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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  134 of 1980

PETITIONER: STATE OF TAMIL NADU

RESPONDENT: AROORAN SUGARS LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/10/1996

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH & M.M.PUNCHHI & N.P.SINGH & M.K.MUKHERJEE & SAGHIR S.AHMAD   

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

(With C.A. Nos. 352-354 of 1980)

DELIVERED BY: N.P. SINGH, J.

N.P. SINGH, J.

    The State  of Tamil  Nadu is  the  appellant  in  these appeals. Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 has been filed against the judgment  of the  High Court  of madras in Writ Petition 1464 of  1974, whereas Civil Appeal Nos. 352-352-354 of 1980 have been  filed against the judgment of the same High Court in Writ  Petition 2341-2343  of 1978. All the writ Petitions had been  filed on  behalf  of  the  respondent  which  were allowed by the High Court.      The respondent,  a public  limited company  which owned and  possessed   3421.14  acres  of  land,  was  engaged  in composite and  integrated activity  of raising  sugarcane on the aforesaid land and crushing it in its sugar factory. The Tamil Nadu  Reforms (Fixation  of ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Act 58  Of 1961), (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) was   published in the Tamil Nadu government Gazette on 2.5.1962. According  to  the  said  Act,  a  ceiling  of  30 standard acres   of  agricultural  land  was  fixed  as  the maximum holding.  Under Section  18(1) of the principal Act, the surplus  land has to be notified as required  for public purposes and on such publication in view of Section 18(3) of the Act  land specified  in the notification shall deemed to have been  acquired for  a public  purpose and shall vest in the Government  free from  all encumbrances with effect from the date  of such  publication  and  all  right,  title  and interest of all persons in such land shall be deemed to have been extinguished.  The relevant  part of  Section 18 of the Act is as follows:-           18.  Acquisition  of   surplus      land.-(1) After  the publication of      the final  statement under  section      12 or  14,  the  Government  shall,      subject  to   the   provisions   of      sections  16   and  17,  publish  a      notification to the effect that the      surplus  land  is  required  for  a

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    public purpose.      (2)..............................           (3)  On the publication of the      notification under sub-section (1),      the   land    specified   in    the      notification  together   with   the      trees standing  on  such  land  and      buildings,   machinery   plant   or      apparatus, constructed,  erected or      fixed on  such land  and  used  for      agricultural purpose shall, subject      to the  provisions of  this Act, be      deemed to  have been acquired for a      public purpose  and vested  in  the      Government    free     from     all      encumbrances with  effect from  the      date of such publication and right,      title and  interest of  all persons      in such  land  shall,  with  effect      from the  said date,  be deemed  to      have been extinguished:           Provided that  where there  is      any crop  standing on  such land on      the date  of such  publication, the      authorized officer  may, subject to      such   conditions    as   may    be      prescribed, permit  the harvest  of      such crop  by the  person  who  had      raised such crop.      Section 50(1) of the Act provides for payment of amount at the  rates specified  in Schedule  III thereto, to person whose right,  title or  interest in  any land is acquired by the Government.      Tamil Nadu land Reforms (Reduction of Ceiling on Land ) Act 17 of 1970, Under the Principal Act there  was provision for grant  of Exemption to the lands held by sugar factories in excess of the ceiling area. This provision was deleted by Tamil Nadu  Amendment Act  41 of 1971, which came into force from 15.1.1972.  Because of  such amendment  even the  sugar factories in  general could  not hold  land in  excess of 15 standard  acres.  The  respondent  filed  its  return  under Section 8  of the  Principal Act on 6.4.1972. The Additional Authorised officer  (Land Reforms), Tiruvarur, published the draft statement  under section 10(1) of the principal Act on 19.4.1972. The minimum compensation payable for excess Lands vesting in  the Government  was 9  times of  the net  annual income. As  such when  the respondent  filed its  return  on 6.4.1972, it  was entitled  to compensation at the rare of 9 times of the net annual income. However, the Tamil Nadu land Reforms (Fixation off Ceiling of land) Fourth Amendment Act, 1972(Act 39  of 1972)   which came in force with effect from 21.12.1972 amended  Schedule III  of principal  Act reducing the minimum  multiples from  9 times  to 2  times. The  said Amending Act  39 of 1972 purported to reduce the multiple of compensation which  was payable  in respect  of lands  which vested in  the Government  after 21.12.1972.  A notification under Section  18(1) of  the principal  Act was published on 4.4.1973 declaring  as surplus an extent of 3414.87 acres of land held  by the  respondent. Possession  over such  excess land were  taken over  by    the  state  Government  between 6.4.1973 and  26.4.1973. The  Draft Compensation  Assessment Roll was  published by  the state  Government  on  5.12.1973 determining the  amount payable to the respondent in respect of the  surplus lands  applying the  rate of 2 times the net annual income.

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    On 15.2.1974,  The Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on  Land )  Sixth Amendment Act 1972 (Act 7 of 1974) was published  in the  Tamil Nadu  Government Gazette.  Sub- section(2)   of Section  3 of  Act 7  of 1974  amended  sub- section (3)  of section 18  of the principal Act on and from 1.3.1972. The relevant part thereof is as follows:-      "3(2)  in   section   18   of   the      principal Act,-      (a) in  sub-section  (3),  for  the      words "with effect from the date of      such publication,"  The words "with      effect  from   the  date   of   the      commandment of  this Act," had been      substituted:      (b)................................      ..      (c)................................      ....      The  effect  of  substitution  of  sub-section  (3)  of section 18  of the principal Act shall be that whereas under the original  sub-section (3) of section 18 of the principal Act only  on publication  of  the  notification  under  sub- section(1)  of   section  18,  the  land  specified  in  the notification together  with the  trees standing on such land and buildings, machinery plant etc., was deemed to have been acquired for  a public  purpose and vested in the Government free from  all encumbrances  ‘with effect  from the  date of such publication’;  because  of  the  substitution  of  sub- section (3)  of section  18 of the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 the  lands in  question shall  deemed to have vested in Government’ with  effect from  the date of the commencement’ of Act  7 of 1974, i.e. with effect from 1.3.1972. It can be said that  as sub-section  (3) of section 18  stood prior to amendment  by   Act  7   of  1974   on  publication  of  the notification  under   Section  18(1),  the  vesting  of  the respondent’s sugarcane  land in  the  state  Government  had taken place  with effect  from  4.4.1973,  but  in  view  of substituted sub-section  (3) of section 18 by Act 7 of 1974, it shall be deemed that the vesting of the excess lands took place with  effect  from  1.3.1972.  In  Section  3  of  the principal Act  by Act  7 of 1974 a new sub-section (3-A) was also introduced which is as follows:           "(3-A)    (a)   Every   person      who,  after   the   date   of   the      commencement of  this Act,  was  in      possession  of,   or  deriving  any      benefit from the property vested in      the  Government  under  Sub-section      (3) shall  be liable  to pay to the      Government, for  the period,  after      such commencement, for which he was      in such possession or deriving such      benefit, an  amount as compensation      for   the    use,   occupation   or      enjoyment of  that property  as the      authorised officer  may fix  in the      prescribed  manner.   Such  officer      shall take  into consideration such      facts as may be prescribed.           (b) Any  amount payable to the      Government under  clause (a)  shall      be recoverable  as arrears  of land      revenue."      According to  the respondent,  in view of the amendment introduced by  Act 7 of 1974, antedating the date of vesting

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from 4.4.1973 to 1.3.1972 the respondent was entitled to the payment applying  the multiple  of 9 times of the net annual income instead  of multiple  of 2 times which was introduced by aforesaid  Act 39  of 1972  with effect  from 21.12.1972. Writ petition  No. 1464  of 1974  was filed on behalf of the respondent challenging  the  Draft  Compensation  Assessment Roll aforesaid,  before the High Court which was admitted by the High Court.      It  may   be  pointed  out  that  the  learned  counsel appearing for  the appellant-state,  could not explain as to what was the purpose of enacting Act 7 of 1974 aforesaid and what object  it purported  to achieve. He simply stated that later the  legislature itself restored the original position by enacting  Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of ceiling on Land) Amendment  Act 78  (Act 25 of 1978). Section 4 of that Act is as follows:      "4.  Tamil Nadu  Act 58 of 1961, as      subsequently  modified,   to   have      effect subject to modifications-The      Principal Act,  shall, on  and from      the 1st  day of  march  1972,  have      effect as if, -      (1) in  section 18 of the principal      Act,-      (a) in  sub-section  (3),  for  the      words "with effect from the date of      the commencement  of this Act," the      words "with effect from the date of      such    publication"    had    been      substituted:      (b)................................      .......      (c)  sub-section   (3-A)  had  been      omitted.      .................................."      In view  of section  4 aforesaid, in sub-section (3) of section 18  of the principal Act the words "with effect from the date  of such publication" was again substituted for the words "  with effect  from the  date of commencement of this Act" which  had been  introduced by  Act  7  of  1974.  Sub- section(3-A) which  had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 was also omitted.  Sections 5  and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 which are relevant provided:      "5.  Certain  provisions  of  Tamil      Nadu Act  7 of  1974  not  to  have      effect-      (1)    Notwithstanding     anything      contained in  the Tamil  Nadu  land      Reforms  (Fixation  of  Ceiling  on      Land)  Sixth  Amendment  Act,  1972      (Tamil  Nadu   Act   7   of   1974)      (hereinafter   in    this   section      referred to as the 1972 Act), or in      any judgment,  decree or  order  of      any court  or other authority, sub-      section(2) of section 3 of the 1972      Act shall  be omitted  and shall be      deemed always  to have been omitted      and accordingly  the  modifications      made to section 18 of the principal      Act by the said sub-section (2),-           (a) shall  be deemed  never to      have been  made and  the provisions      of  the  said  section  18  of  the      principal Act  as they  stood prior

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    to  the  said  modifications  shall      continue  in  force  and  shall  be      deemed always  to have continued in      force; and           (b) shall  be deemed  never to      have had  the effect  of vesting in      the State  Government  the  surplus      lands specified in any notification      published under  sub-section (1) of      the  said   section   18   of   the      principal Act  on or  after the 2nd      may 1962  and before  the  date  of      publication of   this  Act  in  the      Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, from      a date  earlier to  the date of the      publication  of   the  notification      under the  said sub-section (1) and      shall be  deemed always to have had      the effect  of vesting in the state      Government such surplus lands, only      with effect  from the  date of  the      publication of such notification.      (2) Anything  done  or  any  action      taken under  the principal  Act  in      pursuance of the provisions of sub-      section (2)  of section  3  of  the      1972 Act,  shall be  re-opened  and      determined   in   accordance   with      provisions of the principal Act, as      modified by this Act.      6. Vesting of certain surplus lands      and  validation  -  Notwithstanding      anything contained in any judgment,      decree, or  order of  any court  or      other authority,-           (a) where  before the  date of      publication  of  this  Act  in  the      Tamil  Nadu   Government   (1)   of      section 18 of the principal Act has      been published,  the  surplus  land      specified  in   such   notification      shall be  deemed to  have vested in      the state  Government, with  effect      from the  date of  such publication      only,    and     accordingly    the      provisions of the principal Act, as      modified by  section 4 of this Act,      shall for all purposes apply and be      deemed always  to have been applied      in respect of such surplus lands so      vested; and           (b)   all    acts   done   and      proceedings taken by any officer or      authority under  the principal Act,      on the  basis that  compensation in      respect of  surplus lands  referred      to in  clause (a)  shall be payable      only   according   to   the   rates      specified in  schedule III  of  the      principal Act,  as in  force on the      date of  publication  of  the  said      notification,   shall,    for   all      purposes be  deemed to  be  and  to      have always  been validly Section 4      of this  Act had  been in  force at

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    all material  times when  such acts      or proceedings were done or taken."      As already mentioned the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974 claiming compensation applying the multiple of 9  times instead  of 2  times and  for a direction to the authorised  officer   to  prepare   the  Draft  Compensation Assessment Roll  in respect  of the  lands which  had vested taking into  account the  provisions of  aforesaid Act  7 of 1974. This  stand was  taken on  behalf  of  the  respondent because the  effect of Act 7 of 1974 was that vesting was to take effect with effect from 1.3.1972 as provided in section 3 of  Act 7  of  1974.  On  1.3.1974,  admittedly  aforesaid Amendment Act  39 of  1972 by  which the compensation amount payable for  the surplus lands was reduced from 9 times to 2 times of  the net  annual income had not come into force, it came into  force with  effect from 21.12.1972. As such if by virtue of  Act 7 of 1974 if the vesting had taken place with effect from  1.3.1972 the  date of  commencement of Act 7 of 1974, it  shall be deemed that vesting had taken place prior to 21.12.1972  when admittedly  schedule  III  provided  for payment by  applying the multiple of 9 times. The High Court by; its order dated 8.10.1976 quashed the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll  published, treating  the vesting    of  the surplus lands  with effect from 1.3.1972 because of Act 7 of 1974. Civil  Appeal No. 134/80 is directed against aforesaid order of the High Court dated 8.10.1976. The respondent also filed Writ petition No. 624 of 1978 for issuance of mandamus to the authorised officer on basis of the aforesaid judgment and order of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 in writ petition No. 1464/74  to   prepare the  Draft Assessment  Roll as per that a  judgment. The High Court by its order dated 3.3.1978 directed the  authorised officer  to prepare  the Assessment Roll accordingly.      The aforesaid Act 25 of 1978 was published in the Tamil Nadu Government  Gazette on 18.5.1978 and took effect on and from 1.3.1972.  It restored  parts  of  sub-section  (3)  of section 18  as it  stood prior to the amendment in that sub- section   by Act  7 of  1974. it reiterated that the date of vesting  of   the  surplus   lands  shall  be  date  of  the publication of  the notification  under sub-section  (1)  of section 18  of the  Act. so far the respondent is concerned, such notification  under sub-section  (1) of  section 18 had been published on 4.4.1973, i.e. after 21.12.1972 from which date because  Amendment Act  39  of  1972  the  compensation amount payable for the surplus lands had been reduced from 9 times to  2 times of the net annual income. Section 5 of Act 25 of  1978 also  contained non-obstante clause with deeming fiction saying  that notwithstanding  anything contained  in the Tamil  Nadu land  Reforms (Fixation  of Ceiling on Land) Sixth Amendment  Act 1972  (Act 7  of 1974) or any judgment, decree or  order of  any court, sub-section (2) of section 3 of the  aforesaid 1972  Act shall  be omitted  and shall  be deemed always  to have  been omitted. Section 6 thereof said that notwithstanding  anything contained  in any  judgement, decree or  order of  any court  where before the date of the publication of  the said  Act  in  Tamil  Nadu    Government Gazette a  notification under  sub-section (1) of section 18 of the  principal Act  had been  published the surplus lands specified in  such notification  ’ shall  be deemed  to have vested in  the state Government with effect from the date of such publication  only.........’ and  the provisions  of the principal Act  as modified  by section  4 of  Act 25 of 1978 shall for  all purposes  apply and  be deemed always to have applied in  respect of  such surplus  lands  so  vested  and compensation in  respect of  surplus land shall be paid only

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according to  the rates  specified in  Schedule III  of  the principal Act  as in  force on   the date of the publication such notification.  In other  words, sections 5 and 6 of Act 25 of  1978 purported to efface and obliterate the amendment which had  been introduced  in sub-section (3) of section 18 by Act  7 of 1974 and purported to validate the notification which had  been issued  on 4.4.1973 under sub-section (1) of section 18  of the  principle Act declaring 3414.78 acres of the land belonging to the respondent as surplus. It need not be pointed  out that this was done because the multiple of 9 times was  reduced to  2 times by Act 39 of 1972 with effect from 21.12.1972. If the vesting had taken place by effect of amended sub-section  (3) of section 18 by Act 7 of 1974 with effect from  1.3.1972, the  date of  the commencement of the said Act,  then the respondent was entitled for compensation applying the multiple of 9 times.      Writ petition  Nos. 2341-2343  of 1978  were  filed  on behalf of  the respondent  questioning the  validity of  the aforesaid provisions  of Act  25 of 1978 and for a direction that such  provisions which  were introduced by the said Act had no  effect on  the right  of the  respondent to  receive compensation applying the minimum multiple of 9 times of the net annual  income. Those  writ petitions  were allowed by a Division Bench  of the High Court on 20.7.1979. Civil Appeal Nos. 352-354/80 have been filed against the said Judgment.      Mr. Venugopal,  the learned  counsel appearing  for the appellant-state, took  a stand  that civil Appeal No. 134/80 has been  filed on  behalf  of  the  state  challenging  the validity of  the judgment  and order of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 in  Writ petition No. 1464/74 directing payment of compensation to  the respondent  applying the  provisions of Act 7 of 1974, after coming into force of the Act 25 of 1978 it shall  be deemed  that the  basis of the judgment in writ petition No.  1464/74  has  been  taken  away  as  such  the respondent  cannot   claim  compensation   by  applying  the multiple of  9 times. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant-State that  the provisions of Act 25 of 1978 being constitutional and  valid, High  court should have dismissed the writ  petition Nos. 2341-2343 of 1978 filed on behalf of the respondent questioning the validity of Act 25 of 1978.      It may  be mentioned at the outset that none of the two judgments of  the High  Court dated 88.10.1976 and 20.7.1979 in writ  petition No.  1464/74 and  writ petition Nos. 2341- 2343/78 have  became final. Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 and civil appeal  Nos. 352-354 of 1980 are directed  against the aforesaid judgments  dated 8.10.1976  and 20.7.1979. In this background, it  has to be examined whether sections 4, 5 and 6 of  Act 25  of 1978  with non-obstante  clause and deeming provisions have  taken away  the  effect  of  the  aforesaid judgment of  the High  Court dated  8.10.1976 directing  the appellant-state to  apply 9  times multiple  in view  of the amendments introduced  by Act 7 of 1974. The other aspect is as to  whether in view of the provisions aforesaid of Act 25 of 1978,  this Court  while considering  the appeal  against aforesaid judgment  dated 8.10.1976  in  writ  petition  No. 1464/74 has  now to  proceed as  if the  amendments  in  the principal Act  by Act  7 of  1974 had never been introduced. There is  no dispute in respect of legislative competence of legislature to  enact Act  25 of  1978. The  only dispute is whether provisions of that Act has achieved the achieved the desired result.      Sections 5  and 6  of Act  25 of  1978 contain  deeming fiction in  its different  clauses while  purporting to omit and remove the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974  in the  principal Act. The role of a provision in a

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statute creating  legal fiction is by now well settled. When a statute  creates legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed  to have been done which in fact and truth has not been done,  the court has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose  and between  what  persons  such  a  statutory fiction is to be resorted to. Thereafter courts have to give full effect  to such  a statutory  fiction and  it has to be carried to its logical conclusion. In the well-known case of East End  Dwellings Co.  Ltd. V.  Finsbury Borough  Council, 1952 AC  109 Lord  Asquith while dealing with the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947 observed:           "If you are bidden to treat an      imaginary state of affairs as real,      you must  surely, unless prohibited      from doing so, also imagine as real      the  consequences   and   incidents      which, if  the putative,  state  of      affairs had  in fact  existed, must      inevitably  have   flowed  from  or      accompanied it....The  statute says      that you  must  imagine  a  certain      having done  so, you  must cause or      permit your  imagination to  boggle      when it  comes  to  the  inevitable      corollaries  of   that   state   of      affairs."      That  statement  of  law  aforesaid  in  respect  of  a statutory fiction  is being  consistently followed  by  this court. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases of state of Bombay V. Pandurang Vinayak, 1953 SCR 773; Chief Inspector of  Mines V.  Karam Chand  Thapar, 1962(1)  SCR 9; J.K. Cotton  Spinning and  Weaving Mills  Ltd. V.  Union  of India,(1988) 1  SCR 700; M. Venugopal V. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance  Corporation of  India, (1964) 2 SCC 323; and Harish Tandon  V. Additional District Magistrate. Allahabad, (1995)1 SCC 537.      Section  5   of  Act   25   of   1978   provides   that notwithstanding anything  contained in  Act 7 of 1974, or in any judgment,  decree or  order of  any  court  ,  or  other authority, sub-section  (2) of  section 3  of the  aforesaid Act’ shall  be omitted  and shall  be deemed  always to have been omitted and the modifications made to section 18 of the principal Act by the said sub-section (2)-           (a) ’shall  be deemed never to      have been  made and  the provisions      of the  said section  18    of  the      principal Act  as they  stood prior      to  the  said  modifications  shall      continue  in  force  and  shall  be      deemed always  to have continued in      force; and           (b) ’shall  be deemed never to      have had  the effect  of vesting in      the state  Government  the  surplus      lands specified in any notification      published under  sub-section (1) of      the  said   section   18   of   the      principal Act  on or  after the 2nd      May 1962  and before  the  date  of      publication  of  this  Act  in  the      Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, from      a date  earlier to  the date of the      publication  of   the  notification      under the  said sub-section (1) and      shall be  deemed always to have had

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    the effect  of Vesting in the state      Government such surplus lands, only      with effect  from the  date of  the      publication of such  notification.’      The legislature  by  different  deeming  clauses    and through statutory  fiction requires the  Court to treat that amendments so  introduced by  Act 7  of 1974  had never been introduced  in   the  principal   Act.  The   power  of  the legislature to  amend, delete  or obliterate a statute or to enact a  statute  prospectively or retrospectively cannot be questioned and  challenged unless  the court  is of the view that such  exercise is  in in violation of Article 14 of the constitution. It need not be impressed that whenever any Act or amendment  is brought  in force  retrospectively  or  any provision of  the Act  is deleted  retrospectively,  or  any provision of  the Act  is deleted  retrospectively, in  this process rights  of some  are bound to be effected one way or the other.  In every  case, it  cannot  be  urged  that  the exercise  by   the  legislature   while  introducing  a  new provision   or   deleting   an   existing   provision   with retrospective effect per se shall be violative of Article 14 of the  constitution. If  that stand  is accepted,  then the necessary corollary  shall be  that legislature has no power to legislate retrospectively, because in that event a vested right is  effected; of  course, in  special  situation  this court has  held that  such exercise was violative of Article 14 of  the constitution. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases of state of Gujarat & Another V. Raman Lal Keshav Lal  Soni &  others,(1983) 2  SCR 287; T. R. Kapur V. State of Haryana, 1986 (Supp) SCC 584; and Union of India V. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, 1994(5) SCC 450. In the case of state of Gujarat  V. Raman Lal (Supra) a Constitution Bench on the facts and circumstances of that case observed:           "The legislation  is pure  and      simple, self-deceptive,  if we  may      use   such   an   expression   with      reference  to   a  legislature-made      law. The legislature is undoubtedly      competent   to    legislate    with      retrospective effect  to take  away      or impair any vested right acquired      under existing  laws but  since the      laws are   made  under   a  written      Constitution, and  have to  conform      to  the  do’s  and  don’ts  of  the      constitution  neither   prospective      nor retrospective  laws can be made      so  as  to  contravene  Fundamental      Rights. The  law must  satisfy  the      requirements  of  the  Constitution      today  taking   into  account   the      accrued or  acquired rights  of the      parties today.  The law cannot say,      twenty years ago the parties had no      rights, therefore, the requirements      of   the   Constitution   will   be      satisfied if  the law is dated back      by twenty  years. We  are concerned      with   today’s   rights   and   not      yesterday’s. A  legislature  cannot      legislate today with reference to a      situation  that   obtained   twenty      years ago   and ignore the march of      events   and   the   constitutional      rights accrued in the course of the

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    twenty years.  That would  be  most      arbitrary,   unreasonable   and   a      negation of history."      In same  terms this  Court expressed the opinion in the cases of T.R. Kapur V. State of Haryana (supra) and Union of India  V.  Tushar  Ranjan  Mohanty  (supra)  in  respect  of alterations  in  rules  framed  under  Article  309  of  the constitution   retrospectively   regarding   conditions   of service.      So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the provisions of  Act 25  of 1978  do not purport to effect any vested or  acquired right.  It only  restores  the  position which existed  when the  principal  Act  was  in  force.  By notification dated  4.4.1973 issued  under section  18(1) of the Act  as it  stood prior to amendment introduced by Act 7 of 1974,  3414.87 acres of land had been declared as surplus which vested  in the state Government under section 18(3) of the principal  Act as  it stood on that date. It can be said that Act 25 of 1978 simply nullifies Act 7 of 1974 which had made amendments  in the principal Act after notification gad been issued  under section 18(1) and vesting had taken place under section  18(3) of  the principal Act as it stood prior to enactment  Act 7 of 1974. By Act 7 of 1974 futile attempt had been  made by  introducing different amendments. in this process not  only it  created anomaly  in the principal Act, but nothing purposeful was achieved. It is true that because of the  amendments introduced  by that  Act 7  of 1974,  the respondent could  urge before  the High  Court that  as  the vesting had  taken place  on 1.3.1972, in spite of amendment Act 39  of 1972  which had reduced the multiple from 9 times to 2  times of  the  net  annual  income  with  effect  from 21.12.1972 the respondent was entitled to compensation to be worked out on basis of 9 times of the net annual income. But on this  ground the  provisions of  Act 25 to 1978 cannot be held to  be violative of Article 14  of the constitution and as such  ultra vires.  Once the  provisions are  held to  be legal and  valid, then  as pointed  out above  the wish  and desire of the legislature has to be given full effect and to its  logical   end.  The  courts  have  to  proceed  on  the assumption the  Act 7  of 1974 had never been enacted and no amendment whatsoever  had been  introduced in  the principal Act directing  the vesting  to take  place with  effect from 1.3.1972. This  court shall  be fully justified in examining the judgment  of the  High Court  dated  8.10.1976  on  Writ Petition No.  1464/74 filed by the respondent, treating that Act 7  of 1974 was never enacted or was in existence. As the aforesaid  judgment  dated  8.10.1976  is  solely  based  on amendments introduced by Act 7 of 1974, once such amendments have been  effected retrospectively, there is no escape from the conclusion that the substratum and basis of the judgment of the  High court   dated  8. 10.1976  is solely  based  on amendments introduced  by Act 7 of 1974, one such amendments have been  effaced retrospectively,  there is no escape from the  conclusion   that  the  substratum  and  basis  of  the judgement of  the High  Court dated 8.10.1976 has been taken away. The  High Court  had proceeded  on the assumption that because of amendment introduced by Act 7 of 1974 the vesting shall be  deemed to  have taken  place  with  effect    from 1.3.1972 and  on that  assumption  direction  was  given  to calculate the  compensation applying 9 times multiples which had been  reduced to  2 timed with effect from 21.12.1972 by amendment Act  39  of  1972.  But  if  the  provision  which directed Vesting with effect from 1.3.1972 does not exist in eyes of  law, then  there is  no question  of  holding  that vesting shall  be deemed  to have  taken place  with  effect

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1.3.1972 when  compensation was to be worked out by applying the 9  times to 2 times of the net annual income with effect from 21.12.1972.  Thereafter on  4.4.1973 notification under Section 18(1)  of the  principal Act  was  issued  declaring 3414.87 acres  of land  of the  respondent as  surplus which vested in  the State  Government under  Section 18(3) of the principal Act  as it   stood  on  that  date.  As  such  the compensation has  to be worked out on basis of the amendment which had  been introduced  in schedule  III of  the Act  by amendment  Act  39  of  1972.  This  Court  can  modify  the judgement of  the High  Court dated  8.10.1976  taking  into account No.134  of 1980 is against aforesaid judgment of the High Court dated 8.10.1976.      There is yet another aspect of the matter. Section 6 of the Act  25 of  1978 provides  that notwithstanding anything contained in  any judgment, decree, or order of any court or other authority where before the date of publication of this Act in  the Tamil  Nadu Government  Gazette, a  notification under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the principal Act had been  published,   the  surplus   lands  specified  in  such notification shall  be deemed  to have  vested in  the state Government, with  effect from  the date  of such publication only, and  accordingly the  provisions of the principal Act, as modified by section 4 of this Act, shall for all purposes apply and  be deemed  always to have been applied in respect of such surplus lands so vested.      The scope  of a  non-obstante clause  and of validating Act has  been examined  by this  Court from  time to  time . Reference in  this connection be made to the judgment in the case  of   Prithvi  Cotton  Mills  Ltd.  V.  Broach  Borough Municipality, (1969)  2 SCC  283  where  Hidayatullah,  C.J. speaking for the Constitution bench said:           "When a  legislature sets  out      to validate  a tax  declared  by  a      court  to  be  illegally  collected      under   and    ineffectiveness   or      invalidity must  be removed  before      validation  can  be  said  to  take      place   effectively.    The    most      important condition,  of course, is      that the  legislature must  possess      the power to impose the tax, for if      it does  not, the  action must ever      remain  ineffective   and  illegal.      Granted legislative  competence, it      is not sufficient to declare merely      that  the  decision  of  the  court      shall  not   bind   for   that   is      tantamount   to    reversing    the      decision in  exercise  of  judicial      power which  the  legislature  does      not possess  or exercise. A Court’s      decision must  always bind   unless      the conditions  on  which    it  is      based are  so fundamentally altered      that the  decision could  not  have      been   given    in   the    altered      circumstances. Ordinarily,  a court      holds a tax to be invalidly imposed      because the power to tax is wanting      or the statute or the rules or both      area invalid or do not sufficiently      create    the     jurisdiction    .      Validation of  a  tax  so  declared      illegal may  be known  only if  the

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    grounds of illegality or invalidity      are capable  of being  removed  and      are in  fact removed  and  the  tax      thus made  legal. Sometimes this is      done by  providing for jurisdiction      where  jurisdiction  had  not  been      properly invested before. Sometimes      this   is   done   by   re-enacting      retrospectively a  valid and  legal      taxing  provision   and   then   by      fiction  making   the  tax  already      collected to  stand under  the  re-      enacted    law.    Sometimes    the      legislature gives  its own  meaning      and interpretation of the law under      which the  tax was collected and by      legislative  fiat   makes  the  new      meaning binding  upon  courts.  The      legislature  may   follow  any  one      method or  all of them and while it      does  so   it  may  neutralise  the      effect of  the earlier  decision of      the court which becomes ineffective      after the change of the law."      The same  view was  reiterated in  the  cases  of  west Ramnad Electric  Distribution Co.  Ltd.  V. State of Madras, (1963) 2 SCR 747; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India,(1968) 3 SCR 41;  Tirath Ram  Rajindra Nath  V. State of U.P,(1973) 3 SCC 585;  Krishna Chandra  Gangopadhyay v.  Union of  India, (1975) 2 SCC 302; Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. V. State of Haryana, (1985),  4 SCC  124; Utkal  Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. V. State of Orissa, 1987 Supp SCC 751; D. Cawasji & Co. v.  state of  Mysore, 1984 Supp SCC 490 and Bhubaneshwar Singh V.  Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 77. It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively.  In this process it cannot be said that there  has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power  of the judiciary. A court’s directive must always bind unless  the conditions  on which  it is  based  are  so fundamentally altered  that under altered circumstances such decisions could  not have  been  given.  This  will  include removal of  the defect  in a  statute  pointed  put  in  the judgment in  question, as well as alteration or substitution of provisions  of the  enactment on  which such  judgment is based, with  retrospective effect. This is what has happened in the  present case. The judgment of the High Court in writ petition No.  1464/74, dated  8.10.1976 was  solely based on the amendments  which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 . If those  amendments so  introduced have been effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospective effect saying that it shall be deemed that  no such  amendments had ever been introduced in the   principal Act, then full effect has to be given to the provisions of  later Act  unless   they are held to be ultra vires or unconstitutional .      On behalf  of the  respondent, it  was pointed out that the High  Court in  its judgment  dated  8.10.1976  in  writ petition No.  1464/74 has  not declared  any provision to be invalid because  of which a validating Act was required. The said judgment  had also no pointed out any defect in any Act which had to be rectified by a validating Act. It had simply proceeded on  the provisions of Act 7 of 1974 and had issued direction to  the state  Government to proceed in accordance with those  provisions. This Court has examined the power of the legislature  to amend  the  provisions  of  the  Act  in

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question after a court verdict. Reference in this connection may be  made to  the case  of Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v.  Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. (1975) 2 SCC 274 where it was observed:           "We see  no substance  in  the      respondent’s contention that by re-      defining  the   term  ‘house’  with      retrospective   effect    and    by      validating the levies imposed under      the    unamended    Act    as    if      notwithstanding anything  contained      in any judgment, decree or order of      any court,  that Act as amended was      in force  on the  date when the tax      was  levied,  the  Legislature  has      encroached    upon    a    judicial      function.   The    power   of   the      legislature   to    pass   a    law      postulates the  power  to  pass  it      prospectively    as     well     as      retrospectively  the  one  no  less      than the other. Within the scope of      its  legislative   competence   and      subject  to   other  constitutional      limitations,  the   power  of   the      legislature  to   enact   laws   is      plenary. In  United provinces    V.      Atiga  Begum,   Gwyer,  C.J.  while      repelling the  argument that Indian      Legislatures had  no power to alter      the existing  laws  retrospectively      observed that  within the limits of      their     powers     the     Indian      legislatures were  as  supreme  and      sovereign as the British parliament      itself and  that those  powers were      not subject  to  the  "strange  and      unusual     prohibition     against      retrospective   legislation".   The      power    to    validate    a    law      retrospectively is,  subject to the      limitations aforesaid, an ancillary      power   to    legislate   on    the      particular subject.           The state  legislature, it  is      significant, has  not overruled  or      set aside  the judgment of the High      Court.   It    has   amended    the      definition  of   ‘house’   by   the      substitution of a new section 2(15)      for the  old  section  and  it  has      provided that  the  new  definition      shall  have  retrospective  effect,      notwithstanding anything  contained      in any judgment, decree or order of      any court  or other  authority.  In      other words,  it  has  removed  the      basis of  the decision  rendered by      the High Court so that the decision      could not  have been  given to  the      altered circumstances.  If the  old      Section  2(15)   were   to   define      ‘house’  in  the  manner  that  the      amended section  2(15) does,  there      is no  doubt that  the decision  of

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    the High  Court   would  have  been      otherwise.  In  fact,  it  was  not      disputed   before   us   that   the      buildings   constructed    by   the      respondent    meet     fully    the      requirements of  Section  2(15)  as      amended by the Act of 1974.           In Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v.      State  of   U.P,  the   Legislature      amended the law retrospectively and      thereby removed  the basis  of  the      decision rendered by the High Court      of Allahabad.  It was  held by this      Court  that  this  was  within  the      permissible limits  and  validation      of the  old Act  by  constitute  an      encroachment   on the  functions of      the judiciary."      Again in the case of Sunder Dass V.      Ram Prakash, (1977) 3 SCR 60 it was      said:           "The appellant, however, urged      that  the   introduction   of   the      proviso in  section 3 should not be      given     greater     retrospective      operation  than  necessary  and  it      should not  be so  construed as  to      affect decrees  for eviction  which      had already  become  final  between      the parties.  Now, it  is true, and      that  is  a  settled  principle  of      construction, that  the court ought      not to  give a larger retrospective      operation to  a statutory provision      than what  can plainly  be seen  to      have been meant by the legislature.      This  rule   of  interpretation  is      hallowed by  time and sanctified by      decisions, though we are not at all      sure   whether   it   should   have      validity in  the context of changed      social norms  and values.  But even      so,  we   do  not   see   how   the      retrospective introduction  of  the      proviso  in   section  3   can   be      construed so as to leave unimpaired      a  decree   for  eviction   already      passed, then the question arises in      execution whether  it is a nullity.      The    logical    and    inevitable      consequence of  the introduction of      the  proviso   in  section  3  with      retrospective effect  would  be  to      read the proviso as if it were part      or the section at the date when the      Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958  was      enacted  and   the  legal   fiction      created   by    the   retrospective      operation must  be carried  to  its      logical   extent    and   all   the      consequences and  incidents must be      worked out as if the proviso formed      part of  the section right from the      beginning.   This   would   clearly      render the  decree for  eviction  a

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    nullity  and   since  in  execution      proceeding,  an   objection  as  to      nullity of  a decree  is a nullity,      the principle  of finality  of  the      decree cannot  be  invoked  by  the      appellant to avoid the consequences      and  incidents   flowing  from  the      retrospective introduction  of  the      proviso in  section 3.  Moreover  ,      the  words   "notwithstanding   any      judgment, decree  or order  of  any      court or  other authority"  in  the      proviso make  it clear and leave no      doubt that the legislature intended      that  the  finality  of  "judgment,      decree or  order of  any  court  or      other authority"  should not  stand      in the way of giving full effect to      the retrospective  introduction  of      the  proviso   in  section   3  and      applying  the   provisions  of  the      Delhi Rent  Control  Act,  1958  in      cases falling within the proviso."      Same was  the situation  in the  case  of  Bhubaneshwar Singh V.  Union of  India (supra)  where taking  note of the subsequent amendments in the concerned Act the Court came to the conclusion:-           "In  the     present  case  as      already pointed  out above, if sub-      section (2)  as introduced  by  the      Coal  Mines   Nationalisation  Laws      (Amendment) Act  1986 in section 10      had   existed    since   the   very      inception, there  was  no  occasion      for the High Court or this Court to      issue a  direction for  taking into      account the price which was payable      for the  stock of code lying on the      date before  the appointed day. The      authority to  introduce sub-section      (2) in  section 10 of the aforesaid      Act   with   retrospective   effect      cannot  be   questioned.  Once  the      amendment   has   been   introduced      retrospectively, courts have to act      on the  basis that  such  provision      was there  since the beginning. The      role of  the deeming provision need      not  be  emphasised    in  view  of      series of  judgments of  this court      ...................................      ...................................      ...................................      .............           In  the   present  case,   the      lacuna or  defect has  been removed      by the  introduction of sub-section      (2) in  section 10  of the Act with      retrospective  effect.  Sub-section      (2)  of   section  10  as  well  as      section  19,  both  have  specified      that the amount which is to be paid      as compensation  mentioned  in  the      schedule shall be deemed to include      and deemed always to have included,

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    the amount  required to  be paid to      such owner  in respect  of all coal      in stock  on the  date  immediately      before the  appointed day.  As such      the earlier  judgment of this court      is of no help to the petitioner."      On behalf  of the  respondent reference was made to the well-known judgment of this court in the case of Madan Mohan Pathak V.  Union -  of India,  (1978) 2  SC 50  and  it  was pointed out  from the  judgment of  Chief  justice  Bag  who observed:           "I may,  however, observe that      even though  the real object of the      Act may  be to set aside the result      of  the   Mandamus  issued  by  the      Calcutta  High   Court,  Yet,   the      section  does   not  mention   this      object at all. Probably this was so      because the  jurisdiction of a High      Court and  the effectiveness of its      orders  derived  their  force  from      Article  226  of  the  Constitution      Itself. These  could not be touched      by an  ordinary act  of parliament.      Even if  section 3 of the Act Seeks      to  take  away  the  basis  of  the      judgment  of   the  Calcutta   High      Court, without  mentioning  it,  by      enacting what  may appear  to be  a      law, yet,  i think  that, where the      rights of  the citizen  against the      State  are   concerned,  we  should      adopt   an   interpretation   which      upholds  those  rights.  Therefore,      according to  the interpretation  I      prefer to  adopt the  rights  which      had passed into those embodied in a      judgment and  became the basis of a      mandamus from  the High Court could      not be  taken away in this indirect      fashion."      The facts  of that case were entirely different. In the Act which  was being  challenged, there  was no non-obstante clause purporting to take away the effect of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court. Letters patent Appeal filed against the judgment  whose effect  was  being  taken  away  by  the provisions in  question had  been withdrawn. Bhagwati, J (as he then  was) made  a special mention of the aforesaid facts for purpose  of holding that the effect of the Calcutta High Court had not be  nullified by the provisions in question:-           "It  is  significant  to  note      that there  was no reference to the      judgment of the Calcutta High Court      in the  Statement  of  objects  and      Reasons  ,   nor  any  non-obstante      clause referring to a judgment of a      court in  section 3 of the impugned      Act. The  attention  of  parliament      does not  appear to have been drawn      to the  fact that the Calcutta High      Court has  already issued a writ of      Mandamus   commanding    the   Life      Insurance Corporation  to  pay  the      amount of  Bonus for the year April      1,  1975   to  March   31,1976.  It

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    appears  that   unfortunately   the      judgment of the Calcutta High Court      remained almost  unnoticed and  the      impugned   Act    was   passed   in      ignorance of that judgment. Section      3 of  the impugned  Act  or  issued      that   the    provisions   of   the      settlement in so far as they relate      to payment  of annual cash bonus to      class III  and class  IV  employees      shall not  have any force or effect      and shall not to deemed to have had      any  force  or  effect  from  April      1,1975   to   March   31,1976   was      concerned, it became crystalised in      the judgment  and  thereafter  they      became entitled to enforce the writ      of mandamus granted by the judgment      and   not any  right to annual cash      bonus under  settlement. This right      under the  judgment was  not sought      to be  taken away  by the  impugned      Act.  The   judgment  continued  to      subsist  and   the  Life  Insurance      Corporation was bound to pay annual      cash bonus  to Class  III and Class      IV  employees for the year April 1,      1975   to   Mandamus.   The   error      committed  by  the  Life  Insurance      Corporation was  that  it  withdrew      the  Letters   patent  Appeal   and      allowed the judgment of the learned      single judge  to become  final.  By      the time  the Letters Patent Appeal      came up  for hearing,  the impugned      Act had already come into force and      the  Life   Insurance   Corporation      could,     therefore     ,     have      successfully  contended   in   that      letters Patent  Appeal that,  since      the settlement,  in so  far  as  it      provided for payment of annual cash      bonus,  was   annihilated  by   the      impugned Act with effect from April      1,1975 to  March 31,1976  and hence      no writ  of  mandamus  could  issue      directing   the    life   Insurance      Corporation to make payment of such      bonus . If such contention had been      raised,  there   is  little  doubt,      subject   of    course    to    any      constitutional  challenge   to  the      validity of the impugned Act , that      the judgment  of the learned single      judge would  have been upturned and      the writ petition dismissed. But on      account   of    some   inexplicable      reason,  which   is  difficult   to      appreciate,  the   Life   Insurance      Corporation  did   not  press   the      letters  patent   Appeal  and   the      result was that the judgment of the      learned single  judge granting writ      of  mandamus   became   final   and      binding  on   the  parties.  It  is

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    difficult  to   see  how  in  these      circumstances  the  Life  Insurance      Corporation  could   claim  to   be      absolved   from    the   obligation      imposed by  the judgment  to  carry      out the writ of mandamus by relying      on the impugned Act."           (emphasis supplied)      Because of  the aforesaid factual position of that case the view  expressed by the Constitution Bench in the Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. V. Broach Borough Municipality (Supra) was held to be of no help to the life insurance Corporation.      Reference was  also made on behalf of the respondent to the judgment  of this  court in  the case  of A.V. Nachane & Another V.  Union of  India & Another,(1982) 2 SCR 246 where it was  observed in  respect of the Amendment Act, which was the subject  matter of  controversy in  that case,  that  it could not  nullify the  effect of  the writ  issued by  this Court in  D.J. Bahadur’s case, relying on aforesaid judgment in the Madan Mohan Pathak  (Supra). From a bare reference to page 267  of the  report, it appears that the learned judges placed reliance  on the  defect pointed  out in  the case of Madan Mohan  Pathak by  Bhagwati, J  quoted above.  In other words, on  peculiar facts  and circumstances  of the case it was held that the effect of the judgment in the case of D.J. Bahadur had  not been  taken away  by the  Amending Act.  On behalf of  the respondent,  reliance was  also placed on the cases of  Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd.  and Another, (1970) 1 SCC 509; The municipal Corporation of  the City of Ahmedabad and Another, etc. etc. v. The  New Shrock Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. etc. etc.,(1970) 2 SCC 280.  In the  case of  Government of  Andhra Pradesh  V. Hindustan Machine  Tools Ltd.,(1975) 2 SCC 274 the aforesaid judgments in  the cases  of Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and Another (supra) and The Municipal Corporation of the city  of Ahmedabad and Another, etc. etc. (supra) were distinguished by pointing out:           "The decisions  on  which  the      respondent   relies   are   clearly      distinguishable. In  the  Municipal      Corporation   of    the   city   of      Ahmedabad V. New Shrock Spg. & Wvg.      Co. Ltd.,  the  impugned  provision      commended the corporation to refuse      to  refund   the  amount  illegally      collected by  it despite the orders      of the  Supreme Court  and the High      Court.  As   the  basis   of  these      decisions remained  unchanged  even      after the amendment, it was held by      this Court the Legislature had made      a direct  inroad into  the judicial      powers.    In    Janapada    Sabha,      Chhindwara  V.   Central  provinces      Syndicate Ltd.,  the Madhya Pradesh      Legislature passed  Validation  Act      in  order  to  rectify  the  defect      pointed out  by this  court in  the      imposition of  a cess.  But the Act      did not  set out  the nature of the      amendment nor  did it  provide that      the  notifications  issued  without      the   sanction    of   the    state      Government would  be deemed to have      been issued validly. It was held by

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    this court that this was tantamount      to saying  that the  judgment of  a      court rendered  in the  exercise of      its legitimate jurisdiction  was to      be deemed  to be  ineffective.  The      position in  State of Tamil Nadu V.      M. Ravappa  Gounder ,  was similar.      In that case the reassessments made      under an  Act which did not provide      for reassessments were attempted to      be validated  without changing  the      law   retrospectively.   This   was      considered to be an encroachment on      the judicial functions.           In  the   instant  case,   the      Amending Act  of 1974 cures the old      definition  contained   in  section      2(15) of  the vice  from  which  it      suffered. The  amendment  has  been      given retrospective  effect and  as      stated earlier  the Legislature has      the power  to make  the laws passed      by it  retroactive. As the Amending      Act    does     not     ask     the      instrumentalities of  the State  to      disobey or  disregard the  decision      given by the High Court but removes      the basis  of its  decision,    the      challenge made by the respondent to      the Amending  Act  must  fail.  The      levy   of    the   house-tax   must      therefore be upheld."      In view  of sections  4,5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 which cannot be  held to  be unconstitutional,  there is no escape from  conclusion   that  the   provisions  which   had  been introduced in  the principal Act 7 of 1974 have been effaced and courts  have to  proceed  as  if  they  had  never  been introduced in  the principal  Act. If  this is the effect of sections 4,5  and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 then as a corollary it has to  be held  that under the amendment Act 39 of 1972 the compensation amount  payable  for  the  surplus  land  under schedule III  to the Act was reduced from 9 times to 2 times of the  net annual  income w.  e. f 21.12.1972. Notification under section  18(1)   of the Act declaring 3414.78 acres of land of  the respondent-Company  as surplus  was  issued  on 4.4.1973 after  coming into  force of amended Act 39 of 1972 aforesaid and because of the notification dated 4.4.1973 the surplus lands  vested in  the State  Government in  view  of section  18(3)  of  the  Act  as  it  stood  on  that  date. Thereafter, the  Draft Assessment  Roll had  to be published applying the rate of 2 times of the net annual income.      On behalf  of the  respondent, a  stand was  taken that sections 4,  5 and  6 Act  25 of  1978 shall  not revive the notification dated  4.4.1973 which  stood  exhausted  and  a fresh notification  had to  be issued, even if the different provisions of  Act 7  of 1974  shall be  deemed to have been obliterated. In  this connection, it may be pointed out that section 5  (b) of  Act 25  of 1978  provided  in  clear  and unambiguous terms  that modification  made to  section 18 of the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 "Shall be deemed never to have had  the effect  of vesting in the state Government the surplus lands  specified in any notification published under sub-section (1)  of the said section 18 of the principal Act on the  after the  2nd May  1962  and  before  the  date  of publication  of  this  Act  in  the  Tamil  Nadu  Government

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Gazette, from  a date earlier to the date of the publication of the notification under the said sub-section (1) and shall be deemed  always to  have had  the effect of vesting in the State Government  such surplus  lands, only with effect from the date  of the  publication of  such notification."  Again section  6(a)   provides   that   notwithstanding   anything contained in  any judgment,  decree or  order of  any  Court "where before  the date  of publication of this Act in Tamil Nadu Government  Gazette, a  notification under  sub-section (1) of  section 18  of the principal Act has been published, the surplus  land specified  in such  notification shall  be deemed to  have vested  in the state Government, with effect from the  date of such publication only, and accordingly the provisions of the principal Act, as modified by section 4 of this Act,  shall for all purposes apply and be deemed always to have  been applied  in respect  of such  surplus lands so vested" .  In view  of the aforesaid deeming provisions, the notification which  was issued on 4.4.1973 under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the principal Act shall be deemed to be valid and  shall have  the effect  of vesting  the lands  in question in  the state  Government under  sub-section (3) of section 18 of the Principal Act w.e.f. 4.4.1973.      An objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that on 3.3.  1978   the High Court had allowed the Writ petition No. 624  of 1978  filed on behalf of the said respondent and issued a  writ of  mandamus directing  the State  to  comply with the judgment dated 8.10.1976  of the High Court in writ petition No.1464  of 1978 and as no appeal has been filed on behalf of  the state before this Court against the aforesaid order dated  3.3.1978, the  said order has attained finality and if  the appeals filed on behalf of State are allowed, it small lead  to an  anomalous position.  It appears  that the respondent had  filed the aforesaid writ Petition No. 624 of 1978 for  a direction  by the  High Court to comply with the aforesaid order dated 8.10.1976 in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974. In  that writ  petition a grievance had been made that respondents of  that writ petition were delaying preparation of the  Draft Compensation  Roll on  the plea  that  special Leave Petition  to Appeal to the supreme Court along with an application for  stay had been filed on behalf of the state. In that  writ petition,  a learned  judge of  the High Court directed to  consider the  determination of the compensation and the  preparation of  the Draft  Compensation  Assessment Roll, under  section 50(3)  (a) of  the Act  58 of  1961  in respect of the excess lands of the respondent. A copy of the writ of  mandamus issued  by the High Court in the said Writ Petition is  on the record and the operative part thereof is as follows:-           "the Respondents  herein,  are      hereby  directed  to  consider  the      determination of  the  compensation      and the  preparation of  the  Draft      Compensation Assessment  Roll under      section 50{3}{a}  of the  Act 58 of      1961,  in  respect  of  the  excess      lands of  the petitioner,  acquired      by you  , in  due compliance, fully      and properly  of  the  judgment  of      this court dated 8.10.76 and passed      in W.P.Nos. 346 and 1464 of 1974 on      or before  30.6.1976 and  you,  the      second   respondent   herein,   are      hereby directed  to call  upon  the      petitioner  to   furnish   whatever      information  is   required  on   or

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    before 30.3.1978 (which information      will be  supplied  to  you  by  the      petitioner within  15 days from the      date of receipt of the said notice)      and thereupon  to proceed forthwith      to  comply   with   the   aforesaid      directions  of   this  Court  dated      8.10.76 and  passed in w.p.Nos. 346      and 1464 of 1974."      It cannot be disputed that by the aforesaid order dated 3.3.1978 the  High Court   had  not determined  any right or liability inter  se between  the parties. It simply directed the state  Government to  comply with the direction given by order dated  8.10.1976   in writ  Petition No.  1464 of 1974 against which  civil Appeal  No. 134 of 1980 has been filed. If an  order dated 8.10.1976 is set aside by this court, any direction given  on 3.31978 in writ petition No. 624 of 1978 shall be  of  no  consequence.  It  can  be  said  that  the direction which  was given on 3.3. 1978 was in the nature of execution order.      It was  then pointed  out on  behalf of  the respondent that on  15.6.1978   writ Misc.  Petition No.  3153 in  Writ Petition No.  624 of  1978  was filed on behalf of the state for  recall of the aforesaid order dated 3.3.1978  which was dismissed on  23.6.1978. It  was stated  that  in  the  said petition on  behalf of  the state,  attention of the learned judge was  drawn to  the fact that in the meantime Act 25 of 1978 had  come in force and as such there was no question of payment of  compensation to  the respondent  in terms of the order dated  8.10.1976 as directed in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974.  It was  urged that  as no  appeal has  been  filed against the  order dated  23.6.1978 on  behalf of the state, the said  order shall  be deemed  to have  become  final  in respect of  the scope  and effect  of Sections 4 ,5 and 6 of Act 25  of 1978.  The relevant part of order dated 23.6.1978 is as follows:-           "Even      otherwise,      the      respondent  herein  has  challenged      the validity  of Tamil  Nadu Act 25      of 1978  and till  the validity  is      upheld, it is not open to the state      of  Tamil   Nadu  to   maintain  an      application         of         this      character........           Whatever may be said about the      validity of the Act, which question      need not  concern me at this stage,      I find great force in what Mr. M.R.      Narayanaswamy   submits.    In   my      judgment rendered  in W.P.  624  of      1978, I  merely directed that state      of Tamil Nadu to give effect to the      judgment of  the Division  Bench of      this Court in W.P Nos. 346 and 1464      of 1974. I directed full compliance      of that  judgment on or before 30th      of June , 1978."      From a bare reference to the aforesaid order it appears that the  learned judge  having clearly said that he was not considering the  effect of  provisions of Act 25 of 1978, he dismissed the  said writ Misc. Petition in view of the order passed on  3.3.1978.  When  the  learned  judge  refused  to consider the  effect of  the provisions  of Act  25 of 1978, there is no question of the order dated 23.6.1978 having any effect, on  the special Leave Petitions which had been filed

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on behalf  of the  state giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 and civil Appeal Nos. 352-354 of 1980  .      It may  be mentioned that a plea was taken on behalf of the appellant  state that as Act 25 of 1978 provides for the vesting of the land on a particular date, it shall be deemed to be  law relating to agrarian reform and as such protected by Article  31-A of  the Constitution.  As such no challenge based on  Article 14  is available to the respondent. It was stated that  at the  said Act  had  been  reserved  for  the consideration of  the president  and has received his assent and as  such it shall not be deemed to be void on the ground that it  is inconsistent  with or takes away or abridges any of the  rights conferred  by; Article  31-c which  says that notwithstanding anything  contained in  Article 13,  no  law giving effect  to the  policy of  the state towards securing all or  any of the  principles laid down in part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes  away or  abridges any  of the  rights conferred by Article 14.  In this  connection, our attention was drawn to the fact  that in  section 2 of Act 25 of  1978  it has been specifically declared  that the  said Act  was being enacted for giving  effect  to  the  policy  of  the  State  towards securing the  principles laid down in particular clauses {b} and {c}   of  Article 39  which is  in  chapter  IV  of  the constitution i.e.  ownership and  control  of  the  material resources of  the community  are so  distributed as  best to subserve the  common good  and that  the  operation  of  the economic system  does not  result in  the  concentration  of wealth   and means  of production to the common detriment. A stand was  also taken  on behalf of the appellant-state that Act 25  of 1978  has been  included in the Ninth schedule of the Constitution  and as  such  it  has  the  protection  of Article 31-B  of the constitution and its validity cannot be questioned on  basis of  Article 14 of  the constitution. In View of  the findings recorded  above that sections 4, 5 and 6 of  25 of  1978 are  constitutionally  valid  and  it  has effaced the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 in   the  principal Act  because of  which it  shall be deemed that  notification issued  under section 18{1} of the principal Act on 4.4.1973 was legal and valid and because of the said  notification the  lands declared as surplus vested in the state under section 18{3} of the principal Act, there is no  necessity to  decide as to whether Act 25 of 1978 has the protection  of Articles  31-A,  31-B  and  31-C  of  the constitution.      Once it  is held  that vesting  of the surplus land had taken place  on  4.4.1973,  then  the  respondent  shall  be entitled to  the compensation  amount which  is to be worked out at 2 times of the net annual income because of Act 39 of 1972 which had reduced the multiple of the compensation from 9  times  to  2  times  of  the  net  annual  income  w.e.f. 21.12.1972. Accordingly,  civil Appeal  No. 134  of 1980 are allowed . The Judgement dated 8.10.1976 in writ Petition No. 1464 of  1974 and  judgment dated 20.7.1979 in writ petition No. 2341-2343  of 1978  of the High Court area set aside and the writ  petitions filed  on behalf  of the  respondent are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.