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PETITIONER: STATE OF RAJASTHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TARACHAND JAIN

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/05/1973

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ DUA, I.D.

CITATION:  1973 AIR 2131            1974 SCR  (1) 146  1974 SCC  (3)  72  CITATOR INFO :  R          1980 SC 301  (4)  RF         1988 SC1531  (189)

ACT: Criminal Trial-Sanction for prosecution-Application of  mind to  facts of case by authority granting sanction, proof  of- Res judicata in criminal proceedings-Judgment of High  Court in revision is binding on High Court hearing appeal in  same proceeding.

HEADNOTE: The   respondent   who  was  a  member  of   the   Rajasthan Administrative Service was put up for trial before a Special Judge for offences under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and s.  5(2)  of the Prevention of Corruption  Act,  1947  after sanction  for  his  prosecution  had  been  obtained.    The respondent  challenged  the validity of the  sanction.   The Special Judge held that since the sanction was given by  the Chief Minister and not by the appointing authority,  namely, the  Governor.  the  sanction wag invalid.   In  revision  a Division  Bench of the High Court. taking into  account  the Rules  of Business and article 166 of the Constitution  held that  the Chief Minister constituted the Government in  this matter  and  sanction accorded by him in the  name  and  the authority  of the, Governor was valid  Government  sanction. The  case  was  sent back to the  Special  Judge  for  trial according to law.  According to the evidence produced before the  Special Judge sanction p.34 bore the signature  of  the Special Secretary Appointments Department ’The Special Judge rejected  the  contention of the respondent that  the  Chief Minister sanction was given without applying his mind.  and relying on the HighCourt’s  judgement held the sanction  to be valid. The respondent appealed tothe             High Court.Another   Beach  of  the   High  Court  accepted   the contention  andquashed    proceedings    against    the respondent.    The  State  appealed  to  this   Court   with certificate.   It was contended on behalf of  the  appellant (i)  that  in view of the earlier judgment of  the  Division Bench  in  revision  it was not open to the  High  Court  in appeal  to quash the proceedings against the respondent  for want of proof of valid sanction; (ii) that there was  enough material  to, show that valid sanction for  the  prosecution

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had been accorded. Allowing the appeal, HELD : (i) The Special Judge had mentioned in his order that the sanction to prosecute the accused had been given by  the Chief Minister.  This observation about the factual position in  the  order of the Special Judge did not appear  to  have been  challenged  in  revision  in the  High  Court  and  it apparently  seemed to have been accepted that  the  sanction for the prosecution had been accorded by the Chief Minister. It was in those circumstances that the High Court repeatedly referred  to  the sanction accorded by the  Chief  Minister. The  Judgment of the Division Bench in revision was  binding on  the High Court when it disposed of the appeal  filed  by the  accused  respondent, and it was not permissible  to  go into  the  question  as to whether  the  sanction  had  been accorded by the Chief Minister. [152H] Bhagat  Ram  v.  State of Rajasthan,  [1972]  2  S.C.C.  466 applied. Samba  Sivan  v,  Public Prosecutor,  Federation  of  Malaya [1950]  A.C.  458, State of Andhra Pradesh  v.  Kokkiliagada Merrayya  and  Anr.,  [1969]  2  S.C.R.  1004;  Connelly  v. Director  of  Public  Prosecutions, [1964]  A.C.  1254,  and Gokulchand  Dwarkadas  Morarka  v. The  King,  57  I.A.  30, referred to. There  was  positive evidence in the present case  that  the sanction  for the prosecution of the accused-respondent  had been   accorded   by   the   Chief   Minister   The   Office Superintendent  of  the  Appointments  Department  who   was presumably  familiar with  the  signature  of  the   Chief Minister  had stated that the sanction had been accorded  by the  Chief  Minister.  The judgment of the  High  Court  wag vitiated by the omission to take into account this  material piece of evidence. [154H, 155C] 147 (ii) It  is  clear from a perusal of sanction P34  that  the facts constituting the offence have been referred to on  the face of the sanction.  As such it was not necessary to  lead separate  evidence  to  show that the  relevant  facts  were placed  before  the  Chief Minister.  The  evidence  of  the Office  Superintendent showed that the formal  sanction  P34 filed  in  the  court  bore the  signature  of  the  Special Secretary  to  the  Government.  The  fact  that  the  Chief Minister signed the sanction for the prosecution on the file and  not the formal sanction produced in the court  made  no difference.   It was proved on the record that the  sanction for the prosecution of the accused had been accorded by  the competent  authority after it had duly applied its  mind  to the facts of the case.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 24  of 1970. Appeal  by  certificate from the judgment  and  order  dated March 27, 1968 of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur in  D. B. Cr.  A. NO. 762/ 64 and S.B. Cf.  A. No. 387 of 1964. L.   M. Singhvi and Maya Rao, for the appellant. A.   K.  Sen,  A.  N. Mulla and Sobhag  Mal  Jain,  for  the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA,  J.  Tarachand  Jain  respondent  was  convicted  by Special  Judge   Balotra for an offence  under  section  161 Indian  Penal  Court and was sentenced to  undergo  rigorous improvement  for a period of one year and to pay a  fine  of

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Rs.  1,000, or in default to undergo  rigorous  imprisonment for a further period of six months.  On appeal the Rajasthan High Court set aside the conviction of the respondent on the ground  that no valid sanction for his prosecution had  been proved.   All  the proceedings against the  respondent  were quashed-and the Whole trial was held to be null and void for want  of valid sanction.  It was, however, made  clear  that the  order  of the  High Court would not  bar  a  subsequent trial  of the respondent on the basis of a  valid-and  prior sanction  if the State was so advised to take  that  course. The present appeal has been filed in this Court by the State of  Rajasthan on certificate of fitness granted by the  High Court against its above judgement. The  respondent  was a member  of  Rajasthan  Administrative Service  and  was  posted  at the  material  time  as;  Sub- Divisional  Magistrate Barmer.  It is alleged  that  between November 1959 and March 1960 the respondent accepted illegal gratification from various parties to the cases. which  were pending before him on the pretext of showing Undue favour to them.   One Hazi Ali Mohammed was an accused in  a  passport case pending before the respondent.  Hazi Ali Mohammed  made a  complaint  to  the  Deputy  Superintendent  Police,  Anti Corruption Department, Jodhpur on.  March 30, 1960 that  the respondent had made a demand of bribe from him.  A trap  was accordingly  laid during the course of which the  respondent was  stated to have accepted an amount of Rs. 500 in  marked currency   notes  as  bribe.   Those  currency  notes   were thereafter recovered from the possession of the  respondent: During  the  course of investigation, a further sum  of  Rs. 11,4SO  which was lying concealed in the respondent’s  house was  also recovered.  The respondent had a bank  balance  of Rs.  5, 534.68 and- he used to deposit a major part  of  his salary  every month in the bank.  The respondent was put  up for  trial  on  the above allegations  for  offences  under sectio n  161  Indian  Penal Code and section  5(2)  of  the Prevension   of  Corruption  Act  after  sanction  for   his prosecution had been obtained.  The 148 material  part  of  the  sanction  which  was   subsequently exhibited as P34 was as under :                   GOVERNMENT OF RAJASTHAN                Appointment (A-III) Department                            ORDER               No.   F. 19(33)Apptts(A)/60/Group  III.-Jaipur               the  6th  October 1960.-Whereas  it  has  been               brought  to  the  notice of  the  Governor  of               Rajasthan  that Shri Tara Chand Jain, RAS  S/o               Shri  Kesar Lal Jain resident of  Panch  Batti               Baxhi  Bhawan,  Jaipur  City,  and  posted  at               Barmer   as  Sub-Divisional   Magistrate   has               accepted  or obtained Rs. 5001/-  for  himself               from  Shri  Hazi Ali Mohammed  S/o  Shri  Hari               Musalman  resident of Village  Siyar  District               Barmer accused in case No. 82 of 1959 and  No.               462 of 1969 State vs.  Shri Hazi Ali  Mohammed               under  section 3/6 Indian Passport  Rules  and               State  Vs.   Hazi Ali Mohammed  under  section               12/11 Rajasthan Religious Buildings and Places               Act respectively pending in his court on 30-3-               60  at  his residence at Barmer,  as  gratifi-               cation  other  than legal  remuneration  as  a               motive or reward for showing favour to him  in               the  exercise  of his  official  functions  by               extending  a promise to decide the  cases.  in               his  favour or by corrupt and illegal mean  or

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             by otherwise abusing his position as a  public               servant  has  obtained for  himself  pecuniary               advantage  in the form of G. C. notes  of  Rs.               5001/-  in  discharge of his  duty  and  which               gratification of Rs. 5001/- was also recovered               from    his   possession   by    the    Deputy               Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Shri               Nand   Singh   in  the  presence   of   Motbir               witnesses, complainants and Police party,  and               which  acts of said Sub Divisional  Magistrate               are  punishable under section 161 I.P.C.  &  5               (1) (d) (2) of P.C. Act, 1947.               And  whereas it has also been brought  to  the               notice of Governor of Rajasthan that Shri Tara               Chand  Jain, RAS,  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate,               Barmer has habitually accepted or obtained the               following  amounts from the following  persons               in  cases  against  them  in  his  Court,   as               gratification (other than legal  remuneration)               as a motive ox reward such as is mentioned  in               Section 161 of the Indian’ Penal Code.               And  whereas from the perusal of the facts  on               the  record  of this case  placed  before  the               Governor  of  Rajasthan he is  satisfied  that               there  are reasonable grounds to believe  that               Shri    Tara   Chand   Jain,    Sub-Divisional               Magistrate  has committed the  offence  within               the meaning of Section 161 I.P.C. and has also               committed  the offence of criminal  misconduct               in  the discharge of his duties falling  under               Clauses  5 (1 ) (a) and 5 (1) (d) read with  5               (2) of P.C. Act (11 of 1947), on the basis  of               facts stated above.               And   whereas   there  is  no   other   ground               whatsoever to refuse or withhold the  sanction               for the prosecution of Shri Tara Chand Jain.               149               Now,  therefore, in pursuance of section  6(1)               (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  1947               the Governor of Rajasthan being the  competent               authority to remove Shri Tara Chand Jain  from               his office do hereby accords sanction for  the               prosecution  of the said Shri Tara Chand,  for               the  offences  under section  161  I.P.C.  and               section 5(2) read with section 5 (1) (a) and 5               (1)  (d) of P.C. Act, 1947 (No.  11 of  1947),               or any other offence or offences which may  be               found  to  have been committed  by  Shri  Tara               Chand Jain in this connection.                                   BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR                                             (A).  Sd/- (B)                                           (R. D. Thapar) IAS                       Special Secretary to the Government." The  respondent at the trial denied the allegations  against him about his having demanded or accepted bribe. The  Special  Judge examined 28 prosecution  witnesses  till August  18,  1961.  On that date the evidence  of  Umraomal, Section  Officer, Appointments A-III Department,  Government of  Rajasthan  had  to be recorded.   Before,  however,  the statement of Umraomal could be recorded, the Special  Public Prosecutor. filed an application wherein it was stated  that on  examination  of the record it had been found  "that  the original  sanction  of  prosecution  though  having   passed through  ,.he various requisite processes of the  Government is  laconic  in  the absence of  specific  approval  of  the

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Governor  of the State in writing which is  requisite  under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947." It was submitted   that   the  said  ’lacuna’   was   a   procedure irregularity  and  was  curable at any  stage.   Prayer  was accordingly  made for adjournment to enable the  prosecution to file the requisite sanction. On  September 30, 1961 the Deputy Government Advocate  filed another  application  repudiating  the stand  taken  in  the Special  Public  Prosecutor’s application dated  August  18, 1961.   It was stated that the earlier application had  been filed   by   the  Special  Public  Prosecutor   under   some misconception of legal points.  According to the application dated September 30, 1961 the Governor had not reserved  unto himself the right of sanctioning prosecution and, therefore, it  was  futile  to send the papers to  the  Governor.   The sanction was stated to have been properly accorded.  It  was also  claimed  that  the  executive  order  issued  by   the Government  in the name of the Governor was not  justiciable and could not be challenged. On  October 28, 1961 an application was filed on  behalf  of the  respondent  questioning the validity of  the  sanction. Reference  was made to rule 31 of the Rules of Business  and it  was stated that any proposal for dismissing or  removing an officer should be submitted to the Governor and the Chief Minister  before  the issue of orders.  The  respondent  was stated  to be removable from office under the orders of  the Governor.  There was, according to the respondent, no  valid sanction.  Prayer was made that the question of the validity of the sanction should be decided before proceeding  further with the case. The  Special  Judge  thereafter considered  the  matter  and passed order dated November 3, 1961.  In the course of  that order the Special Judge stated 150                "The accused at the time of Commission of the               alleged   offences  was  the  member  of   the               Rajasthan Administrative Service and thus  was               in state service.  This fact is not  disputed.               The  sanction  to prosecute  the  accused  was               given by the Chief Minister.                ***********************               Looking  to the above discussion I  hold  that               the  accused,  an  officer  of  the  Rajasthan               Administrative  Service was and  is  removable               from service by the Governor of the State,  of               Rajasthan and not by the Chief Minister.   The               necessary  consequence  of this will  be  that               according  to Section 6 of the  Prevention  of               Corruption  Act the Governor of the  State  of               Rajasthan  alone can sanction the  prosecution               of the accused for offences mentioned in  that               section."               The  Special Judge accordingly arrived at  the               following conclusion               "I  have  held  above  that  the  Governor  of               Rajasthan  alone is competent to  remove  from               service   the   officer   of   the   Rajasthan               Administrative  Services.  In other  words,  I               hold  that the-, accused was and is  removable               from  service  by the Governor  and  he  alone               could sanction the prosecution of the  accused               for offence under section 161 I.P.C. and under               section  5(2)  Prevention of  Corruption  Act.               The   Chief  Minister  had  no  authority   to               sanction  the prosecution of the  accused  for

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             the  said offences and the sanction  given  in               this  case must be held to be  invalid.   That                             being so, the cognisance was taken by the court               wrongly and the proceedings taken must be  and               are  held  to  be void as  having  been  taken               without jurisdiction." Revision petition was filed, by the State against the  above order  of the Special Judge.  A Division Bench of  the  High Court,  Dave  and   Chhangani  JJ.,  accepted  the  revision position as per judgment dated October 5, 1962.  The learned Judges referred to the Rules of Business and article 166  of the Constitution and summed up their conclusion as tinder               "The  final conclusion then to be  reached  in               the light of the foregoing discussion is  that               the  Chief Minister was competent  to  finally               dispose  of  cases relating  to  sanction  for               prosecution  of the respondent accused and  it               was not necessary that the papers should  have               been  placed to the Governor before  issue  of               the  final orders and that the Chief  Minister               constituted the Government in this latter  and               the  sanction accorded by him in the name  and               the   authority  of  the  Governor  is   valid               Government  sanction and that being  the  real               position,  we cannot concur in the view  taken               by the Special Judge.                **************************               To  conclude,  we must hold that  the  Special               Judge was not justified in treating the  order               of the Government sanctioning the  prosecution               of  the respondent as defective on the  ground               of an omission to put up the papers before the               Governor before the final issue of the  orders               by the Chief               151               Minister and the order of discharge passed  by               him on this finding is erroneous and cannot be               maintained.   We would, therefore, accept  the               revision,  set aside the order of the  Special               Judge, Balotra, and send the case for  further               proceedings in accordance with law." After  the above order of the High Court when the  case  was taken up by the Special Judge , he recorded the evidence  of Umraomal  (PW 29) on July 19, 1963.  Umraomal in the  course of the evidence. stated that sanction P34 bore the signature of Shri R. D. Thapar, Special Secretary in the  Appointments (A-III) Department. At the time of arguments before the Special Judge  question, was  agitated  about  the want of proper  sanction  for  the prosecution of the respondent.  Argument was. advanced  that there  was no evidence to show that the papers had been  put up  to  the Chief Minister, and he had  given  the  sanction after  applying his mind.  The Special Judge  rejected  this contention after observing that at the time he passed  order dated September 3, 1961 the admitted position of the parties was that papers had been put up to the Chief Minister and he had  given the sanction for the prosecution  after  applying his   mind.   The  Special  Judge  also  referred   to   the observation in the, judgment of the High Court and held that no  exception could be taken in respect of sanction  P34  to prosecute  the respondent.  The sanction, it was  held,  was valid. The  accused-respondent  then went up in appeal  before  the High Court.    It was argued in the High Court on behalf  of

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the  accused  respondent in appeal that it  had  never  been admitted  by him that the sanction for his  prosecution  had given  by the Chief Minister after applying his mind to  the facts  and circumstances of the case.  It was further  urged that,  there was nothing to prove that the sanction for  the prosecution of the accused-respondent have been accorded  by the Chief Minister after applying his mind to the facts  and circumstances  of  the case.  This contention  found  favour with  the learned Judges of the High Court, Tyagi and  Lodha JJ.  Prayer was made before the High Court during the course of arguments by the Deputy Government Advocate that he might be  allowed to adduce additional evidence to prove that  the relevant  papers had been put up to the Chief  Minister  and that  the  Chief  Minister had accorded  sanction  for  the prosecution of the respondent after applying his mind.   The High  Court  turned  down this prayer.  In  the  result  the respondent’s  appeal was accepted by the High Court  as  per judgment dated March 27, 1968.  His conviction was set aside and  the  proceedings  taken against him a  the  trial  were quashed,  as mentioned earlier, on the ground of being  null and void in the absence of proof of valid sanction. In  appeal before us the learned Advocate-General  for  the. State  of  Rajasthan  has assailed the  correctness  of  tie judgment of the High Court.  It is urged that in view of the earlier Division Bench judgment dated October 5,1962 it  was not open to the High Court to quash the proceedings  against the  respondent for want of proof of valid sanction. in  any case,  according  to the Advocate-General there  was  enough material to show that valid sanction for the prosecution  of the  accused-respondent had been accorded.  The above  stand has been controverted 152 by  Mr.  Asoka Sen on behalf of the respondent, and  he  has canvassed  for the correctness of the impugned  judgment  of the High Court. In  our  opinion, there is considerable force  in  both  the contentions advanced on-behalf of the appellant.  So far  as the first question about the effect of the earlier  Division Bench judgment dated’ October 5, 1962 is concerned, we  find that the Special Judge held the sanction under section 6  of the Prevention of Corruption Act to be invalid as he was  of the view that the sanction should have been accorded by  the Governor.   The  order  dated  November  3,  1961  of  which extracts have been reproduced earlier shows that it was  the accepted position before him that the sanction to  prosecute the  accused had been given by the Chief Minister.   As  the Special  Judge  thought  that  the-Chief  Minister  had   no authority to sanction the prosecution and that the  sanction could  only  be  accorded  by  the  Governor,  he  held  the proceedings  taken  in  the  case to  be  void  and  without jurisdiction.   When  the matter was taken  up  in  revision before  the  High Court, the learned Judges  at  the  outset observed  that the factual question as to whether the  facts and  circumstances on which the respondent was sought to  be prosecuted  had  been placed before the Chief  Minister  and whether  he had applied his mind before being  satisfied  to the  need  of  sanction had not  been  agitated  before  and determined  by  the Special Judge.  The High Court  all  the same accepted the position that sanction had, in fact,  been accorded by the Chief Minister.  In the opinion of the  High Court,  the Chief Minister was competent to accord  sanction for  the  prosecution  of  the respondent  and  it  was  not necessary that the papers should have been placed before the Governor.   The High Court accordingly, set aside the  order of  the Special Judge.  After the case had been remanded  by

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the High Court, the accused agitated the question that there was  no evidence to show that the papers had been put up  to the  Chief  Minister  and he had given  the  sanction  after applying  his  mind.   The  Special  Judge  rejected   these contentions  and observed that the admitted position of  the parties  had  been that the papers had been put  up  to  the Chief Minister who had accorded his sanction after  applying his   mind.   The  Special  Judge  also  relied   upon   the observations of the High Court in support of his  conclusion that no exception could be taken in respect of the  impugned sanction.   Although the above observations of the  Special Judge were assailed in appeal before the High Court and  the High  Court set aside the judgment of the Special  Judge  in this respect, we are of the opinion that the question as  to whether sanction for the prosecution of the accused had been accorded by the Chief Minister could not be agitated in view of the earlier Division Bench decision dated October 5, 1962 of the High Court.  The Special Judge, as observed  earlier, had  mentioned in his order dated November3, 1961  that  the sanction  to  prosecute the accused had been  given  by  the Chief Minister.  This observation about the factual position in  the order of the Special Judge does not appear  to  have been  challenged  in  revision  in  the-High  Court  and  it apparently seems to have been accepted that the sanction for the prosecution had been accorded by the Chief Minister.  It was  in those circumstances that the High  Court  repeatedly referred  to  the sanction accorded by the  Chief  Minister. The judgement dated October 5, 1962 of the Division Bench of the  High Court, in our opinion, was binding upon  the  High Court when it disposed of the appeal filed by the accused- 153 respondent  as per judgment dated March 27, 1968 and it  was in  our Opinion, not permissible to go into the question  as to  whether  the  sanction had been accorded  by  the  Chief Minister.  The question as to what is the binding effect  of a  decision in subsequent proceedings of the  same  criminal matter  was considered by this Court in the case  of  Bhagat Ram  v.  State  of  Rajasthan() and it  was  held  that  the principle  of res judicata is also applicable  to.  criminal proceedings  and  it is not permissible  in  the  subsequent stage  of  the same proceedings to convict a person  for  an offence  in respect of which an order for his acquittal  has already been recorded.  Reliance in this context. was placed upon the observations of the Judicial Committee in the  case of   Samba  Sivan  v.  Public  Prosecutor,   Federation   of Malaya(2).  In Bhagat Ram’s case a single Judge of the  High Court  to whom a limited question had been referred  because of  a  difference  of  opinion between  two  Judges  of  the Division  Bench, not only decided the question  referred  to him,  he also interfered with the acquittal of  the  accused regarding certain offences in respect of which an order  for acquittal  had  already been made earlier  by  the  Division Bench.   It was held that it was not within the  competence of the single Judge, to reopen the matter and pass the above order of conviction in the face of the earlier order of  the Division  Bench for acquittal.  Although Bhagat  Ram’s  case (supra)  related  to acquittal, the principle laid  down  in that  case,  in our opinion, holds good in a case  like  the present wherein the question is about the binding effect  of the  earlier Division Bench judgment regarding the  validity of  the  sanction  for  the  prosecution  of  the   accused- respondent. Reference  has been made on behalf of the appellant  to  the case  of, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kokkiliagada  Marraayya and  Anr.(3) In that case proceedings were instituted  under

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section  107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against  four persons in respect of four incidents.  One of the  incidents was  alleged to have taken place on June 22,  1964.   Eleven persons,  including  the two respondents, were stated   to have  indulged in certain acts of violence, as a  result  of which a case had been registered against them under sections 148, 323 and 325 Indian Penal Code . The Magistrate  holding the  inquiry took the view that the evidence led in  support of  the  incident  of  June  22,  1964  was  not   reliable. Subsequently the respondents were convicted for the offences under  section 323 and 324 Indian Penal Code in  respect  of the incident of June 22, 1964.  The High Court set aside the conviction  of the respondents by invoking the principle  of "issue  estoppel".  On appeal this Court held that the  High Court was in error in holding that the respondents could not be  tried and convicted for offences under sections 324  and 323  Indian  Penal Code because of the  earlier  proceedings under section 107 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure.Dealing with the question of issue estoppel, this Court observed               "The  rule  of issue estoppel cannot,  in  our               judgement,  be  extended  so  as  to   prevent               evidence which was given in   the               previous  proceeding  and which was  held  not               sufficient to (1)  [1972] 2 S.C.C. 466. (3) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1004. (2) [1950] A.C. 458. 154               sustain  the other. for being used in  support               of  a  charge of an offence  which  the  State               seeks to make out.  The rule of issue estoppel               prevents  relitigation of the issue which  has               been  determined in a criminal  trial  between               the State: and the accused.  If in respect  of               an  offence  arising out of  a  transaction  a               trial has been taken place and the accused has               been  acquitted, another trial in  respect  of               the  offence  alleged  to arise  out  of  that               transaction or of a related transaction  which               requires  the Court to arrive at a  conclusion               inconsistent  with the conclusion  reached  at               the earlier trial is prohibited by the rule of               issue  estoppel.  In the, present case,  there               was no trial and no acquittal." There is no question in the present case also of a  previous trial and acquittal.  This fact would not, however,  detract from  the binding force of the earlier decision of the  High Court.  All that we are concerned with is as to whether  the judgment  of  the High Court in revision is binding  in  the subsequent proceedings in the case.  So far as this question is  concerned, we have no doubt in our minds that the  judg- ment  of  the  High  Court in revision  is  binding  in  the subsequent proceedings in the case. The case of Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions() to which  also  reference was made in the course  of  arguments dealt with section 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907  under the English criminal law.  Dealing with Connelly’s case this Court observed in the case of Merrayya (supra)               "Our Criminal jurisprudence is largely founded               upon the basic rules of English Law though the               procedure  is somewhat different.   Trials  by               jury  have been practically abolished and  the               cases  are  being tried  by  Judges.   Several               charges  arising out of the  same  transaction               can  be  tried  under  the  Code  of  Criminal

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             Procedure together at one trial, and  specific               issues are always raised and determined by the               Courts.    Under   the   English   system   of               administration  of  criminal law,  trials  for               serious offences are. held with the aid of the               jury  and  it  is  frequently  impossible   to               determine  with certitude the specific  issues               on  which the verdict of the jury is  founded.               In criminal trials under the Code of  Criminal               Procedure,  there  is no  uncertainty  in  the               determination of issues decided.  Difficulties               envisaged   in   Connelly’s   case   in    the               application  of the rule of issue estoppel  do               not therefore arise under our system." In view of what has been stated above no help can be derived by the respondent from Connelly’s case. Apart from the binding effect of the judgment dated  October 5, 1962 of the High Court, we are of the opinion that  there is  Positive  evidence on the record of this case  that  the sanction for the prosecution of the accused-respondent has I been  accorded by the Chief Minister.  Although no  question in this respect was put to Umraomal (1)  [1964] A.C. 1254. 155 (PW  29)  in examination-in-chief, the,  witness  stated  in reply to a question put to him in cross-examination that the Chief  Minister  had signed the sanction.   The  witness  no doubt  added that he was not present at the time  the  Chief Minister had signed the sanction but his statement about the signing  of  the  sanction by the Chief  Minister  does  not appear  to  have  been challenged  by  putting  any  further question to the witness.  The witness was working as  office Superintendent, Appointments Department at the relevant time and as such, would be presumably familiar with the signature of  the Chief Minister in the, ordinary course of  business. The,  learned  Judges of the High Court while  holding  that there  was no material to prove that the sanction  had  been accorded  by  the Chief Minister made no  reference  to  the statement  of’ Umraomal that the Chief Minister  had  signed the  sanction.   In our opinion, the judgment  of  the  High Court  in this respect is vitiated by its omission  to  take into account a material piece of evidence. The  fact  that the Chief Minister was competent  to  accord sanction   for  the  prosecution  of  the,   respondent   in accordance with the Rules of Business has not been  disputed before  us  but it has been urged that the  prosecution  has failed  to  prove  that the  Chief  Minister  accorded  his. sanction after applying his mind to the facts of this  case. So  far as this aspect of the matter, is concerned, we  find that  the position of law is. that the burden of proof  that the  requisite  sanction had been obtained  rests  upon  the prosecution.   Such  burden includes proof  that  the  sanc- tioning authority had given the sanction in reference to the facts  on  which the proposed prosecution was to  be  based. These  facts might appear on the face of the sanction or  it might  be, proved by independent evidence that sanction  was accorded  for prosecution after those facts had been  placed before the sanctioning authority. The  question  of sanction was dealt with  by  the  Judicial Committee in the case of Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King(1).   That, case related to a sanction under clause  23 of  the  Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order,  1943  which provided that no prosecution for the contravention of any of the provisions of the Order would be instituted without  the previous   sanction  of  the  Provincial  Government.    The

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Judicial Committee in this context observed               "In their Lordships’ view, to comply  with the               provisions  of el. 23 it must be  proved  that               the sanction was given in respect of the facts               constituting  the  offence  charged.   It   is               plainly  desirable  that the facts  should  be               referred  to on the face of the sanction,  but               this  is not essential, since cl. 23 does  not               require the. sanction to be in any  particular               form, nor even to be in writing.  But if  the               facts constituting the offence charged are not               shown on the face of the sanction, the  prose-               cution must prove by extraneous evidence  that               those facts were placed before the sanctioning               authority." The principle laid down above holds good for the purpose  of sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act see Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh(2).  Let  us now apply the principle laid (1) 75 I.A. 30.               (2) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 637. 1 56 down above to the facts of the present case.  It is no doubt true that no independent evidence was led by the prosecution to prove that the relevant facts had been placed before  the Chief Minister before he accorded sanction but that fact, in our  opinion,  introduce  no fatal infirmity  in  the  case. Sanction  P34 has been reproduced earlier in this  judgement and  it  is  manifest  from  its  perusal  that  the   facts constituting  the offence have been referred to on the  face of  the  sanction.  As such, it was not  necessary  to  lead separate  evidence  to  show that the  relevant  facts  were placed before the Chief Minister.  The evidence of  Umraomal shows that the formal sanction P 34 filed in the court bears the signature of Shri R. D. Thapar, Special Secretary to the Government.   The  fact that the Chief Minister  signed  the sanction for the prosecution on the file and not the  formal sanction produced in the court makes no material difference. It  is,  in  our  opinion, proved on  the  record  that  the sanction  for  the  prosecution  of  the  accused  had  been accorded  by  the  competent authority  after  it  had  duly applied its mind to the facts of the case. We, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the judgment  of the High Court and remand the case to it for disposal of the appeal  on merits.  We are sure that as the matter  is  very old, the High Court would take early steps to dispose of the appeal: G.C.                         Appeal allowed. 157