http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DURGA PRASAD

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1974

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:  1974 AIR 2136            1975 SCR  (1) 881  1975 SCC  (3) 210  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC 393  (5)  RF         1975 SC 753  (8)  RF         1975 SC 919  (9)  R          1981 SC 379  (16,17,18,53,57)  R          1981 SC 635  (1)  C          1991 SC  45  (17)

ACT: Railway  Property (Unlawful Possession)  Act,  1966--Whether enquiry  under section 8(1) of the Act is  an  investigation within  the  meaning  of  Criminal  Procedure  Code--Whether statements  recorded during the course of enquiry  would  be inadmissible  in  evidence by reason of section 162  of  the Criminal Procedure Code--Whether entire trial is vitiated if signatures of Witnesses are obtained on the statements  made by them during the enquiry.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent  was  working as a  turner  in  the  Railway workshop.    He  was  found  in  possession  of   properties belonging  to  the Railways.  The Sub-Inspector  of  Railway Protection  Force inquired into the case under section  8(1) of  the  Act.   During the course  of  enquiry  he  recorded statements  of  3 persons.  The statements  were  signed  by those persons.  The Special Railway Magistrate convicted the respondent  under section 3(9) of the Act.  On  appeal,  the learned  Civil And Sessions Judge confirmed the  conviction. On  a revision application filed, the High Court  set  aside the  judgment  of  the  Sessions  Court  and  acquitted  the respondent  on the ground that the enquiry  contemplated  by Section 8(1) of the Act is an investigation for the purposes of  the  Criminal Procedure Code; that the  enquiry  officer contravened  provisions  of  section  162  of  the  Code  by obtaining signatures of witnesses on the statements made  by them during the enquiry and that since those statements were brought  on  the  record of the trial and were  put  to  the witnesses in their examination-in-chief the entire trial was vitiated. Allowing the appeal. HELD  : The enquiry conducted under section 8(1) of the  Act cannot be deemed to he an, investigation for the purposes of section  162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.  The  exclusion

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

of an important provision of tile Criminal Procedure Code in matters arising under the Act is reflected in section 5  and section 14 of the Act.  Under section 14, the provisions  of the  Act take effect notwithstanding  anything  inconsistent therewith  contained in any other law for the time being  in force.  The Act would prevail over the code if on any matter there is inconsistency between the two.  Section 5(2) of the Code itself lays down that offences under any law other than the  Penal  Code  shall be  investigated  according  to  the provisions of the Code but subject to any enactments for the time  being in force regulating the manner of  investigating such  offences.   Under  section 9(3)  of  the  Act  persons summoned  to  appear  in the enquiry are  under  an  express obligation  to  state the truth whereas section 160  of  the Code  does not cast on such persons the obligation to  state the truth.  The importance of the obligation cast by section 9(3)  of  the  Act is that the  breach  of  that  obligation constitutes an offence under section 193 of the Penal  Code. The  obligation  to state the truth which attracts  for  its breach  a penal consequence, must necessarily imply  in  the officer  conducting  the  enquiry the power  to  obtain  the signature  of the person on the statement made by him.   The right and duty of an investigating officer to file a  Police Report or a Charge Sheet on the conclusion of  investigation is  the  hallmark of an investigation under the  Code.   The Officer conducting an enquiry under section 8(1) of the  Act does not possess all attributes of an officer in charge of a Police Station investigating a case under the Code.  L884 D; G-H; 886 A-B; 887 E] HELD  Further : Apart from the statements made by  witnesses during  the enquiry which were brought on the record of  the case  by  the learned Magistrate there was evidence  of  the witnesses  who  were examined in the Court  and  the  entire trial  could in no case be said to have been  vitiated.   At best, the High Court should have excluded from consideration what it thought was inadmissible 10-M192SupCI/75 882 in evidence.  The evidence clearly shows that the respondent was  in  possession  of railway  property  and  had  thereby committed  an  offence under section 3(a) of the  Act.   The judgment  of  the High Court was set aside and that  of  the Civil & Sessions Judge restored. [889 C-D] State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 338,  Pradhan Jyoti Sawant State of Mysore, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 698, followed. Raja  Ram  Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, [1964]  2  S.C.R.  752 considered.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Cirminal Appeal No. 156 of 1972. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated  the 8th  February,  1971  of the Allahabad High  Court  in  Crl. Revisional Application No. 1995 of 1969. O. P. Rana for the appellant. Uma Dutta for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD,   J.  This  appeal  by  special  leave   raises questions regarding the interpretation of the provisions  of the  Railway  Property (Unlawful Possession)  Act,  XXIX  of 1966.-The main question for decision is whether the  inquiry which an officer of the Railway Protection Force holds under section  8(1)  of  the Act is an  investigation  within  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

meaning  of  the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.   If  so, statements  recorded during the course of the inquiry  would be  inadmissible  in evidence by reason  of  the  injunction contained  in section 162 of the Code.  A  further  question which requires consideration is whether the entire trial  is vitiated  if  signatures of witnesses are  obtained  on  the statements made by them during the course of the inquiry. The  respondent Durga Prasad was working as a Turner in  the Railway  Workshop  at Gorakhpur.  On April 2,  1968  he  was found in possession of a steel rod and two pieces of moulded brass   shells   belonging  to  the  Railway.    After   the preparation of a recovery memo the respondent was  forwarded to  the  Railway  Protection Force Post  where  a  case  was registered against him under section 3(a) of the Act. Gajai   Singh,  Sub-inspector,  Railway   Protection   Force inquired into the case under section 8(1) of the Act, during the  course  of which he recorded the  statements  of  three persons:  Rakshak Indra Deo Yadav, Rakshak Jagannath  Pandey and  R.  K. Nandi.  The statements were read over  to  these persons  and  their signatures were obtained  thereon.   Two others, G. S. Tripathi and Kamla Kant Yadav wrote out  their statements  in  their own hand and handed over the  same  to Gajai Singh. The  respondent pleaded not guilty but the  learned  Special Railway  Magistrate,  First Class, Gorakhpur  convicted  him under  section 3(a) of the Act and sentenced him to  undergo rigorous imprisonment for fifteen months.  That judgment was confirmed in appeal by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur. 883 The  respondent  filed a revision application  in  the  High Court  of  Allahabad  which set aside the  judgment  of  the Sessions Court and acquitted the respondent.  The High Court has taken the view that the inquiry contemplated by  section 8(1) of the Act is an investigation for the purposes of  the Criminal  Procedure Code that section 162 of the Code  would therefore  apply, that the inquiry officer  had  contravened section  162  by obtaining signatures of  witnesses  on  the statements  made by them before him during the  inquiry  and since  those  statements were brought on the record  of  the trial and were put to the witnesses in their examination-in- chief,  the entire trial was vitiated.  We have  to  examine the correctness of this view in this appeal.               Section 8 of the Act reads thus:               "8.  (1)  When any person is  arrested  by  an               officer of the Force for an offence punishable               under  this Act or is forwarded to  him  under               section  7, he shall proceed to  inquire  into               the charge against such person.               (2)   For  this  purpose the  officer  of  the               Force  may exercise the same powers and  shall               be  subject  to  the same  provisions  as  the               officer  in  charge of  a  police-station  may               exercise  and is subject to under the Code  of               Criminal Procedure, 1898, when investigating a               cognizable case:               Provided that- (a)  if the officer of the Force is of opinion that there is sufficient  evidence  or  reasonable  ground  of   suspicion against  the  accused person, he shall either admit  him  to bail  to appear before a Magistrate having  jurisdiction  in the case, or forward him in custody to such Magistrate; (b)  if it appears to the officer of the Force that there is no  sufficient  evidence or reasonable ground  of  suspicion against  the  accused person, he shall release  the  accused

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

person on his executing a bond, with or without sureties  as the officer of the Force may direct, to appear, if and  when so  required before the Magistrate having jurisdiction,  and shall make a full report of all the particulars of the  case to his official superior.  " Section 2(a) defines "Force" as the Railway Protection Force constituted under section 3 of the Railway Protection  Force Act,  1957.  Section 2(c) defines an "officer of the  Force" to  mean an officer of and above the rank of Assistant  Sub- Inspector  appointed  to  the Force,  including  a  superior officer.   Under section 2(e) a "Superior officer" means  an officer appointed under section 4 of the Railway Protect  On Force Act, 1957 and includes any other officer appointed  by the Central Government as a superior officer of the Force. Section  5 provides that notwithstanding anything  contained in the Code of Cr.  Pr. an offence under this Act shall  not be  cognizable.  By section 6 of the Act power is  given  to the  concerned  officers to arrest without an order  from  a Magistrate  and  without a warrant any person who  has  been concerned in an offence punishable under the Act or 884 against  whom  a reasonable suspicion exists of  his  having been  so  concerned.  Section 7 requires that  every  person arrested  for  an offence punishable under the Act  must  be forwarded without delay to the nearest officer of the Force. Section 9(1) of the Act empowers an officer of the Force  to summon  any person whose attendance he  considers  necessary either "to give evidence or to produce a document".  By sub- section  (3) of section 9 persons so summoned are  bound  to attend  either in person or by an authorized agent and  they are  "bound to state the truth upon any  subject  respecting which  they  are examined or make statements".   By  section 9(4)  every  such  inquiry  is  deemed  to  be  a   judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Penal Code. Section 11 provides that all searches and arrests made under the  Act  shall  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the provisions  of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   Section  14 provides  that  provisions  of this Act  shall  have  effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time battle in force". In  face  of these provisions, the inquiry conducted  by  an officer of the Railway Protection Force under section 8(1) f the  Act  cannot be deemed to be an  investigation  for  the purposes  of section 162, Code of Criminal  Procedure.   The scheme  of the Act is in important respects  different  from the  scheme of the Code and there is intrinsic  evidence  it the  Act  to  show that the provisions of  the  Code  cannot proprio vigore apply to inquiries under section 8(1) of  the Act.  See, for example, two provisions of the Act which to a student  of the Code must strike as a glaring  contradiction in  terms.  Section 6 of the Act confers power  on  officers and  members of the Force to arrest without an cider from  a Magistrate and without a warrant any person concerned in  an offence  under the Act or reasonably suspected of  being  so concerned.   Applying the dictionary of the Code  it  should have  followed  from section 6 of the Act  that  an  offence under  the  Act  is cognizable.  Section 4(f)  of  the  code defines  a  cognizable  offence as one for  which  a  police officer   can  effect  an  arrest  without   warrant.    The complementary  part of this definition contained in  section 4(n) of the Code defines a non-cognizable offence as one for which a police officer may not arrest without warrant.   But section 5 of the Act provides that notwithstanding  anything contained  in  the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  an  offence

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

under the Act shall not be cognizable. The  exclusion  of an important provision  of  the  Criminal Procedure Code in matters arising under the Act is not  only reflected  in  section  5 which deals but with  a  facet  of criminal  trials, but the exclusion is more in  evidence  in the provisions of section 14 of the Act.  Under that section the  provisions  of  the  Act  take  effect  notwithstanding anything  inconsistent therewith contained in any other  law for  the time being in force.  Each and every  provision  of the  Code cannot therefore be superimposed on or  read  into the  Act.   The Act would prevail over the Code  if  on  any matter  there  is inconsistency between the two.   In  fact, section  5(2)  of the Code itself lays  down  that  offences under   any  law  other  than  the  Penal  Code   shall   be investigated according to 885 the provisions of the Code, but subject to any enactment for the   time   being  in  force  regulating  the   manner   of investigating such offences. Provisions governing inquiries under section 8(1) of the Act are   either   expressly   or   by   necessary   implication inconsistent with some of the outstanding provisions of  the Cede  governing  investigations under  Chapter  XIV,  called "Information to the Police and their Powers to investigate". Whereas  section 8(1) Speaks of "inquiry" by an  officer  of the  Force,  sections 155 and 156 of the code speak  of  the power  to "investigate" into non-cognizable  and  cognizable cases respectively.  Labels, of course, are not decisive  of the content of a phrase but the difference in terminology is purposeful.  Section 9(1) of the Act confers on officers  of the Force the power to summon any person whose attendance is necessary  either  "to  give  evidence"  or  to  produce   a document.  Section 160 of the Code empowers a police officer making  an investigation to require by a written  order  the attendance of a person who appears to be acquainted with the circus,stances  of  the case.  By section 9(3) of  the  Act, persons  summoned  to  appear in the inquiry  are  bound  to attend either personally or through an authorized agent  and they are under an express obligation "to state the truth" on any subject respecting which they are examined.  Section 160 of  the Code also makes it obligatory for persons to  appear before  the  Investigating  Officer  if  he  requires  their presence  but section 161 does not cast on such persons  the obligation  which section 9(3) of the Act casts,  namely  to state  the  truth.  This is not to suggest  that  the,  Code provides  for  a ,awful option to lie but the  two  parallel provisions governing the obligations of the persons summoned to appear highlight the basic difference in the nature of an inquiry  under the Act and an investigation under the  Code. Section  161(2)  casts but a limited obligation  on  persons required  to  appear  before an  investigating  Officer  "to answer  all  questions" relating to the case, other  than  a certain  class  of  self-incriminating  questions.   Section 161(2)  of  the Code of 1882 contained  an  injunction  that persons summoned to appear by the Investigating Officer must answer  "truly" the questions put to them but  reverting  to the  language of the Cede of 1872, the Code of 1898  omitted the  word "truly".  A provision similar to that  in  section 9(3)  of the Act is, however, to be found in section  175(1) of  the  Code  by which persons summoned to  appear  in  the inquest proceedings are bound to answer truly all  questions put  by the Investigating Officer except a certain class  of self-incriminating questions. The importance of the obligation cast by section 9(3) of the Act that persons summoned to appear before an officer of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

Force  must  state  the truth consists  principally  in  the consequence  that the breach of that obligation  constitutes an  offence  under  section  193 of  the  Penal  Code  which prescribes punishment, inter alia, for intentionally  giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding.  Under the relevant part of section 191, Penal Code, whoever  being legally  bound by an express provision of law to  state  the truth makes any statement which is false and which he either knows  or  believes to be false or does not  believe  to  be true,  is said to give false evidence.  It is not  necessary that  the  statement  should have been  made  on  oath.   By section 9(4) of 886 the  Act every inquiry under section 8(1) is deemed to be  a "judicial  proceeding" within the meaning of section 193  of the  Penal  Code.   The  obligation  to  state  the   truth, attracting   for  its  breach  a  penal  consequence,   must necessarily imply in the officer conducting the inquiry  the power to obtain the signature of the person on the statement made  by him; or else, in a prosecution under  section  193, Penal  Code,  it would be an easy defence to deny  the  very making   of  the  statement  and  thereby  to   escape   the punishment. in order that the prosecution under section  193 may not be rendered illusory and the duty to state the truth should   have  a  real  and  practical  sanction   for   its enforcement,  the officer conducting the inquiry  must  have the  right to obtain the signature of the person making  the statement. That  creates an inconsistency between the Act and the  Code for,whereas an officer conducting an inquiry tinder the  Act may and indeed ought to obtain the signature of witnesses on their  statements, section 162(1) of the Code provides:  "No statement  made  by any person to a  police-officer  in  the course  of  an investigation under this  Chapter  shall,  if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it". In view  of the provisions contained in section 14 of the  Act, the act must prevail over the Code. The  reason of the rule that the statement made to a  police officer  in the course of investigation shall not be  signed by  the  person  making it is contained  in  the  very  same section,  namely section 162(1) of the Code, which  provides that  such a statement shall not be used for any purpose  at any  inquiry  or  trial  in respect  of  any  offence  under investigation  at  the  time when the  statement  was  made, except  for the limited purpose of contradicting  a  witness called  for  the  prosecution, in  the  manner  provided  by section  145  of  the Evidence Act.   If  the  statement  is inadmissible at the trial as substantive evidence and if  an untrue  statement made to a police officer in the course  of an investigation attracts no penal consequence, it is of  no great  significance  to obtain the signature of  the  person making the statement.  Statements made under section 8(1) of the  Act  have  different characteristics  and  are  neither subject to the disability of being inadmissible nor are they immune from the sweep of section 193 of the Penal Code. Relying  on section 8(2) of the Act which provides that  an. officer of the Force may exercise the same powers and  shall be  subject to the same provisions as the officer  in-charge of a police station may exercise and is subject to under the Code  when investigating a cognizable case, counsel for  the respondent  argued that the object of this  provision  could only   be  to  assimilate  inquiries  under  the  Act   with investigations  under the Code and therefore section 162  of the  Code  would govern the inquiries also.   This  argument overlook  the  opening  words of section  8(2).   The  power

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

spoken  of  in  that  subsection  is  conferred  "For   this purpose",  that  is to say, for the purpose of  the  inquiry under section 8(1) and must be limited to that purpose. The  right  and duty of an investigating officer to  file  a police  report  or  a  charge-sheet  on  the  conclusion  of investigation is the hallmark of an investigation under  the Code.  Section 173(1)(a) of the Code, 887 Provides that as soon as the investigation is completed  the officer  incharge of the police station shall forward  to  a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on  a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the  State Government.  The officer conducting an inquiry under section 8(1)  cannot initiate court proceedings by filing  a  police report  as is evident from the two Provisos to section  8(2) of the Act.  Under Proviso (a), if the officer of the  Force is  of  the  opinion that there is  sufficient  evidence  or reasonable ground of suspicion against the accused, he shall either  admit  the  accused  to  bail  to  appear  before  a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case or forward him in custody  to  such  Magistrate.  Under  Proviso  (b),  if  it appears to the officer that there is no sufficient  evidence or  reasonable ground of suspicion against the  accused,  he shall release him on a bond to appear before the  Magistrate having jurisdiction and shall make a full report of all  the particulars  of the case to his superior officer.  The  duty cast  by  Proviso (b) on an officer of the Force to  make  a full  report  to  his  official  superior  stands  in  sharp contrast  with  the duly cast by section 173(1) (a)  of  the Code on the officer-in-charge of a police station to  submit a  report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance  of the offence.  On the conclusion of an enquiry under  section 8(1),  therefore,  if  the officer of the Force  is  of  the opinion  that  there is sufficient  evidence  or  reasonable ground  of  suspicion against the accused, he  must  file  a complaint  under  section 190 (1) (a) of the Code  in  order that  the  Magistrate concerned may take cognizance  of  the offence. Thus an officer conducting an inquiry under section 8(1)  of the   Act  does  not  possess  all  the  attributes  of   an officer-in-charge  of a police station investigating a  case under  Chapter XIV of the Code.  He possesses but a part  of those  attributes  limited  to the purpose  of  holding  the inquiry. That  the inquiry officers cannot be equated generally  with police officers is clear from the object and purpose of  The Railway  Protection  Force Act, XXIII of  1957  under  which their  appointments  are made.The short title  of  that  Act shows  that  it  was passed in order  "to  provide  for  the constitution  and regulation of a Force called  the  Railway Protection  Force for the better protection and security  of railway property".  Section 3(1) of the Act of 1957 empowers the  Central  Government  to  constitute  and  maintain  the Railway  Protection  Force  for the  better  protection  and security of railway property.  By section 10, the Inspector- General and every other superior officer and member. of  the Force  "shall  for  all  purposes  be  regarded  as  railway servants  within  the meaning of the Indian-  Railways  Act, 1890, other than Chapter VI-A thereof, and shall be entitled to  exercise the powers conferred on railway servants by  or under  that Act".  Section 11 which defines duties of  every superior officer and member of the Force provides that  they must promptly execute all orders lawfully issued to them  by their  superior  authority; protect  and  safeguard  railway property; remove any obstruction in the movement of  railway

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

property  and  do  any other act  conducive  to  the  better protection  and  security of railway property.   Section  14 imposes a duty on the superior officers and members of the 888 Force  to  make over persons arrested by them  to  a  police officer-or  to  take  them to the  nearest  police  station. These  provisions are incompatible with the position that  a member  of the Railway Protection Force holding  an  inquiry under  section 8(1) of the Act can be deemed to be a  police officer-in-charge of a police station investigating into  an offence.Members  of  the  Force  are  appointed  under   the authority  of  the Railway Protection Force Art,  1957,  the prime object of which is the better protection and  security of  railway  property.  Powers conferred on members  of  the Force are all directed towards achieving that object and are limited  by it.  It is significant that the Act of 1957,  by section  14,  makes a distinction between a  member  of  the Force and a police officer properly so called. Reference may now be made to a few decisions of this  Court. In State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram(1), the question which fell for consideration was whether a Customs Officer either under the Land Customs Act, 1924 or the Sea Customs Act, 1878 is a police  officer  within  the meaning of section  25  of  the Evidence  Act.  The majority took the view that  though  the expression  "police-officer" occurring in section 25 had  to be  construed  in a wide and popular sense,  Central  Excise Officers  are not police officers and therefore  confessions made to them are not hit by section 25. In  Badku  Joti  Savant v. State  of  Mysore(2),  a  similar question  arose before a Bench of five Judges of this  Court with  reference to the provisions of the Central Excise  and Salt Act, 1 of 1944.  Sections 21(1) and (2) of that Act are in  material  respects  identical  with  the  provisions  of sections  8(1) and (2) of the Act.  A unaminous  court  held that  though under Section 21(2) the Central Excise  Officer has the. powers of an officer-in-charge of a police  station when  investigating  a  cognizable  case,  that  power   was conferred  for  the purpose of’ the  inquiry  under  section 21(1).   Considering the main purpose of the Central  Excise and  Salt Act it was held that the Excise Officer was not  a police  officer  within  the meaning of section  25  of  the Evidence   Act.   Counsel  for  the  respondent   tried   to distinguish this decision on the ground that the application of section 162 of the Code was not considered there.  We see no  substance in this contention because if after  excluding section 25 of the Evidence Act, section 162 of the Code  was still  applicable,  there  was  no  purpose  in  considering whether  the confessional statements were hit by section  25 of the Evidence Act. The  decision in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of  Bihar(3),  on which the respondent relies was considered and distinguished in  Badku  Joti  Savant’s case.   Raja  Ram  Jaiswal’s  case involved  the interpretation of section 78(3) of  the  Bihar and  Orissa  Excise Act, 1915 which provided in  terms  that "for  the  purposes of section 156 of the Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1898,  the  area  to  which  an  excise  officer empowered  under  section 77 sub-section (2),  is  appointed shall  be  deemed to be a police station, and  such  officer shall  be  deemed  to  be  the  officer-in-charge  of   such station".  There is no provision in the Act before (1) [1962] (3) S.C.R. 338.    (2) [1966] (3) S.C.R. 698. (3) [1964] (2) S.C.R. 752. 889 us  corresponding  to  section 78(3) of the  Bihar  Act  and therefore  the  decision  is distinguishable  for  the  same

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

reasons  for  which  it  was  distinguished  in  Badku  Joti Savant’s case. The  High  Court  was therefore in  error  in  holding  that statements made during the inquiry under section 8(1) of the Act  are on a par with statements made during the course  of an investigation, that section 162 of the Code applied  with full  force  to the inquiry proceedings and that  in  taking signatures  of witnesses on the statements made by them  the inquiry  officer  had  committed  a  flagrant  violation  of section  162  of the Code.  We may add that apart  from  the statements  made by witnesses during the inquiry which  were brought on the record of the case by the learned Magistrate, there was before him the evidence of the witnesses who  were examined  in the court and therefore the entire trial  could in any case not be said to have been vitiated.  At best  the High  Court should have excluded from consideration what  it thought was inadmissible in evidence. In  the result we set aside the judgment of the  High  Court and  restore that of the learned Civil and  Sessions  Judge, Gorakhpur. The  evidence  shows  clearly that  the  respondent  was  in possession of Railway property and had thereby committed  an offence under section 3(a) of the Act. P.H.P.                         Appeal allowed. 890