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PETITIONER: STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: L. KRISHNAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       17/01/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J) MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (7) 450        JT 1996 (1)   660  1996 SCALE  (1)621

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the  Division Bench of the Madras High Court made in W.P. No. 6169  of 1983  on April  22,  1991.  Notification  under Section 4(1)  of the  Land Acquisition  Act (Act  1 of 1894) (for short,  ’the Act’)  was published  on August  29,  1975 acquiring large  extent of  land for  planned development of K.K. Nagar  in Madras  City. The declaration under Section 6 of the  Act was  published on  September 28, 1978. The award under Section  11 of the Act was made in February, 1983. The writ petition  was filed  on July  28, 1983  questioning the notification under  Section 4(1)  of the  Act on  the ground that the  notification  was  vague  and  invalid  since  the Government  had   not   formulated   specific   scheme   for construction of  the houses.  That contention  found  favour with  the   High  Court  and  consequently  it  quashed  the notification in  the first  instance, which order was upheld by this  Court in State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. vs. A. Mohammed Yousef &  Ors.  [(1991)  4  SCC  224].  Following  the  said decision, this writ petition along with other writ petitions was allowed  by the  Division Bench.  This Court in State of Tamil Nadu  & Ors.  vs. L. Krishnan & Ors. etc. [JT 1995 (8) SC 1]  had held that the scheme as envisaged under the Tamil Nadu Housing  Board Act  was not  required to  be completely formulated before  publication  of  the  notification  under Section 4(1)  of the  Act. The notification on that account, therefore, was not vague. Same contention has been raised in this appeal; but specific argument was made at the time that there is  distinguishing feature  on factual  background and that, therefore,  it was  required to  be  separately  death with. Accordingly,  this appeal  was separated. Thus, we are hearing this appeal independently.      Shri  A.   Mariarputham,  learned   counsel   for   the appellants, contended  that the  respondents had  laid their

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claim on  the basis  that the  sanction for  layout from the Director, Town Planning was obtained as early as in 1970 and the notifications were issued by the Government from time to time  excluding   such  lands   and  on   that  premise  the respondents claimed  exclusion.  But  the  Government  after elaborate consideration  in G.O.Ms.  No. 583 dated March 11, 1983 had  withdrawn the  earlier notifications  and  several writ petitions  were filed  after that order was passed. The foundation on the basis of which the writ petition was filed was  knocked   of  its  bottom.  The  High  Court  was  not, therefore, right  in granting the relief to the respondents. Dr.  Shankar   Ghosh,  learned   senior  counsel   for   the respondents, contended that since the notifications had been quashed in  respect of  some other lands covered in the same notifications, the respondents stand on the same position as others and  are entitled  to the same benefit. Though we had adjourned the  appeal to  get   particulars relating  to the cases in  which exclusion  of the  lands covered in the same notification and for what grounds was made, Mr. Mariarputham stated that  in spite of his best efforts to get the correct information, he  was unable  to get the information from the Government and  that, therefore,  he is not in a position to place and  factual material  on the basis of which the lands were withdrawn  either by  the orders  of the  Court and for what purpose. Reasons for such omission are not far to seek.      However, he  has pointed out that the earlier orders by the Court  relate to the lands for the establishment of out- station bus  stand and  also wholesale  fruit market.  Since they also  serve  public  purpose,  the  withdrawal  of  the notifications in respect thereof does not have any effect on the planned  development under  the  scheme.  Therefore,  it cannot  be   said  that  there  is  any  invalidity  in  the notification  for  being  quashed.  We  find  force  in  the contention. Dr.  Ghosh submitted that though the respondents are two  families, the  numbers are  as many  as 19 and they require construction  of  houses  for  self-occupation.  The scheme being  for the  planned development  of a residential township and  since the  land acquired  by them  is for that purpose, the  land required  by them  may also be considered for exclusion  for the  construction of their own houses for residential purpose.  The extent of land in question in this appeal is 20 acres and odd.      The question is : whether the view of the High Court is correct  in   law?  The   question  of   vagueness  of   the notification published  under Section  4(1) is no longer res integra. The  ratio in L. Krishnan’s case (supra) covers the field. In State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. etc. vs. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal & Ors. (C.A. 11555 of 1995), this Court has considered the effect  of G.O.  Ms.No.583 dated  March 11, 1983 wherein guidelines issued  for exemption were withdrawn. It was held that the  though  Government  had  issued  notifications  on earlier occasions  giving benefit  for exclusion  of certain lands covered  under the  guidelines formulated  therein, in view of  large-scale misapplication  of the  guidelines  for seeking exclusion of the lands covered under the scheme, the schemes are getting frustrated. Consequently, Government was justified in  withdrawing the guidelines issued earlier. The view of the High Court that they are statutory notifications and confer  right to  get exemption  from acquisition as per guidelines mentioned  therein, is not correct. They are only administrative instructions issued by the Government for the purpose of  consideration by  the Housing  Board  but  these guidelines being  misused and  misapplied,  the  Government, when it  had power  to issue  guidelines, has  same  plenary power to  withdraw the  same.  It  is  seen  that  the  writ

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petition came  to be  filed not  only  after  the  concerned G.O.Ms. was  withdrawn but  also after  the award came to be passed. After taking possession, all acquisition proceedings would become  final except  determination of compensation at different stages.  Consequent to  passing of  the award, the State Government is entitled to take possession of the lands and after  issuance of  the notices  under Section 12 of the Act, the  lands stand  vested in  the State under Section 16 free from all encumbrances. Consequently, we do not find any infirmity in  the notifications  issued under  Sections 4(1) and 6  of the Act and the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer.      It is seen that the very public purpose envisaged under the  scheme   is  planned   development  of   the  city  for residential purposes  to relieve  housing scarcity. Though a part  of   the  lands  was  withdrawn  for  the  purpose  of establishing outstation  bus stand  and also wholesale fruit market, they  being equally  for other  public purposes, the withdrawl of  acquisition for  those purposes  will not have nay effect  on the  notification issued  under Section 4(1). But the  respondents being  the owners  of the lands and the scheme being   for  the planned  development for residential purpose, they  too required  the lands  for construction  of their own houses for their personal residence.      Under  these   circumstances,  we   think  that   while upholding the action of the State in acquiring the lands for planned development of the city, reasonable land may also be excluded for  the actual personal residential purpose of the respondents who  are 19  in number.  In view  of  the  large numbers of  families, we  think that  1 acre 50 cents of the land would  be reasonable for the members of the families of the respondents  to construct  their own houses for personal occupation. On our direction, Mr. M.N. Krishnamani, with the assistance  of  the  local  counsel,  identified  north-east corner  of   the  land  in  Survey  No.167/1B  abutting  the Punamally Highway  road. The  total extent of the land under Survey No.  167/1B is  7 acres 81 cents. Out of which 1 acre 50  cents  in  a  contiguous  place  towards  north-east  is directed to  be released  from the  acquisition so  that the respondents would be able to construct their own residential houses for their personal residence in a compact block.      The order  of the  High Court  is  set  aside  and  the notification stands  upheld except  to the above extent. The notification of  withdrawal in  respect of  excluded land be issued under Section 48(1) within three months from the date of receipt  of the  order. This order of exclusion is not to be treated  as a  precedent. Only as a special case, in view of the  special fact  that large  number of  persons in  two families require  personal accommodation,  we have given the above directions  - that  too on  an  undertaking  that  the respondents  would  use  the  same  only  for  the  personal residence.      The appeal  is accordingly  disposed of  in  the  above terms. No costs.