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PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: POOSU AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/04/1976

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH RAY, A.N. (CJ) BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH SHINGAL, P.N. SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1750            1976 SCR  (3)1005  1976 SCC  (3)   1  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1990 SC1480  (77)  R          1991 SC2176  (51)

ACT:      Constitution of  India, Articles  136 r/w 142-Re-arrest and detention  of accused  during pendency  of State  appeal against acquittal,  whether violative  of Articles 14, 19(1) (a) to (g) and 21.

HEADNOTE:      The accused-respondents  were  acquitted  by  the  High Court of  capital offences.  This Court granted the State of U.P. special  leave to  appeal, and under Art. 136 read with Art.  142,   issued  orders   directing  the  re-arrest  and detention of  the accused. The orders were challenged by the accused -  respondents on  the grounds  that their acquittal and the  findings on which it is based remain fully in force during the  pendency of  the State  appeal, and  that in the absence of  a  specific  statutory  provision,  the  Supreme Court’s inherent power under the Cr.P.C., or under Art. 142, cannot be  invoked to order the deprivation of the acquitted pension’s liberty,  and that  such  an  order  word  violate Articles 14 19(1)(a) to (6) and 21 of the Constitution.      On a  reference of  this question  to the  Constitution Bench, ^      HELD: This  Court,  while  granting  special  leave  to appeal against an order of acquittal on a capital charge, is competent by  virtue of  Art. 142  read with  Art.  136,  to exercise the same powers which the High Court has under sec. 427 (re-enacted  as Sec. 390 of the new Cr.P.C. Of 1973). An order directing  the re-arrest  and detention of an accused- respondent who  has been  acquitted by  the High  Court of a capital offence,  neither  offends  Art.  21  or  any  other fundamental  right   guaranteed   in   Part   III   of   the Constitution. nor  deprives the  accused-respondent  of  his liberty in  a  manner  otherwise  than  in  accordance  with procedure established by law. [1008D-E, 1009A-B]      State v.  Badapalli Adi & Ors. I.L.R. 1955 Cuttack 589,

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Empress of  India v. Mangu ors. I.L.R. 2 All. 340; ’Queen v. Gohilt Tivari  I.L.R. [1876]  I Cal.  281: Queen  Empress v. Gobardhan I.L.R.  [1887] 9 All. 528; Banna v. Methuen & ors. 2 Bens.  228; K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, [1962] I Supp.  S.C.R. 567  and The  State v.  Capt.  Jagjit  Singh [1962] 3 S.C.R. 622, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION  Crl.  Mis.  Petitions Nos. I and 243 of 1975.      (Appeal by  special leave  from the  judgment and order dated the 24-10-1973 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 710 of 1973. Referred No. 34 of 1973)      R.K. Garg,  S. C.  Agarwal,  V.  J.  Francis,  for  the petitioner in Cri. Mis. I and 243 of 1975.      O.P. Rana,  for the  petitioner/r. 2  in Cr.  M.P.  No. 546/75.      D.P. Uniyal  with o.  P. Rana  for the opposite side in Crl. M. P. Nos. 1 and 243 of 1975.      Pramod Swarup,  for respondent  No. 2  in Cr. M. P. No. 546 of 1975.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SARKARIA,  J.  The  common  question  referred  to  the Constitution Bench  in  these  two  cases  is:  Whether  the Supreme Court while granting 1006 Special  Leave   to  appeal   under  Article   136  of   the Constitution, against  an order  of acquittal  on a  capital charges has  the power  to issue  a non bailable warrant for the arrest and committal to prison of the accused respondent who had been acquitted by the High Court?      Mr. R.  K. Garg,  Counsel for  the  accused-respondents herein, col  tends that  while the  legislature has,  in its wisdom, empowered  the High Court to cause an accused person to be  arrested and committed to prison pending the disposal of the  appeal against  acquittal, no  such power  has  been conferred on  the Supreme  Court by  the Code  or any  other statute. According  to Counsel, in the absence of a specific statutory provision,  the inherent  power of the Court to do complete justice under the Code or even under Article 142 of the Constitution  cannot be  invoked to order deprivation of the liberty  of a  person who  has been  found innocent  and acquitted by  the High  Court on all the charges against him because such  an order  would be  violative of  Articles 14, 19(1)(a) to (g) and 21 of the Constitution. It is maintained that even  after the  grant of special leave to appeal under Article 136 against an order of acquittal passed by the High Court, the  acquittal and the findings on which it is based, remain fully  in force  during the pendency of appeal by the State. It  is contended  that once  it is  ensured that  the accused-respondent will  be available  to submit  himself to the final  orders of  this Court  that may  be passed in the appeal under  Article 136,  the inherent powers of the Court under the Code or under Article 142 exhaust themselves.      In support  of his contentions" Counsel has referred to State of U.P. v. Mohamed Nooh(1); and A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras(2);  Lala Jairam  Das and ors. v. King Emperor(3). Sheo Swarup  and ors.  v. The  King  Emperor(4)  and  M.  a. Agarwal v.  State of  Maharashtra(5);  Prem  Chand  Garg  v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad(6).      As against  this, Mr.  Uniyal and  Mr. O. P Rana submit that by  virtue of  Article 142 read with Article 136 of the Constitution, this  Court  pending  disposal  of  an  appeal

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against an  order of acquittal, is competent to exercise the same powers  which are  conferred on  the High  Court by the Code of  Criminal Procedure.  In support of this contention, Mr.  Rana   has  referred   to  State   of  U.P.  v.  Deoman Vpadayaya(7); Abdul  Rehman Mahomed  Yusuf v.  Mahomed  Haji Ahmed Agbotwale and anr.(8).      We are unable to accept the contentions advanced by Mr. Garg.      To appreciate  the point involved, it will be useful to have a  look at  the provisions  of s.  427 of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure,  1898 and  its  historical  perspective. This section (which has been re-enacted as s. 390 of the new Code of 1973) provides:      ’When are  appeal is presented under s. 411A subsection      (2) or  section 417, the High Court may issue a warrant      directing that  the accused  be  arrested  and  brought      before it 1007      or any subordinate Court, and the Court before which he      is  brought  may  commit  him  to  prison  pending  the      disposal of the appeal, or admit him to bail."      It may  be noted  that this provision was for the first time enacted  in the  Code of  1882.  But  even  before  its enactment,  the  High  Court  "  as  a  matter  of  judicial practice, had the power, pending the appeal against an order of acquittal,  to  secure  the  attendance  of  the  accused respondent by  bailable or non-bailable warrants. As pointed out by  , Panigrahi  C. J. in State v. Badapalli Adi and ors (1)  "what  was  formerly  the  judicial  practice  received statutory recognition  in the  year 1882 when this provision in  s.427,  Criminal  Procedure  Code  was  introduced."  In Empress of  India v.  Mangu and  ors.(2) (which  was decided several " years before the addition of this provision in the Code), a  full Bench  of Allahabad High Court held, that the High Court has the power to cause the rearrest and detention of the accused in prison, pending an appeal against an order of acquittal.  To the  same effect  was the  decision of the Calcutta High  Court in  Queen v. Gobin Tewari (8). Again in Queen-Empress v.  Gobardhan(4), Sir John Edge, Chief Justice without laying  down any inflexible rule, emphasised that it is not  desirable that, pending the appeal against acquittal in a capital case, the prisoner should remain at large while his fate  is being discussed by the High Court. The ratio of this decision  was followed  by a  Division Bench  of Orissa High Court in State v. Badapalli Adi and ors. (supra).      Viewed in  this perspective,  it  is  clear  that  even before the  enactment of  this provision, the High Court had the power  to cause,  in  its  discretion,  the  arrest  and detention in  prison of  the accused-respondent  of  or  his enlargement on  bail, pending disposal of the appeal against his acquittal. This power was ancillary to and necessary for an effective  exercise Of  its  jurisdiction  in  an  appeal against an  order of  acquittal, conferred on the High Court by the Code.      As far  back as  1824, in  the English  case,  Bana  v. Methuen and  ors.  Best  J.  following  an  older  precedent enunciated the rule that:      "when an act of Parliament gives a justice jurisdiction      over an offence, it impliedly gives him a power to make      out a  warrant, and bring before him any person charged      with such offence".      This is  the rationale  of s.427.  As soon  as the High Court on  perusing a  petition of appeal against an order of acquittal considers  that there  is  sufficient  ground  for interfering, and  issuing process  to  the  respondent,  his

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status as an accused person and the proceedings against him, revive. The  question of  judging his  guilt or innocence in respect of  the charge  against him,  once more  becomes sub judice.      Similar is  the position when the Supreme Court, in its discretion, grants special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, against an order of acquittal passed by the High Court. 1008      Article 136  confers on  the Supreme  Court,  the  same power which  was vested  in the Crown to grant special leave to appeal to His Majesty-in-Council (which in practice meant the Judicial  Committee of  the Privy Council in England) to convicted persons  from India.  This Article  is couched  in very  specious  phraseology.  The  power  under  it  can  be exercised   in    respect   of    "any   judgment,   decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause, matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India." As pointed  out by  this Court in K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra(l),  "this   wide  and  comprehensive  power  in respect of  any determination  of any court or tribunal must carry with  it  the  power  to  pass  orders  incidental  or ancillary to  the exercise  of that  power."  That  is  why, Article 142  in equally  extensive terms  gives  this  Court power" to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in  any cause  or matter before it and any decree so passed or  order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of  India". With  the same end in view, clause (2) of that  Article (subject  of course to law, if any, made by Parliament) gives  this Court  "all and  every power to make any order  for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person".      Thus there  can be  no  doubt  that  this  Court  while granting  special  leave  to  appeal  against  an  order  of acquittal on  a capital  charge is  competent by  virtue  of Article 142  read with  Article 13,  to  exercise  the  same powers which  the High  Court has  under s. 427. Whether ill the circumstances of the case" The attendance of the accused respondent can be best secured by issuing a bailable warrant or non-bailable  warrant is a matter which rests entirely in the discretion  of the  Court. Although,  the discretion  is exercised judicially,  it is not possible to computerise and reduce into immutable formulae the diverse considerations on the basis  of which  this discretion  is exercised.  Broadly speaking, the  Court would  take into  account  the  various factors such as, "the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances peculiar to the accused,  possibility  of  his  absconding,  tampering  with evidence, larger  interest of  the public and State"-see The State v.  Capt. Jagjit  Singh(2). In addition, the Court may also take  into consideration  the period  during which  the proceedings against  the accused  were pending in the courts below and  the period  which is  likely to elapse before the appeal comes  up for final hearing before this Court. In the context,  it   must  be  remembered  that  this  over-riding discretionary jurisdiction  under  Article  136  is  invoked sparingly,  in   exceptional  cases,   where  the  order  of acquittal recorded  by the High Court is perverse or clearly erroneous and results in a gross miscarriage of justice. 1009      Nor do  we find  any merit  in the  contention that  an order directing  the re-arrest  and detention of an accused- respondent who  had been  acquitted by  the High  Court of a capital offence, in any way, offends Article 21 or any other fundamental  right   guaranteed   in   Part   III   of   the

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Constitution. Such  an order  is made  by this  Court in the exercise of  its plenary  jurisdiction conferred by Articles 136  and   142  of   the  Constitution.  By  no  stretch  of imagination can  it be  said that such an order deprives the accused-respondent of his liberty in a manner otherwise than in accordance with procedure established by law.      It is  not necessary  to burden  this judgment  with  a discussion of  the rulings  cited by Mr. Garg. Suffice it to say that  the facts  of those  cases were entirely different and they have no bearing on the point in issue before us.      For all  the foregoing  reasons, we answer the question posed  at   the  commencement   of  this   judgment  in  the affirmative and dispose of the references accordingly. M.R.      Reference answered against the accused/respondents. 1010