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PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: L.J. JOHNSON AND ANOTHER, ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/09/1983

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA THAKKAR, M.P. (J)

CITATION:  1983 AIR 1303            1983 SCR  (3) 897  1983 SCC  (4) 110        1983 SCALE  (2)292  CITATOR INFO :  RF&E       1992 SC1567  (8,11,15)

ACT:      Urban Land  (Ceiling &  Regulation) Act, 1976-Sec. 4(9) read with  s. Z(g)  (ii) and  (iii)-Interpretation  of-Land- Partly built  and partly open-Principles for determining the ceiling area.  Holding of  separate plot  of open  land  not necessary to attract s. 4(9).      Words & Phrases-’land appurtenant’, and ’appurtenances’ - explained.

HEADNOTE:      The first  respondent in  civil appeal No. 2005 of 1982 had a  parcel of  land measuring  2530  sq.  metres  with  a building constructed  on a  small portion of it, in an urban agglomeration falling  within category specified in Schedule I of  the Urban  Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. As the aforesaid  first respondent  wanted to sell some portion of the  open land,  he sought  permission from the competent authority for  that purpose. The competent authority refused to give permission on the ground that the total area of land in his  possession exceeded  the cieling  limit of  2000 sq. metres prescribed  by the  Act for  that area. In appeal the District Judge  held that  the first respondent was entitled to exclude 500 sq. metres in view of the bye-laws prevailing in that  area and  another 500 sq. metres for the beneficial and convenient  enjoyment of  the building  to  satisfy  the requirement of  the town planning and environmental purposes and since  after excluding these portions of the areas there was no  excess and  the land was not covered by the Act, the refusal of  permission by  the competent  authority was  not legally valid.  In a  writ petition  filed by  the State the High Court strongly relied on the provisions of s. 4(9) read with s.  2. 2(q)(ii)  of the  Act and upheld the decision of the District  Judge. The  State challenged  the High Court’s interpretation of  the principles  laid down  in the Act for computing the  ceiling area.  The facts of other appeals and petitions were similar.      Allowing the  appeals and  petitions; disapproving  the view taken  by the District Judge and the High Court; laying down the  method of  computing the  ceiling area and sending back  the   cases  to   competent  authority  to  get  fresh

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computations done. ^      HELD:  It  is  clear  that  there  can  be  only  three categories of Urban lands      (1)  land which is entirely open in the sense that           it  does  not  contain  any  construction  of           building, 898      (2)   where the entire land is covered by building           or dwelling house, and      (3)   land on  a part of which there is a building           with or  without a  dwelling unit thereon ant           the rest of the land is vacant. [907 F-H]      So  far   as  the   first  category  is  concerned,  no complexity is  because any  open area  in excess of 2000 sq. metres  in  category  States  will  be  taken  over  by  the Government.  For   instance,  if   an  open   land   without construction consists of 6000 sq. metres, the computation of the ceiling  area would  present no  difficulty because 4000 sq. metres will be taken over by the Government and 2000 sq. metres will  be left  to the  landholder. Secondly,  if  the entire land  is covered  by a  building, such  an area would completely fall outside tho ambit of the Act and no question of computation would arise. Thirdly, a question arises as to what would  happen if  there is  a land  on a  part of which there is  a building  with a dwelling unit and an area (open land) which  is appurtenant  thereto is vacant. Section 4(9) of  the  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,  1976 provides for meeting such a contingency. [907 H, 908 A-C]      Section 4(9) contemplates that if a person holds vacant land as  also other  portion of  land on  which there  is  a building with  a dwelling  unit, the extent of land occupied by the  building and  the land  appurtenant thereto shall be taken into  account in  calculating the extent of the vacant land. This sub section has to be read in conjunction with s. 2 (q) (ii) and (iii), which defines ’vacant land’. [908 D-G]      The plain language in which sub-s. (9) of s. 4 had been expressed clearly  shows that  when the legislature used the word ’appurtenant’,  it meant  to qualify the land which was occupied by  the building.  The words  ’appurtenant thereto’ qualify the building which precedes the land. The expression appurtenant’ shows  that the  legislature intended  that  in taking into  consideration the land, it must be the land not contiguous or  close to  the building  but the  very land on which the  building stands. Similarly, the words ’other land occupied by  the building’ also lead to the same conclusion. [909 H, 910 A-B]      Taking the  legal and  dictionary meaning  of the  word ’appurtenant’ or  ’appurtenances’ the inescapable conclusion is that  the words  ’either other land or appurtenances’ are meant to  indicate that  the land in question should form an integral part  of the  main land  containing the building in question. [911 E-P]      Words &  Phrases, Legally  Defined (Vol. 1-2nd Edn.) at p. 105;  Words & Phrases, Judicially Defined (Vol. I); Words JUDGMENT: Stroud’s Judicial  Dictionary Third Edn., at p. 176 referred to.      Bearing in  mind the  well settled rule of construction that the  language of a beneficial statute must be construed so as  to suppress the mischief and advance its object there could be  no other  interpretation of the words "appurtenant or other  land" than  that the  land appurtenant means not a land contiguous 899

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to some  other land but the very land which is a part of the same plot  or area  which contains  the building or dwelling house. This  also seems  to be the avowed object of s. 4(9). [911 G-H]      The scheme  of the  Act seems  to be that if there is a constructed building  with a  dwelling unit,  the  structure thereon cannot  be treated  as open  land for the purpose of declaring it  as an  excess land  beyond the  ceiling limit. Similarly,  the   land  kept   open  under   the   municipal regulations (upto  500 sq. metres) and an additional 500 sq. metres appurtenant  to the  land would  not be available for being declared as excess land beyond the ceiling limit. [912 G-H]      The High  Court was  absolutely wrong  in importing the concept of  contiguity on  the assumption  that s.  4(9) was attracted only  if the  person  concerned  held  a  distinct parcel of land which was vacant land. The argument that once a plot  contains a  building, the whole of the plot would be exempt from  the ceiling  area cannot  be countenanced  on a plain and simple interpretation of s. 2 (q) ii) read with s. 4(9). Section  4(9) would be attracted regardless of whether the landholder  owned a distinct part of land on which there is no construction along with any other parcel of land where there is some construction. [913 D-F]      A combined  reading of  s. 4(9)  and s.  2 (q) (ii) and (iii) would lead to the irresistible inference that in cases which fall  within the  third category  mentioned above  for determining the ceiling area the-      (1)   total area  of the  land of  a landholder is           first to be determined and if the total area,           built or unbuilt, falls below 2000 sq. metres           in category areas, there would be no question           of any excess land,      (2)   where, however,  there is  a building  and a           dwelling  unit  then  the  area  beneath  the           building and  the dwelling unit would have to           be  excluded  while  computing  the  ceiling.           Further if there are any bye-laws requiring a           portion of  the land  to be  kept vacant, the           landholder would  be allowed to set apart the           said land  to the  maximum extent  of 500 sq.           metres. Ho would also be allowed to retain an           additional area  of 500  sq. metres  for  the           beneficial use of the building so that he may           enjoy the  use of  a little compound also for           various purposes. [912 B-E]      After excluding these items if the land falls below the ceiling limit  there would  be no  question of excess but if there is  excess that  is beyond the ceiling limit, the same would have to be taken over by the Government. [912 E]      Where, however,  it is  found  that  any  person  holds vacant  land   in  two   or   more   categories   of   urban agglomerations specified  in Schedule I, the computation and determination of  ceiling area  is to  be done in accordance with the  formula laid  down in cl. (a) to (d) of g. 4(1) of tho Act. [915 E-F] 900      Where a  person  has  several  plots,  some  completely vacant  and   some  partly  built  and  partly  vacant,  for computation of the ceiling area the competent authority will have to  total the  entire area  of  the  lands  in  various places, completely  vacant or partly built and partly vacant and permit  the landholder to retain 2000 sq. metres or less as provided  in clauses  (a) to  (d) of s. 4(1) and give the landholder the option (as provided under s. 6) to select the

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area which  he desires  to retain  provided  that  does  not exceed the ceiling limit.                                             [915 H, 916 A-C]      M/s. Eastern Oxygen & Acetylene Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1981 MP 17, approved.      State of  Uttar Pradesh  & Anr. v. L. J. Johnson & Anr. (1979) All. LJ 1222, overruled.      In Civil  Appeal No.  2005 of  1982 on the facts of the case, in  order to  determine the computation of the ceiling area, first  exclude the  built area which is 464 sq. metres and then  exclude the deductions allowed under s. 2(g) i.e., 1000 sq.  metres. Therefore,  the total  deduction would  be 1464 sq.  metres which  is within  the ceiling limit of 2000 sq. metres  but as actual area is 2530 sq. metres the excess would be  530 sq.  metres which  will be  taken over  by the State [914 C-E]

&      CIVIL  APPELLATE   JURISDICTION:  Civil   Appeal   Nos. 2005/82,  995,  1021-27180,  2927-28/81,  2006-07,  2008-24, 2025, 2026-27,  2028, 2029,  2030-33, 2176,  2179,  2180-84, 2234, 2235,  2241, 2178, 3224-28 and 2832/82 and 6840, 6943, 6842, 6846,  6847-52, 6855-6860,  6861,  6863,  6870,  6871, 6873-80, 6882,  6889, 6890-92,  6881, 6845, 6872, 6883-6888, 6899-6915, 6918, 6919-22, 6923-6943, 6945-54, 6969-76, 7174- 7200, 7342-7347,  7202-45, 7247-54,  7257-83, 7296,  7297 to 7311, 7313,  7314-7333, 7201, 7335-7340, 8211-8217, 8218-23, 8224, -  8230, 8231, 8243, 8245-8256, 8261, 8260, 8262-8265, 8296-8329, 8337-59, 8375-76, 8377-8377C. 8378-8385 of 1983.      Appeals by  Special leave  & by  Certificate  from  the Judgments and  orders dated  the  30th  October,  1978,  8th November, 1978, 12, 15, 16th January, 1979, 8th, 12th, 17th, 21st, 23rd February, 1979, 2nd, 5th, 12th, 26th, 30th March, 1979, 2nd,  4th, 17th,  23rd, 25th,  26th April,  1979, 2nd, 7th, 9th,  10th, 16th  May, 1979, 4th, 5th, 6th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 23rd  July, 1979,  11th, 14th,  18th, 26th  September, 1979, 24th  October, 1979, 5th, 8th and 21st November, 1979, 10th,  12th,  18th  December,  1979  and  15th,  16th,  21st January, 1980,  14th, 17th, 18th, 20th, 21st, 26th, 27th and 28th March,  1980, 1st,  15th, 30th  April, 1980,  5th  May, 1980, 30th  June, 1980,  4th, 5th, 14th, 19th, 20th and 28th August, 1980., 2nd, 5th, 15th September, 1980, 12th January, 1981, 10th 901 February, 1981, 9th, 11th, 13th March, 1981, 2nd, 8th, 11th, 18th, 21st  May, 1981,  7th, 20th  July, 1981,  7th  August, 1981, 25th,  28th, 29th  September, 1981,  12th, 15th, 16th, 19th, 21st,  23rd October,  1981, 2nd,  3rd 4th,  6th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 17th, 23rd, 24th. 27th November, 1981, 1st, 2nd, 23rd December,  1981, 11th,  18th, 26th February, 1982, 1st, 15th March,  1982, 5th April, 1982, 21st and 27th, May, 1952 of The  Allahabad  High  Court  in  Civil  Misc.  Writ  Nos. 3689/77, 7722/79,  6315, 6319, 6322, 6326, 6327, 6329, 5059, 5060, of  1979, 7392/78,  6286/78, 8264,  8265, 8266,  8651, 8654, 8655,  8659, 8660, 8661, 8696, 8697, 8698, 8765, 8766, 8767, 8773,  8774, 8653, 8259, 8210, 8258, 6288, 6690, 8263, 7394-95, 6287,  4104, 6302, 7393, 7739, 7743, 7744. of 1978, 4902/79, 339/79,  1167/78, 1860/78,  4772-4776/79,  2976/76. 8647, 4106/78,  5217/77, 8257/78,  8268, 8652,  8656,  8658, 8699, 8769,  7399, 7400, 7401, 8261, 8270, 8274, 6283, 6693, 4248, 5828,  6695/78, 1387,  3262, 537, 1459/79, 5820, 4249, 1086, 5081,  3028, 4725-28/79,  6692, 6694,  5824/78,  3027, 3030, 3031.  3032, 3033, 3035/79, 1419/77, 5827/78, 4105/78,

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5825/78, 5237,  6189, 6633,  6634/79, 7396/77,  6190,  7049, 5232, 5233,  5234-38, 4903/79,  8768/78, 1612,  2316,  2312, 2775, 2776-78/79,  8271-72178, 1385,  1390,  1392,  1446-51, 2513-15, 2520,  2521, 1388-89,  1391, 2530,  2869,  1467-75, 2529, 1123,  2779-81, 2868,  3263-3264, 3658,  3307, 345179, 10359, 10353-58,  10360/78, 2516-18,  2522 and  2532,  1451- 1462. 1464-1466,  1455-60/7745/78, 344/79, 1184, 1586, 5823, 5833178, 694,  697-712, 841-842,  843, and  893/79, 2060-67, 2068-2070, 8267,  442, 443,  446-52, 481,  538/79,  8829-32, 8862-8864, 8910, 8912/78, 340-42/79, 5192, 5225, 5822, 6282, 6284-85, 6303,  7731, 7742/78, 2953-56, 2519, 3654-55, 1548, 1705,  1708-09,  8833,  6314,  6318,  6321,  3402,  1706-07, 1710/79, 5831/78,  7993, 6339,  6331, 6333-36,  6338,  6340, 9432, 9431, 8345, 9430, 7989/79, 4247/78, 10558/79, 2883/80, 596, 2689,  2888, 1938, 2581, 2580, 5364/80, 10563, 5830/79, 3245/80,  7738/79,   447/80,  2755,   1712,  2895,  7173/80, 8510/79, 1939/801  7429, 7903, 3604, 6190, 7911, 3338, 1937, 3933/80, 8273/70,  5369/80, 7163/80,  356/81, 2803, 2804-06, 2125/81, 595/80,  2803/79, 2804,  3656/79,  10723/80,  9382, 8430, 8192,  9595, 8286, 8429, 9383/80, 6625/81, 6626, 6624, 5600/88,  7983/80,  11296/80,  8408/81,  5257/80,  10093/80, 1453/79, 1942/80,  1943, 1940, 2352, 7172, 5260/80, 9134/78, 4456/79, 9744/78, 4107/78, 2790, 517580/80, 646/819 6609/80, 5257/79, 650/81,  10406/80,  338,  8278,  5456/79,  8262/78, 6332/79, 3555,  250, 9629/81,  442/80, 648/81,  5258,  5253, 196/81, 3244/79,  5256,  6354,  2392/81,  8277/79,  8348/79, 6353, 7714,  7726, 6352,  6317/81, 8347,  3034/79,  1454/80, 10633/80,  8879/80,  14320/81,  1063/80,  6064/79,  3605/80, 14990/81, 75/82, 2853/82, 902 3933/80,  3758/82,   8681/81,  5258/80,   7598/80,  7234-35, 7237/80, 2978:  2974/80, 1956/82, 5256/80, 2831/82, 3430/82, 7594/80 and 2778 of 79      For The Appellants:      Dr. L.M.  Singhvi Prathvi Raj, B.P. Maheshwari and B.P. Singh      For The Respondents:      S.N. Kacker,  R.K Jain  Dr.  Y.S.  Chitale,  Dr.  Meera Agarwal and R.C. Mishra in CAs. 994 & 1021-1027 of 1980.      Pramod Swarup and Arun Madan in CA. 2026-2027 of 1982.      A.K Srivastava in CA. 208-2024 of 1980.      S.K. Bisaria,  Pradeep Misra and Sudhir Kulshreshtha in CA. 2176/82.      R.N. Sharma and N.N. Sharma in CA. 7191/83 @ SLP. 2350/80.      Probir Mitra in CA. 2178 of 1982.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J. Wedded  to  the  ideal  of  achieving  a socialist pattern  of State  and building  up an egalitarian society as  mandated in  the Preamble of the Constitution of India and incorporated in the directive principles contained in part  IV, which  are indeed  the heart  and soul  of  the Constitution as held by this Court on several occasions, the Central Government  brought forth  the  present  legislation called the Urban Land -(Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act No. 33  of 1976)  (hereinafter referred to as the ’Act’). To avoid  anomalies   and   controversies,   inequalities   and inconsistencies, the Central Government obtained the consent of the  State Governments  so as to pass a central law which would apply  equally to  all the  States. The Act applies to the States  and Union  Territories and  contains a  schedule (Schedule I) in which the ceiling of urban 903 areas has been mentioned and which differs from area to area in’ various  States and  Union territories  to which the Act

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applies.      In the  first phase  at the hearing of the appeals, the constitutional validity  of the  Act was  challenged but the Constitution Bench  upheld the  validity of  the Act  in the case of  Union of  India, etc. v. V.B. Chaudhry etc. etc.(1) It is  therefore manifest  that the  challenge to the Act no longer survives.      The Act  was sought  to be  implemented by  the  States which empowered  the competent  authority to  determine  the ceiling area  in accordance  with the  provisions of the Act and take  over the  excess land.  In  due  fairness  to  the citizens, the Act provides an appeal to a judicial authority (District Judge)  to examine the correctness of the decision of the competent authority.      In the instant case the matter has travelled right from the competent  authority to the’ High Court and the case has been placed  before us  for judging  the correctness  of the grounds taken  by the  High Court  in determining the excess area of  lands which  come within  the ambit  of the ceiling fixed by  the Act.  We propose to decide all the 200 and odd appeals and  the  special  leave  petitions  by  one  common judgment as  the question of law relating to the interpreta- tion of  the principles contained in the various sections of the Act to determine the ceiling area is more or less common to all the appeals.      Before we  proceed to detail the relevant provisions of the Act,  we would like to point out the aims and objects of the Act in the light of which the pivotal provisions have to interpreted. The  aims and  objects  are  contained  in  the Preamble of  the Act,  the relevant portions of which may be extracted thus:           "An Act  to provide  for the  imposition of a      ceiling on  vacant land  in urban  agglomerations,      for the  acquisitions, for the acquisition of such      land in  excess of  the ceiling limit, to regulate      the construction of buildings on such land and for      matters  connected   therewith,  with  a  view  to      preventing the  concentration of urban land in the      hands  of   a  few  persons  and  speculation  and      profiteering 904      therein and  with  a  view  to  brining  about  an      equitable   distribution    of   land   in   urban      agglomerations to subserve the common good.           WHEREAS it  is expedient  to provide’ for the      imposition of  a ceiling  on vacant  land in urban      agglomerations, for  the acquisition  of such land      in excess  of the  ceiling limit,  to regulate the      construction of  buildings ’on  such land  and for      matters  connected   therewith,  with  a  view  to      preventing the  concentration of urban land in the      hands  of   a  few  persons  and  speculation  and      profiteering therein  and with  a view to bringing      about an  equitable distribution  of land in urban      agglomerations to subserve the common good."      The opening  words of  the preamble,  viz., An  Act  to provide for  the imposition  of a  ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations"  clearly indicate  that the  pith  and substance of  the Act is that a ceiling should be imposed on vacant lands  situated in  urban areas  which may or may not have building constructed thereon. Side by  side  the  other dominant object  to be  achieved seems  to be to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons so as to  checkmate speculation and profiteering therein on the one hand  and to  bring about  an equitable  distribution of

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land amongst  the urban population. The second clause of the preamble merely  repeats and  stresses what  is contained in the opening part.      Analysing, therefore,  the real  object which  ’the Act seeks to achieve, it seems to us that the provisions have to be  construed   against  the  background  of  two  important considerations:-      (1)   that the  vacant land must be situated in an           urban rather than a rural area, and      (2)   that even  in those  portions of  urban land           which contain  buildings, substantial  relief           should  be   given  to   the  owner  for  the           beneficial enjoyment  of  the  property  left           with him so that the Act may not be dubbed as           being of a confiscatory nature.      Moreover, the  Act governs  only urban  vacant lands or lands which  contain building or dwelling units or outhouses and the areas 905 set apart  in compliance with the respective byelaws have to be taken  into account  while  computing  the  ceiling  area applicable to the towns and territories concerned      Before discusing  the problem  in L.J.  Johnson’s  case which has  given rise  to these appeals, we would first like to give  a birds  eye view  of the various provisions of the Act which  are relevant  to the  decisions of these appeals. The relevant  provisions in  this case  are  sections  2(c), 2(q)(ii), 3  and 4(9). Section 2(c) states that the ’ceiling limit’ means  the ceiling  limit specified  in s. 4(1). This brings us to s. 4(1) at once. The various clauses of s. 4(1) (a) to  (d) prescribe ceiling limits in urban agglomerations falling within different which may be extracted thus:           "4(1) -  Subject to  the other  provisions of      this section,  in the  case of  every person,  the      ceiling limit shall be-           (a)   where that vacant land is situated in an                urban   agglomeration    falling   within                category A  specified in Schedule I, five                hundred square metres;           (b)   where such  land is situated in an urban                agglomeration  falling   within  category                specified in  Schedule  I,  one  thousand                square metres;           (c)   where such  land is  situated  in  an  urban                agglomeration   falling    within    category                specified in  Schedule I,  one thousand  five                hundred square metres;           (d)   where such  land is situated in an urban                agglomeration  falling   within  category                specified in  Schedule  I,  two  thousand                square metres."      In the  instant case, we are concerned with the land in the ’  town of  Dehradun situated  in  the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh, which  was the  subject matter of the writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. It is indisputable that the land in  Johnson’s case  (supra) falls  under category where the ceiling limit is 2000 sq. metres. The only problem which is required  to be  resolved in  these group  of appeals  by special leave by and large concerns the interpretation of s. 4, sub-s. (9) of the Act. All the appeals are from Uttar 906 Pradesh but  the principles  laid down  by us would apply to all  the   States  and   Union  Territories.  In  fact,  the substratum and  the fate  of the case depends on the outcome of the  appeal arising  out of State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

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v. L.J.  Johnson &  Anr.(1) decided  by the  Allabhabad High Court and  which has  been taken  as a  sample case  so that other appeals  would merely follow the decision in Johnson’s case (c.A. No. 2005/82 in this Court).      There are some other cases like A. No. 995/80 where the facts and  principles may  differ but  we do  not intend  to decide or  go into  the  intricacies  of  the  other  points involved therein  and will  leave the competent authority to determine the excess land in the context of other points and in the  light of  the law laid down by us. In these appeals, we are  mainly concerned with the interpretation of s. 4 (9) and the allied construction of s. 2(g) and 2(q) (iii) of the Act and their impact on s. 4(9). It follows, therefore, that once the  view taken  in Johnson’s  case in  regard to  this question is reversed all the matters will have to go back to the competent  authority for  a decision in the light of the view taken  by this Court. This will be the ultimate outcome because in  all the  allied matters  there is only a cryptic order disposing  of the  concerned matter in accordance with the view taken by the High Court in Johnsan’s case in regard to the  interpretation of  s. 4 (9). The remaining questions raised by  the land-holders will have to be resolved and the actual computation  of excess land, if any, would have to be undertaken by the competent authority on remand.      Before going  into the  merits of Johnson’s case we may briefly narrate  the admitted  facts. It  appears  that  the respondent (Johnson) had a parcel of land, the total area of which was  2530 sq.  metres on  which there  was a building. After the  coming into  force of  the Act. he wanted to sell some portion of the open land in his possession to Maj. Gen. Prem Chandra,  a resident  of Vasant  Vihar, New  Delhi. The competent authority refused permission to sell on the ground that the  total area in possession of Johnson being 2530 sq. metres, it  exceeded the  ceiling  limit  and  therefore  no permission to  sell could be given. Johnson thereafter filed an appeal  before the  District Judge assailing the decision of the  competent authority  as being  based r  on  a  wrong interpretation of the provisions of the Act. The District 907 Judge after  considering the  provisions of  s. 2 (g), 2 (q) (ii) held  that the  owner was  entitled to  exclude 500  sq metres in  view of  the bye-laws  prevailing in Dehradun and another 500  sq. metres  for the  beneficial and  convenient enjoyment of the building to satisfy the requirement of town planning and  environmental purposes. This, according to the District Judge,  flowed as a logical consequence of s. 2 (g) of the  Act. Ultimately,  the district judge held that after excluding the  portions of  areas indicated above, there was no excess  and the  land was  not covered by the Act and the refusal of  permission by  the competent  authority was  not legally valid.      Against the  decision of  the District Judge, the State filed a  writ petition before the High Court contending that the interpretation  placed by  the District  Judge was wrong and the competent authority was fully justified in computing the area.  The High  Court Strongly relied on the provisions of s. 4 (9) read with s. 2(q)(ii) and upheld the decision of the  District  Judge  and  accordingly  dismissed  the  writ petition. After  this decision,  a number  of petitions were filed before  the High Court which were decided by it in the light of the decision taken in Johnson’s case.      Before proceeding  to s.  4 (9)  of the  Act, we  might mention as a prelude the nature, character and the spirit of the Act.  The Act applies only to urban areas and not to any other area. Secondly, the statute fixes the ceiling limit in

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various urban areas of all the States where the Court has to determine the  extent of the ceiling. It is clear that there can be only three categories of Urban lands-      (1)  land which is entirely open in the sense that           it  does  not  contain  any  construction  or           building,      (2)   where the entire land is covered by building           or dwelling house, and      (3)   land on  a part of which there is a building           with or  without a  dwelling unit thereon and           the rest of the land is vacant,      So  far   as  the   first  category  is  concerned,  no complexity is  involved because  any open  area in excess of 2000 sq. metres in category States will be taken over by the Government.  For   instance,  if   an  open   land   without construction consists Of 6000 sq. meters, the 908 computation of  the ceiling area would present no difficulty because 4000 sq. metres will be taken over by the Government and  2000  sq.  metres  will  be  left  to  the  landholder. Secondly, if  the entire land is covered by a building, such an area  would completely  fall outside the ambit of the Act and no  question of  computation  would  arise.  Thirdly,  a question arises  as to  what would happen if there is a land on a  part of which there is a building with a dwelling unit and an  area (open  land) which  is appurtenant  thereto  is vacant. This  category of  land would doubtless present some difficulty in  making the  computation and the principles on which such  computation is  to be  made. Section  4  (9)  is designedly  and   artistically  drafted   to  meet   such  a contingency which may be extracted thus:-           "Where a  person holds  vacant land  and also      holds any  other land on which there is a building      with a  dwelling unit  therein, the extent of such      other land  occupied by  the building and the land      appurtenant  thereto  shall  also  be  taken  into      account in  calculating the  extent of vacant land      held by such person."                                         (Emphasis supplied)      In order to understand the import of s. 4 (9) it may be necessary to  extract clauses (i) and (ii) of s. 2 (q) which run thus:      "(q) ’Vacant  land’ means  land,  not  being  land           mainly used  for the  purpose of agriculture,           in  an  urban  agglomeration,  but  does  not           include-      (i)   land on  which construction of a building is           not   permissible    under    the    building           regulations in  force in  the area  in  which           such land is situated;      (ii)  in   an  area   where  there   are  building           regulations  the   Gland  occupied   by   any           building which  has been  constructed before,           or is being constructed on, the appointed day           with  the   approval   of   the   appropriate           authority and  the land  appurtenant to  such           building; and ..."      Clause (i)  gives  a  blanket  exemption  to  any  land situated in  an urban  area where the entire area is covered by land  on which  it is not permissible to raise a building which will not be deemed to be 909 vacant land  within the meaning of s. 2 (q). This is because such land  in an  urban area  cannot be  used  for  building purposes but  being vacant  falls beyond the purview. Of the

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Act. Clause (ii) postulates that where a land is occupied by any building  constructed before  or on  the  appointed  day (’appointed day’  has been  defined in  s. 2 (a) of the Act) and there  is some  vacant  land  appurtenant  to  the  said building, land  which is  built upon  and any  area which is left out  in accordance  with the building regulations would not  be  included  in  the  ceiling  area.  The  term  ’land appurtenant to such building’ would mean the contiguous land which remains  after giving full allowance for the area left out under the municipal or building regulations subject to a maximum of  500 sq.  metres and another 500 sq. metres which may be  left for  the beneficial use of the owner. The words ’land appurtenant’  used  in  s.  4  (9)  takes  us  to  its connotation as  defined in s. (2) (g) (i) and (ii) which may be extracted thus:           "(g) ’land appurtenant’, in relation to - any      building, means-      (i)     in  an   area  where  there  are  building           regulations,  the   minimum  extent  of  land           required under such regulations to be kept as           open  space   for  the   enjoyment  of   such           building, which  in no case shall exceed five           hundred square metres; or      (ii) in  an  area  where  there  are  no  building           regulations an  extent of five hundred square           metres contiguous  to the  land  occupied  by           such building,      and  includes,   in  the   case  of  any  building      constructed  before   the  appointed  day  with  a      dwelling unit  therein, an  additional extent  not      exceeding five  hundred square  metres of land, if      any, contiguous  to the minimum extent referred to      in sub-clause  (i) or  the extent  referred to  in      tub-clause (ii?, as the case may be;"      It may,  however, be  necessary to  explain  the  terms ’land appurtenant’  or ’other  land’ as used in s. 4 (9) and s. 2(g) (ii) as a wrong interpretation of these terms by the High Court  has made  confusion worse  confounded. To  begin with, the  plain language  in which  sub-s. (9)  of s. 4 has been expressed  clearly shows that when the legislature used the word ’appurtenant’, it meant to qualify the 910      land which  was occupied  by the  building.  The  words ’appurtenant thereto  ’ qualify  the building which precedes the  land.  The  expression  ’appurtenant’  shows  that  the legislature intended  that in  taking into consideration the land, it  must be  the land  not contiguous  or close to the building but  the very  land on  which the  building stands. Similarly, the  words ’other  land occupied by the building’ also lead  to the same conclusion, viz., that the other land will not  be land  in some other plot but refers only to the very land a portion of which is occupied by the building.      In Words and Phrases, Legally Defined (Vol. I-2nd Edn.) at p. 105 it is clearly mentioned that ’land’ do not usually pass under  the word ’appurtenances’ with reference to other land, in  its strict  sense, but  they do pass if it appears that the  word is used in a larger sense, Land has been held to pass  under this word where is a gift of a house with its appurtenances. There  has been  a distinction between a gift of a  land with  appurtenances and  a  gift  with  the  land appertaining thereto.  A chose in action does not ordinarily pass  as   appurtenant  ’to   other  property’.   The   word ’appurtenance’ has been further defined thus:           "Appurtenance, in  relation to a dwelling, or      to  a   school,  college   or  other   educational

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    establishment,   includes    all   land   occupied      therewith and  used for the purposes thereof ..The      word ’appurtenances’  has a  distinct and definite      meaning, and  though it  may be  enlarged  by  the      context. yet the burden of proof lies on those who      so contend  Prima facie,  it imports  nothing more      than what is strictly appertaining to the subject-      matter of the device or grant, and which would. in      truth, pass without being specially mentioned."      Similarly, at page 220 in Words and Phrases, Judicially Defined (vol.  I) the  word ’appurtenances’ has been defined thus:           "The word  ’appurtenances’ includes  all  the      incorporeal hereditaments  attached  to  the  land      granted or  demised  such  as  rights-of  way,  of      common, or  piscary, and  the like but it does not      include lands in addition to that granted."                                     (Emphasis supplied)      Likewise, in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition (Vol. 3A) at  p. 546,  the word ’appurtenances’ has been explained thus 911           "The   word    ’appurtenances’,   which    is      ordinarily used  in connection with real property,      while  strictly   confined  to  those  incorporeal      hereditaments that  are commonly  annexed to  land      and  houses,   includes  corporeal   articles   of      personal property..  ’Appurtenances’ as  used in a      deed of trust of certain real estate conveying all      and singular  the  tenements,  hereditaments,  and      ’appurtenances’ thereto  belonging or  in  anywise      appertaining, means  things belonging  to  another      thing as  principal, and which pass as incident to      the principal thing."                                          (Emphasis supplied)      In Stroud’s  judicial Dictionary  (Third edn.)  at page 176, the word ’appurtenances’ has been defined thus,           "By the  grant of  a messuage;  or a messuage      with the appurtenances, doth pass no more than the      dwelling house,  barn  dove-house,  and  buildings      adjoining, orchard,  garden, yard, field, or piece      of  void  ground,  lying  near  and  BELONGING  to      messuage, and  houses adjoining  to the  dwelling-      house, and the close upon which the dwelling-house      is built, at the most."      Thus, taking  the legal  and dictionary  meaning of the word  ’appurtenant’   or  ’appurtenances’   the  inescapable conclusion  is   that  the   words  ’either  other  land  or appurtenances’ are  meant  to  indicate  that  the  land  in question should  form an  integral part  of  the  main  land containing the  building in  question.  The  Allahabad  High Court, therefore,  clearly misdirected  itself in  putting a wrong and  loose interpretation on the words ’appurtenant or other land’.  It is  well settled  that the  language  of  a beneficial statute  must be  construed so as to suppress the mischief and  advance its  object. Bearing  this in mind, we can see no other interpretation of the words ’appurtenant or other land’  than the  one we  have indicated above which is that the  land appurtenant  means not  a land  contiguous to some other  land but  the very  land which  is a part of the same plot  or area  which contains  the building or dwelling house. This  also seems  to be the avowed object of s. 4 (9) of the Act.      In the  ultimate analysis  the position  is quite clear that s 4 (9) contemplates that if a person holds vacant land

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as also  other portion  of land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit, the extent of 912 Land occupied  by the  building  and  the  land  appurtenant thereto shall betaken into account in calculating the extent of the vacant land. This  sub-section  has  to  be  read  in conjunction with s. 2 (q) (ii) and (iii). A combined reading of  these   two  statutory  provisions  would  lead  to  the irresistible inference  that in  cases which fall within the third category mentioned above, the-      (1)   total area  of the  land of  a landholder is           first to be determined and if the total area,           built or unbuilt, falls below 2000 sq. metres           in category areas, there would be no question           of any excess land,      (2)   where, however,  there is  a building  and a           dwelling  unit  then  the  area  beneath  the           building and  the dwelling unit would have to           be  excluded  while  computing  the  ceiling.           Further, if there are any byelaws requiring a           portion of  the land  to be  kept vacant, the           landholder would  be allowed to set apart the           said land  to the  maximum extent  of 500  sq           metres. He would also be allowed to retain an           additional area  of 500  sq. metres  for  the           beneficial use af the building so that he may           enjoy the  use of  a little compound also for           various purposes.      After excluding these items if the land falls below the ceiling limit  there would  be no  question of excess but if there is  excess that  is beyond the ceiling limit, the same would have to be taken over by the Government. For instance, A has  4000 sq.  metres of land out of which 2000 sq. metres is covered  by building  then in  such a case the landholder will be  entitled to  keep the  whole of  the covered  area, i.e., 2000  sq. metres  plus 1000  sq. metres (500 under the municipal byelaws  and another  500 for  beneficial use) and the excess would only 1000 sq. metres. The scheme of the Act seems to  be that  if there is a constructed building with a dwelling unit,  the structure  thereon cannot  be treated as open land  for the purpose of declaring it as an excess land beyond the  ceiling limit.  Similarly, the  Land  kept  open under the municipal regulations (upto 500 sq. metres) and an additional 500  sq. metres appurtenant to the land would not be available  for being  declared as  excess land beyond the ceiling limit. The central idea governing this philosophy of putting a  ceiling on  urban land  is that  in an urban area none can  hold land  excess of  the  ceiling  regardless  of whether the land is entirely open or whether 913 there is  a structure consisting of a dwelling unit thereon, subject  to  the  rider  mentioned  above.  Indeed,  if  the intention would  have been to take over the entire open land without giving  any  benefit  of  appurtenant  land  to  the landholder than  the Act  would  perhaps  be  liable  to  be challenged on  the ground  of being of a confiscatory nature and  would   fall  beyond  the  permissible  limits  of  the directive  principles   enshrined  in   Part   IV   of   the Constitution.  Furthermore,  such  an  interpretation  would discourage  new   building  enterprises   or  factories   or industrial units coming up in the urban areas which would be contrary to the very tenor and spirit of the Act.      Coming now  to Johnson’s  case, while the High Court of Allahabad was  right in  interpreting these provisions in so far as  it held that the built area plus upto 500 sq. metres

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allowed under  the municipal  byelaws and  another  500  sq. metres as additional area for beneficial enjoyment had to be excluded but it seems to have committed a grave error of law in applying  this principle to concrete cases which had come up before  it. Further,  the High Court was absolutely wrong in importing  the concept  of contiguity  on the  assumption that s. 4(9) was attracted only if the person concerned held a  distinct  parcel  of  land  which  was  vacant  land.  As discussed above,  these words  do not  envisage  that  there should be  land other than the one which contains a building which is  to be taken into consideration while computing the excess land  but the  section really refers to the very land which is a part of the plot which contains the building. The argument that  once a plot contains a building, the whole of the plot  would be  exempt from  the ceiling  area cannot be countenanced on  a plain  and simple  interpretation  of  s. 5(q)(ii) read  with s. 4(9). In fact s. 4(9) itself puts the matter beyond  controversy by  qualifying the  words  ’other land occupied  by the  building  and  the  land  appurtenant thereto’. The expression ’thereto’ manifestly shows that the intention of  legislature was  to the land on which building or the dwelling unit stands. In other words, the vacant land which contains  a building would include appurtenant land or any other land situated in that particular plot.      We have  gone through  the judgments of the High Court, the District  Judge and  that of the competent authority and we are not satisfied that all the details which are required for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  ceiling  have  been mentioned in any of the judgments. So far as Johanson’s case is concerned,  all that  is mentioned is that the total area of urban land was 2530 sq. metres, including the built 914 area. So far as the built area is concerned, it is mentioned as 464  sq. metres  but the details of the calculations have not been  given which  would have  to be redetermined by the competent authority.  Even on  the facts  mentioned  in  the judgments of  the  High  Court  and  the  courts  below  the position appears to be as follows .           Total  area   of  the   land  owned   by  the      landholder, is  2530 sq.  metres. Prima  facie 530      sq. metres is above the ceiling limit.      In order  however to  calculate as  to whether  or  not Johson had  exceeded  the  permissible  limit,  we  have  to compute in the following manner:      First exclude  the built  area which  is 464 sq. metres (it is  not clear  whether 464  includes the area of servant quarters also  which  are  also  mentioned  to  be  existing there). Then  exclude the  deductions allowed under s. 2(g). i.e, 1000  sq. metres.  Therefore, the total deduction would be 1464 sq. metres which is within the ceiling limit of 2000 sq. metres  but as  the actual  area is  2530 sq. metres the excess would  be 530  sq. metres which will be taken over by the State.  The High  Court  seems  to  have  made  a  wrong calculation by  not  relying  on  s.  4(9)  and  in  wrongly importing the concept of ’other land’ being a distinct plot. This however  is not permissible. The landholder cannot have it both  ways. He  cannot take  the benefit of the exclusion and then add that benefit to the total ceiling area in order to compute the excess. For these reasons, therefore, we p do not agree  with the  view taken  by the  High Court  or  the District Judge  regarding the  computation  of  the  ceiling area.      To sum  up, the  effect of  the view taken in Johnson’s case  virtually   comes  to  this.  Section  4(9)  would  be attracted regardless  of  whether  the  landholder  owned  a

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distinct part  of land  on which  there is  no  construction alongwith any  other parcel  of land  where  there  is  some construction alongwith  any other parcel of land where there is some  construction. In  other words, whether or not there is a surplus will not depend on whether the landholder holds a separate  plot of  land which  is open  land. To  take the other view  is to hold that if there is no separate plot but the construction is in the same plot then even if the entire plot comprises  10,000 sq. metres that would fall beyond the purview of section 4(9) if the 915 structure is  built only on 1000 sq. metres of land. Such an interpretation of  s. 4(9)  cannot be  accepted by  us as it goes against  the very  spirit and  intent of  the  Act  and allows the  landholder to  escape the ceiling area by merely putting a construction on a plot of land owned by him.      On the  other hand,  the Madhya  Pradesh High  Court in M/s. gr Eastern oxygen and Acetylene Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh(1) seems  to have  taken a  correct view  in holding that nothing  turns upon whether or not the landholder holds open land and a separate parcel of land with a dwelling unit thereon. The  High Court  in paragraph 5 rightly pointed out that it  will necessitate  reading the words "not contiguous to the vacant land" after the words "any other land" in sub- section (9) of s. 4 and such qualifying words cannot be read into  the   provision  by   implication.  If   this  be  the interpretation then  it  would  mean  that  if  there  is  a boundary wall which separates the construction from the open land, the  land would  be within  the purview of the ceiling and if  there is  no such  wall it  would fall  outside  the purview. Such an interpretation, would lead to a most absurd and anomalous  situation. The Madhya Pradesh High Court was, therefore, fully  justified in  expressing its  dissent from judgment of  the Allahabad  High Court. We fully endorse the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court.      Where, however,  it is  found  that  any  person  holds vacant  land   in  two   or   more   categories   of   urban agglomerations specified  in Schedule I, the computation and determination of  ceiling area  is to  be done in accordance with the  formula laid down in cl. (a) to (d) of s. 4 (1) of the Act.      In fine,  therefore, the  position in the instant case, as already  pointed out  by us,  is that  even  taking  into account the  concessions and  exemptions granted to Johnson, the landholder,  the land  in  his  possession  exceeds  the ceiling of 2000 sq. metres by 530 sq. metres which will have to be declared as surplus.      Before concluding  we might dwell on one more aspect of the matter  which  flows  as  a  logical  corollary  of  our interpretation of the various provisions of the Act;      Where a  person  has  several  plots,  some  completely vacant and  some partly  built and partly vacant, a question may arise as to how 916 the computation  of the  ceiling area  is to be made in such cases. This  presents no  difficulty in view of what we have fully discussed  in our judgment because it is manifest that the legislature  intended to  leave with the landholder only the area  of 2000 sq. metres in category area or the various ceiling areas  mentioned in different categories of s. 4 (1) of the  Act. It is manifest that in such cases the competent authority will have to total the entire area of the lands in various ’  places, completely  vacant or  partly  built  and partly vacant  and permit  the landholder to retain 2000 sq. metres or less as provided in clauses (a) to (d) of s. 4 (1)

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and give  the landholder the option (as provided under s. 6) to select  the area which he desires to retain provided that does not exceed the ceiling limit.      By  way   of  postscript  we  might  dwell  on  certain consequences   of   the   legislation   flowing   from   the interpretation which  we have  put on the various provisions of the  Act. The  Act being  a social  piece of  legislation should  have   been  implemented   long  ago   but  as   its constitutional validity was challenged, which was decided by this Court only in 1979 as indicated above, the operation of the Act remained stayed.      The second  phase however began when the correctness of the manner  in which  computation was  to be made as held by the Allahabad  High Court  was challenged by the State which also we have now decided in this judgment. We hope and trust that all  the States will now go ahead with implementing the Act and  take over  the excess  land in  order to distribute them according  to the  tenor, spirit  and provisions of the Act. Any  further delay  is likely to defeat the very object for which the Act was passed.      For  the  reasons  given  above,  we  allow  all  these petitions and  appeals, set  aside the judgments of the High Court and  send back the cases to the competent authority to get fresh  computations done  in  all  the  cases  and  then determine the  ceiling area  in the  light of the principles enunciated and the law laid down by us. Civil appeal No. 995 of 1980  is also  remanded to  the competent  authority  for redetermination of  the ceiling  area as indicated above. In the circumstances  of the case, there will be no order as to costs. H.S.K.                      Appeals and petitions dismissed. 917