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PETITIONER: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMAGYA SHARMA VAIDYA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/02/1965

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. WANCHOO, K.N. MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1966 AIR   78            1965 SCR  (3) 161

ACT:    Iron  and Steel (Control) Order, 1956,  cl.  7--Obtaining permit  to  purchase iron goods for  specified  purpose--Not using it for any purpose, whether constitutes  contravention cl. 7.

HEADNOTE:     The respondent obtained permits under the Iron and Steel (Control)  Order, 1956 on the representation that he  wanted to purchase iron goods for the purpose of building a  temple and  a  dharamshala. The   permits were  obtained  from  the authorities  of District Deoria in U.P. At the back  of  the permit  a  condition  was  printed    tematerials   required against   the   permit   will  be  used   only   that   "h.q for  the  purpose for which it was asked for  and  has  been given".  The respondent was tried for the  contravention  of cl.  ? of the aforesaid order on the allegation that he  had not  used  the  goods purchased under the  permits  for  the purpose  for which ,they were issued. The  trial  Magistrate found  him  guilty. In appeal, however, the  Sessions  Judge acquitted  him  on the ground that the  possibility  of  his retaining  the  iron at some other place  was  not  entirely excluded.  The High Court in appeal by the  State  confirmed the acquittal holding      that it had not been proved  that the respondent had "used" the iron              which he had obtained  on  the  basis  of  the  permit.  The  High  court further  held  that  it was not possible to  look  into  the application  in order to see for what purpose the  applicant took  the  permit and no condition actually printed  at  the back  of  the permit had been broken. By special  leave  the State appealed to the Supreme Court,  On behalf of the appellant it was urged: (1) the word "use" in  cl. 7 of the order includes "kept for eventual  use  for another  purpose." (2) The High Court erred in holding  that the  application  cannot be referred to for the  purpose  of construing the conditions appearing in the permit.     HELD:  The  respondent  could not be held  guilty  of  a contravention of cl. 7 of the order.     (i) No doubt the legislative intent of the Iron &  Steel (Control)  Order is that this essential commodity should  be utilised in accordance with the conditions contained in  the

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permit,  but  no  clause in the Control  Order  in  question evinces  a legislative intent that a mere non-user  is  also prohibited and made punishable. [165 H]     The word ’use’ must take its colour from the context  in which is used. In cl. ? the expression "use...in  accordance with  the  conditions  contained"  suggests  something  done positively  e.g. utilisation or disposal. Mere "non-use"  is not  included in  the word  "use". 165 D]     (ii) The High Court was wrong in holding that it is  not permissible  to  look at the application  to  determine  the purpose for which permit is obtained. However in the present case  the applications did not disclose that the  respondent wanted  to build a temple or dharamshala at  any  particular place.  From the mere fact  that the applications were  made to  the authorities in Deoria District, or the fact that  in the  applications it was mentioned that the goods  were  not available in Deoria District, it did not necessarily  follow that  the goods were intended to be used in  that  District. [166 H] 162

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  60 of 1963.    Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August  24, 1962 of the Allahabad High Court  in  Government Appeal No. 1379 of 1962. B.C.  Misra and O.P. Rana, for the appellant. 1.  P.  Goyal, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Sikri,  J.  This  appeal by special  leave  is  directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court  dismissing the appeal of the State against the judgment of the Sessions Judge  allowing the appeal of the respondent and  acquitting him.     The respondent obtained permits under the Iron and Steel (Control)  Order,  1956--hereinafter   referred  to  as  the Control  Order  for about 28 tons of iron, including 6  tons of rods, 151/2 tons of joints and 2 tons of G.C. Sheets.  He is alleged to have purchased these articles on the basis  of the  above  permits between July 1957 and March  1958.   The permits  were  obtained on three applications  made  by  the respondent.   Only  two  applications  are  in  the  printed record.  The first application is dated May 23, 1957, and is addressed  to  the  Provincial Iron  and  Steel  Controller, Kanpur,  through  the District Magistrate, Deoria.  In  this application  the respondent stated that he was  a  political sufferer  and he was constructing a public temple for  which he  required  five  tons of M.S. Round  and  eight  tons  of Girder.  He  further stated that the requirements  were  nor available  at Deoria and as such the application  should  be considered and forwarded to the Controller for consideration and orders.  It appears that this application was forwarded, duly  recommended, by the District Supply  Officer.  Deoria, and ultimately a permit was given to him by the  Controller. He  made  another application dated September 7,  1957.   In this  application  he again stated that he was  a  political sufferer  and  he  was  constructing  a  public  temple  and dharamshala  for  which he required  certain  quantities  of iron.   He  further stated that the  requirements  were  not available  at Deoria and as such the application  should  be forwarded  to  the Controller.  This  application  was  also recommended and forwarded and ultimately a permit was  given

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to  him.   On  January 2, 1958,  the  accused  made  another application (Ex. Ka 9--not available in the printed  record) and a permit was given to him by the District Supply Officer himself.   We may mention that the original permits are  not printed in the record, and, therefore, we have not been able to  see  for ourselves as to what are the  exact  conditions contained in the permits.     It  is the case of the prosecution that  the  respondent after  obtaining the materials sanctioned to him  under  the permits did not construct any temple or dharamshala building at Barhaj Bazar or at any other place.  We may mention  that Barhaj   Bazar  is  the  place  where  he  lives   and   the applications  which  are  in the record  also  mention  this address. 163     Before the Magistrate who tried the case the  respondent was put the following question:       "It  is  alleged  that the  iron  obtained  under  the permits  mentioned in questions 2, 3 and 4 was not  utilised for the   purpose for which it was taken.  What have you  to say   in this respect?" The respondent’s reply was:       "No.  Whatever  iron 1 got, I used it  in  the  temple situate  in mauza Tinbari, P.S. Madhubam district  Azamgarh, which is my place of residence as well."     Before  the Magistrate the accused had admitted to  have purchased  about  17 tons of iron.  The Magistrate  held  it proved  that the accused had atleast purchased one ton  more from  one  Mishri  Lal,  P.W.  7.   Thus,  he  came  to  the conclusion  that the accused had purchased at least 18  tons of iron.  He further held that on the evidence it was  clear that only 3/4 ton of rods had been utilised in the  building constructed  at  Tinhari,  but  as  the  building  had  been constructed  between  1943--52,  no  portion  of  the   iron obtained  by the accused had been utilised for  the  purpose for which it was procured.  He further held that the accused had  disposed of the iron wrongfully at Kanpur and  did  not even bring the same to Barhaj Bazar or Tinhar.   Accordingly he  held that the respondent had contravened the  provisions of cl. 7 of the Control Order.     The  respondent  filed  an appeal  before  the  Sessions Judge.  The  Sessions Judge held that barring a  very  small quantity  of iron, the remaining quantity that was  received by  the  respondent had not been utilised in the  temple  or dharmashala  at Tinhari. Differing from the  Magistrate,  he held  that  it  was  not proved by  any  evidence  that  the respondent had actually sold the excess quantity at  Kanpur. He  then observed that "in the absence of any such  evidence the possibility of the appellant retaining the iron at  some other place is not completely excluded."  Then construing d. 7  of the Control Order, he observed that "in the  aforesaid section  there is no mention that the iron purchased  should be  utilised at any particular place or within a  particular period.  The condition in the various permits granted to the appellant was simply this that he should utilise the iron in creecting a temple or dharamshala in the town of Barhai.  It may be noted that the main purpose was the construction of a temple  and  dharamshala;  the  place where  it  was  to  be constructed  does  not  appear to  have  much  significance. Further  no  time-limit  is given during  which  the  entire quantity  of iron should be utilised."  Accordingly he  held that there had been no contravention of cl. 7 of the Control Order.      The  State appealed to the High Court.  Srivastava,  J. dismissed  the  appeal  holding  that  there  had  been   no

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contravention  of cl. 7 of the Control Order.  According  to him,  two  essentials  are necessary  before  there  can  be contravention of el. 7.  "In the 164 first place the iron and steel should be ’used’; secondly it should  be  used  otherwise  than  in  accordance  with  the conditions  contained or incorporated in the document  which was  the authority for the acquisition."  He held  that  the first  condition had not been fulfilled because it  had  not been  proved that the respondent had used the iron which  he had obtained on the basis of the permit. It appears that the findings  of  the learned  Sessions Judge, as  well  as  the Magistrate,  that he had not used or utilised the  remaining portions  of the iron and steel at all were  not  questioned before  him. According to him, if the remaining quantity  of iron  was  still unutilised or unused, then  the  respondent could  not be said to have done anything contrary to cl.  7. He further held that the second condition had also not  been fulfilled  because  the  permit itself  contained  only  one condition printed on its back.  This condition was "that the materials required against the permit will be used only  for the purpose for which it was asked for and has been  given." According  to  him, it is not permissible to  refer  to  the application  made for the permit because the  only  document that  can  be  looked at is the permit.   He  was,  however, prepared to concede that "it is also open to the officer  to mention  in  the  permit that it is being  granted  for  the purpose mentioned in the application.  That may be a  short- cut  for avoiding the trouble of entering in the permit  the details of the purpose.  In that case it may be  permissible to refer to the application."  In spite of this  concession, he  concluded  that "when even that is not done in  fact  no condition is mentioned in the permit at all about the manner in  which the iron or steel is to be utilised it  cannot  be said that a condition of the permit has been broken  because the assurance given in the application has not been  carried out."     Mr.  B.C. Misra, learned counsel for the appellant.  has urged  before  us  that on the facts found  by  the  learned Sessions  Judge.  cl.  7  of  the  Control  Order  has  been contravened.  He says that the word "use" in el. 7  includes "kept  for eventual use for another purpose."  He says  that if one stores iron and steel. one uses it and the word "use" does  not  imply consumption  only.  Relying on  Maxwell  on Interpretation  of  Statutes, Eleventh Edition, p.  266.  he says  that we should give a wide construction to  the  word’ "use" in cl. 7.     Clause  5  and  the relevant portion of  cl.  7  of  the Control Order are as follows:               "5. Disposals.                     No  person, who acquires iron  or  steel               under  clause 4. or no producer shall  dispose               of  or agree to dispose of or export or  agree               to  export from any place to which this  Order               extends   any   iron  or  steel,   except   in               accordance  with the conditions  contained  or               incorporated  in a special or general  written               order of the Controller.               165                   7.  Use  of Iron and Steel to  conform  to               conditions governing acquisition.                     A  person  acquiring iron  or  steel  in               accordance with the provisions of el. 4  shall               not  use the iron or steel otherwise  than  in               accordance  with any conditions  contained  or

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             incorporated  in  the document which  was  the               authority for the acquisition  ......  "     We are unable to accede to the above contentions.  There is no provision in the Control Order requiring that iron  or steel  acquired under the Control Order should  be  utilised within  a specified time.  If it had been the  intention  to include keeping or storing within the word ’use’ there would have  been some provision regarding the period during  which it would be permissible to keep or store the iron, for it is common   knowledge  that  building  operations   take   some considerable time and are sometimes held up for shortage  of material or other reasons. Further the word ’use’ must  take its  colour from the context in which it is used.  In cl.  7 the  expression  "use...in accordance with  the   conditions contained"   suggests   something  done   positively,   e.g. utilisation or disposal. Mere ’non-use’, in our opinion,  is not included in the word ’use’. The passage relied on by the learned counsel in Maxwell is as follows:               "Wide Sense given to words:                     The   rule   of   strict   construction,               however, whenever invoked, comes attended with               qualifications   and  other  rules   no   less               important,  and it is by the light which  each               contributes   that   the   meaning   must   be               determined.  Among them is the rule  that  the               sense of the words is to be adopted which best               harmonises  with the context and  promotes  in               the  fullest manner the policy and  object  of               the  legislature.   The paramount  object,  in               construing penal as well as other statutes, is               to  ascertain the legislative intent, and  the               rule of strict construction is not violated by               permitting  the  words  to  have  their   full               meaning,   or  the  more  extensive   of   two               meanings,    when   best   effectuating    the               intention. They are, indeed, frequently  taken               in the widest sense, sometimes even in a sense               more  wide  than etymological  belongs  or  is               popularly attached to them, in order to  carry               out effectually the legislative intent, or, to               use  Sir Edward Coke’s words, to suppress  the               mischief and advance the remedy."     But  this  passage  does not warrant  the  giving  of  a meaning  to  a word apart from the context in  which  it  is used.  There is no doubt that the legislative intent of  the Control  Order  is that this essential commodity  should  be utilised in accordance with the conditions contained in  the permit,  but  no  clause in this  Control  Order  evinces  a legislative  intent that a mere non-user is also  prohibited and made punishable. 166     The learned counsel referred to London County Council v. Wood(1), but we do not derive any assistance from that case. The  head-note brings out the point decided in that case  as follows:                     "The Highways and Locomotives Act, 1878,               provides  by s. 32 that "A  country  authority               may...make...by-laws   for   granting   annual               licences  to  locomotives  used  within  their               country."  And by a by-law made by the  London               County  Council  under  that  section  it  was               provided that "No locomotive shall be used  on               any highway within the county of London  until               an  annual  licence for the use  of  the  same               shall  have been obtained from the council  by

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             the owner thereof":--                     Held, that a steam-roller  which was not               at the time being employed in road-making, but               was  merely  passing through the county  to  a               destination outside was being "used within the               country" within the meaning of the section and               the by-law." In the context, the word "used" was, with respect,  properly construed.   Collins, J., held that "the object of  the  Act was  evidently to protect the highways, and the effect of  a steam-roller upon the highways may be just the same  whether it be engaged in mending the roads or not".     In  conclusion we hold that it has not been  established that  the  respondent had used the iron acquired by  him  in contravention of cl. 7 of the Control Order.     The  learned council further urges that the  High  Court erred in holding that the application cannot be referred  to for  the purpose of construing the conditions  appearing  in the permit, the condition being that "the materials acquired against a permit will be used only for the purpose for which it  was  asked for and has been given."  He  says  that  the expression  "the purpose for which it was asked for"  refers back to the application, and the expression "has been given" refers  back to the Order.  There is some force in  what  he urges.   We  are unable to sustain the finding of  the  High Court that it is not permissible to refer to the application and the order to find out the purpose for which the iron was obtained. But even if we look at the applications, which are in  the  printed  record,  the  purpose  mentioned  is  only construction  of a temple, in the application dated May  23, 1957,  and temple and dharamshala in the  application  dated September 7, 1957.  These applications do not disclose  that the   respondent   wanted  to  construct  the   temple   and dharamshala  at any particular place. It is urged  that  the sentence which occurs in both the applications, namely  that the requirements are not available at Deoria, shows that the purpose  for which the iron and steel was required  was  for construction (1)[1897] 2 QB 482. 167 of a temple and dharamshala in the district of Deoria.  This argument  is  sought to be reinforced by  asserting  that  a District   Magistrate   was  not  empowered   to   recommend applications  for iron required for works to be  constructed outside the District, and therefore it must be held that the purpose was construction of a temple and dharamshala in  the district   of  Deoria.   However,  no  orders  showing   the jurisdiction  of the District Magistrate in respect of  this matter  has been shown to us, and we are unable to  conclude from the applications that the purpose was construction of a temple and dharamshala in the district of Deoria alone.     Accordingly   we  hold  that  the  respondent  has   not contravened  cl.  7  of  the  Control  Order.   The   appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed Appeal dismissed. 168