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PETITIONER: STATE OF TAMIL NADU ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMALINGA SAMIGAL MADAM ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/05/1985

BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. KHALID, V. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR  794            1985 SCR  Supl. (1)  63  1985 SCC  (4)  10        1985 SCALE  (1)1138  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC2205  (13)  R          1991 SC 884  (22)

ACT:      Jurisdiction of  the civil  court when  and under  what circumstances barred-Civil Court’s jurisdiction to determine the nature of the land in respect where of a Ryot has sought a Ryotwari  Patta under section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 is ousted or barred  under section 64-C of that Act, read with section 3(16)(a), (b) and (c) of the Tamil Nadu Estate Lands Act.

HEADNOTE:      Under the Tamil Nadu Estates’ (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)  Act,  1948,  estates  of  several  Zamindars including the Sivaganga Estates and Ramnad Zamindari estates were abolished  and vested  with the  Government.  In  Civil Appeal No.  474, of  1971, the respondent religious Math, in respect of  the land  admeasuring 3.55 acres being a portion of survey  No. 114  obtained from  the erstwhile Zamindar of Sivaganga under  an (Order  of Assignment  (Ex.  A-1)  dated 29.1.1938 Kudi  right (i.e.  Right to cultivate), subject to the payment  of a  nominal nuzzur  of Re.  1 per acre and an annual rent  of Re. 1 per acre beside cesses and a Teervapat Cowle Patta  issued in  favour of its trustee Sutha Chaitnya Swamigal. After  the abolition of the Zamindari estates, the religious Math  applied on  25.11.53 for  Ryotwari Patta  in respect  of  the  said  land  to  the  Assistant  Settlement Officer, who,  without reference to the respondent passed an order (Ex.  B-4) on  25.6.54 that  Survey No.  114 was not a ryoti land  on the  notified date but had been registered as Proromboke (village  communal land)  and, therefore,  no one was entitled  to Ryotwari  Patta in respect of it. Aggrieved by the order, the respondent filed a Civil Suit O.S. No. 184 of 1959  in the Court of District Munsiff at Manamadurai for declaration of  its title  on the  basis  of  its  long  and uninterrupted possession prior to 1938 as also under Ex. A-1 issued to  it by  the Zamindar  and  right  to  continue  in possession and  enjoyment  of  the  suit  land,  subject  to payment  of   Ryotwari  or  other  cess  to  be  imposed  by Government without any interference from the Government. The appellant State  resisted the  suit on  merits by contending

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that the suit land was communal land and that the assignment or grant  by the  Zamindar in  favour of plaintiff-Madam was invalid as  well as  by raising  a technical  plea that  the decision of  the Additional Settlement Officer that the suit land was  poromboke and  not ryoti  land was  final and  the Civil Court’s  jurisdiction  to  decide  that  question  was barred under section 64-C of the Act.      The Trial  Court as  well as  the Sub  Judge in  appeal accepted the respondent’s case on merits by holding that the suit land  was a  ryoti land and that the assignment of Kudi right therein by the Zamindar in respondent’s 64 favour was  valid and  negativing the technical plea of want of jurisdiction  decreed the  suit by granting the necessary declaration   and    injunction   protecting    respondent’s possession and  enjoyment of the suit land. In second appeal preferred by  the State  of Tamil Nadu to the High Court the plea of lack of jurisdiction in the light of section 64-C of the Act  was referred  to a Division Bench who negatived the contention and dismissed the appeal. The Division Bench took the view  that there  was no provision under section 11 read with proviso  to cl.  (d) of  section 3  of the  Act for the ascertainment of  the character  of the land (whether it was ryoti land  or communal  land) and  that the decision of the Settlement Officer  whether the  land is  ryoti or not is an incidental one  merely  for  the  purpose  of  granting  the Ryotwari Patta  and Civil Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the nature of the land when that aspect is specifically put in  issue, is  not taken  away under section 64-C of the Act and  that the  respondent’s suit was not for obtaining a ryotwari patta  in its  favour (which  matter lay within the powers and  jurisdiction of  the Settlement Officer) but the suit was  for  injunction  restraining  the  appellant  from disturbing respondent’s possession and enjoyment of the suit land on  the basis  of its  title and long and uninterrupted possession and  such relief  the Civil Court could obviously grant.      In Civil Appeal No. 1633 of 1971 after an adverse order had been passed by the Settlement Officer to the effect that the land  in question  was neither  a ryoti  land in  Ramnad Zamindari nor  the private  property of  erstwhile Zamindar, the respondent  filed a  suit for declaration of their title to the  suit land  (based on a registered sale deed) and for injunction restraining  the appellants from interfering with their possession.  In that  suit one  of the  issues  raised pertained to  the nature  or character  of  the  suit  land, whether  it  was  a  ryoti  land  in  the  erstwhile  Ramnad Zamindari which  had been  taken over  under the  Act  or  a Poromboke (communal  property) and  the plea  was  that  the Civil Court  had no  jurisdiction to decide this question in view of  section 64-C.  The Trial  Court held  that the suit property was  Poromboke property  and dismissed the suit but in appeal  preferred by  the respondents  the sub-Judge held that it was ryoti land and respondents’ title and possession thereto had  been proved  but  the  suit  was  barred  under section 64-C  of the  Act and on this basis he confirmed the dismissal of  the suit.  The High  Court  in  second  appeal accepted the  findings of  the 1st Appellate Court on merits of the  respondents’ claims  and on  the question  of  Civil Court’s jurisdiction  to adjudicate  upon the real nature or character of  the suit  land following  its  Division  Bench decision held  that the  Civil  Court  had  jurisdiction  to decide that question and allowed the appeal.      Dismissing the appeals, the Court ^

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    HELD:  1.  Whether  a  Civil  Court’s  jurisdiction  to adjudicate upon  the nature  and character  of the  land  in question has  been excluded  or ousted under section 64-C of the  Tamil  Nadu  Estates  (Abolition  and  Conversion  into Ryotwari) Act,  1948 will have to be decided by reference to the principles  laid down  by the  Supreme Court, as to when the exclusion  of the  Civil  Court’s  jurisdiction  can  be inferred and  in particular  two out  of seven  propositions culled out in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1968] 3 SCR 662. [737-H] 65      2.1 It  is true  that section  64-C of  the  Act  gives finality to  the orders  passed by  the Government  or other authorities in  respect of  the matters  to be determined by them under the Act and sub-section (2) thereof provides that no such  orders shall  be called in question in any court of law. Even  so, such  a provision  by itself  is not,  having regard to  the two  propositions stated  in Dhulabhai’s case decisive on  the  point  of  ouster  of  the  Civil  Court’s jurisdiction and several other aspects such as the scheme of the Act, adequacy and sufficiency of remedies provided by it etc., will  have to  be considered  to ascertain the precise intendment of  the Legislature.  In between  the two sets of provisions dealing  with grant  of Ryotwari  Patta to a Ryot (section II) and the grant thereof to a land-holder (Section 12-15) there is a difference of vital significance, with the result  that   different  considerations   may  arise  while deciding  the   issue  of   the  ouster   of  Civil  Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the true nature or character of the  concerned land.  Approaching the  question from this angle it  will be  seen in the first place that section 64-C itself in  terms provides  that the  finality to  the orders passed by  the authorities  in respect  of the matters to be determined by  them under  the Act  is "for  the purposes of this Act"  and not  generally nor for any other purpose. [77 E-H]      2.2 The  main object  and purpose  of  the  Act  is  to abolish  all   the  estates   of  the   intermediaries  like Zamindars, Inamdars,  Jagirdars or under-tenure holders etc. and to  convert  all  land-holdings  in  such  estates  into ryotwari settlements  which operation  in  revenue  parlance means  conversion  of  alienated  lands  into  non-alienated lands, that  is to  say, to  deprive the  intermediaries  of their right  to collect  all the revenues in respect of such lands and  vesting the  same back  in  the  Government.  The enactment and  its several  provisions are  thus intended to serve the  revenue purpose  of the  Government,  by  way  of securing to  the Government  its sovereign  right to collect all the  revenues from  all the  lands and to facilitate the recovery thereof  by the  Government and in that process, if necessary, to deal with claims of occupants of lands, nature of the lands, etc. only incidentally in a summary manner and that too  for identifying  and registering  persons  in  the revenue records  from whom such recovery of revenue is to be made. The  object of  granting a  ryotwari patta  is also to enable  holder  thereof  to  cultivate  the  land  specified therein directly  under the  Government on  payment to it of such assessment  or cess  that may  be imposed  on the  land under section 16. [78A-D]      2.3 The  expression "for  the purposes of this Act" has been designedly  used in the section which cannot be ignored but must  be given  cogent meaning and on a plain reading of the section  which uses such expression it is clear that any order passed  by the  Settlement Officer  either granting or refusing to  grant a  ryotwari patta to a ryot under section

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11 of  the Act  must be  regarded as  having been  passed to achieve the  purposes of  the Act, namely, revenue purposes, that is to say for fastening the liability on him to pay the assessment or  other dues  and to facilitate the recovery of such revenue  from him  by the Government; and therefore any decision impliedly  rendered on  the  aspect  of  nature  or character of  the land  on that  occasion will  have  to  be regarded as  incidental to  and merely  for the  purpose  of passing the order of granting or refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose. [78 E-G] 66      2.3 Secondly,  the principle  indicated in  the  second proposition enunciated in Dhulabhai’s case requires that the statute: when  it creates  a special  right or liability and provides for  its determination,  should also  lay down that all questions  about the  said right  or liability  shall be determined by  the Tribunal  or authority constituted by it, suggesting thereby  that if  there is  no such  provision it will be  difficult to  infer ouster  of  the  Civil  Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate all other questions pertaining to such right  or liability.  Since from  the notified date all the estate  vests in  the Government  free from encumbrances all the lands lying in such estate including private land of land-holder and  ryoti land  cultivated by a ryot would vest in the Government and the Act could be said to be creating a new right in favour of a land-holder (re: his private lands) and a  ryot (re: ryoti land) by granting a ryotwari patta to them under  sections 12  to 15  and section 11 respectively, and the  Act provides for determination of such right by the Settlement Officer. [78 H; 79 A-B]      2.5 However,  it cannot  be  said  that  the  Act  also provides for determination of all questions about such right by  the  Settlement  Officer.  Unlike  in  the  case  of  an application for  a ryotwari  patta by  a  land-holder  under section 12,  13 or  14 where  an inquiry  into the nature or character of  the land  and the history thereof is expressly directed to  be undertaken  by virtue  of section  15 in the case of  an application for a ryotwari patta by a ryot under section 11  there is  no express  provision for  any inquiry into the  nature or character of the land before granting or refusing to  grant such  patta to  the applicant. It is true that some inquiry is contemplated if section 11 is read with proviso to  cl. (d)  of section  3 but even then there is no provision directing  inquiry for  the ascertainment  of  the nature of  the land,  namely, whether  it is a ryoti land or communal land but it is obvious that impliedly a decision on this aspect  of  the  matter  must  be  arrived  at  by  the Settlement Officer  before he  passes his  order  on  either granting or  refusing to  grant such  patta. Obviously  such decision rendered  impliedly on  this aspect  of the  matter will be  an incidental  one and  arrived at  in the  summary manner only for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant the patta.  A summary  decision of  this type  in an inquiry conducted for  revenue purposes  cannot be regarded as final or conclusive  so as  to constitute a bar to a Civil Court’s jurisdiction adjudicating  upon the  same issue arising in a suit for  injunction filed  by a  ryot on the basis of title and or  long an uninterrupted possession. Since a fullfedged inquiry on  the nature  or character of land is provided for under section  15 in  the case  of an application by a land- holder the character of the Settlement Officer’s decision on such issue may be different. [79 C-G]      2.6 Thirdly,  having regard  to the principle stated by the Supreme Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai’s case it is clear that even where the statute has

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given finality  to the  orders of  the special  tribunal the civil Court’s  jurisdiction can  be regarded  as having been excluded if  there is  adequate remedy  to do what the Civil Court would  normally do  in a  suit. In  other words,  even where finality  is accorded  to the  orders  passed  by  the special tribunal  one will  have to see whether such special tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant  in a  suit and  if  the  answer  is  in  the negative it  would be  difficult to imply or infer exclusion of Civil  Court’s jurisdiction.  Since under  the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition  and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, the Settlement Officer has no power, 67 beyond the power to grant or refuse to grant the patta under section 11  read  with  section  3(d)  of  the  Act  on  the materials placed  before him,  to do what  Civil Court would normally do  in a suit (like granting of injunction), ouster of Civil  Court’s  jurisdiction  cannot  be  implied  simply because  finality   has  been  accorded  to  the  Settlement Officer’s order under section 64-C of the Act. [79 H; 80 A-B; E]      Secretary of  State v, Mask and Company, [1967] IA 222; and Dhulabhai  v. State  of Madhya Pradesh, [1968] 3 SCR 662 relied on.      M. Chayana  v. K.  Narayana, [1979]  3 SCR  201; and O. Chenchulakshmamma  v.   D.  Subramanya,   [1980]1  SCR  1006 discussed and distinguished.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 474 of 1971.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  7.6. 1968  of  the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 1149 of 1962.                             WITH                Civil Appeal No. 1633 of 1971.      From the  judgment and  decree  dated  17.6.69  of  the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 1773 of 1964.      T.S. Krishnamurthy and A.V. Rangam for the appellant.      B. Parthasarthy for the Respondent in C.A. No. 4747/1.      Gopal Snbramanium  and Mrs.  S.  Balakrishnan  for  the Respondent in C.A. No. 1633 of 1971.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      TULZAPURKAR, J.  These appeals  raise a common question of law  for  our  determination,  namely,  whether  a  Civil Court’s jurisdiction  to determine the nature of the land in respect whereof  a Ryot has sought a Ryotwari Patta under s. 11 of  the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act  1948 (for  short the Act) is ousted or barred under s. 64-C of that Act ?      The ma  I facts giving rise to the question in both the appeals are almost similar and therefore, it will suffice if facts obtaining  in Civil Appeal No. 474 of 1971 are alluded to in  details. In  this case one Ramalinga Samigal Madam, a religious Math  through its  trustee Sutha Chaitnya Swamigal filed a suit (O.S. 68 No. 184  of 1959)  in  the  Court  of  District  Munsiff  at Manamadurai for  declaration of  its title  to the suit land admeasuring 3.55 acres being a portion of Survey No. 114 and for an  injunction  restraining  the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu (Defendant-Appellant) from  interfering with  its possession and enjoyment of the same. The Plaintiff-Madam claimed title to the  suit land on the basis of its long and uninterrupted

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possession since  prior to  1938 as  also under  an Order of Assignment (Ex. A-1) dated 29.1.1938 issued in its favour by the Zamindar  of the  erstwhile Sivaganga Estate whereby the Kudi right  (i.e. right  to  cultivate)  in  that  land  was granted to  it subject to the payment of a nominal nuzzur of Re. 1  per acre  and an annual rent of Re. 1 per acre beside cesses and a Teervapat Cowle Patta was directed to be issued in favour of its trustee Sutha Chaithya Swamigal. It appears that  the   plaintiff-Madam  applied  on  25.11.1953  for  a Ryotwari Patta  in respect  of this land after the abolition of the  Sivaganga Estate  under the  Act and  the Additional Settlement Officer  merely informed the Plaintiff-Madam that its petition  would receive consideration when s. 11 inquiry would be  taken up.  But subsequently,  without reference to the Plaintiff-Madam the Additional Settlement Officer passed an order  (Ex. B-4) on 25.6.1954 that Survey No. 114 was not a ryoti land on the notified date but had been registered as a Poromboke  (village communal  land and,  therefore, no one was entitled  to Ryotwari  Patta in respect of it. Aggrieved by the  order the  Plaintiff-Madam  filed  the  suit  for  a declaration of its title and right to continue in possession and enjoyment  of the  suit  land,  subject  to  payment  of Ryotwari or  other case  to be imposed by Government without any interference  from the  Government. The  State of  Tamil Nadu resisted the suit on merits by contending that the suit land was  communal land  and that the assignment or grant by the Zamindar in favour of plaintiff-Madam was invalid a well as by  raising a  technical plea  that the  decision of  the Additional  Settlements  Officer  that  the  suit  land  was Pmorboke and  not ryoti land was final and the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to decide that question was barred under s.64-C of the  Act. The  Trial Court  as well  as the  Sub Judge in appeal accepted  the plaintiff’s  case on  merits by holding that the  suit land was a ryoti land and that the assignment of Kudi  right therein by the Zamindar in plaintiff’s favour was valid;  the technical plea of jurisdiction was negatived and  the   suit  was   decreed  by  granting  the  necessary declaration and injunction protecting plaintiff’s possession and enjoyment  of the  suit land. In second appeal preferred by the  State of  Tamil Nadu  to the  High Court  the  lower Courts’ decision  on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim was not challenged but 69 the technical  plea of  the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the  Civil Court  in the  light of s. 64-C of the Act was pressed. In  view of  the   importance of  the question  the learned Single Judge referred the case to the Division Bench who negatived  the contention  and dismissed the appeal. The Division Bench  took the  view that  there was  no provision under s. 11 read with proviso cl. (d) of s. 3 of the Act for the ascertainment  of the  character of the land (whether it was ryoti  land or  communal land)  and that the decision of Settlement Officer  whether the  land is  ryoti or not is an incidental one  merely  for  the  purpose  of  granting  the Ryotwari Patta  and Civil Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the nature of the land when that aspect is specifically put in  issue, is  not taken  away under s. 64-C of the Act; and what  is more  the Division  Bench further held that the plaintiff’s suit  was not  for obtaining a ryotwari patta in its  favour   (which  matter   lay  within  the  powers  and jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer) but the suit was for injunction  restraining   the  defendant   from   disturbing plaintiffs’ possession and enjoyment of the suit land on the basis of its title and long and uninterrupted possession and such relief the Civil Court could obviously grant.

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    In the  other matter  (Civil Appeal  No. 1633  of 1971) also,  after  an  adverse  order  had  been  passed  by  the Settlement Officer  to the  effect that the land in question was neither a ryoti land en Ramnad Zamindari nor the private property of  erstwhile Zamindar, the plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration  of their title to the suit land (based on a registered sale  deed) and  for injunction  restraining  the defendants from  interfering with  their possession. In that suit one  of the  issues raised  pertained to  the nature or character of  the suit  land, whether it was a ryoti land in the erstwhile  Ramnad Zimindari  which had  been taken  over under the  Act or  a Poromboke  (communal property)  and the plea was  that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide this question  in view of s. 64-C. The Trial Court held that the suit  property was  Poromboke property and dismissed the suit but in appeal preferred by the plaintiffs the Sub-Judge held that  it was  ryoti  land  and  plaintiffs’  title  and possession thereto  had been  proved but the suit was barred under s.  64-C of the Act and on this basis he confirmed the dismissal of  the suit.  The High  Court  in  second  appeal accepted the  findings of  the 1st Appellate Court on merits of the plaintiffs claim and on the question of Civil Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the real nature or character of the  suit land it followed the Division Bench decision in the earlier  matter  and  held  that  the  Civil  Court  had jurisdiction to decide that question and allowed the appeal. 70      In the  instant appeals  before us  the State  of Tamil Nadu has challenged the aforesaid view of the High Court.      Counsel for  the appellants  in both  the  appeals  has relied upon  s. 64-C  of the  Act and  s. 11 of the Act read with the  definition of  the ’ryoti  land’  given  in  s.  3 (16)(a)(b) and  (c) of the Tamil Nadu Estate Lands Act, 1908 for the  purpose of  contending that  an order passed by the Settlement Officer  in an  enquiry under s. 11 of the Act to the effect  that the  land in question is not ryoti land but Poromboke property (communal land) and therefore no ryotwari patta could  be issued  in respect  thereof to the applicant has been  given finality  under s.  64-C of  the Act and the same cannot  be questioned in any court of law and therefore the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the nature or character  of the  land must  be regarded  as having been ousted  or   excluded  by   the  Legislature.  In  order  to appreciate this  contention it  will be necessary to set out the relevant  provisions on  which  the  reliance  has  been placed by  the Counsel  for appellants.  Section 64-C of the Act runs thus:           "64-C. Finality  of orders passed under this Act.-      (1)  Any  order  passed  by  the  Government  or  other      authority under  this Act  in respect  of matters to be      determined for  the purpose  of this Act shall, subject      only to  any appeal  or revision  provided by  or under      this Act, be final.           (2) No such order shall be liable to be questioned      in any Court of law." Section 11 so far as is material runs thus:           "11. Lands  in which  ryot is entitled to ryotwari      patta.-Every ryoti  in an  estate shall, with effect on      and from  the notified  date, be entitled to a ryotwari      patta in respect of-           (a) all  ryoti lands which, immediately before the      notified date,  were properly included or ought to have      been properly included in his holding and which are not      either lanka lands or lands in respect of which a land-      holder or  some other  person is entitled to a ryotwari

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    patta under any other provision of this Act; and           (b) ... ... ... ..." 71 It is  thus clear  that before  a ryotwari  patta can be had under s.  11 (a)  two conditions  must be  satisfied (a) the applicant must  be a "ryot" in an estate and (b) the land in respect of  which the  patta is sought must be "ryoti land". The expression  ’estate’ has  been defined in s. 2(3) of the Act to  mean-a ’Zamandari’  or an  under-tenure or  an  inam estate. But the expressions ’ryot’ and ’ryoti land’ have not been defined  in the Act but their definitions given in s. 3 of the  Tamil Nadu  Estate Lands Act, 1908 have been adopted for the purpose of the Act. Section 3(15) of the T.N. Estate Lands Act, 1908 defines ’ryot’ thus:           ’Ryot’ means a person who holds for the purpose of      agriculture ryoti  land in  an estate  on condition  of      paying to  the landholder the rent which is legally due      upon it. Section 3 (16) defines ’Ryoti land’ thus:           ’Ryoti land’  means cultivable  lan in  an  estate      other than private land but does not include-           (a)  beds  and  bunds  of  tanks  and  of  supply,      drainage surplus or irrigation channels;           (b) threshing-floor, cattle-stands, village-sites,      and other  lands situated  in any  estate which are set      apart for the common use of the villagers;           (c) lands granted on service tenure either free of      rent or  on favourable  rates of rent if granted before      the passing  of this  Act or  free of  rent if  granted      after  that   date,  so  long  as  the  service  tenure      subsists. The definition  of ryoti land given above clearly shows that it means  cultivable land  in an  estate other  than private land but  it also  excludes Porombokes  or village  communal lands under  cl. (b).  It is  thus clear that any cultivable land in an estate will not be ’ryoti land’ if it falls under cl. (b).      Relying upon  the aforesaid  provisions Counsel for the appellants urged  before us that every refusal of a ryotwari patta by  a Settlement  Officer in  an inquiry  under s.  11 involves a decision on his part that either the applicant is not a  ryot or  the land  is not  ryoti land; in the instant cases it  was the  latter and such decision on the nature or character of the land has been given a finality 72 under s.64-C  which cannot  be questioned  in a Court of law and therefore  the Civil  Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the  nature or character of the suit lands must be held to have  been excluded  or ousted.  Counsel therefore  urged that the High Court’s view deserves to be quashed.      On the other hand Counsel for the respondents contended that it  is well  settled that  exclusion of  Civil  Court’s jurisdiction is  not to  be readily  inferred and  has to be provided for  in express  terms or by necessary implication. Counsel urged  that there  is no  express exclusion  and  if regard is  had to  the scheme  of the  Act, particularly the provisions dealing  with the  grant of  ryotwari patta  to a Zamindar or  landholder under ss. 12-15 in contrast with the grant thereof  to a  ryot under  s. 11  it will appear clear that qua  the former  there may  be such  exclusion of Civil Court’s jurisdiction  but qua  the latter  none is intended. Counsel also  urged us  to accept the view taken by the High Court on the point.      The principles  bearing on  the  question  as  to  when exclusion of  the Civil Court’s jurisdiction can be inferred

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have been  indicated in  several judicial pronouncements but we need  refer to  only two decisions. In Secretary of State v. Mask and Company,(1) the Privy Council at page 236 of the Report has observed thus:           "It is  settled law  that  the  exclusion  of  the      jurisdiction of  the Civil  Courts is not to be readily      inferred  but   that  such  exclusion  must  either  be      explicitly expressed  or clearly  implied. It  is  also      well settled  that even if jurisdiction is so excluded,      the Civil  Courts have  jurisdiction  to  examine  into      cases where  the provisions  of the  Act have  not been      complied with  or the  statutory tribunal has not acted      in  conformity   with  the  fundamental  principles  of      judicial procedure." In Dhulabhai  v. State of Madhya Pradesh(2) Hidayatullah, C. J., speaking  for the  Court, on  analysis  of  the  various decisions cited  before the  Court expressing diverse views, culled out  as many as 7 propositions; out of them the first two which are material for our purposes are these: 73           "(1) Where  the statute  gives a  finality to  the      orders  of  the  special  tribunal  the  civil  courts’      jurisdiction must  be held  to be  excluded if there is      adequate remedy  to do  what  the  civil  courts  would      normally do  in a  suit. Such  provision, however, does      not exclude  those cases  where the  provisions of  the      particular Act  have not  been  complied  with  or  the      statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the      fundamental principles of judicial procedure.           (2)  Where   there  is   an  express  bar  of  the      jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme      of the  particular Act  to find  the  adequacy  or  the      sufficiency of  the remedies  provided may  be relevant      but is  not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the      civil court.           Where  there   is   no   express   exclusion   the      examination of  the remedies  and  the  scheme  of  the      particular Act  to  find  out  the  intendment  becomes      necessary  and   the  result  of  the  inquiry  may  be      decisive. In  the latter case it is necessary to see if      the statute  creates a special right or a liability and      provides  for   the  determination   of  the  right  or      liability and  further lays  down  that  all  questions      about the  said right and liability shall be determined      by the  tribunals so  constituted, and whether remedies      normally associated  with actions  in civil  courts are      prescribed by the said statute or not."      It is  obvious  that  the  question  raised  before  us whether the  civil court’s  jurisdiction to  adjudicate upon the nature  or character  of the  land in  question has been excluded or  ousted will  have to be decided by reference to these principles.  It was fairly conceded by Counsel for the appellants that  there is nothing in the Act which expressly bars the  civil court’s  jurisdiction but such exclusion has to inferred  by be clear implication in view of s.64-C which accords finality  to any   order  that may  be passed by the Government or  other authority  under the  Act in respect of matters to  be determined  for  the  purposes  of  the  Act, subject only  to any appeal or revision provided by or under the Act and also because the section goes on to provide that no such  order shall be liable to be questioned in any court of law.  Therefore, an  examination of the scheme of the Act and  the  relevant  provisions  thereof  including  s.  64-C becomes necessary 74

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before such  exclusion  of  civil  court’s  jurisdiction  by necessary implication can be inferred.      The Act,  as its  Preamble indicates  was  put  on  the statute book  with a  view "to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement,  the acquisition  of the rights of the land-holders  in   permanently  settled  and  certain  other estates in  the State  of Tamil Nadu and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates"; in other words the avowed object  or purpose  of the  Act  was  to  repeal  the permanent settlement  and acquire  the rights  of the  land- holders i.e.  all intermediaries  like Zamindars, Jagirdars, under-tenure holders  etc. on  payment of  compensation  and convert the  land holdings  in such  estates  into  Ryotwari settlements. Section  3, which  seeks  to  abolish  all  the estates under  the Permanent  Settlement, provides that with effect on  and from  the notified date (which in relation to an estate  means the  date on which the provision of the Act shall come  into force  in that  estate) the  entire  estate (including all  communal lands,  porombokes, other non-ryoti lands, waste lands, pasture lands, lanka lands, forest mines and minerals,  quarries, rivers and streams, tanks, ooranies (including private tanks and ooranies) and irrigation works, fisheries  and   ferries  shall  stand  transferred  to  the Government and  vest in  them free from all encumbrances and the T.N.  Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 and the T.N. Irrigation Cess Act,  1865  and  all  other  enactments  applicable  to ryotwari areas  shall apply to the estate; and under s. 3(d) Government has  been given  the  right  to  take  possession forthwith of  such estate.  However.  such  vesting  of  the entire estate  in the  Government on  and from  the notified date  and  the  Government’s  right  to  recover  possession thereof are  qualified by the proviso thereto whereunder the possession (occupancy  right) of a ryot in ryoti land and of a  land-holder   of  his  private  land  in  the  estate  is protected.  Section   3(d)  together  with  the  proviso  is material and it runs thus:           "3(d)  The  Government  may,  after  removing  any      obstruction  that   may  be   offered  forthwith   take      possession of  the estate, and all accounts, registers,      pattas, muchilikas,  maps, plans  and  other  documents      relating to the estate which the Government may require      for the administration thereof:           Provided that  the Government shall not dispossess      any person  of any  land in  the estate  in respect  of      which 75      they consider  that he  is prima  facie entitled  to  a      ryotwari patta-      (i)   if such person is a ryot, pending the decision of           the  Settlement   Officer  as  to  whether  he  is           actually entitled to such patta;      (ii)  if   such  person  is  land-holder,  pending  the           decision  of   the  Settlement   Officer  and  the           Tribunal on  appeal, if  any, to it, as to whether           he is actually entitled to such patta." The topic  of grant  of ryotwari pattas to a ryot in respect of ryoti  land in  an estate and to a land-holder in respect of his  private lands in such estate is dealt with by ss. 11 and 12  to 15.  Section 11  which deals  with the grant of a Ryotwari Patta  to a  Ryot in  ryoti land,  in so  far as is material, has already been quoted above. Sections 12, 13 and 14 deal  with the grant of a Ryotwari Patta to a land-holder in respect  of his  private lands in Zamindari estate, inami estate, and under-tenure estate respectively and s. 15 which follows upon  ss. 12, 13 and 14 and deals with the aspect of

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determination the  nature of character of the lands in which the land-holder  is to  be granted  ryotwari patta  is  very material and it runs thus:           "15 Determination  of lands  in  which  the  land-      holder is  entitled to  ryotwari patta  under foregoing      provisions.- (1)  The Settlement  Officer shall examine      the nature and history of all lands in respect of which      the landholder  claims a  ryotwari patta  under section      12, 13  or 14 as the case may be, and decide in respect      of which lands the claim should be allowed.           (2)(a)  Against   a  decision  of  the  Settlement      Officer under  sub-section  (1),  the  Government  may,      within one year from the commencement of the Tamil Nadu      Estates  (Abolition   and  Conversion)  into  Ryotwari)      Amendment Act,  1954, or from the date of the decision,      which-ever is  later; and  any person aggrieved by such      decision may,  within two  months from  the said  date,      appeal to the Tribunal.           Provided that the Tribunal may, in its discretion,      allow further  time not  exceeding six  months for  the      filing of any such appeal: 76           Provided further  that the  Tribunal may,  in  its      discretion, entertain,  an appeal  by the Government at      any time  if  it  appears  to  the  Tribunal  that  the      decision of  the Settlement  Officer  was  vitiated  by      fraud or by the mistake of fact.           (b) The  decision of  the  Tribunal  on  any  such      appeal  shall   be  final  and  not  be  liable  to  be      questioned in any Court of Law." Section 16  deals with the liability to pay assessment, etc. for lands  held under  Ryotwari Pattas to the Government and it runs thus:           "16.  Liability   to  pay   assessment,  etc.   to      Government.-(1) Every  person, whether a land-holder or      a ryot,  who becomes entitled to a ryotwari patta under      this Act  in respect  of any land shall (for each fasli      year commencing with the falsi year in which the estate      is notified)  be liable  to pay  to the Government such      assessment, as may be lawfully imposed on the land.           (2) If  in respect  of any such land, the ryot was      liable immediately before the notified date to make any      payment to  the landholder  otherwise than  by  way  of      rent, whether  periodically  or  not,  the  ryot  shall      continue to  make such  payments as  accrue on or after      that to the Government."      It will  be seen  that elaborate  provisions have  been made in  the enactment  to carry  out the main objective and other purposes  of  the  Act  and  ss.  4  to  8  deal  with constituting authorities like Tribunals and Board of Revenue and appointing  various  officers  such  as  a  Director  of Settlement Officers  and Managers  of Estates  etc. to carry out functions  and duties assigned to them under the Act. It will be  pertinent to observe that in between the provisions dealing with  grant of Ryotwari Patta to a Ryot (section 11) and the  grant thereof to a land-holder (ss. 12 to 15) there is a  difference of  vital significance; whereas in the case of an  application for  a Ryotwari  Patta by  a  land-holder under s.  12, 13  or 14,  s. 15 in terms enjoins a duty upon the Settlement  Officer to  examine the nature and character of the  land and history thereof and then decide whether the claim of  the land-holder  should be  allowed or not, in the case of  an application for a ryotwari patta by a ryot under s. 11 there is no similar 77

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express  provision  for  any  inquiry  into  the  nature  or character of  the land  before granting or refusing to grant such patta  to the applicant. Even if s. 11 is read with the proviso to  cl. (d)  of s.  3, whereunder  some  inquiry  is contemplated before  granting a  Ryotwari Patta  to  a  ryot there  is   no  provision   directing  an  inquiry  for  the ascertainment of  the character of the land, namely, whether it is  ryoti  land  or  communal  land  and  the  Settlement Officer’s decision  on this aspect will be incidental to and impliedly rendered  only for  the  purpose  of  granting  or refusing to  grant the  Ryotwari Patta.  There is  also this further difference that the Settlement Officer’s decision on the nature  or character  of the land under s. 15 is subject to a regular appeal to the Tribunal under sub-s. (2) thereof while the  Settlement Officer’s  decision to grant or refuse to grant  a Patta  to a  ryot under  s. 11  is subject to be revised by  the Director of Settlement under s. 5(2) as also by the Board of Revenue under s. 7(c) and the relevant Rules in  that   behalf  and  the  decision  of  the  Director  of Settlement in  revision is further revisable by the Board of Revenue under  s. 7(d)  of the Act. Then comes s. 64-C which accords finality  to the  orders passed by the Government or other authorities under the Act which we have earlier quoted in extenso.      Now turning to the question raised in these appeals for our determination  (it is true that s. 64-C of the Act gives finality to  the orders  passed by  the Government  or other authorities in  respect of  the matters  to be determined by them under  the Act  and sub-s. (2) thereof provides that no such orders shall be called in question in any court of law. Even so, such a provision by itself is not, having regard to the two  propositions quoted  above  from  Dhulabhai’s  case (supra), decisive  on the  point  of  ouster  of  the  Civil Court’s jurisdiction  and several  other  aspects  like  the scheme of  the Act,  adequacy and  sufficiency  of  remedies provided by it etc., will have to be considered to ascertain the precise  intendment of  the Legislature. Further, having regard to  the vital  difference indicated above, in between the two  sets of  provisions dealing  with grant of ryotwari pattas to landholders on the one hand and ryots on the other different considerations  may arise while deciding the issue of the  ouster of  Civil Court’s  jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the  true nature  of character  of the  concerned land. Approaching the  question from this angle it will be seen in the first  place that  s. 64-C itself in terms provides that the finality  to the  orders passed  by the  authorities  in respect of  the matters  to be  determined by them under the Act is  "for the purposes of this Act" and not generally nor for any other purpose. 78 As stated  earlier the main object and purpose of the Act is to abolish  all  the  estates  of  the  intermediaries  like Zamindars, Inamdars,  Jagirdars or under-tenure holders etc. and to  convert  all  land-holdings  in  such  estates  into ryotwari settlements  which operation  in  revenue  parlance means  conversion  of  alienated  lands  into  non-alienated lands, that  is to  say, to  deprive the  intermediaries  of their right  to collect  all the revenues in respect of such lands and  vesting the  same back  in  the  Government.  The enactment and  its several  provisions are  thus intended to serve the  revenue purposes  of the  Government, by  way  of securing to  the Government  its sovereign  right to collect all the  revenues from  all the  lands and to facilitate the recovery thereof  by the  Government and in that process, if necessary, to deal with claims of occupants of lands, nature

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of the lands, etc. only incidentally in a summary manner and that too  for identifying  and registering  persons  in  the revenue records  from whom such recovery of revenue is to be made. The  object of  granting a  ryotwari patta  is also to enable  holder  thereof  to  cultivate  the  land  specified therein directly  under the  Government on  payment to it of such assessment  or cess that may be lawfully imposed on the land. Section  16 is very clear in this behalf which imposes the liability  to pay  such  ryotwari  or  other  assessment imposed upon the land to the Government by the patta-holder. The expression  "for the  purposes of  this  Act"  has  been designedly used  in the  section which cannot be ignored but must be  given cogent  meaning and on a plain reading of the section which  uses such  expression it  is clear  that  any order passed  by the  Settlement Officer  either granting or refusing to  grant a ryotwari patta to a ryot under s. 11 of the Act  must be  regarded as  having been passed to achieve the purposes  of the  Act, namely, revenue purposes, that is to say  for fastening  the  liability  on  him  to  pay  the assessment or  other dues  and to facilitate the recovery of such revenue  from him  by the Government; and therefore any decision impliedly  rendered on  the  aspect  of  nature  or character of  the land  on that  occasion will  have  to  be regarded as  incidental to  and merely  for the  purpose  of passing the order of granting or refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose.      Secondly,  the   principle  indicated   in  the  second proposition enunciated  in Dhulabhai’s case (supra) requires that the  statute,  when  it  creates  a  special  right  or liability and  provides for  its determination,  should also lay  down  that  all  questions  about  the  said  right  or liability shall  be determined  by the Tribunal or authority constituted by  it, suggesting  thereby that  if there is no such provision 79 it will  be difficult  to infer  ouster of the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate all other questions pertaining to such right  or liability.  Since from  the notified date all the estate  vests in  the Government free from encumbrances) it must  be held  that (all  the lands  lying in such estate including  private   land  of  land-holder  and  ryoti  land cultivated by  a ryot  would vest  in the Government and the Act could  be said to be creating a new right in favour of a land-holder (re:  his private  lands) and  a ryot (re: ryoti land) by  granting a  ryotwari patta to them under ss. 12 to 15  and  s.  11  respectively,  and  the  Act  provides  for determination of  such  right  by  the  Settlement  Officer. Question is  whether the Act also provides for determination of all  questions about such right by the Settlement Officer ? On  this aspect,  as has been indicated earlier (unlike in the case  of an  application for a ryotwari patta by a land- holder under  s. 12,  13 or  14 where  an inquiry  into  the nature or  character of  the land and the history thereof is expressly directed  to be  undertaken by  virtue of s. 15 in the case  of an  application for  a ryotwari patta by a ryot under s.  11 there  is no  express provision for any inquiry into the  nature or character of the land before granting or refusing to  grant such  patta to  the applicant. It is true that some  inquiry is  contemplated if  s. 11  is read  with proviso to  cl. (d)  of s.  3 but  even  then  there  is  no provision directing  inquiry for  the ascertainment  of  the nature of  the land,  namely, whether  it is a ryoti land or communal land but it is obvious that impliedly a decision on this aspect  of the matter must be arrived at the Settlement Officer before  he passes  his order  on either  granting or

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refusing  to  grant  such  patta.  Obviously  such  decision rendered impliedly  on this  aspect of the matter will be an incidental one and arrived at in the summary manner only for the purpose  of granting  or refusing  to grant the patta. A summary decision  of this  type in  an inquiry conducted for revenue purposes  cannot be  regarded as final or conclusive so as  to constitute  a bar  to a Civil Court’s jurisdiction adjudicating upon  the same  issue arising  in  a  suit  for injunction filed by a ryot on the basis of title and/or long and uninterrupted  possession. Since a fullfedged inquiry on the nature  or character of land is provided for under s. 15 in the case of an application by a land-holder the character of the  Settlement Officer’s  decision on  such issue may be different but that question is not before us.      Thirdly, having  regard to the principle stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai’s case (supra)  it is  clear that  even where  the statute has given finality to the orders 80 of the  special tribunal  the civil court’s jurisdiction can be regarded  as having  been excluded  if there  is adequate remedy to  do what  the civil  court would  normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed  by the  special tribunal one will have to see whether such  special tribunal  has powers  to grant reliefs which Civil  Court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is  in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion  of Civil Court’s jurisdiction. Now take the case of  an applicant  who has  applied for a ryotwari patta under s.  11 staking  his claim  thereto on the basis of his long and  uninterrupted possession of the ryoti land but the Settlement Officer  on materials before him is not satisfied that the  land in  question is  ryoti land;  in that case he will refuse  the patta  to the  applicant. But  can he, even after the refusal of the patta, protect the applicant’s long and  uninterrupted   possession  against   the  Government’s interference ?  Obviously, he cannot, for it lies within his power and  jurisdiction merely  to grant  or refuse to grant the patta  on the  basis of materials placed before him. But such a  person even  after the refusal of the ryotwari patta would be  entitled to  protect his possessory title and long enjoyment of  the land  and seek  an  injunction  preventing Government’s interference  otherwise than  in due  course of law and  surely before  granting such relief the Civil Court may have  to adjudicate upon the real nature of character of the land  if the  same is put in issue. In other words since the Settlement  Officer has  no power to do what Civil Court would normally  do in a suit it is difficult to imply ouster of Civil  Court’s jurisdiction  simply because  finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officer’s order under s. 64- C of the Act.      Counsel for the appellants invited our attention to two decisions of this Court one in M. Chayana v. K. Narayana,(1) under the  Andhra Pradesh  (Andhra Area)  Estates (Abolition and Conversion  into Ryotwari)  Act 26 of 1948 and the other in O. Chenchulakshmamma v. D. Subramanya(2) under the Madras Estates (Abolition  and Conversion  into Ryotwari) Act 26 of 1948. It  may be  stated that  both the enactments (the A.P. Act  as  well  as  the  Madras  Act)  contain  substantially identical provisions  and in particular s. 56 with which the Court was  concerned  in  the  two  cases  is  in  identical language. Sub-sec  (1) of  sec. 56 provides that "whereafter an estate  is notified,  a dispute  arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any Fasli 81

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year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who  the lawful  ryot in  respect of any holding is, the dispute shall  be decided  by the  Settlement Officer". Sub- sec. (2)  provides for an appeal to the tribunal against the decision  of  the  Settlement  Officer  and  the  tribunal’s decision in appeal has been rendered final and not liable to be questioned  in a  Court of  law. In  both the  cases this Court has  taken the  view that  a dispute between two rival claimants as to who is the lawful ryot entitled to the patta of the  holding in question had been exclusively left to the determination of the Settlement Officer under that provision and since  finality has  been accorded to such determination which is not liable to be called in question in any Court of law the  Civil Court’s  jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such dispute has  been excluded.  Relying upon  these  decisions, counsel for  the appellant  urged before  us that  the civil court’s jurisdiction  to adjudicate  upon the  issue of real nature or  character of the land should be held to have been excluded under  s.  64-C  of  the  Act  which  also  accords finality to the Settlement Officer’s order refusing to grant the ryotwari  patta to  a ryot under s. 11 of the Act on the ground that  the land  in question  is not ryoti land. It is not possible to accept this contention for the two decisions are clearly  distinguishable. In  the first place s. 56 with which the  Court was  concerned  in  those  cases  does  not contain the  words "for the purposes of the Act" which occur in s.  64-C; and  presumably in view of the absence of those words in  the  section  this  Court  in  M.  Chayana’s  case observed that  there was no warrant for taking the view that the Settlement Officer’s decision under s. 56 (1) (c) on the question as  to who  was the lawful ryot of holding was only for the purpose of indentifying the person liable to pay the arrear of  rent. Secondly  under s. 56 (1)(c) the Settlement Officer is  expressly required  to make  an inquiry into and decide the  question as  to who  is a  lawful  ryot  of  the holding  between  two  rival  claimants  whereas  as  stated earlier there  is no  express provision directing an inquiry into the  question of  the real  nature or  character of the land while  considering a  ryot’s application  for  a  patta under s.  11 read  with the  proviso to  s. 3(d).  In  other words, the  two provisions  are dissimilar. Moreover, it may be pointed out that so far as the Madras Act is concerned by Madras Act  34 of  1958 s.  56 itself has been repealed with effect from  27th December 1958 and s. 9(2) of the repealing Act (No.  34 of  1958) has  gone  on  to  provide  that  all proceeding pending before the Settlement Officer or Tribunal under that  section shall  abate. As a result of such repeal the Madras  High  Court  in  two  decisions,  Krishna  Swami Thevar’s case(1) and A.R. Sanjeevi Naicker’s(2) 82 case has held that now there is no machinery available under the Madras  Act to  have  a  determination  of  the  dispute between two  rival claimants regarding their title as to who would be  entitled to  the patta  and s. 11 does not contain machinery for deciding disputed questions of title. Whatever be the position in regard to dispute concerning rival claims or titles,  the ratio  of the two decisions of this Court on which counsel  placed reliance  is inapplicable to the issue raised in these appeals for our determination.      Having regard  to the  above discussion  we confirm the High Court’s  view that  the Civil  Court’s jurisdiction  to adjudicate on  the real  nature of  the land  is not  ousted under s. 64-C by reason of the Settlement Officer’s decision to grant  or refuse  to grant  a patta under s. 11 read with the proviso  to  s.  3(d)  of  the  Act.  The  appeals  are,

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therefore, dismissed but with no costs. S.R.      Appeals dismissed. 83