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PETITIONER: STATE OF UTTAR, PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BANSI DHAR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1973

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. PALEKAR, D.G.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1084            1974 SCR  (2) 679  1974 SCC  (1) 416

ACT: Public  Trust-Doctrine  of  cypres, if  applicable  to  non- testamentary gifts Conditions for its  applicability-General object, when inferred-Applicability of s.    83, Trusts  Act (2 of 1882) to public trusts.

HEADNOTE: In 1945, a donation of Rs. 30,000 was made for building a 6- bed hospital for women on an approved chosen spot, according to the approved plan, to be constructed by the donor with  a matching contribution from the government and with any other voluntary donation.  The donor died in 1947 and all that was done  by that time was to lay a foundation stone.  In  1952, the  sons  of the donor filed a suit for return of  the  Rs. 30,000  on the ground that the conditions subject  to  which it’   had  been  given  had  been  violated  and  that   the contemplated charity never materialised. The  trial  court and the High Court in appeal  decreed  the suit. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD  : (1) A hospital for women is a charitable object  and since  the  beneficiaries are a section of  the  public,  it constitutes a public trust. (2)  The   doctrine   of  cypres  is  applicable   to   both testamentary   and   non-testamentary   gifts   for   public charitable purposes. [686G] Nori  Venkata Rama Dikshitulu v. Ravi Venkatappayya,  A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 35 and Potti Swami v. Rao Saheb D.  Govindarajulu, A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 605, referred to. (3)  The conditions for the application of the doctrine are- (a)  The settlor has shown a general  charitable  intention- that is, the charitable object is of a general and not of  a specific  nature,  and  the original  trust  has  failed  ab initio;  (b) there must be impossibility, not in the  strict physical  sense  but  in  the  liberal  diluted  sense,   of impracticability  of carrying out’ the  settlors  intention; and (c)  there must be a completed gift. [689B-E] In  re Hilsom [1913] 1 Ch 314, In re Ulversion and  District New Hospital Building Trust, [1956] 1 Ch. 622, Commissioner, Lucknow  Division  v.  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Pertapgarh, A.I.R. 1937 P. C. 240 and In re Rymer, [1895] 1 Ch. 19,  31,

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referred to. (4)  The  present is a borderline case is to  whether  there was a general intention to benefit the community, but Courts should  lean  in  favour of the  charity  taking  effect  by imputing,  without straining the languages an  intention  to help the people of the area with a maternity hospital.   The rule of law must rise to this rule of life by a facilitating the-  fulfillment  of  benevolent  objects  but   vigilantly guarding against perversion, diversion. subversion, inaction and  unjust  enrichment, where public  donations  have  been raised. [691B] (5)  But the transaction in the instant case was not a  gift simpliciter  but  was subject to a matching grant  from  the Government the building being required to be constructed  by the   donor  with  such  augmented  money   etc.    Assuming substantial  compliance  as sufficient in law,  one  of  the conditions has been carried out by the State. [693F] 680 Harish  Chandra  v. Hindu Sharma Sewak Mandal,  A.I.R.  1936 All.  19  lit  re  University  of  London  Medical  Sciences institute  Fund,  [1909] 2 Ch. 1;8-9, In re  White’s  Trust, [1886] Ch.  Div 449, Tudor on Charities and Halsbury’s  Laws of England 3rd Edn., referred to.  (6)  :The  conditions  having failed,  the  charity  proved abortive, and the legal consequence is a resulting trust  in favour  of the door.  Though s. 83 of the Trusts  Act,  1882 does not apply proprio vigore, it embodies a universal  rule of  equity  and  good  conscience and  may  be  held  to  be applicable to public charitable trusts also. [688A-B;  693F- G] Government  litigation involves expenditure of public  money and  should  not  be permitted to  become  an  occasion  for abusing the legal process regardless of the morality of  the please  and  indifferent to any offer of settlement  of  the claim on fair terms.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1844  of 1967. Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment and  Order  dated the   10th  August  1965  of the  Allahabad  High  Court  at Allahabad in First Appeal No. 435 of 1954. G.   N. Dikshit and O. P. Rana, for the appellant. R.   K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- KRISHNA  IYER,  J.-A litigation launched by the  sons  of  a frustrated  philanthropist, who is no more, has reached  the last  deck  of  the justice edifice as a  civil  appeal,  by special leave, a little over 22 years after its institution. While  illustrating  the injustice of delayed  justice  this case  more  provocatively  exposes the damage  done  by  the administration’s dilatory indifference to a clear commitment of an enthusiastic Collector to construct quickly a ’female’ hospital out of a donation from a compassionate gentleman in Kannauj  on  certain  conditions  which  were  breached by Government, according’ to the findings of, the courts below. These   socially   disturbing  features   will   be   better appreciated, regardless of the legal result, when the  facts are set out, which we now proceed to do. An  old,  affluent man called Dubey, in a  munificent  mood, responded  to  the  request  of  Shri  Govind  Narain,  then Collector  of  Farrukhabad District, way back  in  1945.   A promise  to donate Rs. 30,000/- was made, on the basis of  a

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matching contribution by Government, for the good cause of a women’s  hospital in sacred memory of the  donor’s  deceased wife,   Gomti   Devi.   Apprehending  the  tardy   ways   of government,  this anxious soul insisted on his being put  in charge  of  the construction so that the hospital  may  come into  existence,  through  his diligent  hands  and  in  his lifetime, aided of course by government grant and  auxiliary voluntary  contributions.  The activist  Collector  accepted these conditions, received the philanthropic cheques,  moved swiftly to get the foundation-stone laid ceremonially by the British Indian Governor of the Province, all in 1945.   This sentimental stone had the name Gomti Devi inscribed thereon, and  the donor, believing the brave words of  the  Collector about quick 681 acquisition of land, government contribution and making over of   the  agency  for  construction  to   himself,   started collecting the necessary bricks for the building.  But  Shri Govind Narain in the usual course left, the District  charge and  once  his back was turned on the District,  things  got stuck.  For the next Collector, Shri Bhagwan Sahai, noticing official  stagnation  in  this matter  wrote  to  the  Civil Surgeon  in March 1946-four months after Sir Maurice  Hallet had planted with, pomp the first stone at the hospital site- that  "the  proposal has been, hanging since long  which  is certainly  not  fair  to the  donor".   Shri  Sahai  tepidly concluded his note thus               "For the balance of non-recurring  expenditure               I   presume   we  shall  have  to   apply   to               Government.  If so who will do it ? C.S. or 1.               I  am prepared to do so if I have a clear  cut               scheme with all  loose ends tied up." Nothing  happened however, and to add insult to  injury  the District  Supply Officer sent a chill into the chest of  the expectant donor by proposing to freeze the bricks  collected by him for the hospital. building and to divert them for the construction  of a school, thus, showing the lazy  unconcern of the officials for the hospital project.  Exhibits 18  and 19  betray this neglect of Govind Narain’s  undertaking,  on behalf of Government. The  old  man,  Dubey,  continued  to  correspond  with  the District  authorities  on the hospital project till  he  was spirited away by death in July 1947 and his human agency for construction   thus   became  unavailable,  No   doubt,   no postmortem   repentance  was  manifested  in  the   official quarters  even  after Independence came to the  country  and nothing  was  done for years,  suggesting  that  slow-motion administration,  a  die-hard heritage has  survived  British rule in India.  The  subsequent part of the story discloses dereliction  of duty, as  it were, for instead of constructing the  proposed six-bed hospital expeditiously with the additional sum to be brought  into the hotchpotch by Government, what  transpired was  that the plans were changed, the agency  visualised  in the  original understanding given up, government’s  matching sum never granted and even the foundation stone laid by  the Governor of the Province removed.  Apparently the  officials engaged  themselves  in  paper work of no  import  like  the routine reply to the reminder by the sons of the donor,  Ex. A-6,  which chanted "that the proposal of constructing a  6- bedded  Women’s  Hospital  at Kannauj is  under  the  active consideration of Government." If six Vears after the receipt of the donation of Rs. 30,000/- for the urgent execution  of a  hospital construction, the matter was "under  the  active consideration of Government" its sense of time had  suffered

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somnolence or its officialese had indolent semantics.   Even a formal  suit  notice  under s. 80 of the  Civil  Procedure Code for return of the sum given to the Collector on account of the failure of the charity did’ not shake the  Government out of its neglectful tranquility.  These lethargic official exercises in the present case remind one of the word,.;, 682 Of  Lord  Curzon about the administrative  apparatus,  which bear  repetition  and  find ’Some  contemporary  echo.   The Viceroy wrote to his Secretary of State               "I  am  prodding  up  the  animal  with   most               vigorous  and unexpected digs, and it  gambols               plaintively under the novel spur.  Nothing has               been  done hitherto under six months.  When  I               suggest  six  weeks, the attitude  is  one  of               pained surprise; if six days, one of  pathetic               protest;  if  six  hours,  one  of   stupefied               resignation." Had  August  1947 accelerated the process the  Dubeys  might have avoided the court. The  present  suit, if it has served nothing, has  at  least awakened  ,the  State  Government  to  some  extent  to  its obligation.  For, Government at long last constituted a  new committee  for  the construction of the  hospital  building, drew  up a new plan and built a 22-bed hospital in the  same place.   All this was after the legal action was  instituted and perhaps  on account of it.  It must  be  mentioned  in fairness  to the ,plaintiffs that they offered  to  withdraw the  suit  for  the  return of the  money  if  the  original undertaking  was  substantially complied with and  half  the costs of the suit-which was not much-upto then incurred were also  paid by Government.  However, this public body  chose to  continue what we regard, in the light of  fuller  facts, its  cantankerous  defence  despite defeat  in  two  courts. Government  litigation involves expenditure of public  money and cannot become an ,occasion for abusing the legal process regardless of the morality of the plans and indifferent  to any offer of settlement of the claim on fair terms.  Here we may  quote  what  one  of us had  observed  in  an  .earlier appeal(1) about litigation to which Government is a party               "In  the  context of expending  dimensions  of               State  activity  and  responsibility,  is   it               unfair to expect finer sense and  sensibility               in  its  litigation policy. . . . ..  the  Law               Commission  of India in a recent report(2)  on               amendments  to  the Civil Procedure  Code  has               suggested the deletion of s. 80, finding  that               wholesome  provision hardly ever  utilised  by               Government, and has gone further to provide  a               special procedure for government litigation to               highlight  the need for an activist policy  of               just settlement of claims where the State is a               party.... certain observations I had made in a               Kerala High Court decision(3)........... I may               usefully excerpt here                "The    State,   under   our    Constitution,               undertakes economic. activities in a vast  and               widening public sector and inevitably               (1)   Dilbagh  Rai  Jarry v. Union  of  India,               Civil  Appeal  No.  1898  of  1967;   Judgment               delivered on November 5, 1973.               (2)   Law  Commission of India,  54th  report-               Civil Procedure Code.               (3)   P.P. Abubacker V. Union of India; A.I.R.               1972 Ker. 103; 107; Para

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             683               gets   involved  in  disputes   with   Private               individuals.  But it must be remembered-  that               the State is no ordinary party. trying to  win               a case against one of its own citizens by hook               or  by crook; for, the State,s interest is  to               meet  honest claims, vindicate  a  substantial               defence  and never to score a technical  point               or  overreach a weaker party to avoid  a  just               liability  or  secure  an  unfair   advantage,               simply because legal devices. provide such  an               opportunity.  The State is a virtuous litigant               and  looks with unconcern on immoral  forensic               successes.  so that if on the merits the  case               is  weak, government shows. a  willingness  to               settle, the dispute regardless of prestige and               other  lesser motivations which  move  private               parties  to fight, in court.  The  lay-out  on               litigation  costs  and executive time  by  the               state and its agencies is so staggering  these               days because of the large amount of litigation               in  which it is involved that a  positive  and               wholesome policy of              cutting  back               on  the  volume-  of law  suits  by  the  twin               methods  of  not being tempted  into  forensic               show-downs  where a reasonable adjustment  is,               feasible  and  ever offering to  extinguish  a               pending  proceeding on just terms, giving  the               legal  mantors of government some.  initiative               and authority in this behalf." To complete the human side of the story, we reach its  anti- climax-.   when,  the  forgotten   foundation-stone   laying notwithstanding, a fresh, ceremony  of stone placing for the new hospital was gone through with the then Health Minister, Shri  C.  B.  (Gupta, as the dignitary to  repeat  what  the former  Governor  had once done.  This presumably  hurt  the donor’s  sons who prayed, to the Collector at least for  the return  of the former lapidary momento.  Be that as it  may, we are assured happily that a hospital has been  constructed although  it  was a total departure from the  project  which induced the alleged conditional gift. The sons of the donor brought the present suit on the ground that the conditions subject to which the sum-of Rs. 30,000/- had  been  given  had  been violated  that  the  charity  as contemplated had never materialised and a totally  different scheme  had  been belatedly executed.   The  defendant,  the State  of Uttar Pradesh, contested the facts but  failed  in that effort, Shri Govind Narain having wisely declined to be a  witness  to the Government’s version  and  the  documents having testified to the truth of the plaintiff’s case.  Some legal  contentions were raised, but rejected and  have  been repeated  before us by Shri Dixit, learned counsel for  the, appellant State. The  facts as found by the trial Judge were accepted by  the State  before  the High Court and affirmed  by  the  learned Judges.   Before proceeding to discuss the issues of law  we may set out the findings of,fact concurrently recorded.  The High Court held,:               "The  learned  counsel for the  appellant  has               rightly conceded that for the Purpose of  this               appeal all the findings of fact arrived at  by               the learned Civil Judge, might be accepted  as               correct.   We  have gone  through  the  entire               evidence and we..               684

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             .feel no hesitation in accepting the  findings               of fact arrived at by the learned Civil Judge.               it is fully established from the ,evidence  on               the  record that the sum of Rs.  30,000/-  bad               been .advanced by Pandit Surj Prasad Dubey  on               the understanding ,that the hospital would  be               constructed.               (1) on the approved site;               (2)   according to the approved plan; and               (3)   at an early date through his agency.               the  entire amount of Rs. 60,000/- was  to  be               paid to Sri Dubey for the construction of  the               hospital." Since  the  appellant  had accepted  the  findings  of  fact recorded  by  the Civil Judge we may  notice,those  findings before proceeding further.  The trial Judge held :               "There is overwhelming and unrebutted oral and               documentary  evidence  which leaves  me  clear               that  Pandit Suraj Prasad Dubey, the  deceased               father of the plaintiffs gave Rs. 30,000/-  as               his  subscription on the terms and  conditions               challeged in the plaint."               "These letters and the evidence of P.W. 1  Sri               Hari  Har Nath Vakil conclusively  prove  that               the following terms were :settled between  the               Collector and Dubeyji.               1.    That  the hospital would be  constructed               on  Kannauj Makrand Nagar Road near  Phoolmati               Temple.               2.    That  the hospital will be  named  after               the  name of person suggested by  Dubeyji  and               which  name was to be communicated by him,  to               the D.M. subsequently.  Dubeyji suggested  the               name  of the hospital as "Gomti Devi"  by  his               letter dated 30th October, 1945 which name was               accepted by D.M.               3.    That  the hospital would be  constructed               by  Dubeyji according to the plan approved  by               Government with nice arrangement for maternity               and child welfare.               4.    That  a sum of Rs. 30,000 would be  paid               by Dubeyji for that purpose.               5.    That  the aforesaid sum along  with  the               plan   necessary   help  for   procuring   raw               materials would soon be given to Dubeyji after               the  foundation  laying ceremony was  over  so               that Dubeyji might be able to get the hospital               constructed  at the earliest through  his  own               agency."               "It  is thus clear that all the terms set  out               in the plaint               ,were settled and have been definitely  proved               by  the evidence discussed above.  The  entire               matter was settled with Sri Govind Narain  and               although  several adjournments were taken  ’by               the defendant to produce Sri Govind Narain but               he was                                    685               not examined.  It seems he was not found in  a               position  to say any thing to the contrary  or               in rebuttal to plaintiffs’ evidence.  There is               thus  not  a word in rebuttal  of  plaintiffs’               case  on the matter of terms  settled  between               the parties."               "In  this  connection I think it will  not  be

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             unimportant   to  point  out   that   District               Government  Counsel was examined under  0.  10               rule  (r) C.P.C. he admitted  that  plaintiffs               settled term with defendant Government through               Sri   Govind   Narain   the   then    District               Magistrate.   He also admitted that  the  then               Collector  had  agreed that  the  building  be               constructed  according  to the  approved  plan               through the agency of plaintiffs’ father.   He               further  admitted  that  defendant  agreed  to               invest   at   least  Rs.  30,000/-   for   the               construction of that hospital.  The only  fact               which he appears to deny is that there was  no               understanding that the hospital would be  com-               pleted  and  established in the  near  future.               All  other  conditions set out in  the  plaint               were practically admitted by him."               "I  therefore  hold  that  plaintiffs’  father               donated Rs. 30,000 for a specific object  viz.               for  the  construction of  Gomti  Devi  Female               Hospital with child welfare and maternity ward               at  Kannauj Makrand Nagar Road near  Phoolmati               Devi temple under his own agency on the  terms               contained  in  para 2 of the  plaint.   Issues               answered correctly in favour of the plain-               "As I have held above plaintiffs father gave a               handsome  subscription of Rs. .30,000  on  the               terms  and conditions contained in para  2  of               the plaint.  There is overwhelming  unrebutted               evidence  which  point  to  the   irresistible               conclusion that the defendant left the  scheme               in the cold and venture came to an end in  the               life time of Pt.  Suraj Prasad Dubey." These concurrent findings of fact have been rightly rendered in our view, counsel Shri Dixit having taken us through  the relevant  papers.   Of  course,  he  did  not  canvass   the correctness  of these findings before us so that we have  to proceed  on  the  footing that given these  facts,  has  the appellant  made  out  a case to dislodge  the  liability  to disgorge the sum of Rs. 30,000 decreed by the courts below. We need hardly say that the cleemosymary venture agreed upon between  the  late  Dubey and the  then  Collector  in  1945 remained  a humanitarian essay, not a charity  accomplished, but the legal question still remains whether the  plaintiffs stepping  into  the shoes of the donor have  the  right  to demand  repayment  of the amount already made over.   It  is proper  to  condense and formulate the legal  frame  of  the longish  submissions made by Mr. Dixit.  He argued that  the donation was ’without strings’, if we may use a cliche, that Dubey  had  made an outright gift  with  general  charitable intent and the pious wishes superadded to the do-nation  did not  make  it  a conditional gift.  In his  view,  the  non- fulfillment of these wishes did not amount to the 686 failure   of   a,  condition  precedent  making   the   gift inoperative.   His  further  contention was  that  the  gift having  been accompanied by a general charitable purpose  of benefiting  the  local people with hospital  facilities  the cypres  doctrine applied to the case even it the  object  of the charity could not be literally carried out.   Therefore, he argued that the Court may issue directions appropriate to the  broad  purpose so as to salvage the  substance  of  the charity.   Finally,  he  urged  that  the  plaintiffs ad, subsequent  to the suit, agreed to give up the claim in  the light of a new hospital having been built and they could not

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now  resile  therefrom or recall the sum  their  father  had irrevocably  given  away  for a  public  cause.   Mr.  Garg, learned  counsel for the respondent, has sought to meet  the challenge  of  law  by  law, facts  by  facts  and  unfilial imputation of withdrawing from the paternal bounty by  proof of  a  better public charity by starting a school  in  Gomti Deevi’s name with a much larger input.  We will examine  the validity of these various contentions. The essential issue turns on the nature and efficacy of  the gift itself but before we discuss it the deck may as well be cleared  by disposing of the, plea of agreement to  withdraw the claim, estoppel on account of the defendant having acted thereon,  and  the consequent untenability  of  the  action. Both  the courts have overruled it and we are  in  agreement with them. After  the institution of the suit Shri V. Kumar,  the  then District Collector, discussed the closure of the  litigation with Murli Dhar, one of the plaintiffs.  The latter  offered not  to press for the refund on certain terms.   He  desired that  the hospital be constructed through the agency of  the plaintiffs  now that Shri Dubey was dead, according  to  the old  approved plan on the approved site.   Ex.A-4  evidences this  offer.  The Collector did not, and perhaps  could  not without the consent of Government, accept the said offer but merely  replied  that  the  matter  would  be  referred   to Government.   Nothing  more was done,  apart  from  internal correspondence.  The long wait was in vain.  Thereafter, the plaintiffs  had to pay the full court-fee although to  start with they had filed the suit with a nominal court fee.   Ex. 25  indicates  that the Government would not  agree  to  the agency  of  the  plaintiffs  for  the  construction  of  the hospital.  It is further seen that in Ex. 27 the  plaintiffs again made an offer to withdraw the case provided they  were also  paid  half the costs of the suit till  then  incurred. Papers  moved  but the agreement did not click.   The  trial Court,  going  through  the  documentary  evidence  on  this aspect, concluded               "It  is  therefore, clear that  there  was  no               finally  accepted  contract  between  parties.               There  have  been offers  and  counter  offers               without  any  final acceptance  by  either  of               them....... It is, therefore, erroneous to say               that’  defendant started construction  on  the               assurance   of  plaintiffs  that  they   would               withdraw the suit as soon as the work started.               Consequently it cannot be said that  defendant               incurred   any  expenditure  on   account   of               plaintiffs’  assurance.  Thus no  question  of               estoppel arises."                687                In the High Court the contention was repeated               and   the  learned  Judges  disposed  of   the               contention with the observation               "The  plaintiffs agreed to withdraw  the  suit               provided certain conditions laid down by  them               were  fulfilled.   However, nothing  seems  to               have  materialised  because  those  conditions               were  not  fulfilled. : In  the  circumstances               the, plea of estoppel raised by the defendants               had  no substance in it and was rightly  given               up  at the time the appeal was  argued  before               us," In  the light of the abandonment of the plea, no weight  can be attached to its repetition in this Court, apart from, the lack of intrinsic substance in the submissions.

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Let us have a close look at the terms and conditions of  the donation and spell out their legal effect.  The law of gifts is,  in a sense, a collection of  equitable       principles but         crystallised for India   under the British  from Anglo-Saxon          jurisprudence.      Since  Independence collections from the public have escalated and in India  to- day popular contributions to public charitable purposes  are a  new dimension of community involvement  in  developmental activities.  And so the rule of law mustrise to this rule of life  by facilitating the fulfillment of benevolent  objects but     vigilantly     guarding     against      perversion, diversion,subversion,. inaction and unjust enrichment, where public  donations have been raised.  The law  of  charitable trusts  must  undergo an evolutionary adaptation  to  Indian social  environs, illumined of course by  the,  well-settled rules  in  this branch of jurisprudence  developed  over-the centuries  by  great English judges.  Maitland’s  remark  is ’valid  even  now for us : "Of all exploits  of  Equity  the largest and most important is the invention and  development of trust." The principles relevant for our case may now be  considered. Was  the  contribution  of Rs.  30,000/-  for  a  charitable purpose  ?  Lord  Sterndale, M. R., said in  the  Court.  of Appeal in In re Tutley(1) :               "I .... am unable to find any principle  which               will guide one easily, and safely, through the               tangle of the cases as to what is and what  is               not a charitable gift.  It  is possible I hope               sincerely  that  at  some  time  or’  other  a               principle  will  be  laid  down.   The   whole               subject   is  in  an   artificial   atmosphere               altogether." While  in  India  we  shall  not  be  hidebound  by  English decisions  on this point, luckily both sides agree  here-and that  accords with the sense of the law-that a hospital  for women  is  a charitable object, being  for  medical  relief. Moreover,  the  beneficiaries are a section of  the  public, women-that still silent, suffering half of Indian  humanity. Therefore, this ’elecent connotes a public’ trust.  The next question is whether the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, applies 1. (1923) 1 Ch. 258, 266. L748SCI/74 688 to   the  present  case.   The  Courts  below  have   argued themselves  into an application of s. 83 of the Trusts  Act. Sri  Dixit rightly objects to this course because  that  Art relates  only to private trusts, public  charitable  trusts, having  been  expressly, excluded from its ambit  But  while these  provisions  proprio vigore do  not  apply,  certainly there is a common area of legal principles which covers  all trusts,  private and public, and merely because they find  a place  in the Trusts Act, they cannot  became  ’untouchable’ where  public trusts are involved.- Care must  certainly  be exercised  not to import by analogy what is  not,germane  to the  general law of trusts, but we need have no  inhibitions in administering the law by invoking the universal rules  of equity  and  good conscience upheld by the  English  Judges, though  also sanctified by the statute relating  to  private trusts.   The Court below have drawn inspiration from s.  83 of the Trusts Act and we are not inclined to find fault with them  on that score because the provision merely reflects  a rule of good conscience and of general application.  The de- tails of the argument on the basis of this principle will be discussed a little later. Accepting  that Dubey intended a charitable gift  the  first

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question  that  falls for- decision, as preliminary  to  the application  of the cypres doctrine, in as to the nature  of the  charitable object-whether general or specific.  if  the former,  the doctrine is attracted but if the latter  it  is repelled.  We will revert to this aspect later. Sri Garg objected to the application of the cypres principle to  cases of gifts as, in his view, only wills attract  this Jurisdiction.  There is much in the precedents tending this way  but  the  opposite is not bereft  of  authority.   Nori Venkata Rama Dikshitulu v. Ravi  Venkatappayya(1) and Potti SWami v. Rao Saheb D. Govindarajulu (2) , for instance,  ire two  authorities  in the same volume  supporting  the  rival positions.   We  have come across other  cases,  Indian  and English,  where  even gifts inter vivos have  been  enforced cypres  by courts although the general run of  trusts  where failure   has   been   saved   ,relates   to    testamentary dispositions.   There  is  perhaps  a  reason.   Why  courts should,  in  the  case of wills, step in to  supply  a  near intent  and  apply  the funds  cypres  where  otherwise  the charity  will  fail on sticking to the literal  object,  the author  being  dead and unable to speak.   For  gifts  inter vivos.  the  donor is ordinarily available  to  suggest  the mutation  in the event of impossibility or  impracticability of  the  original object.  Even so, we are inclined  to  the view that, both testamentary and non-testamentary gifts  for public  charitable  purposes  must  be  saved  by  a   wider intervention  of court, for public interest is  served  that way.   Neither  principle nor precedent  bars  this  broader invocation  of  the court’s  beneficent  jurisdiction.   But there are two other limitations on the cypres doctrine which come  into play here.  Where the donor has  determined  with specificity  a special object or mode for the course of  his benefaction the Court cannot innovate and undo, but where  a general charitable goal is projected and particular  objects and modes are indicated the Court, (2)  A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 605. (1) A.T.R. 1960 A.P. 35. 689 acting  to fulfill the broader benevolence of the donor  and to  avert  the  frustration of the good  to  the  community, reconstructs,  as. nearly as may be, the  charitable  intent and makes viable what otherwise may die. The judges have set this restraint on their power to resurrect,  or  rather   to vary and validate.  The twin conditions to be satisfied are               "(1) The settlor must, in general, have  shown               a  general charitable intention ....  It  will               only apply where the original trust has failed               ab   initio.    The  absence  of   a   general               charitable  intention  will not  be  fatal  to               those trusts which have taken affect but  have               failed  .... Once money has  been  effectively               and  absolutely dedicated to charity,  whether               in  pursuance  of a general  or  a  particular               charitable intent, the testator’s next  of-kin               or  residuary legatees are for ever  excluded.               This will mean that the material date for  the               purpose   of  deciding  whether   the   cypres               doctrine  is applicable is the date  when  the               trust  came  into effect (e.g. in a  will,  on               ’the death of the testator ) ."               (2)   The second condition for the application               of the cypres doctrine used to be that it  was               or  had become "impossible" to carry  out  the               settlor’s  intention or alternatively  that  a               surplus  remained  after  fulfillment  of  the

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             purpose...... In  short.  there must be a larger intention  to  give  the. property,  in  the first instance; secondly, there  must  be impossibility  not in the strict physical sense but  in  the liberal.  diluted  sense, of impractibility.  Even  here  it must  be mentioned, however, that the cypres application  of the  gift funds assumes a completed gift.  It  is  essential that  a gift has been made, effectively before,  its  actual implementation by application of the funds, literally or  as nearly as may be, arises. Parker, J., as be then was, in In re Wilson (2) stressed the presence  of a paramount general intention as  distinguished from  a  particular limited purpose.  "Where,  on  the  true construction   of  the  will,  no  such  paramount   general charitable  intention can be inferred, and where  the  gift, being  in  form a particular gift,-a gift for  a  particular purpose-and it being impossible to carry out that particular purpose, the whole gift is held to fail." We  need  not deal with cases of anonymous  donors,  for  in those  cases the Court would be inclined to read  a  general intention  in  favour of charity.  In In re,  Ulverston  and District New Hospital Building Trust(3) the Court held  that in the case of a certain fund collected with the sole object of. building and maintaining a new hospital and not for  the general  charitable  purpose  of  improving  facilities  for medical.  and  surgical  treatment in the  districts  to  be served by the (1)  The  Modern Law of Trusts-Parker and Mellow-2n edn.  pp 204,.208. (2)  (1913) 1 Ch. 314; (3)  (1956) 1 Ch. 022. 690 hospital,  no general charitable intent could be imputed  to the  donors and that the particular charitable  purpose  for which  the  fund was intended having.failed ab  initio,  the money   in   the  hands  of  the  trustees   received   from identifiable sources was held on resulting trusts. The  Privy Council in an Indian case, Commissioner,  Lucknow Division v. Deputy Commissioner of Partapgar(1) had to  deal with the subscriptions paid to a committee (for the  purpose of  fulfilling  a  specific  and  (well-defined   charitable purpose  which  could  not  be carried  out  on  account  of impracticability.   Lord Maugham observed that "there is  no general  charitable intent shown in this case and  that  the subscriptions were paid to the committee for the purpose  of fulfilling  a specific and well-defined  charitable  purpose and that only." (Emphasis supplied).  He further observed :               "The  money  having  been  paid  over  to  the               committee,  a  complete trust was  created  to               apply  the  funds in carrying out  the  object               mentioned.   If the object has become  imprac-               ticable,  the  subscribers .... have  a  clear               right to the return of their subscriptions pro               rota.   ...   The  present  members   of   the               committee  .... are trustees in either  event;               in the event of impracticability being  shown,               they are trustees for the subscribers; if,  on               the other hand, impracticability is not shown,               they still have to carry out the trust." Lord  Herschell, L.C., in the case of In re Rymer (2 )  laid down the law early in the day and it holds good even to-day. On  a  construction  of the document before  the  Court  the bequest   was  read  as  meant  to  benefit   a   particular institution and not a general class in, a general way,  and, that  institution having ceased to exist in  the  testator’s

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lifetime, the legacy could not be applied cypres, but lapsed and fell into the residue.  The proposition as laid down  in that decision with precision is just this               "There  is a distinction well settled  by  the               authorities.  There is one class of cases.  in               which  there. is a gift to charity  generally,               indicative  of a general  charitable  purpose,               and pointing out the mode of carrying it  into               effect; if that mode fails, the Court says the               general  purpose of charity shall  be               carried out.  There is another class, in which               the  testator  shows  an  intention,  not   of               general   charity,   but  to  give   to   some               particular institution;. and then if it fails,               because there is no such institution, the gift               does   not  go  to  charity  generally;   that               distinction  is  clearly  recognised;  and  it               cannot  be said that wherever a gift for any               charitable, purpose fails, it is  nevertheless               to  go to charity." (Passage excerpted in  the               judgment from Clark v. Taylor(3) .  Mr.   Garg’s  contention  is  that  there  is  no   general charitable  intention in the, present case while  Mr.  Dixit plausibly urges that Shri (1)  A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 240. (3)  1 Drew.642;644. (2) (1895) I.Ch. 19, 31, 691 Dubey wanted his townsmen to enjoy the facility of a "female hospital".   However,  the  findings  of  the  courts  below negatives   any  such  general  intention  to  benefit   the community  and the, old mail while donating a large sum  had taken care to particularise that the female hospital  should be  a six-bedded one on a chosen spot to be  constructed  by himself with matching contribution from government and other voluntary donations.  We are inclined to think that this  is a  borderline case and, if at all, we should lean in  favour of the charity taking,effect by imputing, without some legal straining, an intention to help the people of the area  with a maternity hospital. This does not see the end of the matter because, we have  to be-gin by asking whether there is a gift in existence.  Then alone   the  object  being  general  or  specific  and   the application of the cypres doctrine, etc.. will arise.   This takes  us to the primary contention of Mr. Garg  .that  Shri Dubey made a conditional gift and the, conditions not having been  fulfilled  it  just  did  not  take  effect.   We  see considerable  force in this contention and will  proceed  to examine it. There may be cases where a donor makes a gift for a specific charitable  purpose,  the performance of which  is  rendered impossible.  In such cases courts have to consider the  gift as  a conditional one (vide the ruling in Harish Chandra  v. Hindu Sharnm Sewak Mandal(1).  In that case as the gift  had failed  the land reverted to the successor-in-title  to  the donor. The  University  of London was minded in 1902  to  found  an institute of medical sciences and appealed for funds in that behalf.   One donor responded. by making a handsome gift  by his  will.(  Unfortunately,  the  supervening  circumstances prevented  the proposed scheme for an institute  of  medical sciences  coming  to pass.  The question arose, as  to  what should happen to the gift.  Farewell, L.J., observed in this context  in  In  re University of  London  Medical  Sciences Institute Fund(2).

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             "I  do  not think that anybody who was  not  a               lawyer  could  for one moment doubt  that  the               University  were, bound to return at once,  to               the  living subscribers the moneys  which  had               been sent to them for a scheme which they  had               abandoned;  but  we  are  asked  to  say  that               although  that  may be so-and I  am  not  sure               whether the Attorney-General admits it or  not we ou ght to construe, a will, which  contains               words  in  all probability  similar  to  those               which  the testator wrote in every  letter  in               which  he enclosed a subscription, as  showing               an  intention to give this money  for  general               charitable   purposes.   and   not   to   the,               particular  institute conditionally upon  that               institute  being called into existence.  I  am               wholly   unable   to  follow   Mr.   Sergant’s               suggestion  founded on a contract between  the               parties.When money has once been paid ever  to               the               (2)   (1909) 2 Ch. 1;8-9.               (1) A.I.R. 1936 All 197,                692               trustees  in,  the  lifetime of  the  donor  a               complete trust is created, and the money  must               be  held on the trusts declared by the  donor;               the  right of the donor to a return  of  ..the               money arises when the trust is on the face  of               it contingent on the proposed institute  being               called  into being.( I can see  to  difference               between   that  case  and  the  case  of   the               testator.   It  is  well settled  law  that  a               legacy  may  be  given to  a  charity  upon  a               condition,  which condition may be express  or               implied,     precedent     or     subsequent."               (emphasis supplied). In  this  connection  reference may also be made  to  In  re White’s  Trust(1) where we may glean the same law laid down. The  law  has  been  correctly stated  by  Delany  (The  Law relating to Charities in Ireland) at p. 128 thus               "if  a  gift  is  made,  to  a  charity  on  a               contingent event and the happening of the even               is a condition precedent to the gift then,  if               the  condition is too remote or for any  other               reason  illegal,  the gift to the  charity  is               void.   This has been expressed  by  Melbourne               L.C.  in Chamberlayne v. Brockett(2))  in  the               following  words : "If the gift in  trust  for               the  charity  ’is itself  conditional  upon  a               future and uncertain event, it is subject,  in               our   judgment,   to  the   same   rules   and               principles any other estate depending for  its               coming  into  existence,  upon  a.   condition               precedent.   If  the condition is  never  ful-               filled, the estate never arises,. . . .               Tudor  on  Charities sums up the  law  in  one               sentence               "Condition  precedent : Where- the  charitable               intention is subject to a condition  precedent               which  is not satisfied, the  charitable  gift               fails to take effect." (p. 132)               In  Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd edn.)  the               rule has been thus expressed :               "Where,  however,  the  particular  mode   of.               application  prescribed by the donor  was  the

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             essence  of his intention (which may be  shown               by   a  condition  or  by   particularity   of               language) and that mode is incapable of  being               performed,  there is nothing left  upon  which               the  Court can found its jurisdiction so  that               in  such circumstances the Court has no  power               to direct any other charitable application  in               place of that which has failed." (p. 318; para               654) So much so, although a charity once established does not die (though its nature may be changed) the gift must first  take effect which takes us to the question of conditional  gifts. The  law  is  clear  in this area and  is  found  stated  in Halsbury               "611.  Conditions precedent      A  charitable               gift my be               made subject to conditions precedent, as  that               the institution               (1) [1886] Ch.  Div. 449.               (2) L.R. 8 Ch. 206;211.               693               which is too benefit shall perform some act or               that  if  the trust is declared  unlawful  it               shall  revert,  or that the  gift  shall  take               effect  only  if  the  testator’s  estate   be               sufficient for the intended object, or  amount               to  a  certain  sum or that  a  bequest  to  a               hospital  shall  not  take effect  if  at  the               testator’s death the hospital has ceased to be               run  on  a  voluntary system  and  come  under               state,  control, or if it comes under  govern-               ment control.  The gift fails if the condition               precedent is impossible, or is not  satisfied,               or need not be fulfilled within the perpetuity               period.               A legacy to t fund which has been  raised  for               the   purpose   of  effecting   a   particular               charitable  object is construed as a  gift  to               take effect upon the happening of a  condition               precedent,  namely,   the  effecting  of  that               particular object." (pp. 295-96)               "613.  Acceptance of conditional gift.   Where               a gift subject to a condition is accepted  the               condition   must  be  fulfilled  whether   the               subject-matter of the gift is adequate for the               purpose or not... . . In the, law of real property the vesting of an estate can be made  to  depend on a condition precedent and  the  transfer fails if the contion is not fulfilled (c.f.ss. 25 & 26, T.P. Act).  We. may sum up the situation now.  If the donation by Dubey was conditional the Government was a mere custodian of the  cash till the condition was complied with and  if  the performance thereof was defeated by Government, the gift did not take effect. The factual findings, as already set out, leave no doubt  in our mind that the transaction was not a gift simplicitor but was subject to the matching grant from Government,  building having to be made with such augmented amount by Shri  Dubey, etc.  Assuming substantial compliance as sufficient in  law, the  defendant  has no case that any of the  conditions  has been  carried out, not even the equal  contribution,from  Ox State  exchequer  without  which  the  construction  of  the hospital  would  have been a half-done  project.   Thus  the conditions  failing,  the charity proved abortive,  and  the legal  consequence  is a resulting trust in  favour  of  the

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donor.  The State could not keep the money and the suit  was liable  to be decreed.  The Kannauj community, as the  happy sequel to this unhapy litigation has turned out, has now got a bigger hospital and a memorial college. Shri Dixit has prayed for the dismissal of the suit for non- joinder of other donors and the charity.  We mention it  out of  deference to counsel but negative it as  undeserving  of consideration.   The  appeal fails and we  dismiss  it  with costs,  an  added injury to the public  exchequer  which  we regret  we cannot help.  May we hazard the hope that out  of deference  to  the  memory  of  Gomti  Devi    in  posthumous furtherance, of Dubey’s project, the plaintiffs will  donate the costs when realised, to the charity chest of the Kannauj Female hospital. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed. 694