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PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ASHOK KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/01/1992

BENCH: AHMADI, A.M. (J) BENCH: AHMADI, A.M. (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1992 AIR  840            1992 SCR  (1)  37  1992 SCC  (2)  86        JT 1992 (1)   340  1992 SCALE  (1)149

ACT:      Indian   Penal  Code,  1860  :  Sections  302  and   34 (Occurrence prior to insertion of Section 304-B).      Dowry  death-accused-Husband,  his father  and  sister- Conviction by Trial Court-Re-evaluation and  Re-appreciation of  evidence by the High Court-Reversal of conviction  order and  acquittal  of accused by High Court-Held  High  Court’s order resulted in miscarriage of justice and is liable to be set aside.      Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 136-Scope of      Murder-Covinction by Trial Court-On appeal acquittal by High  Court-Appeal against acquittal order-Power of  Supreme Court  to appreciate evidence and interfere  with  acquittal order-Held Supreme Court can interfere with acquittal  order if  High  Court’s  order  has  resulted  in  miscarriage  of justice.      Indian Evidence Act, 1872 : Section 3.      Circumstantial evidence-Appreciation and evaluation of- Court  must adopt a cautious approach-Conviction  should  be recorded  only  if all the links in the  chain  of  evidence fully  establish the hypothesis of guilt of the  accused-But prosecution  is not bound to meet any and  every  hypothesis put  forward by accused however far-fetched and fanciful  it might be.

HEADNOTE:      Respondent,  A  was married to M, daughter of  PW2,  at Banaras on 13th May, 1973.  Subsequent to their marriage  A, who  was serving as Assistant Engineer, was  transferred  to Lucknow where he hired a two room first floor apartment  for his residence. The ground floor of the house was occupied by the sons of the landlord, PWs 1 and 4.  It was alleged  that A,  his  father  and  sister were  not  satisfied  with  the sufficiency  of the dowry and therefore all the  three  were taunting,  tormenting and torturing M. During one  of  their visits  to  Banaras  the question of dowry  was  once  again raised when A’S father and sister misbehaved with M                                                   38 and  her father and stated that they won’t allow M  to  live with A unless dowry was made good.  When there was a  heated argument,  A returned to Lucknow without M. M entreated  her

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father-in  law  to permit her to join A at Lucknow  but  the latter  refused saying that she will have to rot at  Banaras alone  unless the dowry amount was made good.  Ignoring  her father-in  law’s  refusal  M went to  Lucknow  to  join  her husband.   On coming to know that M had gone to Lucknow  A’s father and sister followed her to Lucknow and all the  three quarrelled and  beat M. On that very  night  they  sprinkled kerosene on M and set her ablaze.  Thereafter, all the three accused  came  out  of the room  shouting  ‘fire-fire’.   On hearing  the shouts PWs 1 and 4 came out of their house  and saw  that while M was in flames all the three  accused  were standing  in  the verandah talking to each  other  and  were unconcerned  about  her  plight. None of  accused  made  any effort  to  extinguish the flames or to rescue  her.   PW  1 called  the fire brigade and PW 3, a fireman, took M to  the hospital where she was declared dead.  On coming to know  of the incident, PW 2, father lodged the FIR and all the  three accused were prosecuted for murder.      Relying  upon the evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 4 and  other circumstances  of  the  case the Trial  Court  came  to  the conclusion that the charge against all the three accused was made   out   by   prosecution   beyond   reasonable   doubt. Accordingly  the Trial Court convicted them  under  sections 302/34 and sentenced each of them to imprisonment for  life. The Trial Court also rejected the theory of accidental death of M.      The  accused preferred an appeal before the High  Court which  on re-evaluation and re-appreciation of the  evidence agreed with the Trial Court that the presence of PWs 1 and 4 on  the  scene of occurrence was probable  and  natural  but suspected    the   trustworthiness   of   their    evidence. Accordingly,  it  allowed  the  appeal  and  set  aside  the conviction  order  by  holding that  the  evidence  did  not disclose  the  involvement of the accused and  that  in  all probability the deceased M committed suicide.       The  state  preferred  an  appeal  before  this  Court challenging the High Court’s decision.      Allowing the appeal, this Court,      HELD  : 1. While appreciating  circumstantial  evidence the  court  must adopt a very cautious approach  and  should record  a conviction only if all the links in the chain  are complete pointing to the guilt of the                                                   39 accused  and  every hypothesis of innocence  is  capable  of being  negatived on evidence.  Great care must be  taken  in evaluating  circumstantial  evidence  and  if  the  evidence relied  on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the  one in favour of the accused must be accepted.  The circumstance relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the  cumulative effect of all the facts so established  must be  consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.  But  this is  not to say that the prosecution must meet any and  every hypothesis  put forward by the accused  however  far-fetched and fanciful it might be.  Not does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law  permits  rejection if the doubt is reasonable  and  not otherwise. [46D-E]      2.  The  presumption  of innocence of  the  accused  is strengthened, certainly not weakened, by their acquittal and ordinarily this Court is slow to interfere with an order  of acquittal  in  exercise of its  extraordinary  powers  under Article 136 of the Constitution, but in the instant case the approach of the High court has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice.  Therefore it is not possible for this Court  to refuse to interfere when a gruesome crime is committed which

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has resulted in the extinction of a young mother to be. [46- F, 48-D]      3.  The approach of the High Court was  wholly  against the  weight of evidence.  Since PWs 1 and 4  were  occupying the  ground  floor  of the building of which A  and  M  were occupying  the  first floor their presence at  the  time  of occurrence cannot be doubted. They had no reason to  falsely implicate the accused persons and have disclosed vital facts such  as the arrival of accused-husband’s father and  sister hot  on the heels of the return of deceased M from  Banaras, quarrels  and beating which had taken place in the past  and immediately before the incident between the accused  persons on the one hand and the deceased M on the other, and all the three accused having come out shouting ‘fire fire’ when  the deceased  was afire and none of the accused having  gone  to her rescue.  The conduct of the three accused persons in not trying to save deceased M and in showing total  indifference to her fate speaks volumes of their culpability.  [48-C, 44- B, 47-C, 44-G-H, 46-A]      3.1  All  the  circumstances of  the  case  when  taken together  leave  no room for doubt that  the  three  accused persons were the joint authors of the crime. Accordingly the order of acquittal passed by the High Court is set aside and the  order  of conviction and sentence passed by  the  Trial Court is restored. [48-C, E]                                                   40

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal  No. 464 of 1979.      From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  8.3.1978  of  the Allahabad High  Court in Criminal Appeal No. 913 of 1976.      Shiv Pujan Singh and A.S. Pundir for the Appellants.      R.K. Garg and Anil K. Gupta for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      AHMADI,  J. Meera Srivastava, a young woman aged  about 25 years.  died of burns on the night between 20th and  21st July,  1974 at about 2.30 a.m. in the two room apartment  of her husband Ashok Kumar Srivastava, original accused No. 1. The  marriage had taken place less than a year ago on  13th May,  1973 at Banaras.  Both the family of the deceased  and the family of the husband hail from Banaras but after  their wedding  Ashok who was serving as an Assistant Engineer  was transferred  to Lucknow where he had hired a two room  first floor  apartment  for his residence.  The ground  floor  was occupied by the landlord.  The first Information Report  was lodged  by PW 2 J.P. Shrivastava, father of the  unfortunate woman, after he rushed by taxi to Lucknow on learning  about the  incident.  The offence of murder was registered and  in the course of investigation statements of PW 1 Prabhat Kumar and  PW  4  Rajendra Prasad, both brothers  residing  on the ground  floor  came  to be recorded.   Statements  of  other witnesses including PW 3 Ram Raj Mishra, a fire brigade man, and PW 5 S.K. Srivastava, brother of the deceased, were also recorded.  On a consideration of the evidence of PWs 1 to  5 as well as the evidence of PW 9 Dr R.K. Aggarwal, the  Trial Court,  bearing in mind other circumstances pointed  out  in the judgment, came to the conclusion that the charge against the three accused was brought home by the prosecution beyond reasonable  doubt.   On  that  conclusion  the  Trial  Court convicted  all  the  three  accused  persons  under  Section 302/34,  I.P.C., and sentenced each of them to  imprisonment for life.  Feeling aggrieved by this order of conviction and

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sentence recorded by the learned Additional Sessions  Judge, Lucknow,  the  three accused persons  preferred  an  appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 913/1976, to the High Court,  That appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court which on  a  re-evaluation and reappreciation of  the  prosecution evidence came to the conclusion that in all probability  the deceased  Meera committed suicide and the evidence  did  not disclose  the involvement of the appellants/accused  in  the commission  of the crime.  In that view that the High  Court took, the  High Court allowed the                                                     41 appeal,  set  aside the order of conviction  and  order  and sentence  passed  by the Trial Court and acquitted  all  the three appellants/accused.  The State of U.P., not  satisfied by  the judgment rendered by the High Court approached  this Court  under  Article 136 of the Constitution.   This  Court granted Special Leave to Appeal and that is how the  present appeal is before us.  In order to understand the prosecution case we may now state the facts in brief.      Meera and Ashok, both residents of Banaras, were married on 13th May, 1973 at Banaras.  On Ashok being transferred to Lucknow, they occupied a two room apartment of house  number 557/17K.  Ashok and his wife were occupying the first  floor whereas  PW 1 and PW 4, the two sons of Kedar Singh to  whom the   house  belonged,  occupied  the  ground  floor.    The prosecution  case  is that at the time  of  and  immediately after the marriage there was some bickering in regard to the quantum of dowry paid by the bride’s father.  The allegation is  that the father and sister of Ashok were  not  satisfied with  the  dowry  or expenditure incurred on  gifts  by  the father  of the deceased Meera.  They were of the  view  that what was paid in cash as well as by way of gifts at the time of ‘Tilak’ was short by about Rs. 4,000.  On account of this feeling  the  three accused were taunting the  deceased  and when  she tried to defend her father she was  tormented  and tortured  by the accused persons.  On 13th July,  1974  both ashok and Meera had gone to Banaras.  While  they were there this question of dowry once again raised its head and it  is alleged that even on that occasion the father and sister  of Ashok  misbehaved with Meera and her father and stated  that they  would  not allow Meera to live with Ashok  unless  Rs. 4,000  were paid towards dowry.  It appears that after  this exchange  of  heated words Ashok left for  Lucknow  on  18th July,  1974  leaving  Meera  behind.   Meera  was  naturally perturbed.   She wanted to follow him but her  father-in-law did  not  permit  her.  She then went to the  house  of  her friend  Madhu and from there called her brother PW 5  Sushil Kumar  Srivastava and told him she desired to go to  Lucknow as  she  wanted  to find out the attitude  of  her  husband. Despite  PW 5 advising her not to go to Lucknow in  view  of the threats administered by the father and sister of  Ashok, she  went to Lucknow on 20th July, 1974 to the house of  her husband.  PW 5 left her there and returned to Banaras by the 2.00  p.m. by Punjab Mail.  On learning about Meera’s  visit to  Lucknow  the  father and sister of Ashok  also  went  to Lucknow.   The prosecution case is that after  they  reached Lucknow all the three quarrelled and beat Meera  during  the day  and  in the dead of night at about 2.30 or  2.45  a.m., they  sprinkled  kerosene on her and set  her  ablaze.   The house was occupied by Ashok, his father Rajendra Lal and his sister  Sudha when the incident occurred.  According to  the prosecution  at the dead of night these three  persons  came out of the room shouting ‘fire-fire’ and stood in the  front verandah of the  house  while  Meera                                                       42

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was  still in flames.  No effort whatsoever was made by  any of them to extinguish the flames or to rescue her.  PW 1 and PW  4 on hearing the shouts came out of their house.   PW  1 ran  up  to see what had happened.  He was shocked  to  find that Meera was in flames and the three accused persons  were standing  in the verandah talking to each other  unconcerned about  the plight of the woman.  PW 1 thereafter ran to  the nearby  fire  brigade station and informed the  staff  there about  the incident. PW 4 had followed p. W. 1 upstairs.  He saw the incident  from  place where  he was not  visible  to the accused persons.  He saw the accused carry Meera to  the next room and after a while brought her back with the tongue protruding  out.  PW 1 returned with the  fire-brigade  men. The  fireman,  PW  3  Ram Raj Mishra,  carried  Meera  on  a stretcher  to the van and then to the Civil Hospital  Hazzat Ganj  but the Medical Officer there could not admit her  for want  of a vacant bed.  She was therefore sent to  Balrampur hospital  where  the  doctor declared her  dead.   This,  in brief,  is  the  prosecution version  regarding  the  actual incident.      The father of the girl was informed about the  incident and  as no train was immediately available, he hired a  taxi and  came  to  Lucknow.  He went straight to  the  place  of occurrence.   Since he was a stranger he talked  to  certain persons,  including  PW 1, and thereafter lodged  his  First Information  Report, Ka-I, at about 7.00 p. m. at Alam  Bagh Police Station, Lucknow.  Prior thereto it may be  mentioned that PW 3 Ram Raj Mishra had taken the three accused persons to the hospital and after they were free from there  Ashok’s father  went  to the police station at about  6.15  p.m.  to lodge  a  report about his daughter-in-law’s  death  due  to burns.This  is how the report Exh. Kha-I and the F.I.R.  Exh Ka-I came to be recorded.      The prosecution placed reliance on the evidence of PW 1 to PW 5 and PW 9 DR. Aggarwal who undertook the post  mortem examination  to  bring  home the  guilt  against  the  three accused.   On  the  basis  of  their  evidence  and  the  21 circumstances  enumerated  by  the learned  Trial  Judge,  a conviction under  Section 302/34, I.P.C. was recorded.      The  Trial  Court came to the  conclusion  that  having regard  to  the  time at which  the  incident  occurred  the presence of PW 1 and PW 4 at the place of occurrence is  not only  probable  but also natural.  He did  not  doubt  their testimony when they deposed that they saw the three  accused persons  standing  in the verandah chit-chatting  with  each other  totally indifferent to the plight of Meera who was an fire.   It  also accepted the testimony of PW  4  that  when Meera was dragged to the smaller room her tongue was  inside the  mouth,  but when she was brought back, her  tongue  was protruding  out, thereby suggesting that the  three  accused persons made sure her life was                                                   43 extinct   by   strangulating   her.    This   inference   is corroborated  by medical evidence.  It also found  that  the evidence of PW 3 corroborated the evidence of PWs 1 and 4 to some  extent.   It held that the F.I.R. was  lodged  without delay  and since PW 2 was a total stranger, the  absence  of names  of  witnesses cannot weaken it.  The motive  for  the crime  was  dowry.  This  fact was  found  proved  from  the evidence  of  PWs 1, 2, 4 and 5.  The fact  that  Meera  was carrying twins in her womb since six months is proved beyond doubt.   The  theory of accidental death had to  be  brushed aside  in view of the presence of kerosene on the  scalp  of the deceased.  Of the two remaining possibilities, the Trial Court  came  to the conclusion that the evidence  placed  on

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record  proved beyond doubt that death was homicidal as  (i) her  tongue  was protruding out (ii) there was  presence  of kerosene  and (iii) her stomach was empty.  In this view  of the  evidence,  the  learned  Trial  Judge  relying  on  the evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 4 and the 21 circumstances set  out in  the judgment came to the conclusion that the  cumulative effect  of the evidence led one to the only conclusion  that the  accused  persons had done Meera to  death.   Particular emphasis  was  laid on the unnatural conduct  of  the  three accused  persons.  The fact that accused Rajinder and  Sudha followed  Meera to Lucknow and yet they tried to tell a  lie on this point betrayed a guilty conscience.  The absence  of an  ‘angithi’ in the kitchen, the protruding of  the  tongue and  the  absconding of the accused  immediately  after  the incident supplied links to the prosecution version regarding the  incident.  On the basis of this evidence,  the  learned trial  Judge  convicted  all the three  accused  persons  of murder with the aid of Section 34, I.P.C.      On appeal, the High Court while agreeing with the Trial Court that the presence of PWs 1 and 4 was both probable and natural  doubted their testimony firstly on the ground  that their  names did not figure in the F.I.R. filed  by  Meera’s father even though they had spoken to him about the incident before  he  lodged the F.I.R. The High Court  observes  that this meant that both the witnesses did not disclose anything incriminating the accused persons, for otherwise such  facts would  have found a mention in the F.I.R.  On the  basis  of this  inference drawn by the High Court  on account  of  the absence of their names in the F.I.R. the High Court came  to the  conclusion that PWs 1 and 4 had falsely implicated  the accused  persons  at the behest of Meera’s  father  and  his acquaintances  and  hence  their  evidence  was  not  beyond suspicion.   The High Court points out the PW 1 hailed  from Qadirabad of Banaras District which village was adjacent  to village  Ghauspur where the complainant’s niece was  married to  one Bansidhar who happened to be a friend of the  family of  PWs 1 and 4.  One Inspector, Vijay Pratap Singh,  posted at  Lucknow was a ‘pattidar’ of that family and through  him Meera’s father had approached the investigating Officer  who in turn succeeded in                                                   44 persuading PWs 1 and 4 testify against the accused  persons. Once  the High Court suspected the trustworthiness of PWs  1 and 4 it brushed aside the various circumstances pointed out in the judgment of the Trial Court and acquitted the accused persons.  The question is whether this approach of the  High Court can be sustained?      As pointed out earlier since PWs 1 and 4 were occupying the ground floor of the building of which Ashok and his wife were  occupying the first floor, their presence at the  time of  occurrence  cannot  be doubted.  Nor  have  the  accused denied  their presence in their statements.  Even  according to  the  theory put up the defence the accused  persons  had come  out  shouting  ‘fire-fire and, therefore,  it  is  not surprising  that PWs 1 and 4 woke up from their sleep. PW  1 immediately  rushed to the first floor to find out what  had happened.  PW 4 followed him and placed himself at  a  point from where he was not visible to the accused persons.   Both these witnesses have deposed that after Ashok and Meera came to occupy the first floor there used to be frequent quarrels between them on the question of insufficiency of dowry. Both of  them have deposed that the accused used to beat her  and she used to confide in their sister.  They also deposed that the  father  and sister of Ashok had come  to  Lucknow  from Banaras after Meera’s brother, PW 5, had left her at Lucknow

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and  returned to Banaras.  The evidence of PWs 2 and 5,  the father  and  brother  of  Meera,  shows  that  before  Meera returned to Lucknow there were quarrels between the  accused persons  on the one side and she and her family  members  on the  other regarding insufficiency of dowry.  It  was  after heated exchanges on this account that Ashok left for Lucknow on  18th July, 1974.  Meera entreated her  father-in-law  to allow her to go to Lucknow but the latter refused and stated that  she would have to rot at Banaras unless the dowry  was made  good.  Meera, therefore, went to the residence of  her friend Madhu, and from there she sent for her brother PW  5. When  her father-in-law returned to the house and found  her missing  he was annoyed and went to the house of her  father and quarreled with him.  Immediately thereafter he and Sudha left for Lucknow and during the day beat and quarreled  with Meera.   Her husband too joined them.  The absence  of  food matter  in the stomach and small intestines of  Meera  shows that  she  did not take her dinner before she went  to  bed. Ultimately  between  2.30  and  2.45  a.m.  the  unfortunate incident took place.  PWs 1 and 4, therefore, disclose three vital  facts, namely, (i) the arrival of the Ashok’s  father and  sister  hot on the heels of the return  of  Meera  from Banaras,  (ii) quarrels and beating took place in  the  past and  immediately  before the incident  between  the  accused persons  on the one hand and Meera on the other,  and  (iii) all  the  three accused came out shouting  ‘fire-fire’  when Meera was afire at about 2.30 or 2.45 a.m. and none went  to her rescue. Counsel for the defence                                                     45 submitted  that  Meera  had  a  flicker  of  hope  that  her husband’s  attitude  would  be different from  that  of  her father-in-law  and sister-in-law but when she found that  he too shared their views she was frustrated and when every one was fast asleep she poured kerosene on herself and committed suicide.   This suggestion would have found favour  with  us had  the  conduct  of the accused  persons  been  consistent therewith.   The evidence of PWs 1 and 4 clearly shows  that after  the  accused persons came to reside in  their   house there  were frequent quarrels with Meera and she  was  being beaten by all the three.  Even on the evening of the fateful day  she was beaten and kicked by her husband and the  other two  as she was not wanted at Lucknow.  On the night of  the incident all the three accused persons came out of the house shouting  ‘fire-fire’ and stood in the verandah  unconcerned about  Meera’a  fate.   They were seen  chit-chatting  in  a casual  manner, by both the witnesses.  Besides it  must  be noticed that none of the three accused had any burn marks to suggest  that they had tried to go to the rescue  of  Meera. Since the body of Meera was lying in between the two  rooms, the possibility of Meera having Bolted one room from  inside must  be ruled out.  Search of the three accused was on  and accused Rajinder Lal and  Sudha could be apprehended on  the 23rd but accused Ashok was absconding and presented  himself as  late as 5th September, 1974 armed with  an  anticipatory bail  order.  He was clearly absconding and his  explanation that he had gone to Allahabad to fetch his pay slip must  be stated  to  be rejected.  One does not absent  oneself  from duty  for  more than one and a half months to  fetch  a  pay slip.  A lame and false explanation of this type only adds a link  in  the prosecution chain of  events.   Similarly  the false explanation of the other two accused that they had not followed Meera but had come a day before her arrival to  see an  ailing  relative  shows  their  anxiety  to  avoid   the situation  of having followed her for obvious  reasons.   No match  box was found on the floor but it was found  securely

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placed on the upper 6 feet high slab.  Then the statement of accused  Rajendra Lal to the police, kha-1, that  Meera  was taking her meals at 10.00 p.m. when he  retired is falsified by  the  absence of food material in her stomach  and  small intestines.   These  are added circumstances  on  which  the prosecution has justifiably relied.      Much  was tried to be made of the fact that it was  the accused  who gave the alarm of fire and informed the  police also  which  goes to show that they did not  have  a  guilty conscience.   This submission, however, overlooks  the  fact that  the apartment was a small two room apartment and  with smoke billowing from the clothes and the body of Meera  they were  virtually  forced out of the small  room  occupied  by them.  it is, therefore, not surprising that they flung open the door to the verandah and ran out for fresh air  shouting ‘fire-fire’. It was impossible to keep that information from the neighbours.                                                   46      The  intimation  to the police was also to  save  their skin as they would have known anyhow since PW 3 had  reached the  place  of occurrence.  Therefore, the  conduct  of  the three  accused  persons in not trying to save Meera  and  in showing total indifference to her fate which speaks  volumes of  their culpability cannot be explained away by the  above facts.   We,  are,  therefore,  not  impressed  by  the  two submissions made by counsel for the accused persons.  On the other hand, we find that in the background of facts  deposed to  by PWs 1 and 4 and their subsequent total indifference regarding  the  Meera’s  fate  certainly  betrays  a  guilty conscience as observed by the Trial Court.  So also we  find it difficult to accept the contention that the accused being highly  educated  (so  was Meera) would not  commit  such  a gruesome crime.  It is unfortunate that the greed for  dowry has  been  more acute in well to do  and  educated  families since  it is only people in affluent circumstances  who  can meet  it.  We cannot countenance such a submission  although that found favour with the High Court.      This Court has, time out of number, observed that while appreciating circumstantial evidence the Court must adopt  a very  cautious approach and should record a conviction  only if  all the links in the chain are complete pointing to  the guilt  of the accused and every hypothesis of  innocence  is capable of being negatived on evidence.  Great care must  be taken  in  evaluating  circumstantial evidence  and  if  the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two  inferences, the  one  in favour of the accused must  be  accepted.   The circumstance  relied upon must be found to have  been  fully established  and the cumulative effect of all the  facts  so established  must be consistent only with the hypothesis  of guilt.   But  this is not to say that the  prosecution  must meet  any  and every hypothesis put forward by  the  accused however  farfetched  and fanciful it might be. Nor  does  it mean  that  prosecution  evidence must be  rejected  on  the slightest  doubt  bacause the law permits rejection  if  the doubt  is  reasonable  and  not  otherwise.   We  are   also conscious  of the fact that the presumption of innocence  is strengthened, certainly not weakened, by their acquittal  by the  High  Court  and  ordinarily  this  Court  is  slow  to interfere  with  an order of acquittal in  exercise  of  its extraordinary powers under Section 136 of the  Constitution. However,  in  the  present case the facts  found  proved  as discussed earlier are (i) the accused were unhappy about the cash  and articles given by way of dowry at the time of  the ‘tilak’  ceremony  (ii) the accused taunted,  tormented  and tortured  Meera  for the insufficiency of the  dowry  amount

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(iii)a  few days before the incident while at Banaras  there was  a  heated argument and then Ashok returned  to  Lucknow without  Meera  (iv) Meera entreated  her  father-in-law  to permit  her to join Ashok but the latter refused saying  she will  have to rot at Banaras alone unless the  dowry  amount was made good (v) ignoring her father-in-law’s refusal Meera went                                                   47 to  Lucknow  (vi)  the two accused Rajendra  Lal  and  Sudha followed her to Lucknow (vii) while at Lucknow all the three illtreated her (viii) Meera was found on fire at about  2.30 or  2.45 a.m. (ix) while she was burning the  three  accused who alone were inside came out of the room and stood in  the verandah chit-chatting unconcerned about her plight (x)  none of  them tried to help Meera (xi) soon after that the  house was  locked and the accused could not be found  (xii)  while the two accused were apprehended on the 23rd Ashok could not be  traced till he surrendered on 5th September,  1974,  and (xiii) false explanation or statements were made to  explain away their conduct.      PWs  1  and 4 had no reason to  falsely  implicate  the accused  persons.  The suggestion that they  had  implicated them at the behest of Inspector, Vijay Pratap Singh, is  too far-fetched to be accepted.  Even according to the  evidence of PW 2, the father of Meera, he did not know them prior  to the incident.  This unfortunate father came to the scene  of occurrence  after  he was informed about the  death  of  his young   daughter.   He  naturally  went  to  the  place   of occurrence,  contacted the people there and talked to PWs  1 and  4.  He went back and lodged a complaint, Ext. Ka-1,  in which he did mention the presence of the house owner  though he  did not name them this is quite natural because  he  had not  enquired  of their names having regard to  the  strain, stress and tension in which he was at the relevant point  of time.   We  are afraid the High Court was not  justified  in coming  to the conclusion that they had been set up  at  the behest  of  Inspector  Vijay  Pratap  Singh  who  was  their pattidar.   We see no reason to disbelieve any part  of  the version given by PWs 1 and 4 except to say that perhaps  the evidence of PW 4 that Meera’s tongue was not protruding when she  was removed to the smaller room and the same was  found protruding  when  she brought back may  be  an  exaggeration based   on  medical  testimony.   We,  therefore,  find   it difficult  to  agree  with the High  Court  that  these  two witnesses  have  been  falsely set up  at  the  instance  of Inspector Vijay Pratap Singh to give false evidence  against the accused persons.  So far as the complainant and his  son are concerned they have not tried to exaggerate or introduce false  material  to  support the  prosecution  case.   Their testimony regarding the quarrels which took place on account of  insufficiency  of  dowry  stands  corroborated  by   the evidence  of  PWs  1  and 4  and  can  be  accepted  without hesitation.      The  evidence of PWs 1 and 4 is partly corroborated  by PW  3. Immediately after the fire was noticed and the  smoke was seen billowing out, PW 1 ran to the nearby fire  station and called the fire brigade. P.W. 3 arrived at the scene  of occurrence and he too saw the three accused persons standing in the verandah totally indifferent to what was happening to Meera.  He took                                                    48 the  victim Meera on a stretcher to the  Hospital.   Counsel for  the  defence tried to contend that the  fact  that  the accused  went to the hospital along with her  is  consistent with their innocence.   We are afraid we cannot accept  this

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submission   for  the  simple  reason  that  they   had   no alternative but to go along with the fireman since they were asked  to  do  so.  It was thereafter  that  Ashok’s  father lodged  the report Ext. Kha-1.  After the F.I.R. was  lodged by  Meera’s father foul play was suspected but by  then  the accused  had left.  The investigation ultimately led to  the arrest  of  the two accused other than Ashok  on  the  23rd. Ashok  was still untraced and no valid explanation is to  be found  for  his absence.  He secured anticipatory  bail  and thereafter  surrendered on 5th September, 1974.   It  would, therefore,  appear that he had made himself scarce for  over one and a half months.  This is a circumstance which betrays guilty  conscience.   In  addition  thereto,  a  number   of circumstances have been pointed out by the Trial Judge which taken  together  leave  no room for  doubt  that  the  three accused  persons  were the joint authors of the  crime.   We have  no  hesitation,  whatsoever, in  concluding  that  the approach of the High Court was wholly against the weight  of evidence and it is impossible to approve the same.      ordinarily,  in  an  acquittal this Court  is  slow  to interfere  while exercising power under Article 136  of  the Constitution but here we find that the approach of the  High Court  has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice.  It  is not  possible for this Court to refuse to interfere  when  a gruesome  crime  is  committed which has  reassured  in  the extinction of a young mother to be.      In  the  result, we allow this appeal,  set  aside  the order of acquittal passed by the High Court and restore  the order of conviction and sentence passed by Trial Court.  The accused will surrender to their bail forthwith. T.N.A.                                      Appeal allowed.                                                   49