http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1938 of 2007

PETITIONER: State of Tamil Nadu

RESPONDENT: Seshachalam

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/09/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPEAL NO.1938 OF 2007

[With CA Nos.1940, 1941, 1942, 1944, 1946, 1947, 1949,  1950, 1952,1954, 1955, 1957, 1958 and 1960 of 2007]

J U D G M E N T S.B. Sinha, J.  1.      These appeals involving identical questions of law and fact were taken  up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2.      Respondents herein have been working in the Secretariat of the  Government of Tamil Nadu.  Each and every department in the Government  Secretariat prior to 1961 had a separate unit for appointment, promotion etc.   The State, however, amended the Special Rules in the year 1961 whereby all  the departments in the Secretariat were made the "one unit" for the purpose  of appointment and promotion.  Appointments in the Secretariat at all entry  level posts, i.e., Junior Assistants (subsequently re-designated as Assistants),  Assistants (subsequently re-designated as Assistant Section Officers),  Typist/Personal Clerks were to be made from the common list of candidates  selected by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission.  Promotion to  different higher posts in different departments was also being made from  amongst those employees.  The Government of Tamil Nadu, however, by  issuing G.O.Ms. No.1290 dated 05.06.1970 excluded the Finance and Law  Departments from the "one unit" system.  Whereas posts in the cadre of  Assistants, Assistant Section Officers, Typists/Personal Clerks continued to  be filled up from the common list of candidates, but in Finance and Law  Departments, further promotions were effected from amongst the employees  allotted thereto only.  Appointments to Finance Department, however, were  made at random and probably in terms of the option exercised by any  particular candidate.  Many persons, who have, thus, been ranking higher  were employed in "one unit" departments whereas some of the candidates  ranking lower were employed under fortuitous circumstances in the Finance  Department.  The employees working in the Finance Department, therefore,  obtained promotions much ahead of their peers or even seniors who were  discharging their duties in other departments coming within the "one unit".   3.      G.O.Ms. No.3288 (Public Services Department) was thereafter issued  on 29.10.1971 specifying Finance and Law Departments as separate units  from the level of Superintendent (Section Officer) and above.  Admittedly,  however, Rule 4 of the Special Rules of the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service  was amended in that behalf.  The said policy, however, is said to have been  implemented.  Two employees, S. Kalaiselvan and S. Sivasubramanian, filed  an Original Application before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in  the year 1990 claiming promotion and scale of pay at par with those who  were working in the Finance Department and who were said to be juniors to  them but had been promoted to higher posts in Finance Department.  The  said Original Application was allowed by the Tribunal by an order dated  16.4.1993 opining that there existed no guidelines to allot any employee to  the Finance Department, vis-‘-vis, other departments and, thus, the  employees working in other departments could not have been deprived of  the benefit of promotion.  It was furthermore pointed out that even Rule 4 of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

the Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service had not been  amended by the said GOMs No.1290  dated 05.06.1970. 4.      The Government of Tamil Nadu thereafter amended the Service Rules  with retrospective effect from 05.06.1970 by issuing G.O.Ms. No.30  Personnel and Administrative Reforms (D) Department dated 28.1.1994.   Upon issuance of the said Government Order, an application for review was  filed but the same was dismissed by the Tribunal by an order dated  30.1.1995.  The Government was thereafter advised to implement the order  of the Tribunal by giving promotion to the concerned employees with  retrospective effect from the date on which their juniors had been promoted  as Assistant Section Officers in the Finance Department.  Sanction was also  accorded for creation of two supernumerary posts, namely, posts of  Assistant Section Officers in the respective departments.  Several  representations thereafter were made by persons said to be similarly situated  claiming promotion and parity in the scale of pay as compared to their  counterparts in the Finance Department.  A large number of Original  Applications were also filed before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal.   Upon consideration of various pros and cons, the Government of Tamil  Nadu issued a GOM bearing No.126 dated 29.5.1998, relevant paragraphs  whereof read as under : "10.    The Government accordingly direct that :- (i)     the pay of the seniors in One Unit who have  been recruited to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat  Service on or before 28.1.1994, shall be  stepped up on par with their juniors in the  Finance unit by upgrading the posts held by  them to the Scale of pay applicable to the  juniors with immediate effect. (ii)    The stepping up of their pay on par with the  juniors in the Finance Unit by upgrading the  posts held by them to the scale of pay  applicable to the junior ordered in sub-para  (1) above is purely a person-oriented  upgradation and no new posts will be  created for this purpose. (iii)   The upgradation sanctioned for the seniors  will lapse in the event of the retirement of  the individuals concerned or their promotion  to the upgraded post in their normal turn. (iv)    The pay of the other seniors in the One Unit  in the same cadre will be stepped up on par  with immediate juniors in the Finance Unit,  with effect from the date of issue of this  order. (v)     In respect of the Typists/Personal  Clerks/Personal Assistants, in One Unit who  have not relinquished their right for  promotion as Assistant Section Officer, and  are still awaiting their turn for promotion as  Assistant Section Officer, their pay shall be  upgraded to Assistant Section Officer scale  on par with their immediate junior in the  Finance Unit who got his promotion as  Assistant Section Officer. 11.     The benefits of upgradation of pay of the  seniors on par with their juniors as per  Commission’s Seniority list ordered in sub-paras  (i) to (iv) of Para 10 above, shall also be extended  to those seniors in the Finance Unit who were  recruited before 28.1.1994 and or drawing less pay  than their juniors in One Unit. 12.     The upgradation ordered above is subject to  the following terms and conditions : (1)     The upgradation ordered will involve only  stepping up of pay of the senior on par with

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

his junior in the upgraded scale of pay. (2)     It does not entitle him to any claim for  arrears of pay. XXX                     XXX                     XXX These orders shall come into force with effect from  the date of issue of the orders. 13      ... 14.     The Departments of Secretariat concerned  shall issue necessary orders for upgradation of  posts and for stepping-up of the pay of the Seniors  in One Unit in the upgraded scales ordered in para  10 above, after obtaining necessary individual  undertaking in the format enclosed from the  seniors concerned to the effect that they accept the  terms and conditions of this order."

5.      The said Government Order further stipulated that undertaking should  be given by the seniors getting upgradation of their pay with their juniors in  the Finance Department in the format enclosed to the effect that they accept  the terms and conditions thereto.  Respondents before  us, save and except  R. Ragothaman in CA No.1955 of 2007 indisputably had retired much prior  to issuance of the said Government Order dated 29.5.1998. They also made  representations before the appellant demanding fixation of their pay at par  with their juniors in the Finance Department.  As the said request was not  acceded to, a large number of original applications were filed before the  Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal.  By a common judgment pronounced  on 20.1.2004, the Tribunal dismissed the said applications opining that the  same were barred by limitation.  It was held that the applicants having  retired long back and having filed applications between 1998 to 2003 and  the promoters having retired as Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and  Joint Secretaries and in some cases as Additional Secretaries, they should  have raised the dispute long back when their juniors had been given  promotions in the Finance Department and as the original applications were  filed after 20 years, the same could not be entertained. 6.      Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, respondents filed writ  petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Madras.  By reason of the  impugned judgment dated 21.4.2006, a Division Bench of the High Court,  inter alia, held that the cause of action for filing the original application  arose only upon issuance of GOMS No.126 dated 29.5.1998 and in that view  of the matter it cannot be said that the original applications filed by the  respondents suffered from delay and latches and/or otherwise barred by  limitation as GOMS No.126 applied also in respect of those who had retired  before 29.5.1998.  It was also opined that the respondents who had not been  in service on or before 28.1.1994 came within the scope and ambit of the  said GOMs.  Although GOMs 126 provided for operation with prospective  effect and by reason thereof past benefits were not made available, the same  should be construed in consonance with the provisions contained in Article  14 of the Constitution of India,  holding : "There is no specific clause in G.O.Ms. No.126  excluding the applicability of this G.O. to the  persons who had retired before 29.5.1998.  The  G.O. itself recites that the Government wanted to  provide a solution to the long standing problem  and had decided to take a sympathetic view to  effect lasting and equitable solution to the long  standing issue so as to redress the grievances of the  seniors in the One Unit by upgrading the pay of the  seniors in One Unit on par with their immediate  juniors in the Finance Unit. Keeping in view the explicit intention of the  Government, it is apparent that the G.O. had been  issued as a beneficial measure and the provisions  in such G.O. are to be liberally construed so as to  benefit the employees for whose benefit the G.O.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

was avowedly issued.  It is not disputed that the  petitioners were in service on and before 28.1.1994  and therefore, they fall within the scope and ambit  of the impugned G.O.  Once they are covered  under the said G.O., the benefit of the said G.O.  will flow automatically."

       It was further held that the said Government Order applied not only to  the existing staff but also to the retired employees and as such a beneficial  interpretation to the said Government Order should be given as the said  provisions have to be read in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution  of India.   7.      Mr. M.S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  appellants, would submit that the High Court committed a serious error in  passing the impugned judgment in so far as it failed to take into  consideration that :  (i)     no explanation was offered by the respondents for not preferring there  claim petitions prior to or immediately after the announcement of the  order dated 16.04.1993;  (ii)    the High Court committed serious error in interfering with the finding  of fact arrived at by the Tribunal;  (iii)   doctrine of legitimate expectation does not postulate conferment of  any right which has been lost for any reason whatsoever; and  (iv)    as in terms of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, no employee  has any fundamental right of promotion, upgradation, allocation of  any particular department or to receive any benefit after  superannuation the impugned judgment is unsustainable. 8.      Mr. Venkataramani, Dr. A.E. Chelliah, senior counsel appearing on  behalf of respondents and caveator-in-person on the other hand contended  that : (i)     from the perusal of the order of Tribunal dated 16.04.1993, it would  appear that observations made therein were not confined only to the  two employees who had filed the original application but covered the  cases of all others similarly situated;  (ii)    having regard to the fact that the State was required to respond  comprehensively to the said observations and that the review  application filed by the State in view of the said order has been  dismissed, before issuing the GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998, the  State must be held to have considered the ground realities as also the  plight of those employees who had suffered discrimination,  irrespective of the fact as to whether they were in service or had  retired.   (iii)   GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998 must be given effect to for stepping  up the scale of pay of the employees to bring them at par with their  juniors in the Finance Department with the object of treating all the  employees equally; (iv)    no new right having been created by GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998,  any mini classification or micro classification would offend Article 14  of the Constitution of India as there was no rational object behind the  same and it is not possible to segregate the cases of the employees in  service vis-‘-vis the retired employees.  9.      The employees of the Finance and Law Departments were being  treated differently from a long time. The respondents herein never  questioned the purported different treatment meted out to them by the State  either by making representations or by filing any application before the  Central Administrative Tribunal.  Only two of the employees did.  Their  applications were allowed, inter alia, on the premise that posting of  employees in the Finance and Law Departments took place by way of  fortuitous circumstances and were not supported by any rationality.  The  State, we have noticed hereinbefore, amended the Rules with retrospective  effect.  The said Rule is still in force.  Validity of the said Rule has not been  questioned by the respondents.  Different treatments meted out to the  employees of the Finance and Law Departments vis-‘-vis other department  is now covered by Rules, but despite the same, the State intended to assuage

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

the feelings of the employees by issuance of the said GOMs No.126 dated  29.5.1998.  The said notification was issued upon considering various  factors including pendency of a large number of matters before the  Administrative Tribunal on the said issue.  The State intended to lay down a  policy for providing financial benefits with prospective effect.  Various pros  and cons therefor were examined.  Avenues available to the State were taken  to into consideration.  Only thereafter it was directed : "The Government, after careful consideration of  all these points and also the related issues  involved, have decided to take a sympathetic view  and attempt a lasting and equitable solution to this  long standing issue, so as to redress the grievances  of the seniors in the One Unit, by upgrading the  pay of the seniors in One Unit on par with their  immediate juniors in the Finance Unit."

10.     It is one thing to say that the State had come up with a policy decision  which is beneficial to all the employees irrespective of the fact as to whether  they had reached the age of superannuation or not, the only criteria being  that they were recruited to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service on or before  28.1.1994 but it is another thing to say that the claim petitions filed by the  responders were based on the success of their colleagues before the  Administrative Tribunal in the year 1994.  The employees working in the  Finance Department had been promoted long back.  We have noticed  hereinbefore that some of them retired as Additional Secretaries whereas the  respondents retired as merely Assistants.  Presumably, promotions to the  employees of the Finance Department were given systematically over a long  period of time but no such grievance was made nor any application was filed  before the appropriate forum.  Such grievance, in our opinion, should have  been raised or proper application before the Tribunal should have been filed  long long back.  It was in the aforementioned situation, the Tribunal was of  the opinion that their applications were barred by limitation.  Assuming that  the cause of action for filing such applications arose in view of the  observations made by the Tribunal in its order dated 16.4.1993 passed in  Original Application No.166 of 1990, but then in terms of the Act and the  Rules, the respondents were required to file a proper application within a  period of one year only.  It is borne out from the records that, in fact, 62  such applications were already pending when GOMs No.126 was issued.   11.     Some of the respondents might have filed representations but filing of  representations alone would not save the period of limitation.  Delay or  latches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to  whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration.  Delay  and/or latches on the part of a Government servant may deprive him of the  benefit which had been given to others.  Article 14 of the Constitution of  India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known  that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.  Opinion of the  High Court that GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998 gave a fresh lease of life  having regard to the legitimate expectation, in our opinion, is based on a  wrong premise.  Legitimate expectation is a part of the principles of natural  justice.  No fresh right can be created by invoking the doctrine of legitimate  expectation.  By reason thereof only the existing right is saved subject, of  course, to the provisions of the statute.  {See State of Himachal Pradesh &  Anr. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan & Ors. [1992 Supp.(2) SCC 351]}. 12.     We may notice that in Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy  & Ors. [(2004) 1 SCC 347], this Court held : "The respondents furthermore are not even entitled  to any relief on the ground of gross delay and  laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The  first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976  wherein the respondents herein approached the  High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not  only two writ petitions had been decided but one  way or the other, even the matter had been  considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar (supra).  The plea of delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

should be a ground for denying the relief to the  other persons similarly situated would operate  against the respondents. Furthermore, the other  employees not being before this Court although  they are ventilating their grievances before  appropriate courts of law no order should be  passed which would prejudice their cause. In such  a situation, we are not prepared to make any  observation only for the purpose of grant of some  relief to the respondents to which they are not  legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom  who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court  of law."

See also Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh & Anr.  [2006 (12) SCALE 347] and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh &  Ors. [2007 (4) SCALE 204].   Only because a cut off date has been fixed, the same per se cannot be  said to be arbitrary as some date is required to be fixed for that purpose.           Recently, this Court in K.S. Krishnaswamy etc. v. Union of India &  Anr. [2006 (12) SCALE 307] held : "Nakara’s case (supra) was a case of revision of  pensionary benefits and classification of  pensioners into two groups by drawing a cut off  line and granting the revised pensionary benefits to  employees retiring on or after the cut- off date. The  criterion made applicable was "being in service  and retiring subsequent to the specified date". This  Court held that for being eligible for liberalised  pension scheme, application of such a criterion is  violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it was  both arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. It was  further held that the employees who retired prior to  a specified date, and those who retired thereafter  formed one class of pensioners. The attempt to  classify them into separate classes/groups for the  purpose of pensionary benefits was not founded on  any intelligible differentia, which had a rational  nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The  facts of Nakara’s case (supra) are not available in  the facts of the present case. In other words, the  facts in Nakara’s case are clearly distinguishable."

13.     In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.  [(2005) 1 SCC 625], a Division Bench of this Court, as regards applicability  of doctrine of promissory estoppel, opined : "In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory  estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must  be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking  the doctrine and bald expressions without any  supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is  attracted because the party invoking the doctrine  has altered its position relying on the assurance of  the Government would not be sufficient to press  into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to  consider all aspects including the results sought to  be achieved and the public good at large, because  while considering the applicability of the doctrine,  the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental  principles of equity must for ever be present in the  mind of the Court. 20. In Shrijee Sales Coporation and Anr. v. Union  of India (1997 (3) SCC 398) it was observed that  once public interest is accepted as the superior  equity which can override individual equity the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

principle would be applicable even in cases where  a period has been indicated for operation of the  promise. If there is a supervening public equity,  the Government would be allowed to change its  stand and has the power to withdraw from  representation made by it which induced persons  to take certain steps which may have gone adverse  to the interest of such persons on account of such  withdrawal. Moreover, the Government is  competent to rescind from the promise even if  there is no manifest public interest involved,  provided no one is put in any adverse situation  which cannot be rectified. Similar view was  expressed in Pawan Alloys and Casting Pvt. Ltd.  Meerut etc. etc. v. P.P. State Electricity Board and  Ors. (AIR 1997 SC 3810 ) and in Sales Tax officer  and Anr. v. Shree Durga Oil Mills and Anr. (1998  (1) SCC 573) and it was further held that the  Government could change its industrial policy if  the situation so warranted and merely because the  resolution was announced for a particular period, it  did not mean that the government could not amend  and change the policy under any circumstances. If  the party claiming application of the doctrine acted  on the basis of a notification it should have known  that such notification was liable to be amended or  rescinded at any point of time, if the government  felt that it was necessary to do so in public  interest."

       {See also Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity  Inspector and E.T.I.O. and Ors. [(2007) 5 SCC 447] 14.     Interpretation of GOMS No.126 would, no doubt, depend upon the  backdrop of the events in which it was made but it is trite  that the intention  of the maker of the policy must be drawn from the language used therein.   For the said purpose, the entire document should be read in its entirety.   Original Application No.166 of 1990 was filed by two serving employees.   The State could in obedience to the Tribunal’s order create two  supplementary posts and promote them thereto so as to treat them at par with  their juniors working in the Finance Department.  The Notification envisages  a personal pay by way of stepping up of pay.  It was given the prospective  effect.  No arrear of pay was to be paid.  The upgradation sanctioned was to  lapse in the event of retirement of the individuals or their promotion to the  upgraded post.  The said upgradation were to be subject to the terms and  conditions contained in clause 12 of the said order, a reading whereof would  clearly, in our opinion, lead to only one conclusion that it was meant to be  applied to the existing employees.  By reason thereof, on upgradation, the  seniors were required to continue to perform the duties attached to the  existing post till they get their normal promotion to the next higher category.   Upgradation of their posts was further dependant on the fact as to whether  they had been promoted in their normal course only.  It was meant to be a  one time affair.  In respect of some categories of employees, the question of  upgradation was deferred as specified in paragraph 12(6).   15.     It would, in our opinion, therefore, be incorrect to construe that the  notification applied to all who had been recruited to the Tamil Nadu  Secretariat Service on or before 28.1.1994.  Additional benefits have been  accorded by reason of the said notification.  A person who fulfills the  conditions, thus, would be entitled to the benefits provided for therein.   Those who had not fulfilled the same could not claim any benefit thereunder.   For the said purpose, the Court, in our view, should not give a strained or  extended meaning thereto.  While construing such a notification, the  financial impact thereof is also required to be taken into consideration.  {See  State of A.P. & Anr. v. A.P. Pensioners’ Association & Ors. [(2005) 13 SCC  161] and Union of India  & Anr. v. Manik Lal Banerjee [(2006) 9 SCC

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

643]}. 16.     Reliance placed by the learned counsel on R.L. Marwaha v. Union of  India & Ors. [(1987) 4 SCC 31] is misplaced.  This Court in the said  decision was considering validity of a subordinate legislation whereby  retrospective effect was granted.  It was not a case where pensionary benefit  was granted to a class of employees.  The benefit was meant to be accorded  to the existing employees only. 17.     Reliance has been placed by Mr. Venkataramani on the following  passage of The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [(1952) 3 SCR  284] : "The learned Attorney-General, appearing in  support of these appeals, however, contends that  while a reasonable classification of the kind  mentioned above may be a test of the validity of a  particular piece of legislation, it may not be the  only test which will cover all cases and that there  may be other tests also. In answer to the query of  the Court he formulates an alternative test in the  following words : If there is in fact inequality of  treatment and such inequality is not made with a  special intention of prejudicing any particular  person or persons but is made in the general  interest of administration, there is no infringement  of article 14. It is at once obvious that, according  to the test thus formulated, the validity of State  action, legislative or executive, is made entirely  dependent on the state of mind of the authority.  This test will permit even flagrantly discriminatory  State action on the specious plea of good faith and  of the subjective view of the executive authority as  to the existence of a supposed general interest of  administration. This test, if accepted, will amount  to adding at the end of article 14 the words "except  in good faith and in the general interest of  administration." This is clearly not permissible for  the Court to do. Further, it is obvious that the  addition of these words will, in the language of  Brewer, J., in Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe  Railway Co. v. W. H. Ellis (165 U.S. 150), make  the protecting clause a mere rope of sand, in no  manner restraining State action. I am not,  therefore, prepared to accept the proposition  propounded by the learned Attorney-General,  unsupported as it is by any judicial decision, as a  sound test for determining the validity of State  action."

       This Court therein was dealing with the provisions of the West Bengal  Special Courts Act.  The said decision, in our opinion, has no application  with the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly, when in the said  decision itself, it has been pointed out that Article 14 does not insist that  every piece of legislation must have universal application and it does not  take away from the State the power to classify person for the purpose of  legislation.   18.     As to what, therefore, is necessary for this purpose is that  classification must be rational and in order to pass the test : (1) the  classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and (2) the  differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved  by the Act. 19.     Equally misplaced is the decision of this Court in The State of Jammu  & Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors. [(1974) 1 SCC 19], wherein  this Court, inter alia, held that educational qualification can be held to be a  criteria for valid classification for different scales of pay.  Justice V.R.  Krishna Iyer, held : "The social meaning of Articles 14 to 16 is neither

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

dull uniformity nor specious ’talentism’. It is a  process of producing quality out of larger areas of  equality extending better facilities to the latent  capabilities of the lowly. It is not a methodology of  substitution of pervasive and slovenly mediocrity  for activist and intelligent-but not snobbish and  uncommitted-cadres. However, if the State uses  classification casuistically for salvaging status and  elitism, the point of no return is reached for  Articles 14 to 16 and the Courts jurisdiction  awakens to dadden such manoeuvres. The soul of  Article 16 is the promotion of the common man’s  capabilities, over-powering environmental  adversities and opening up full opportunities to  develop in official life without succumbing to the  sophistic argument of the elite that talent is the  privilege of the few and they must rule, wriggling  out of the democratic imperative of Articles 14 and  16 by the theory of classified equality which at its  worst degenerates into class domination."

20.     Reference has also been made by Mr. Venkataramani to a decision of  this Court in U.P. Raghavendra Acharya & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.  [2006 (6) SCALE 23] wherein it was held that pension is not a bounty and it  is a deferred salary.  This Court is not concerned herein with such a  situation.  In the said decision, this Court was concerned with a case where  an employee retiring on a particular date was to receive 50% of the pension  on the enhanced salary.  In the fact situation obtaining therein that as the  revision of pay and consequent revision in pension had come into force and  by reason of a notification, the modality of computing the pension was  required to be determined, those who had fulfilled the conditions laid down  therein were held to be entitled to the benefits provided for thereunder  holding that the concerned employees had a vested right therein. 21.     For the reasons aforementioned, we regret to express our inability to  agree with the view of the High Court. The impugned order of the High  Court is, therefore, set aside.  The appeals are allowed.  In the facts and  circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no orders as to costs.