  gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced  to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for  long years, persons suffering from undue delay in  service  matters  -government  or  private,  persons  awaiting  the  disposal  of  cases  wherein  huge  amounts  of  public  revenue  or  unauthorized  collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu  expecting their release from the detention orders  etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine  queue for years with the fond hope of getting into  the Courts and having their grievances redressed,  the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers  or  officious  interveners  having  absolutely  no  public  interest  except  for  personal  gain  or  private profit either of themselves or as a proxy  of others or for any other extraneous motivation  or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing  their faces by wearing the mask of public interest  litigation  and  get  into  the  Courts  by  filing  vexatious  and  frivolous  petitions  and  thus  criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts  and  as  a  result  of  which  the  queue  standing  outside the doors of the Courts never moves, which  piquant situation creates frustration in the minds  of  the  genuine  litigants  and  resultantly  they  loose faith in the administration of our judicial  system.”

The Court cautioned by observing that:

“Public interest litigation is a weapon which has  to be used with great care and circumspection and  the  judiciary has to be extremely careful to see  that behind the beautiful veil of public interest  an  ugly  private  malice,  vested  interest  and/or  publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used  as an effective weapon in the armory of law for  delivering  social  justice  to  the  citizens.  The  attractive  brand  name  of  public  interest  litigation  should  not  be  used  for  suspicious  products  of  mischief.  It  should  be  aimed  at  redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury  and not publicity oriented or founded on personal  vendetta.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The  Court  has  to  be  satisfied  about  (a)  the  credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie  correctness or nature of information given by him;  (c)  the  information  being  not  vague  and  indefinite.  The  information  should  show  gravity  and  seriousness  involved.  Court  has  to  strike  balance  between  two  conflicting  interests;  (i)  nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and  reckless allegations besmirching the character of  others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and  to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail,  for  oblique  motives,  justifiable  executive  actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot  afford  to  be  liberal.  It  has  to  be  extremely  careful to see that under the guise of redressing  a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the  sphere  reserved  by  the  Constitution  to  the  Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to  act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and  busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating  as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as  crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the  name  of  Pro  Bono  Publico though  they  have  no  interest of the public or even of their own to  protect.”

177. The malice of frivolous and vexatious petitions did not  

originate in India.  The jurisprudence developed by the Indian  

judiciary  regarding  the  imposition  of  exemplary  costs  upon  

frivolous  and  vexatious  PIL  petitions  is  consistent  with  

jurisprudence  developed  in  other  countries.   U.S.  Federal  

Courts  and  Canadian  Courts  have  also  imposed  monetary  

penalties upon public interest claims regarded as frivolous.  

The courts also imposed non-monetary penalties upon Advocates  

for filing frivolous claims.  In  Everywoman's Health Centre  

Society  v.  Bridges  54  B.C.L.R.  (2nd Edn.)  294, the  British  

Columbia Court of Appeal granted special costs against the  

Appellants for bringing a meritless appeal.    

178. U.S. Federal Courts too have imposed monetary penalties

against  plaintiffs  for  bringing  frivolous  public  interest  

claims.   Rule  11  of  the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  

(“FRCP”) permits Courts to apply an “appropriate sanction” on  

any party for filing frivolous claims.  Federal Courts have  

relied  on  this  rule  to  impose  monetary  penalties  upon  

frivolous public interest claims.  For example, in Harris v.  

Marsh 679 F.Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.C. 1987), the District Court for  

the  Eastern  District  of  North  Carolina  imposed  a  monetary  

sanction  upon  two  civil  rights  plaintiffs  for  bringing  a  

frivolous, vexatious, and meritless employment discrimination  

claim.   The Court explained that “the increasingly crowded  

dockets of the federal courts cannot accept or tolerate the  

heavy burden posed by factually baseless and claims that drain  

judicial resources.”  As a deterrent against such wasteful  

claims,  the  Court  levied  a  cost  of  $83,913.62  upon  two  

individual civil rights plaintiffs and their legal counsel for  

abusing the judicial process.  Case law in Canadian Courts and  

U.S. Federal Courts exhibits that the imposition of monetary  

penalties upon frivolous public interest claims is not unique  

to Indian jurisprudence.  

179. Additionally,  U.S.  Federal  Courts  have  imposed  non-

monetary  penalties  upon  Attorneys  for  bringing  frivolous  

claims.  Federal rules and case law leave the door open for  

such non-monetary penalties to be applied equally in private  

claims  and  public  interest  claims.   Rule  11  of  the  FRCP  

additionally permits Courts to apply an “appropriate sanction”  

on Attorneys for filing frivolous claims on behalf of their

clients.  U.S.  Federal  Courts  have  imposed  non-monetary  

sanctions upon Attorneys for bringing frivolous claims under  

Rule 11.   

180. In Frye v. Pena 199 F.3d 1332 (Table), 1999 WL 974170,  

for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth  

Circuit  affirmed  the  District  Court’s  order  to  disbar  an  

Attorney  for  having  “brought  and  pressed  frivolous  claims,  

made personal attacks on various government officials in bad  

faith and for the purpose of harassment, and demonstrated a  

lack of candor to, and contempt for, the court.” This judicial  

stance endorses the ethical obligation embodied in Rule 3.1 of  

the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”): “a lawyer  

shall  not  bring  or  defend  a  proceeding,  or  assert  or  

controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law  

and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”   Together, the  

FRCP,  U.S.  federal  case  law,  and  the  MRPC  endorse  the  

imposition  of  non-monetary  penalties  upon  attorneys  for  

bringing frivolous private claims or public interest claims.

181. In  Bar Council of Maharashtra (supra) this court was  

apprehensive that by widening the legal standing there may be  

flood  of  litigation  but  loosening  the  definition  is  also  

essential  in  the  larger  public  interest.   To  arrest  the  

mischief is the obligation and tribute to the judicial system.

182. In SP Gupta (supra)  the court cautioned that important  

jurisdiction of public interest litigation may be confined to  

legal wrongs and legal injuries for a group of people or class

of  persons.   It  should  not  be  used  for  individual  wrongs  

because individuals can always seek redress from legal aid  

organizations.  This is a matter of prudence and not as a rule  

of law.

183. In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti  (supra)  

this court again emphasized that Article 32 is a great and  

salutary safeguard for preservation of fundamental rights of  

the citizens.  The superior courts have to ensure that this  

weapon under Article 32 should not be misused or abused by any  

individual or organization.

184. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Others (1992) 4 SCC  

305, the court rightly cautioned that expanded role of courts  

in  modern  ‘social’  state  demand  for  greater  judicial  

responsibility. The PIL has given new hope of justice-starved  

millions of people of this country.  The court must encourage  

genuine PIL and discard PIL filed with oblique motives.

185. In Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee & Another v.  

C.K. Rajan & Others (2003) 7 SCC 546, it was reiterated that  

the court must ensure that its process is not abused and in  

order to prevent abuse of the process, the court would be  

justified  in  insisting  on  furnishing  of  security  before  

granting  injunction  in  appropriate  cases.   The  courts  may  

impose  heavy  costs  to  ensure  that  judicial  process  is  not  

misused.

186. In  Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware  (supra) this court again

cautioned  and  observed  that  the  court  must  look  into  the  

petition carefully and ensure that there is genuine public  

interest  involved  in  the  case  before  invoking  its  

jurisdiction.   The  court  should  be  careful  that  its  

jurisdiction is not abused by a person or a body of persons to  

further his or their personal causes or to satisfy his or  

their  personal  grudge  or  grudges.   The  stream  of  justice  

should  not  be  allowed  to  be  polluted  by  unscrupulous  

litigants.

  187. In  Neetu  (supra) this court observed that under the  

guise of redressing a public grievance the public interest  

litigation should not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the  

Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature.

188. In M/s. Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. (supra) this court  

observed that the judges who exercise the jurisdiction should  

be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of  

PIL, an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-

seeking is not lurking.  The court should ensure that there is  

no abuse of the process of the court.

189. When we revert to the facts of the present then the  

conclusion is obvious that this case is a classic case of the  

abuse of the process of the court.  In the present case a  

practicing lawyer has deliberately abused the process of the  

court.  In that process, he has made a serious attempt to  

demean  an  important  constitutional  office.   The  petitioner  

ought to have known that the controversy which he has been

raising in the petition stands concluded half a century ago  

and by a Division Bench judgment of Nagpur High Court in the  

case  of  Karkare (supra)  the  said  case  was  approved  by  a  

Constitution Bench of this court.  The controversy involved in  

this case is no longer  res integra.  It is unfortunate that  

even after such a clear enunciation of the legal position, a  

large number of similar petitions have been filed from time to  

time in various High Courts.   The petitioner ought to have  

refrained from filing such a frivolous petition.

190. A degree of precision and purity in presentation is a  

sine qua non for a petition filed by a member of the Bar under  

the label of public interest litigation.   It is expected from  

a member of the Bar to at least carry out the basic research  

whether the point raised by him is  res integra or not.  The  

lawyer who files such a petition cannot plead ignorance.     

 191. We would like to make it clear that we are not saying  

that the petitioner cannot ask the court to review its own  

judgment because of flaws and lacunae, but that should have  

been a bona fide presentation with listing of all relevant  

cases in a chronological order and that a brief description of  

what judicial opinion has been and cogent and clear request  

why  where  should  be  re-consideration  of  the  existing  law.  

Unfortunately, the petitioner has not done this exercise.  The  

petition which has been filed in the High Court is a clear  

abuse of the process of law and we have no doubt that the  

petition has been filed for extraneous considerations.  The

petition  also  has  the  potentiality  of  demeaning  a  very  

important constitutional office.   Such petition deserves to  

be discarded and discouraged so that no one in future would  

attempt to file a similar petition.

192. On  consideration  of  the  totality  of  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case, we allow the appeals filed by the  

State and quash the proceedings of the  Civil Miscellaneous  

Writ Petition No. 689 (M/B) of 2001 filed in the Uttaranchal  

High Court.  We further direct that the respondents (who were  

the  petitioners  before  the  High  Court)  to  pay  costs  of  

Rs.1,00,000/-  (Rupees  One  Lakh)  in  the  name  of  Registrar  

General of the High court of Uttarakhand.  The costs to be  

paid by the respondents  within two months.   If the costs is  

not deposited within two months, the same would be recovered  

as the arrears of the Land Revenue.   

193. We request the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Uttrakhand High  

Court to create a fund in the name of Uttarakhand High Court  

Lawyers Welfare Fund if not already in existence.  The fund  

could be utilized for providing necessary help to deserving  

young  lawyers  by  the  Chief  Justice  of  Uttarakhand  in  

consultation with the President of the Bar.   

194. We  must  abundantly  make  it  clear  that  we  are  not  

discouraging  the  public  interest  litigation  in  any  manner,  

what we are trying to curb is its misuse and abuse. According  

to us, this is a very important branch and, in a large number  

of PIL petitions, significant directions have been given by

the  courts  for  improving  ecology  and  environment,  and  

directions helped in preservation of forests, wildlife, marine  

life etc. etc.  It is the bounden duty and obligation of the  

courts to encourage genuine bona fide PIL petitions and pass  

directions  and  orders  in  the  public  interest  which  are  in  

consonance with the Constitution and the Laws.

 195. The  Public  Interest  Litigation,  which  has  been  in  

existence in our country for more than four decades, has a  

glorious record.  This Court and the High Courts by their  

judicial creativity and craftsmanship have passed a number of  

directions in the larger public interest in consonance with  

the inherent spirits of the Constitution.  The conditions of  

marginalized  and  vulnerable  section  of  society  have  

significantly improved on account of courts directions in the  

P.I.L.   

196. In our considered view, now it has become imperative to  

streamline the P.I.L.

197. We have carefully considered the facts of the present  

case.  We have also examined the law declared by this court  

and other courts in a number of judgments.

198. In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of the  

PIL,  it  has  become  imperative  to  issue  the  following  

directions:-

(1) The courts must encourage genuine and bona fide  PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL  filed for extraneous considerations.  

(2) Instead of every individual judge devising his  own  procedure  for  dealing  with  the  public  interest litigation, it would be appropriate for  each High Court to properly formulate rules for  encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the  PIL filed with oblique motives.  Consequently,  we request that the High Courts who have not yet  framed the rules, should frame the rules within  three  months.   The  Registrar  General  of  each  High Court is directed to ensure that a copy of  the Rules prepared by the High Court is sent to  the Secretary General of this court immediately  thereafter.

(3) The  courts  should  prima  facie  verify  the  credentials  of  the  petitioner  before  entertaining a P.I.L.   

(4) The  court  should  be  prima  facie  satisfied  regarding the correctness of the contents of the  petition before entertaining a PIL.

(5) The  court  should  be  fully  satisfied  that  substantial public interest is involved before  entertaining the petition.  

(6) The court should ensure that the petition which  involves  larger  public  interest,  gravity  and  urgency  must  be  given  priority  over  other  petitions.

(7) The courts before entertaining the PIL should  ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of  genuine  public  harm  or  public  injury.    The  court  should  also  ensure  that  there  is  no  personal gain, private motive or oblique motive  behind filing the public interest litigation.   

(8) The court should also ensure that the petitions  filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior  motives  must  be  discouraged  by  imposing  exemplary  costs  or  by  adopting  similar  novel  methods  to  curb  frivolous  petitions  and  the  petitions  filed  for  extraneous  considerations.

199. Copies  of  this  judgment  be  sent  to  the  Registrar  

Generals of all the High Courts within one week.

200. These  appeals  are  listed  on  03.05.2010  to  ensure  

compliance of our order.

……….…………………………….J.                     (Dalveer Bhandari)

.……..….………...……….……. J.     (Dr. Mukundakam Sharma)

New Delhi; January 18, 2010.