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PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BUDH SINGH (D) BY LRS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       03/12/1996

BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN, B.L. HANSARIA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      B.L. Hansaria,      This appeal  was once  heard earlier  and in  the order passed on  25th September,  1995 it  was stated  that as the High Court  in the  impugned  judgment  has  relied  on  the earlier pronouncement  by Division  Bench of  the same  High Court in Krishan Kumar’s (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3073 of 1977),  it would  be appropriate to peruse that judgment, which being not on record a direction was given to place the same for  our perusal.  It has  been so  done. We  have gone through the  judgment and,  according  to  us,  the  learned single Judge who rendered impugned judgment misread the view taken by the Division Bench in Krishan Kumar’s case. In that judgment, the  Division Bench  has really  held that section 38-B was  wide enough to "capture finding or decisions given under the  Ceiling Act  as well prior to the commencement of section 38-B".  It has  really not  been held  in  that case that "in  the subsequent  ceiling proceedings,  the  earlier finding would  be binding unless it can  be shown that after the  earlier   ceiling  proceedings  there    occurred  some amendments in the Ceiling Act which justified that reopening of a finding recorded in the earlier ceiling proceedings" as observed in  the impugned  judgment.  No  doubt  in  Krishan Kumar’s case  as argument was advanced to cut down the width of section  38-B by  inviting the  attention of the Bench to section 31(5); the Bench, however, held that the section had no impact on the applicability of section 38-B.      In view  of the  above, the  view taken in the impugned judgment cannot be upheld. The same is, therefore, set aside and   the decision  of the  Prescribed Authority rendered on 29th June,  1976, which  was affirmed by the Appellate Court by its  judgment dated  July 25,  1977 is restored. The High Court’s remand order has, therefore, no leg to stand.      The appeal  is allowed  accordingly, in  the facts  and circumstances of the case, we  make no order as to costs.