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PETITIONER: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAM SAGAR YADAV AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/01/1985

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR  416            1985 SCR  (2) 621  1985 SCC  (1) 552        1985 SCALE  (1)108  CITATOR INFO :  R          1992 SC1817  (17)

ACT:      Indian Penal  Code. ss.  300  302  and  304-Murder  and culpable  homicide   not  amounting   to  murder-Distinction between.      Indian  Evidence   Act-Evidence-Appreciation   of-Dying declaration-If true,  whether corroboration  necessary-Death caused  and/or   atrocities  perpetrated   while  in  police custody-Burden   of   proof-Need   for   re-examination   by legislature.      Criminal Law-Petty details and minor contradictions  in evidence-Whether can tilt the scale of justice.

HEADNOTE:      Respondent  1   was  the   Station  House  Officer  and Respondents 2 to 4 were attached as constables to the Police Station. The  prosecution alleged that a complaint was filed against the  deceased for  cattle trespass.  The  Respondent pursuant to  the said  complaint sought  to  extort  illegal gratification from  the deceased  for hushing  up the  case. Respondent 2  succeeded in  obtaining Rs.  100  and  made  a further demand  of Rs.  200. The  deceased refused to oblige him and  made a  complaint to  the Superintendent of Police, who forwarded  it to  Respondent 1  for inquiry  and report. This incensed  Respondent 1.  The deceased  was arrested and brought to  the Police  Station by  Respondents 3  and 4  at about 10.00  A.M. Same  day at  about 6.00 P.M. the deceased succumbed to injures which were caused to him by Respondents while he was in their custody.        The   Sessions  Court  tried  the  four  Respondents, convicted each  of them  under section  304, Part  2 of  the Penal Code  while Respondent  I  was  also  convicted  under section 220  of the  Penal Code  and all  were sentenced  to different terms of imprisonment.       The  Respondents appealed  to the  High  Court  and  a Single Judge  set  aside  their  order  of  convictions  and sentences.       Allowing the Appeal of the State, 622 ^      HELD: 1.  It is  impossible to  sustain the judgment of

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the High Court as it has totally overlooked crucial evidence led by  the prosecution  and taken  an unrealistic  view  of unequivocal facts.  It has  not even adverted to the reasons given by  the trial court for holding the Respondents guilty of the offences of which they were convicted. [625B-C]      2. It  is quite clear that upon the evidence led by the prosecution only  one conclusion is possible, which is, that the Respondents inflicted injuries upon Brijlal while he was in their custody, thereby causing his death. [635F]      3. It is well-settled that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration can  be acted  upon without corroboration. There is not  even a  rule of  prudence which  has harden d into a rule of  law that  a dying  declaration cannot be acted upon unless it  is corroborated.  The primary effort Or the Court has to be to find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it  is, no  question of corroboration arises.  It is only If the  circumstances surrounding  the dying declaration are not  clear  or  convincing  that  the  Court  may,  for  its assurance, look  for corroboration to the dying declaration. [628D-E]      The instant  case. is  a typical  illustration of  that class of cases in which the Court should not hesitate to act on the  basis of  an uncorroborated  dying  declaration  The circumstances leave no doubt that the dying declaration made by the  deceased to  the Judicial  Magistrate to  the effect that he  was beaten  by   Darogah and  the constables at the Police Station  is true  in every  respect and it is safe to accept the same. [628F; G; 629A-B]      Khushal Rao  v. The  State of  Bombay, [1958]  SCR 552, Harbans Singh  v. State of Punjab, [1967] Supp. ISCR 104 and Gopalsingh v. State of M.P, [1972] 3 SCC 268, followed.      4. The distinction between murder and culpable hom cide not amounting to murder is often lost sight of, resulting in undue liberality  in favour of undeserving culprits like the respondent-police officers  Except in  cases covered by five exceptions mentioned  in section  300  of  the  Penal  Code, culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is  done with  the intention  of causing death, or if the act  falls within  any of  the three  clauses of section 300, namely, 2ndly, 3rdly and 4thly. [630 F-G]       The  instant case,  appears to  fall under  the clause ’2ndly’ of  section 300  since the act by which the death of was caused,  was done  with the  intention of  causing  such bodily injury  as the Respondents knew to be likely to cause his  death.  It  is  regrettable  that  the  Sessions  Court convicted the  Respondents  under  section  304  instead  of convicting them  under sect  on 302 of the Pen 11 Code. This Court, would not however pursue the matter further since the State did  not fled  an appeal  against the  judgment of the Sessions Court. [630H; 631A]       5.  The record of the case is disproportionately bulky to the narrow Point which is involved in the case. It is not an unusual  experience that the wood is missed for the trees when a Judge is confronted with a jumbled-up mass of data 623 relevant and  irrelevant. it  is necessary  in such cases to find the  central point  of the case and to concentrate upon evidence which  bears upon  that point.  Petty details which befog the  real issue  and contradictions  in  the  evidence which are  inevitable when  a story  is narrated  under  the stress of  a grave  crime, ought not to be permitted to tilt the scales  of justice. The more a Judge gets bogged down in superfluous details  the greater  is the  likelihood of  his straying away  from evidence  which can  clinch  the  issue. [625C-E] R

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     In  the instant case, the High Court missed or mistook the salient  features of  the case and embarked upon a hair- splitting exercise while appreciating the evidence.      6. Remand  orders are often passed mechanical,y without a proper  application of  mind. In this case, the Magistrate was led  into passing an order of remand on the basis of the usual statement  that the  offence of  which the accused was charged was  still under investigation. What is important is that deceased had not committed any offence at all for which 1- could  be remanded and, far from being an accused, he was in the  position of  a complainant.  Respondent  1  was  the architect of  his remand  and the  motive for  obtaining the remand order was to keep him in custody so as to prevent him from disclosing to his people who beat him and where. [627D- F]       7.  It is necessary that the Government amends the law appropriately so  that policemen  l who commit atrocities on persons who  are in  their custody are not allowed to escape by reason of paucity or absence of evidence. Police Officers alone and  none else.  can  give  evidence  as  regards  the circumstances in  which a  person in  their custody comes to receive injuries  while in their custody. Bound by ties of a kind of  brotherhood, they  often prefer to remain silent in such situations and when they choose to speak they put their own glass   upon  facts and pervert the truth. The result is that persons  on whom  atrocities  are  perpetrated  by  the police in  the sanctum  sanctorum OF the Police Station, are left without   evidence  to prove who the offenders are. The law as  to the  burden of  proof in  such cases  may be  re- examined by  the legislature  so that  hand-maids of law and order do  not use  their  authority  and  opportunities  for oppressing the  innocent citizens,  who  look  to  them  for protection. [631C-E]

JUDGMENT:       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No 69 of 1 975 .       From  the Judgment  and Order  dated 13th May, 1974 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 269 of 1973.       M.R.  Sharma, Dalveer  Bhandari, H.M.  Singh and  Miss Rachna Joshi, for the Appellant       R.K  Garg,  V  J.  Francis  and  N.M.  Popli  for  the Respondents. 624       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by          CHANCRACHUD, C.J. This is an appeal by the State of U.P., against  the judgment of a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High  Court, setting aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by  the learned Sessions Judge, Fatehpur against the four respondents. Respondents 1 and 2, Ram Sagar Yadav and  Shobha Nath  alias Pujari  were convicted  by the learned Sessions  Judge under  section 304.  Part 2,  of the Penal Code  and were  sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years.  Respondent 1  was also convicted under section 220 of  the Penal  Code for  keeping a person in confinement corruptly and   was  sentenced to  rigorous imprisonment for five years  Respondents 3 and 4 were convicted under section 304, Part 2 of the Penal Code and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years.       Respondent l, Ram Sagar Yadav, was the Station House   Officer   of  the  Hussainganj  Police  Station,  District Fatehpur,  while   the  remaining   three  respondents  were attached to  that  police  station  as  constables.  On  the

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morning of  August 29,  1969 respondents  3 and  4  went  to village Haibatpur, arrested the deceased Brijlal and brought him to the police station at about 1().()0 A.M. Brijlal died the same  day at  about 6.00  P.M. due to the injuries which were   caused to him between the time that he was brought to the police station and the forenoon of August 29.       The  case of  the prosecution  is that the respondents wanted to  extort  illegal  gratification  from  Brijlal  in connection with  a complaint  which was filed against him by one Faheeman  Faqirin for  cattle  trespass.  Respondent  2, Shobha Nath,  had succeeded  in obtaining  a sum  Of Rs. 100 from Brijlal  with an  assurance that no steps will be taken against him  in that  complaint.  Respondent  2  demanded  a further sum of Rs. 200 from Brijlal for hushing up the case. which the  latter refused to pay. Instead, on August 7, 1969 he sent  a complaint (Exhibit Ka-2) to the Superintendent of Police,  Fatehpur,   complaining  that  a  bribe  was  being demanded from  him by  respondent 2,  a   policeman  of  the Hussainganj Police  Station. That complaint was forwarded by the Superintendent of Police to respondent I for inquiry and report. Being  incensed by  the  ’audacity’  of  Brijlal  in complaining against a policeman under his charge, respondent I sent  respondents 3  and 4  to bring Brijlal to the police station in  order that  he could  be taught a proper lesson. That is the genesis of Brijlal’s arrest. Apart from Faheeman Faqirin’s complaint  that Brijlal’s  bullock had damaged her crop, there was no complaint or charge against him. 625       We  have heard  this appeal  at reasonable  length and both  Shri  M.R.  Sharma,  who  appears  on  behalf  of  the appellant and  Shri R.K.  Garg who  appears on behalf of the respondents, have taken us through the relevant evidence and the judgments of the High Court and the Sessions Court. Upon a consideration  of that  evidence, we find it impossible to sustain the  judgment of  the High  Court.  Ii  has  totally overlooked  crucial  evidence  led  by  the  prosecution  in support of its case and, with respect, taking an unrealistic view of  unequivocal facts,  it has not even adverted to the reasons  given   by  the  trial  court  in  support  of  its conclusion that  the respondents  are guilty of the offences of which it convicted them.       The  record of the case is disproportionately bulky to the narrow point which is involved in the case. It is not an unusual experience  that the  wood is  missed for  the trees when a  Judge is  confronted with a jumbled-up mass of data, relevant and  irrelevant. It  is necessary  in such cases to find out  the central  point of  the case and to concentrate upon evidence  which bears  upon that  point. Petty  details which befog  the real  issue and minor contradictions in the evidence which are inevitable when a story is narrated under the stress  of a  grave crime,  ought not to be permitted to tilt the scales o justice. The more a Judge gets bogged down in superfluous details, the greater is the likelihood of his straying away  from evidence  which can clinch the issue. In the instant  case, the  High Court  missed  or  mistook  the salient features  of the  case and,  in the result, embacked upon  a   hair-splitting  exercise  while  appreciating  the evidence.       We  do not  propose to  discuss more  than is strictly necessary since it is quite clear that upon the evidence led by the  prosecution only  one conclusion  is possible, which is, that  the respondents  inflicted injuries  upon  Brijlal while he was in their custody, thereby causing his death.       Brijlal  was hale  and hearty on the morning of August 29, 1969.  He was ploughing his field when respondents 3 and

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4 reached Haibatpur in order to arrest him. They took him on foot to  the Hussaniganj  Police Station which is about 3 km away from  Haibatpur. They  reached the  police  station  at 10.00 A.M.  Two hours  later, Brijlal  was taken in a police van  to   the  Court  of  the  learned  Additional  District Magistrate  for  obtaining  remand.  Shri  R.C.  Nigam,  the Presiding Officer  of the  Court, had  finished the  winding list of  the remand  applications, at  the end  of which the Moharir of the 626 Court informed  him that  a remand  order had remained to be passed  against   an  accused   who  was  brought  from  the Hussainganj Police Station and that the accused could not be produced in  Court since  he was  lying in the verandah in a badly injured  condition. Shri  Nigam (P.W.  5) says  in his evidence that since the accused could not  be brought to the Court-room, he  himself  went  to  the  verandah  where  the accused was lying and he asked him his name. The accused was unable to  respond at  first since  his condition  was "very serious" but,  on repeated  inquiries, the accused told Shri Nigam that  his name  was Brijlal. On being questioned as to how he  came to  receive the  injuries, Brijlal replied that ’the Darogah  of Hussainganj  and the  constables had beaten him very  badly’. Shri  Nigam made  a note  of the statement made by  Brijlal on  the remand  application (Exhibit Ka-l). That application  bears Shri Nigam’s signature and the thumb impression of Brijlal.       Shri  Nigam’s evidence is of a crucial character since it establishes     , beyond  any  doubt,  that  Brijlal  had extensive injuries  on his  person and that, at the earliest opportunity, he  involved the  policemen of  the Hussainganj Police Station  as the  authors of  those injuries, It is as transparent, as  any fact  can be,  that the  injuries which were found  on the  person of  Brijlal were caused to him at the Hussainganj  Police Station. The few and simple steps in the logical  process leading   to  that conclusion  are that Brijlal had  no injuries  on his person when he was arrested at Haibatpur  in the  morning or  when he was brought to the police station  at about  10.00 A.M,  and that,  when he was sent for  remand he  had a  large number  of injuries on his person which  had induced a state of shock. We are unable to see what  other explanation  can reasonably be given of this chain of  facts except  that the   injuries  were caused  to Brijlal by  the policemen attached to the Hussainganj Police Station. Who,  from amongst  them, is or are responsible for causing the  injuries has undoubtedly to be considered. But, there is  no escape  from the  conclusion that  Brijlal  was assaulted while  he was in custody of the respondents at the Hussainganj Police Station.       The evidence of Laxmi Narain, P.W. No. 17, who was one of the constables attached to the Hussainganj Police Station has an important bearing on the guilt of the respondents, an aspect which  has escaped  the attention of the High, Court. Laxmi Narain says that when he went to the police station at about 10.45  a.m. On  August 29,1969,    respondent  1,  the Station House Officer, and the other three respon- 627 dents were  present at  the police station; that Brijlal was lying in  the lock-up  of the  police station  shrieking  in pain; and  that, when Brijlal was handed over to his custody for being  taken to  the Magistrate,  there were a number of injuries on  his arms  and legs.  According to Laxmi Narain, and that  is undisputed,  respondent 1  also accompanied him and Brijlal  to the  Magistrate’s  court.  It  seems  to  us surprising that respondent I was nowhere on the scene in the

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Magistrate’s court, especially in the light of the fact that Brijlal’s was  an unusual  case in  which, the  prisoner for whom remand was to be obtained was in a precarious condition due to  the injuries  suffered by  him. It  was respondent I who, being  the S.H.O., had the custody and care of Brijlal. Instead of  making himself  available to  the Magistrate for explaining how  Brijlal came  to be  injured, he resorted to the  expedient   of  deputing   Laxmi  Narain  to  face  the Magistrate. Laxmi  Narain has  also stated  in his  evidence that Brijlal  told the  Magistrate that  the Darogah and the constables of  the Hussainganj  Police Station had assaulted him.       It  is notorious  that remand  orders are often passed mechanically without  a proper application of mind. Perhaps, the Magistrates  are not  to blame  because, heaps  of  such applications are  required to  be disposed of by them before the regular  work of  the day  begins. Shri  Nigam has to be complimented for  the sense  of duty  and humanity  which he showed in  leaving his seat and going to the verandah to see an humble  villager like  Brijlal. It is obvious that he was led into  passing an  order of  remand on  the basis  of the usual statement  that the  offence of  which the accused was charged was  still under investigation. What is important is that Brijlal  had not committed any offence at all for which he could  be remanded and, far from being an accused, he was in the  position of  a complainant.  Respondent  I  was  the architect of  his remand  and the  motive for  obtaining the remand order was to keep Brijlal in custody so as to prevent him from disclosing to his people who beat him and where.       After  obtaining the remand order, Brijlal was sent to the Fatehpur District Jail at 3.40 p.m. Sheo Shanker Sharma, P.W.8, who  was the  Assistant Jailor  of the Fetehpur Jail, says that  when he examined Brijlal at about 3.45 p.m. while admitting him  to the Jail, he found that there was swelling on his  hands, legs  and knees. Brijlal was unable to get up and on  being questioned,  he told Sharma that the policemen belonging to the Police Station arrested him H 628 from his field, took him to the Police Station and committed "marpit" on  him, as  a result  of which  the was  unable to stand. Finding  that Brijlal’s  condition  was  serious,  he called the Jail Doctor.           Dr. S. C. Misra P W. 21, went to the District Jail at about  5.20  IS p.m. He found that there were 19 injuries on  the  various  parts  of  Brijlal  ’s  person.  On  being questioned, Brijlal  told him  in a  faltering voice that he had been  beaten by  the  policemen.  Dr.  Misra  says  that Brijlal’s condition  was precarious but that, he had neither any fever  nor any symptoms of Pneumonie. The evidence of Dr Misra proves  that Brijlal  died on  account of the injuries received by him and that, the suggestion made by the defence that he  died on  account of  some   kind of  a fever  or on account of  the pneumonic  condition of his lungs, is utteiy baseless. The  congestion in his lungs was the result of the beating administered to him.       It  is well-settled  that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration can  be acted  upon without  corroboration. (See Khushal Rao v. The  State of Bombay(1);Harbans Singh v.State of Punjab,(2)  and Gopalsingh  v. State of M.P.)(3) There is not even  a rule  of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law  that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is  corroborated. The  primary effort of the Court has to be to  find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it is, no  question of  corroboration arises. It is only if the circumstances surrounding  the  dying  declaration  are  not

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clear or  convincing that  the Court may, for its assurance, look for  corroboration to  the dying  declaration. The ease before us  is a  typical illustration of that class of eases in which,  the Court should not hesitate to act on the basis of an  uncorroborated  dying  declaration.  Brijlal  had  no reason  for  involving  the  policemen  falsely  for  having assaulted him.  There was  no possibility of anyone tutoring him, for  the simple  reason that  he was  in the  exclusive custody of  the policemen of Husssainganj Police Station. It is the respondents who were in a position to exert influence over him.  No one  else had  access to  him, which  not only excludes the  possibility of  his being  tutored, but  which also excludes   the possibility that he was assaulted by any one else.  Indeed, the  circumstances of  the case  leave no doubt that the dying declaration       (1) [1958] SCR 552.          (2) [19621 Supp. 1 SCR 104,          (3) 119721 3 SCC 268. 629 made by  Brijlal to  Shri Nigam is true in every respect. We consider it  safe to accept the statement made by Brijlal to Shri Nigam  that he  was beaten  by  the  ’Darogah  and  the constables’ of the Hussainganj Police Station.       The  only question  which remains for consideration is as  to   the  identity  of  the  persons  belonging  to  the Hussainganj Police  Station who  participated in the assault on  Brijlal.  Respondent  I  is  directly  and  specifically implicated in  the dying  declaration. He was the "Darogah‘’ of that  Police Station.  Laxmi Narain  says in his evidence that at  10.45 a.m.  when Brijlal  was brought to the police station by  respondents 3 and 4 respondent I was present. It is difficult  to believe  that The  police constables  would beat an accused so mercilessly in the police station without the connivance,  consent or  coollaboration of  the  Station House Officer.  The Police  Station of Hussainganj is not so large that  the Station House Officer would not know what is happening there  during his presence. The possibility of any other officer  being a  "Darogah" is removed by the evidence of S.I.  Bajrang Bahadur  Singh, P.W.  19, who says that, at the relevant  time, there was no other Second Officer at the Hussainganj Police Station except him.       Any  doubt lurking about the involvement of respondent I in  the incident  is removed by his own conduct. Though he was unquestionably  present at  the police  station  at  the material time,  he prepared  a false record in order to show that he had gone for the purpose of an identification parade to another  place. We  agree with  the leaned Sessions Judge that the record was thus prepared by respondent 1 falsely in order to support the defence of alibi. That, indeed, was his defence at  the trial. He also prepared false record to show that Brijlal  was involved in a dacoity case and was brought to the  police station  for that  reason. There  was no such charge against Brijlal and yet, respondent ], as the S.H.O., authorised or  allowed respondents  3 and  4 to go Haibatpur for arresting Brijlal. The true reason for arresting him was that the  respondent were  incensed at the complaint made by Brijlal against respondent 2 for extorting a bribe.       In  so far  as respondent  2 is concerned, he is truly the cause  of the  assault on  Brijlal. It  was he  who  had extorted a bribe from Brijlal and was attempting to get some money from  him. Brijlal  sent a complaint on August 7, 1969 to  the  Superintendent  of  Police,  Fatehpur,  complaining against respondent 2. That complaint having 630 been referred  for inquiry  and report  to  the  Hussainganj

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Police Soltion,  respondents hatched  a  conspiracy  to  put Brijlal under  arrest, bring  him to  the police station and assault him.       In  so far as respondents 3 and 4 are concerned, it is they who  arrested Brijlal  on a false charge of dacoity and brought him to the  police station at 10 a.m., on August 29. Shortly  thereafter,   constable  Laxmi  Narain  found  that Brijlal  was  lying  in  the  lock-up  in  a  badly  injured condition and was shrieking in agony.       In  the light  of these findings, it is unnecessary to refer to  the   evidence  of  P.Ws.  6.  7  and  9  who  are respectively the  nephew,  the  daughter  and  the  wife  of Brijlal. We agree with the learned Sessions Judge that these persons went to the police station immediately after Brijlal was taken  there under  arrest. It is not, however, possible to say  with a  reasonable amount of certainty that they saw the respondents  assaulting Brijlal. They reached the police station quite  some   time after Brijlal was taken there and it would  be too  much of a coincidence to suppose that they arrived at  the police  station precisely  at the  time when Brijlal was  being beaten. They might have heard the shrieks of Brijlal  who was  writhing in pain. But, standing outside the police  station, as  they were,  it could  not have been possible for  them to  see who  was assaulting  Brijlal. The limited relevance  of their   evidence is for showing, apart from the  other circumstances stated above, that Brijlal was lying injured in the police station.       For these reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of  the High  Court and affirm that of the Sessions Court. It  is to  be   greretted that  the learned  Sessions Judge convicted the respondents under section 304 instead of convicting them  under section  302 of  the Penal  Code. The distinction  between   murder  and   culpable  homicide  not amounting to  murder is  often lost  sight of,  resulting in undue liberality  in favour of undeserving culprits like the respondent-police   officers, Except in cases covered by the five exceptions  mentioned in section 300 of the Penal Code, culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is  done with  the intention of causing  death, or if the act  falls within  any of  the three  clauses of section 300, namely,  2ndly, 3rdly  and 4thly.  In  this  case,  the injuries suffered  by Brijlal would appear to fall under the clause ’2ndly’  of section  300, since  the act by which his death was caused was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury  as the respondents knew to be likely to cause his death. However, we will not pursue that matter 631 any further  since the  State did not file an appeal against the judgment  of the  learned Sessions Judge asking that the respondents should  be convicted  under section  302 of  the Penal Code and since the prosecution did not lead sufficient evidence through  the Medical  Officer in order to bring out the true nature of the injuries suffered by Brijlal.       Before  we close,  we would  like to  impress upon the Government the  need to  amend the law appropriately so that policemen who  commit atrocities on persons who are in their custody are  not allowed  to escape  by reason of paucity or absence of  evidence. Police  Officers alone, and none else, can give  evidence as  regards the  circumstances in which a person in  their custody  comes to receive injuries while in their custody.  Bound by ties of a kind of brotherhood, they often prefer  to remain  silent in  such situations and when they choose  to speak,  they put  their own gloss upon facts and pervert  the truth.  The result is that persons, on whom atrocities are  perpetrated by  the police  in  the  sanctum

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sanctorum of  the  police  station,  are  left  without  any evidence to  prove who  the offenders are. The law as to the burden of  proof in  such cases  may be  re-examined by  the legislature so  that hand-maids  of law and order do not use their  authority   and  opportunities   for  oppressing  the innocent citizens  who look  to them  for protect  on. It is ironcial that,  in the instant case, a person who complained against a  policeman for  bribery, was done to death by that policeman, his  two companions and his superior officer, the Station House  Officer. The  vigilant Magistrate,  Shri R.C. Nigam, deserves a word of praise for dutifully recording the dying  declaration   of  the   victim,  which  has  come  to constitute the sheet anchor of the case of the prosecution. A. P. J.                                     Appeal allowed. 632