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PETITIONER: STATE OF TAMIL NADU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PYARE LAL MALHOTRA ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/01/1976

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH RAY, A.N. (CJ) SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1976 AIR  800            1976 SCR  (2) 168  1976 SCC  (1) 834  CITATOR INFO :  R          1976 SC1437  (12)  R          1981 SC1649  (13,14)  R          1982 SC 149  (245)  R          1991 SC 354  (4)  RF         1992 SC 422  (3)

ACT:      Central Sales  Tax Act-Secs. 14-15-Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act Sec. 2(j)- Prohibition against imposing tax at more than one stage-Whether  all categories  and sub items of iron and steel to  be treated  as one  commodity -Words  and Phrases- Meaning of "that is to say."

HEADNOTE:      The respondents  are dealers under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act.  Section 14  of the  Central Sales Tax Act declares certain goods enumerated therein of ‘’ special importance in inter-state trade  or commerce.  The list  of goods given at serial No. IV reads as under:      (IV) Iron and Steel, that is to say-         (a)    pig iron and iron scrap .         (b)    iron plates  sold in  the same  form in which                they are  directly produced  by  the  rolling                mill;         (c)    steel scrap,  steel  ingots,  steel  billets,                steel bars and rods,           (d) (i)   steel plates              (ii)   steel sheets,              (iii)  sheet bars and tin bars,              (iv)   rolled steel sections, I mill.              (v)    tool alloy steel, J             sole in the same from in which they are directly                                produced by the rolling mill. The said  clause IV  was amended  by the  Central Sales  Tax Amendment Act,  Act 61 of 1972 by which certain more entries were added.      Section 15  of the  Central Sales Tax Act provides that the tax  payable under  a State  Law on  sale or purchase of declared goods shall not be levied at more than one stage.      Respondents used  to purchase iron scrap and thereafter

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used to  convert them  into steel rounds, flats, plates etc. The scrap  was already  subject to tax once. The respondents contended that  the entry  Iron & Steel was wide enough to - include scrap  as well  as the  steel rounds, flats, plates, etc. made out of the scrap which was subject to tax once and that, therefore,  the  sale  of  the  steel  rounds,  flats, plates, etc.,  cannot be  subjected to  tax again  under the Tamil Nadu  Sales Tax  Act.  The  High  Court  accepted  the contention of the respondents.      Allowing an appeal by certificate, ^      HELD: 1. The intention was to consider each sub-item in clause IV  as a  separate taxable  commodity for purposes of sales tax.  The object  was not  to lay  down that  all  the categories or  sub-items of  goods specified separately were to be  viewed as a single saleable commodity called iron and steel for  purposes j  of determining a starting point for a series of  sales. The note against sub division of Clause IV makes it  clear that  even each  sub-category of  a sub-item retains its  identity as  a commercially  separate item  for purposes of  sales tax  so  long  as  it  retains  the  sub- division. [171Gm, 172B-C]      2. The  expression ’that is to say’ is employed to make it clear  and fix  the meaning  of words  to be explained or defined. Such  words are  not used,  as a rule, to amplify a meaning while  removing a  possible doubt  for which purpose the word  ’includes’  is  generally  employed.  The  precise meaning of the words 169 that is  to say’  must vary with the context. The purpose of the expression in a sales A lax law would be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute separate class for a series of sales. [172F-H, 173B]      3. The  chemical composition  of iron  and steel cannot afford a  clue to  the meaning  of iron and steel. Sales Tax Law taxes  sales of  goods and is not a taxation on sales of substance out  of which  goods are made. We prefer to follow the more  natural and  normal interpretation  which  follows plainly from the fact of separate specification numbering of each item.  State of  Madhya Pradesh  v. Hira Lal; (1966) 17 STC 313-315  distinguished. The  case  cf  Devidas  applied. [173C. E-F]      4. It  has not  been shown to, us that any provision of the Tamilnadu  Sales Tax  Act violates  section  15  of  the Central Sales  Tax Act  enacted in  accordance with  Article 286(3) of  the Constitution.  Section 2(j) of the Tamil Nadu Act defines goods and section 4 imposes charge in respect of tax on declared goods. The Tamilnadu Act borrows clause (IV) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. [176 C-H] C

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 58-59 and 880-883 of 1971.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  10-4-1970  of  the Madras High  Court in  Writ Petition  Nos. 437/67 and 520/68 and Tax Cases Nos. 135-138 of 1970 respectively.      P. Ram  Reddy, A. V. Rangam and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Appellant in C.As. 58-59/71.      Sachin Chandra Chaudhury and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for Respondent.      Gobind Das.  P. H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley for the Intervener (M/s Durga Steel)      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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    BEG, J.-The  two Civil Appeals Nos. 58-59 of 1971 arise out of  a judgment  of a  Division Bench  of the Madras High Court dismissing  two Writ  Petitions filed  against notices issued by  a Commercial  Tax officer  showing institution of Sales tax  assessment proceedings in respect of certain iron and steel  goods for  the assessment  year 1965-66  in  Writ Petition No. 437 of 1967 and for the assessment year 1966-67 in Writ  Petition No.  520 of 1968. The High Court of Madras had certified  the cases  as fit  for appeal  to this  Court under Article 132 and 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution. Although, the  Writ Petitions  had  been  dismissed  on  the ground that  they involve an investigation into the-question of fact  whether the  iron and steel scrap, out of which the manufactured goods, sought to be subjected to Sales tax, had been made,  were already  taxed or  not, yet,  the State  of Tamil Nadu  was aggrieved by the decision of the Madras High Court holding  that the  manufactured goods, said to consist of "steel  rounds, flats,  angles, plates,  bars" or similar goods in other forms and shapes, could not be taxed again if the material  out of  which they  were made had already been subjected to sales’ tax once an iron and steel scrap as both were  "Iron  and  steel".  It  was  possible  to  leave  the assessing authorities free to decide all the questions which they had  jurisdiction to consider. But, it appears that the Madras High  Court thought  it proper to decide the question as the Sales’ tax 170 authorities had  already adopted  the view,  in other cases, that such goods, though covered by the broad genus "Iron and Steel", were  separately taxable  commodities  because  each kind of  "Iron and Steel" goods was a commercially different and separately  taxable species  or category. Moreover, this very question  was also  before the  High Court  in  regular revision petitions  under  the  Tamil  Nadu  Sales  Tax  Act (hereinafter referred to as ’the Tamil Nadu Act’).      Civil Appeals  Nos. 880-883  of 1971  arise out of four petitions for  revision under  the provisions  of the  Tamil Nadu Act  for the  years 1964-65  and  1965-66,  which  were allowed by  the Madras High Court 4 setting aside assessment orders by  following its  judgment  and  decision  mentioned above given  on 24-6-1970 on Writ Petitions Nos. 437 of 1967 and 520  of 1968.  The Madras  High Court  had also  granted Certificates of  fitness for  appeal  to  this  Court  under Article 132  read "  with Article  133(1)(a)(c) in  the four cases before it on revision petitions. Hence, six cases were connected and  heard together  by us.  The same  question of law, decided  by the  Madras High Court on grounds contained in one judgment, under appeal in Civil Appeals Nos. 58-59 of 1971 before this Court, arise in all of them.      All the six cases before us relate to what are known as "declared goods"  under Section  14 of the Central Sales Tax Act (hereinafter  referred to  as ’the Central Act’). It was claimed, on  behalf of  the r dealers, sought to be assessed in each case, that, by reason of the restrictions imposed by Section 15  of the  Central Act,  the levy  of tax under the Tamil Nadu Act was not permissible.      Section 14  of the  Central Act  declares certain goods enumerated there to be "of special importance in inter-State trade or  commerce". The  list of  goods given  there at No. (iv), as it stood in 1968, was:      "(IV)     Iron and Steel, that it to say-      (a)  ’pig iron and iron scrap      (b)  iron plates  sold in  the same  form in which they           are directly Produced by the rolling mill;      (C)  steel scrap,  steel ingots,  steel billets,  steel

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         bars and rods;      (d) (i)   steel plates         (ii)   steel sheets,         (iii)  sheet bars  and tin  bars, sold  in the  same                form in which they are         (iv)   rolled steel  sections, directly  produced by                the rolling mill;"         (v)    tool alloy steel, ,             sole in the same from in which they are directly                                produced by the rolling mil;" By the  Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act 61 of 1972, clause (iv) r was redrafted. It now reads as follows:      "(iv) iron and steel, that is to say-           (i)  pig  iron  and  cast  iron  including  ingot,                moulds, bottom  plates, iron scrap, cast iron                scrap, runner scrap andiron skull scrap;           (ii) steel  semis   (ingots,  slabs,   blooms  and                billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes);           (iii)skelp bars, tin bars, sheet bars, heebars and                sleeper bars; 171           (iv) steel bars  (rounds,  rods,  squares,  flats,                octagone and  A hexagone, plain and ribbed or                twister, in  coil from  as well  as  straight                lengths):           (v)  steel structurals  (angles, joints, channels,                tees, sheet  piling sections, sections or any                other rolled sections);           (vi) sheets, hoops,  strips and  skelp, both black                and galvanised,  hot and  cold rolled,  plain                and corrugated, in all qualities, in straight                lengths and  in coil  form, as  rolled and in                rivetted condition;           (vii)plates  both   plain  and  chequered  in  all                qualities;           (viii)discs, rings, forgings and steel castings;           (ix) tool, alloy  and special steels of any of the                above categories;           (x)  steel melting  scrap in  all forms  including                steel kull, turnings and borings;           (xi) steel cubes, both welded and seamless, of all                diameters   and   lengths,   including   tube                fittings;           (xii)tin-plates, both  hot dipped and electrolytic                and tin-free plates;           (xiii)fish  plate   bars,  bearing   plate   bars,                crossing sleeper  bars, fish  plates, bearing                plates, crossing  sleepers and  pressed steel                sleepers, rails-heavy and crane rails;           (xiv)wheels, tyres, axles and wheel sets;           (xv) wire   rods    and    wires-rolled,    drawn,                galvanised, alumanised, tinned or coated such                as by copper;           (xvi)defectives, rejects,  cuttings or  end pieces                of any of the above categories";      It will  be seen  that "Iron  and Steel" is now divided into 16  categories which  clearly embrace  widely different commercial commodities,  from mere scrap iron and left overs of processes of manufacturing to "wires" and "wheels, tyres, axles, and  wheel sets".  Some of  the enumerated items like "melting scrap"  or "tool alloys" and "special steels" could serve as  raw material out of which other goods are made and others are  definitely varieties  of manufactured  goods. If the  subsequent   amendment  only   clarifies  the  original intentions of  Parliament, it would appear that heading 4 in

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Section  14,   as  originally  worded,  was  also  meant  to enumerate  separately   taxable  goods   and  not   just  to illustrate what  is just  one taxable  substance, "Iron  and Steel". The  G reason given, in the statement of objects and reasons  of   the  1972  Act,  for  an  elucidation  of  the "definition" of  iron and  steel, was  that the "definition" had led  to varying interpretations by assessing authorities and the  courts so  that a  comprehensive list  of specified declared iron  and steel  goods would  remove ambiguity. The Select Committee,  which recommended  the amendment,  called each specified category "a sub-item" falling under "Iron and Steer’. Apparently, the intention was to consider each "sub- item" as a separate taxable commodity for purposes of Sales’ tax. Perhaps  some items  could overlap,  but no difficultly arises in cases before us due to this feature. As we have 172 pointed out, the statement of reasons for amendment spoke of Section 14(iv)  as a  "definition" of  "Iron and  Steel".  A definition is expected to be exhaustive. Its very terms may, however, show  that it  is not  meant to  be exhaustive. For example, a purported definition may say that the term sought to be  defined "includes"  what it  specifies, but, in ‘that case, the definition itself is not complete.      Although, we have looked at the subsequent amendment of 1972  in  order  to  find  an  indication  of  the  original intention, because  subsequent history of legislation is not irrelevant, yet,  we think  that, even  if  we  confine  our attention to  Section 14  as  it  originally  stood  at  the relevant time,  with which  we are  concerned in  the  cases before us,  the object  was not  to lay  down that  all  the categories or  sub-items of  goods, as  specified separately even before  the amendment  of 1972,  were to  b viewed as a single  saleable  commodity  called  "Iron  and  Steel"  for purposes of  determining a  starting point  for a  series of sales. On  the other  hand, the note against the brackets in front of  the five  smaller sub  divisions of  (d) makes  it clear that  even each sub-category of a sub-item retains its identity as  a commercially  separate item  for  purpose  of sales tax  so long  as it  retains the subdivision. The more natural and normal meaning of such a mode of listing special or declared kinds of goods seems to us to be that the object of specification  was to  enumerate only those categories of items, each  of which  was to  serve as a new starting point for  a  series  of  sales,  which  were  to  be  classed  as "declared" goods.  If one  were  to  state  the  meaning  in different words,  it would seem to us to be: "Iron and Steel goods of various types enumerated below".      What we  have inferred  above also  appears to us to be the significance  and effect of the use of words "that is to say" in accordance with their normal connotation and effect. Thus, in  Stroud’s Judicial  Dictionary, 4th Edn. Vol. 5, at page 2753, we find:           "THAT IS  TO SAY.  (1) ’That  is to  say’  is  the      commencement of  an ancillary clause which explains the      meaning of  the principal  clause. It has the following      properties:  (1)   it  must  not  be  contrary  to  the      principal clause:  (2) it  must  neither  increase  nor      diminish it;  (3) but  where the  principal  clause  is      general in terms it may restrict it: see this explained      with many examples, Stukeloy v. Butler Hob. 171"; The  quotation,   given  above,   from   Stroud’s   Judicial Dictionary shows  that, ordinarily,  the expression "that is to say"  is employed  to make  clear and  fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined. Such words are not used, as a  rule, to  amplify a  meaning while removing a possible

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doubt for  which purpose  the word  "includes" is  generally employed. In  unusual cases,  depending upon  the context of the words  "that is to say", this expression may be followed by illustrative  in stances.  In Megh  Raj &  Anr. v.  Allah Rakhia & Ors.(1) the words "that is to say.", with reference to a  general category  "land" were  held to  introduce "the most general  concept" when  followed, inter  alia,  by  the words: "Rights  in or  over land." We think that the precise meaning of  the words  "that is  to say"  must vary with the context, where, (1) A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 72. 173 as in  Megh Raj’s case (supra), the amplitude of legislative power to  enact provisions  with regard  to "land and rights over it  was meant to be indicated, the expression was given a wide  scope because it came after the word "land" and then followed "rights  over land"  as an  explanation on  "land". Both were  wide classes.  The  object  of  using    them  or subject-matter of  legislation was, obviously, to lay down a wide power to legislate. But, in the context of single point sales’ tax,  subject to  special conditions  when imposed on separate categories  of specified  goods, the expression was apparently  employed   to  specifically  enumerate  separate categories of  goods on  a given  list. The  purpose of such specification and  enumeration in  a  statute  dealing  with sales’ tax  at a  single point  in a  series of sales would, very naturally,  be to  indicate the  types of goods each of which would  constitute at  separate class  for a  series of sales. Otherwise,  the listing  itself loses all meaning and would be without any purpose behind it.      Learned Counsel appearing for an intervener argued that the chemical  position of  iron and  steel affords a clue to the meaning of "Iron and Steel" as used in Section 14 of the Central Act.  We are unable to agree that this could be what Parliament or  any legislature  would be  thinking  of  when enumerating items  to be  taxed  as  commercial  goods.  The ordinary meaning  to be assigned to a taxable item in a list of specified  items  is  that  each  item  so  specified  is considered as  a separately  taxable item  for  purposes  of single point  taxation in  a  series  of  sales  unless  the contrary is  shown. Some  confusion has  arisen because  the separate items  are all  listed under  one heading "Iron and Steel".      If the  object was  to make iron and steel taxable as a substance, the  entry could  have been:  "Goods of  Iron and Steel." Perhaps  even this would not have been clear enough. The entry  to clearly  have that  meaning would  have to be: "Iron and  Steel irrespective  of change  of form  shape  or character of  goods made  out of  them". This  is  the  very unusual meaning  which the  respondents  would  like  us  to adopt. If  that was the meaning, sales’ tax law itself would undergo a change from being a law which normally taxes sales of "goods"  to a  law which taxes sales of substances out of which goods  are made.  We, however, prefer the more natural and normal  interpretation which  follows plainly  from  the fact of  separate specification  and numbering of each item. This means  that each  item so  specified forms  a  separate species for  each series  of sales  although  they  may  all belong to  the genus:  ’’Iron and Steel." Hence, if iron and steel "plates"  are melted  t and  converted into "wire" and then sold  in the  market, such  wire would  only be taxable once so  long as  it retains  its identity  as a  commercial goods belonging  to the  category "wire" made of either iron or steel.  The mere  fact that the substance or raw material out of  which it  is made  has also been taxed in some other

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form, when  it was  sold as a separate commercial commodity, would make  up difference  for purposes of the law of sales’ tax. The  object appears  to us to be to tax sales of. goods of each  variety and  not the  sale of the substance. Out of which they are made.      As we all know, sales’ tax law is intended to tax sales of different  commercial commodities  and  not  to  tax  the production or  manufacture of  particular substances  out of which these commodities may have 174 been made. As soon as separate commercial commodities emerge or come into existence, they become separately taxable goods or entities  for purposes  of sales’  tax. Where  commercial goods, without  change of  their identity as such goods, are merely  subjected   to  some   processing  or  finishing  or are‘merely jointed  together, they  may remain  commercially the same  goods which  cannot be  taxed again,  in a  series sales, so  long as  they retain their identity as goods of a particular type.      In State of Madhya Bharat v. Hiralal(1) this Court held that a  dealer, who  bought  some  scrap  iron  locally  and imported some  iron plates  from outside  and then converted the material into bars, flats and plates, by rolling them in his mills,  and  then  sold  them,  was  still  entitled  to exemption given  to iron  and steel  from sales tax. But, in that  case,   the  language  of  the  provision  giving  the exemption justified  this interpretation.  The exemption was given to  a sale  by either  an importer  or a  purchaser of "goods prepared  from any metal other than  gold or silver." In other words, the question was whether exemption was given to the  substance out  of which  goods were  made. In that . context, it  had become  necessary to  examine  whether  the exemption from  sales’ tax  was meant for all goods made out of a  particular  sub  stance,  or  for  goods  as  separate commercial  commodities.   This  Court  held  that  the  raw material from which the goods were made was decisive for the purposes of the exemption given. This Court said (at p 315):           "A comparison of the said two Notifications brings      out the  distinction between  raw materials of iron and      steel and  the goods prepared from iron and steel while      the former  is exempted  from tax, the latter is taxed.      Therefore, iron  and steel  used as  raw  material  for      manufacturing other  goods are  exempted from taxation.      So long as iron and steel continue to be raw materials,      they enjoy  the exemption.  Scrap iron purchased by the      respondent was  merely re-rolled  into bars,  flats and      plates. They  were processed  for convenience  of sale.      The raw  materials were  only re-rolled  to  give  them      attractive and  acceptable forms.  They did  not in the      process lose  their character  as iron  and steel.  The      dealer sold  ’Iron and  steel’ in  the shape  of bars,‘      flats and  plates and  the customer purchased ’iron and      steel’ in  that shape.  We, therefore,  hold  that  the      bars, flats  and plates  sold by  the assessee are iron      and steel exempted under the Notification."      The law to be interpreted in Hiralal’s case (supra) was entirely   different. In  interpreting it,  this  Court  did observe that  a mere  change of  the  form  of  a  substance excepted from sales’ tax did not matter. The language of the notifications  involved   there  made   it  clear  that  the exemption was for the metal used. In the cases before us now the object  of  single  point  taxation  is  the  commercial commodity and  not the  sub stance  out of which it is made. each commercial  commodity here becomes a separate object of taxation in  series of sales of that commercial commodity so

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long as it retains its identity as that commodity.      We think  that the  correct rule  to apply in the cases before us  is the  one laid  down by this Court in Devi Dass Gopal Krishan & Ors. v.      (1) [1966] 17 S.T.C. 313, 315. 175 The State   of  Punjab  &  ors.(1)  where  Subba  Rao,  C.J. speaking for   a  Constitution Bench  of this Court, said at (p. 447).           "Now coming  to Civil  Appeals Nos.  39 to  43  of      1965, the  first additional  point raised  is that when      iron scrap  is converted  into rolled steel it‘does not      involve the  process of  manufacture. It  is  contended      that the  said conversion  does not involve any process      of manufacture,  but the  scarp is   made into a better      marketable  commodity.   Before  the  High  Court  this      contention was  not pressed.  That apart,  it is  clear      that scrap  iron ingots  undergo a  vital change in the      process  of   manufacture  and  are  converted  into  a      different commodity, viz, rolled steer sections. During      the process   the  scarp iron  loses its  identity  and      becomes a  new marketable  commodity." The  process  is      certainly one of manufacture.      It is  true that the question whether goods to be taxed have been  subjected to  a manufacturing  process so  as  to produce a new market able commodity, is the decisive test in determining whether  an excise  duty is  leviable or  not on certain goods.  No doubt, in the law  dealing with the sales tax, the  taxable event  is the sale and not the manufacture of goods.  Nevertheless, if  the question  is whether  a new commercial commodity has come into existence or not, so that its sale  is a  new taxable event, in the Sales’ Tax law, it may  also   become   necessary   to   consider   whether   a manufacturing process, which has altered the identity of the commercial commodity,  has taken  place. The law of sale tax is also  concerned with "goods" of various descriptions. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine when they cease to be goods  of one  taxable description  and become those of a commercially different category and description.      It appears  to us that the position has been simplified by the  amendment of  the law,  as indicated  above, so that each of  the  categories  falling  under  "Iron  and  Steel" constitutes a  new  species  of  commercial  commodity  more clearly new.  It follows that when one commercial  commodity is transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for purposes of sales tax.      We think  that the  Madras High  Court had committed an error in  applying Hiralal’s case (supra) to the decision of cases now  before us    which  turns  really  on  a  correct interpretation of  Section 14  of the  Central Act.  On  the question now  before us, we approve of the reasoning adopted by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Devgun  Iron & Steel Rolling Mills v. State of PunJab(2).      Section  15   of  the   Central  Act   places   certain restrictions and  conditions upon  State enactments imposing Sales tax. It says:      Every sales  tax law  of a State shall, in so for as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or      (1) (1967) 20 S.T.C. 430 at 447.   (2) (1961) 12 S.T.C.                                                       p. 590 176      purchase of declared goods, be subject to the following      restrictions and conditions, namely:           (a) the  tax payable  under that law in respect of      any sale  or purchase  of such  goods inside  the State

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    shall not exceed three per cent of the sale or purchase      price thereof,.  and such  tax shall  not be  levied at      more than one stage;           (b) where  a tax has been levied under that law in      respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any      declared   goods and  such goods are sold in the course      of inter-State   trade  or commerce,  and tax  has been      paid under  this Act  in respect  of the  sale of  such      goods in  the course  of inter State trade or commerce,      the tax  levied under  such law  shall be reimbursed to      the person  making such  sale ill  the course of inter-      State trade  or commerce  in-such manner and subject to      such condition  as may  be provided in any law in force      in that State".      It has  not been  shown to us that any provision of the Tamil Nadu  Sales Tax Act violates Section 15 of the Central Act  enacted  in  accordance  with  Article  266(3)  of  the Constitution. Section  3 of the Tamil Nadu Act levies. taxes on sales and purchases of "goods" as defined in Section 2(j) of the Act:           "(j) ’goods,  means all  kinds of movable property      (other than  newspapers, actionable  claims, stocks and      shares and  securities)  and  includes  all  materials,      commodities, and  articles (including  these to be used      in the  fitting out,  improvement or  repair of movable      property),  and  all  growing  crops  grass  or  things      attached to,  or forming  part of,  the land  which are      agree to  be severed  before sale or under the contract      of sale,"      Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act lays down:           "4.   Tax    in   respect   of   declared   goods.      Notwithstanding anything  contained in  Section 3,  the      tax under  this Act shall be payable by a dealer or the      sale or purchase inside  the State of declared goods at      the rate  and only  at the point specified against each      in the  Second Schedule  on the turn over in such goods      in each  year, whatever  be the quantum  of turnover in      that year". Item 4  of the second schedule specifies the rates of tax in accordance with  the  Central  Act.  It  reproduces  Section 14(iv) of the Central Act. On an amendment of Section 14(iv) of the  Central Act,  serial No. 4 of the second schedule of the Tamil Nadu Act was also correspondingly amended so as to reproduce the  sixteen items  found in Section 14(iv) of the Central Act.  Hence, the  decision  of  these  cases  really depends on  an interpretation  of Section  14 of the Central Act which we have already given above. Other provisions only fortify our conclusion. 177      The result is that we allow these appeals. We set aside the orders  of the  High Court and restore the orders of the assessing authorities  in cases giving rise to Civil Appeals Nos. 880-883  of 1971.  In cases  but of which Civil Appeals Nos. 58-59  of 1971  arise, we set aside the judgment of the High Court  but  maintain  its  order  dismissing  the  Writ Petitions and  order that the assessing authorities will now proceed to  determine such question of fact and law as still survive for  determination after the decision given above of the question  considered by  us. The parties will bear their own costs. P.H.P.                                      Appeals allowed. 178