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PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: C.L. AGRAWAL & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       02/05/1997

BENCH: CJI, M.M. PUNCHHI, S.C.AGRAWAL, A.S. ANAND, S.P. BHARUCHA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:     WITH        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10596 OF 1996       JU D G ME N T S.P. BHARUCHA, J.      These civil  appeals ariseupon identical facts and may be disposed  ofby a common judgment. The principal judgment under appeal  is that  of a  Full Benchof the High Court at Allahabad, in Civil Appeal No. 10568 of1996. The Full Bench judgment was  followed by a Division Bench of the High Court and that  orderis  impugned in Civil Appeal  No. 10596  of 1996.      The factsthat we state relate  to Civil Appeal No. 10568 of  1996.The  first respondent  was appointed a Lower Division Assistant  in the  High Courtat Allahabad  on 1st June, 1957.  Hewas  given, onthe orders  ofthe    Chief Justicein  office at  the relevant  time, one premature (or advance)  increment   in  theyear  1989,   two  premature increments in  the year 1990 and one prematureincrement in the year  1991.He  retired from service on 31st July, 1994. For the purposes of  calculating hispensionary benefits, the appellantsdid not take into  account these  premature increments. They acted upon thebasis of a letter dated27th June, 1992,  which had been addressed by the Joint secretary of the appellant State to the Registrarof the High Court in respectof  a premature increment that had been granted to one Nazim  Hussain, a Section Officer of the High Court, who had   then retired.  The letter stated, "As  the  power  to create the  post is  vested  with  theGovernor,  so  under Fundamental Rule  27 it is mandatory for His Excellency the Governor to  exercise aforesaid powers.  There is  similar provision in  Article 229  of the Constitution and Allahabad High Court (Condition of service of Staff) Rules, 1976". The letter referred to a  communication dated  30th May,  1955, addressed by  the Accountant  General of the appellant State explaining theprovisions in  this behalf  in the Allahabad High Court  (Condition of Service of Staff) Rules, 1946, and stated that  there was no provision for grantof Premature increment in the 1976 Rules. The letterconcluded, "it shall be  anirregularity  to  approve  thepremature  increment withoutprior approval of His Excellency the Governor".

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    The first respondent fileda writ petitionto quash the letter dated  27th June,  1992,and  to seek  a    writ  of mandamus to theappellant Stateand itsDirector of Pensions to make payment of  the balance  of his    pensionarydues without reducing   the amount  of  the  four   premature increments that had been  granted to  him  bythe    Chief Justiceof the High Court. The writ petition was referred to a FullBench, and the Full Bench allowed it bythe judgment and order now impugned.      Article  229   ofthe   Constitution  deals  with the officers and  servants and  theexpenses  of High Courts. It reads thus :      "229. officers andservants and the      expenses  of  High Courts.  -  (1)      Appointments   of  officers   and      servants of  a High  Courtshall be      made by  the Chief Justice of  the      Court  or such  other   Judge  or      officer of the  court  as he  may      direct:   Provided that the Governor of      the Statemay by rule require that      insuch  cases asmay be specified      inthe  rule no  person not already      attached  to  thecourt  shall  be      appointed to  any office  connected      with   the   court   save   after      consultation withthe State Public      Service  Commission.      (2)  Subject to  the provisions  of      any law  made by the Legislature of      the  State,   the conditions   of      service ofofficers and servants of      a High  Court shall  be such as may      beprescribed  by rules made by the      Chief Justice  of the  Court or  by      some other Judge or officer of the      court  authorised by  the   Chief      Justice  to   make rulesfor  the      purpose :      Provided that  therules made under      this clause   shall, so far as they      relate  to salaries    allowances,      leave  or pensions,  require  the      approval of  the  Governor of  the      State.      (3)  The administrative expenses of      aHigh   a  Court,  including  all      salaries, allowances  andpensions      payable to or inrespect of  the      officers and servants of the court,      shall   be   charged   upon    the      Consolidated Fund of the State, and      any fees  or other moneystaken by      the courtshall form  part of that      Fund."      The Allahabad HighCourt Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service  andConduct) Rules,1976, were madeby the Chief Justice of  the  HighCourt  in  exercise  of the  powers conferred by  clause (2) of Article 229and were notified on 13th July,  1976. Rules 3, 40and 41 were called in aid by learnedcounselfor theappellants. They read thus :      "Strength of  theestablishment  -      (1) The  number of permanent posts      of the   various categories   in

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    classes  I,   II, III   and   IV,      respectively, in  the establishment      ofthe  High Courtshall be such as      may  he  determined  by  the  Chief      Justice from  timeto timewith the      approval  of   Governor  of   Uttar      Pradesh.   The  Chief  Justice  may  from      time to time, create such temporary      posts   as   may be   considered      necessary with  the approval of the      Governor.      (3)  The Chief  Justice  may  leave      unfilled or  may hold  inabeyance      any  vacant  postwithout thereby      entitling   any   person     to      compensation.      (4)  Thereshall  be separate cadre      for each category of posts."      40.  Regulation of other matters -      (1) All  officers and  servants  of      the Courtshall be  subject to the      superintendence and  control of the      Chief Justice.      (2)  In respect ofall matters (not      provided  for   in  these  rules)      regarding the conditions of service      ofofficers  and  servants of  the      Court including matters relating to      their    conduct,  control    and      discipline, the  rules  and  orders      for the  time being  in  force  and      applicableto  Governmentservants      holding corresponding  posts in the      Governmentof  Uttar Pradesh  shall      apply to  the officers andservants      of the   Court  subjectto  such      modifications,   variations,    and      exceptionsif  any,  as  the  Chief      Justice may,  from time  to  time,      specify.   Provided   that    no   order      containing  modifications,      variationsor  exceptions in  rules      or orders relating  to  salaries,      allowances, leave or pensions shall      bemade bythe Chief Justice except      with the approval of the Governor.   Provided further thatthe said      powers exercisable under rules and      orders  of  Government  of   Uttar      Pradesh by the Governor  shall  be      exercised by  the Chief  Justice or      by such  officeras  hemay,  by      general orspecialorder, direct.      (3)  If any  doubtarises in regard      to a   particular postin   the      establishment  being  corresponding      toa  postin the State Government,      the matter will be  decided by the      Chief Justice.      41.  Residuary  powers-Nothing   in      these  rules  shall  be  deemed  to      affect  the   power  of  the  Chief      Justice to make such  orders, from

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    time to  time, ashe may,deem fit      inregard to all matters incidental      orancillary  to  these  rules  not      specifically provided for herein or      inregardto matters  as have  not      been sufficiently providedfor :   Provided  that   if  any  such      order    relates to    salaries,      allowances, leaveor pension,  the      same  shall   be  made   with   the      approval of the Governor of U.P."      Learned counsel  for the  appellants submitted that the premature increments  could nothave been givento the first respondents inthese appeals  without the  approval of the Governor.  Inhis  submission,  the  orders  granting the premature increments  were orders  relating to salariesthat required the  approval of  the Governor by  reason  of the provisions of the firstprovisoto sub rule (2)of Rule40.      The argument,  ona  plain  reading  of  Rule  40,  is untenable. Thefirst proviso  to Sub-rule  (2)of  Rule  40 speaks of  rules or orders relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions and states that theseshall not be made by the Chief Justice except with the  approval of the Governor. The second  proviso to sub rule(2) of Rule 40 refers to the powers exercisable  under rulesand orders of the Government by the Governor.  Reading thetwo provisos together, it is apparent that  the rules and orders that are referred to are rules and  orders of a general nature and not orders made in exercise thereof in individual cases.      The second proviso to  sub-rule (2)  of Rule  40 is of importance for a more fundamental reason. It states that the powers which are exercisable bythe Governor under the rules and orders of the Government inRespectof matters regarding conditions of  service not  provided for  by the  1976 Rules shall be  exercised bythe Chief Justice or bysuch officer as he  may direct.  Insofar asofficers and servants of the High Court  areconcerned,  therefore, the  Chief Justice or his  delegateexercises  thepowersexercisable  by the Governor undersuch rules  andordersof  the Government. Insofaras  officers and  servants of  the  High  Court are concerned, it is enoughthat the Chief justice exercises the powers conferred  upon the  Governor under  such  rules and ordersof  the Government;  no  further  approval  by the Governor is required.      Rule 41  gives the Chief Justiceresiduary powers  to make orders  inregard to matters incidental orancillary to the 1976  Rules and  if  the  orders  relate  to  salaries, allowances, leave  or pension,they are to be made with the approval of theGovernor. Once again, clearly, the reference is to  the making  of general  orders in  regard to  matters incidental or  ancillary to the1976 Rules and not in regard to orders in individualcases.      The orders of the ChiefJustice granting  premature increments didnot, therefore, require the approval of the Governor under the aforesaid provisions.      Learned counsel  for the appellants then based hiscase upon Rule 27 ofthe Financial Hand Book, Vol. II, Part II to IV, which readsthus :      "27.  Anauthority  maygrant  a      premature increment to a Government      servant on a time scale of pay if      ithas  power to  create a post in      the same cadre on the samescale of      pay."      Learned counsel  submittedthat itwas theGovernor who

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had created  the postswhich the firstrespondents in these appeals had  occupiedand,  therefore,  it  was  only the Governor who  could have  approved thegrant  of  premature increments to them.      Article 229 does not statethat posts in the High Court are tobe created  by the  Governor; it  does not evendeal with the  creation of posts. Clause (1)thereofempowers the Chief Justice  to makethe  appointments  of  officers and servants of  a High  Court. Clause  (2)empowers  the  Chief Justiceto  make rules prescribing the conditions of service of officers  and servants  of a High Court with the proviso that so far as these rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or  pensions, they  require the  Governor’s  approval. Clause (3)  requires the administrativeexpenses of theHigh Court to be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State.      Rule 3  ofthe  1976 Rules requires that the number of permanent postsof the various categories in classes I to IV in theHigh Court’s  establishment shall be determinedfrom time to time by  the Chief Justice with the approval of the Governor. It  is, therefore,  the Chief Justice who has the power to  create postsin the High Court. Thathe may do so with the approval of the Governor does not detract fromthis position. The  creationof  a post precedes andis different from the  approval of  its creation. Inany event, by reason of theprovisions of  the 1976Rules referred to above, the powers of  the Governor under the  rules and  orders of the Government areexercisable bythe Chief Justice in respect of matters not covered by the 1976 Rules.      Since, then,  it is the Chief Justice who has the power to create  posts in  the High Court, itis the Chief Justice who may grant premature increments under the aforesaidRule 27 to the officers and Servantsof the High Court. Moreover, even ifthe power underthe aforesaid Rule 27 be exercisable by the Governor, by virtue of the second proviso to sub-rule (2) ofRule 40 of the1976 Rules, thepower is exercisable by the Chief Justice.      Itneeds  to be  noted that  the appellants  had before them an analysis of  the power of Chief  Justice to  grant premature increments  in the  communication dated  30thMay, 1955, addressed by the Additional Deputy  Secretary of the appellant State to its Accountant General,  with a copy to the Registrar  of   theHigh  Court. The  letter dated27th June, 1992,  which   has been  quashed by  the impugnedFull Bench decision,refers to it. The communicationof 30thMay, 1955, stated :      "Rule 7  of  these rulesprovides      that the  rules and  orders for the      time being in force and applicable      to   Government  servants    of      corresponding   classesin   the      service ofthe State shallregulate      conditionsof  service (other  than      these  covered  by the  Rules)  of      persons  servingon   the   staff      attached to the High Courtprovided      that the  powers exercisable  under      the said  rules and  orders by  the      Governor shall  be exercisable  by      the Chief Justice or by such person      ashe  maydirectAccordingly, the      power exercisableby theGovernor      under Fundamental Rule 27 Financial      Hand BookVol. II regarding grant      ofpremature  increments is  vested      inthe  Chief Justice  in so far as

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    the High  Court staff is concerned.      Iam   further  to   invite   your      attention to  the explanatory  Note      tothe Financial Hand Book, Vol. II      Part II-IV and to say that in the      circumstances the Chief Justice was      fully  competentto  grant  three      premature increments  to Sri Lalloo      Lal Jouhary. Theseorders are being      issued  with   the concurrence  of      Finance Department.      The letter dated 27th June, 1992,seeks to distinguish the analysis  on the  basis that  therewas no provision for grant  of   premature  increment  in  the  1976 Rules. The distinction was not justifiedfor  the  substance  of the relevant provisions  inthe  1946 Rulesremainsunaltered in the 1976 Rules,as has already been pointed out.      Itwill  have been noted that  the appellants  did not directly challenge  theordersof theChief Justice giving the premature  increments to  the  first  respondents.They employed a  side wind,by refusing  totake these premature increments into account for the purposes of calculating the first respondents’  pensionarybenefits  and,accordingly, compelled the  first respondents  to file the writ petitions challenging  the  orders  in  this  behalf.  The  appellants approach must be deplored. We can do nobetter than to refer to  the  observationsof   aConstitution   Bench  in  M. Gurumoorthy vs. Accountant General Assam & Nagaland & Ors., 1971 Supp. S.C.R. 420, thus :      "Once an  order had  been passed by      the Chief Justice of the High Court      in exercise  of  his  power  under      Article 229 of theConstitution the      only course open to the Government,      ifit  wanted  tochallenge  those      orders,  was  to  take  appropriate      proceedings  either   byway   of      persuading the  Chief  Justice  to      rescind or amend his  order on the      administrative side  or to file  a      writ   petition   challenging   his      orders inthe High  Court. But the      Governmenttook  the  extraordinary      and  somewhat   unusual   step   of      directingthe  Accountant General      not to  issue anypay slip  to the      appellant until final orders of the      Governmentwere issued."      During the courseof  thehearing of these appeals we noticedthat  an orderdated 27th  October, 1995, madeby a Division Bench of the High Court (in Writ Petition No. 32987 of 1993, S.D. Dixit vs.State U.P. & Ors.) had been included in thepaper books  and asked about it. It appears that the said writ  petitioner is  in the  same position as are the first respondents  in the appeals before us. Learned counsel on hisbehalf prayed  that the Division Bench hearing the said writ  petition follow the impugnedFull Bench judgment. The Division Bench observed :      "The submission  made above  by Dr.      Padia appears to be contrary to the      Apex Court decisions  rendered  in      Supreme  Court   Employees Welfare      Association vs.  Union ofIndia  &      Others, A.I.R.  1990 S.C.334, and      inH.C. Puttaswamy& others vs. The

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    Hon’ble Chief  Justice of Karnataka      High Court &  others  A.I.R.  1991      S.C.  294.  Further,   these   two      decisions appear  to havenot been      brought to the notice  ofthe Full      Bench  inadvertently  as  the  Full      Bench has not referred to these two      above    mentioned   Apex   Court      decisions which  have binding      effect. Itis, therefore, necessary      toexamine the issue  involved  in      this petition  in the  light of the      above  referred  decisions of  the      Apex   Court   as the   aforesaid      decision  of  theApex  Court  are      binding on this   court      notwithstandingthe    aforesaid      pronouncement of  the FullBench in      C.L. Agarwal’s case in this regard.      Sri Padiahas prayed  for and  is      granted time.   List thiscase   on   15th      December, 1995."      Weasked  learned counsel for the appellants whether he desiredto  rely upon  the aforementioned  judgments ofthis Court in  the cases  ofthe Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association andM.C. Puttaswamy. Learned counsel statedthat they were  not relevanthaving regard  to the interpretation of the Rules that has appealed to us.      There is  a passage  in the  judgment in  the  case  of SupremeCourt  Employees’ Welfare  Association that,  in the contextof the matters before us, deserves to be set out. We endorsewhat  is observed  and commendit to  the States so that they  may deal  with  proposals  made  bytheir  Chief Justices with due deference andrespect.      "57. So  far as  the Supreme  Court      and the  High Courts are concerned,      the ChiefJusticeof India and the      Chief Justice of the concerned High      Court, areempowered to frame rules      subject tothis that when the rules      are framed by theChief Justice of      India or  by the  Chief Justice  of      the   High   Court   relating   to      salaries,allowances,   leave   or      pensions,the   approvalof   the      President of Indiaor the Governor,      asthese may be, is required. It is      apparent that  theChief Justice of      India andthe Chief Justice of the      High Court have been  placed at  a      higher  level   in regard to  the      framing  of  rules containing  the      conditionsof  service. It is true      that the  President of India cannot      becompelled  to grant  approval to      the  rules  framed  by  the  Chief      Justice  of   India   relating   to      salaries,allowances,   leave   or      pensions, but  it is  equally  true      that  when such  rules  have  been      framed bya very high dignitary of      the State,it should be looked upon      with respect  and unless  there  is      very  good  reason  not  to  grant

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    approval, the   approval  should      always be granted.If the President      ofIndia  is of  the viewthat the      approval cannotbe  granted,  he      cannot straightway refuseto grant      such   approval, but  before  doing      so,  there  mustbe  exchange  of      thoughts between  the President  of      India  and the  Chief  Justice  of      India."      Weare  dismayed that  theDivision  Benchhearing the said writ petition should have proposedto examine the issue "notwithstanding the  aforesaidpronouncement  of  theFull Bench judgment". If  the judgments inthe cases of Supreme Court employees’  welfare Association  and  M.C.  Puttaswamy were cited  and  the respondents  to the said writ petition submitted thatthe Full  Benchjudgment  was  erroneous  by reason thereof, the proper course for the Division Bench to follow,if  it found  any merit in the submission, was  to refer the  saidwrit  petition to  a  Full  Bench.  Judicial discipline requires that a Division Bench should not examine de   novo an  issue that  is concludedby the decisionof a Full Bench of that HighCourt.      The High  Court shall now proceed to expeditiouslyhear and dispose  ofthe said writ petition and the three orfour other similar  writ petitions  that arestated to be pending before it in the light of thisjudgment.      The  appeals   are dismissed.   The  appellants  shall finalise within 6 weeks  from today the pensionary benefits payableto  thefirst respondents in the appeals takinginto accountthe  prematureincrements  that  had  so  farbeen excluded and  shall pay them all  arrears  inthis  behalf within 12 weeksfrom today.      The appellants  shall payto thefirst respondents in each of theseappeals the  costs  thereof  fixed  at Rs. 10,000/-.