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PETITIONER: STATE OF RAJASTHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAO RAJA SARDAR SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/08/1978

BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1642            1979 SCR  (1)  95  1978 SCC  (3) 528

ACT:      Rajasthan Land  Reforms and  Resumption of  Jagirs  Act 1952 (No.  VI of  1952)-Ss. 46  and  47-The  Act  ousts  the jurisdiction of  civil and  Revenue Courts.-  State  claimed certain recoveries  from the  Jagirdar out  of  compensation payable to  him-No proper  account  of  dues  produced-Jagir Commissioner rejected  State’s claim-State sought to recover dues under  Ss. 229/257A  of the  Rajasthan Land Revenue Act 1956-Recoveries if could be made.

HEADNOTE:      The Rajasthan  Land Reforms  and Resumption  of  Jagirs Act, 1952  which provide  for the  resumption of jagir lands and other measures of land reforms, contains a comprehensive scheme for the determination of the amount of dues and debts recoverable by the State from the Jagirdar in respect of the jagir  lands   and  their   deduction  from  the  amount  of compensation payable to him. Sections 22 to 31 read together provide for  the continuance  of the Jagirdar’s liability to the payment  of arrears  of revenue,  ceases and  other dues which were  due from  him in  respect of the jagir lands for any period prior to the date of resumption or the jagir, out of the  compensation payable to him. A duty has been cast on the jagirdar  to mention,  in the statement of his claim for compensation the  amount of  dues and debts recoverable from him under  s. 22(1)(e). Section 32(1) makes it obligatory on The Jagir Commissioner to provisionally determine the amount of compensation  unrecoverable from  the Jagirdar  under  s. 22(1)(e) and  serve a  copy of  the provisional order on the Government, the  Jagirdar and every other interested person. It is only after giving all or them a reasonable opportunity that the  Jagir Commissioner  can make  a final  order.  The order so  made under  s. 32(2)  would be final in respect of the amounts  mentioned in  it. Section  34 provides  for the deduction of  the amounts  determined by  the  Commissioner, from the  compensation payable  to the Jagirdar under s. 26. Section 35  deals with  payment of  compensation. Section 39 provides for  appeals against  and  decision  of  the  Jagir Commissioner, to the Board of Revenue according to which the decision of  the Board in the appeal shall be final. Section 46 provides  that no  order mad  by any officer or authority under the  Act shall  be called  in question in any civil or

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revenue court.      Under the provisions of the Act, the lands belonging to the  respondent,  who  was  a.  Jagirdar  in  the  State  of Rajasthan, vested  in the State. When the Jagir Commissioner took up the question of deciding the compensation payable to the respondent,  the State  filed a  claim  that  a  certain amount was  recoverable from the compensation payable to the Jagirdar on account of revenue dues etc. But since the State was not able to give a proper account of the dues, the Jagir Commissioner made  an order  that the  amount claimed by the State could  not be deducted. The Board of Revenue dismissed the State  Government’s appeal  any, therefore, the order of the Jagir Commissioner became final.      In the  meanwhile, when the Tehsildar sought to recover the dues  from the  respondent, he  raised an objection that since  the  Jagir  Commissioner’s  order  became  final  the Government was not competent to claim that amount. The 96 Tehsildar  rejected   the  objection.  In  the  respondent’s appeal, the  Board of  Revenue  quashed  the  order  of  the Tehsildar on  the ground  that the  State Government did not furnish  the   required  particulars  in  spite  of  several opportunities given to it when the matter was before him and that the Jagir Commissioner was light in rejecting the claim of the  State. It  also held  that since  his  order  became final, proceedings  to have  the recovery  of the dues under the Land Revenue Act, Where without jurisdiction.      The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the State Government. It held that The determination of the dues and debts  recoverable by  the State from the Jagirdar was a matter which  was  required  to  be  settled  by  the  Jagir Commissioner and that by virtue of s. 46 of the Act, a Civil or Revenue Court had no jurisdiction in respect of it.      On the  question whether the Jagir Commissioner’s order was final  and  whether  any  Civil  or  Revenue  Court  had jurisdiction to  reopen it,  as it related to a matter which was required  to be  settled or decided or dealt with by the commissioner.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: The High Court was right in raising the bar of s. 46  and   holding  that   no  Civil  or  Revenue  Court  had jurisdiction in  respect of  the controversy  as  it  was  a matter which  had in  fact been finally decided by the Jagir Commissioner and  the Board  of Revenue under the provisions of the  Act. The  belated attempt  by the State to get over. the bar  by instituting proceedings under s. 229 or s. 257-A of the  Rajasthan land  Revenue  Act  was  illegal  and  was rightly set aside by the Board. The objection against it had no merit  and had  rightly been  rejected by the High Court. [104D-E]      The provisions  of  the  Act  are  quite  adequate  and comprehensive and  read with the relevant rules, provide for the determination  and recovery  of the amounts due from the Jagirdar on  account of  the Jagir lands. This had to be so, because when  the Act  provides for  the resumption  of  the jagir lands  it is  fair and  reasonable that it should make provision for  the determination  and recovery of the amount recoverable from  the Jagirdar.  The provisions  of that Act are a  comprehensive code  concerning the  liability of  the Jagirdar. [103D-E]      There is no force in the contention that the resolution of the  Jaipur State Council was a final adjudication of the liability of the Jagirdar and that, being in the nature of a decree, the  Jagir Commissioner’s  order  was  illegal.  The

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Jagirdar denied  any knowledge  of the  resolution. When the Jagir Commissioner  undertook the enquiry, the State did not produce the  resolution and,  therefore,  he  dismissed  the claim of the State. [104F-H, 105A-B]      There is  also no force in the contention that s. 34 is not a bar to civil action because in a given case the amount of compensation  might fall  short of the amount recoverable from the  Jagirdar. Such possibility could not arise in this case. The  compensation payable  to the  Jagirdar was far in excess of  his liability  to the State. The Act casts a duty on the  Jagir Commissioner  to take  necessary steps for the adjustment of  the recovery  and  further  recovery  of  the balance, if  any, that  might remain outstanding against the Jagirdar   there could,  therefore, be  no occasion  for the recovery of  any balance  of revenue does by civil action in this case. [105C-F] 97      Ullal Venkatrava  Kini v.  Louis Souza  AIR 1960 Mysore 209; G.  Venkatachala Odavar  v. Ramachandra  Odavar & Anr., AIR 1961  Mad, 423 Kulandaiswami Madurai & Ors. v. Murugayya Madurai & Ors., AIR 1969 Mad. 14; Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. Satya  Narain   &  Ors.   AIR  1954   All  115,   Gurbasappa Mahadevappa v. Neel-Kanthappa Shivappa AIR 1951 Bom. 136; A. R.  Sarin  v.  B.  C.  Patil  &  Anr.  AIR  1951  Bom.  423; Shivshankar Prasad Shah & Ors. v. Baikunth Nath Singh & Ors. [1969] 3 SCR 908 held inapplicable.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 260 of 1969.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  13-3-1968  of  the Rajasthan High  Court in  D.B. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 205 of 1965.      Dr. L. M. Singhvi and U. P. Singh for the Appellant.      R. K.  Garg, B.  P. Agarwal,  V. J.  Francis and  Madan Mohan for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SHINGHAL, J.-The  State of  Rajasthan  has  filed  this appeal by  certificate against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court  dated March 13, 1968, by which its writ petition for quashing  the order  of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, dated  January 13,  1964, in case No. 1/1962/Tonk "to enable  the   petitioner"     to  recover  Rs.  5,94,215.30, "according to law" was dismissed.      It was  stated in  the writ  petition that the lands of the Uniara jagir, Aligarh tehsil of Tonk district. vested in the Rajasthan  State on their resumption under the provision of the  Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952,  hereinafter   referred  to  as  the  Act.  The  Jagir Commissioner therefrom  took up  the question of determining the compensation  which was payable to Rao Raja Sardar Singh who was  then the  jagirdar of  Uniara. In that connection a certificate was  filed before the Jagir Commissioner in Form 10 under  rule  37-C  of  the  Rajasthan  Land  Reforms  and Resumption of  Jagirs Rules,  1954, certifying that a sum of Rs. 5,49,234/12/3  should be  recovered from  the jagirdar’s compensation and rehabilitation grant on account of "revenue dues". The  jagirdar raised  several objections  before  the Jagir Commissioner,  but it was urged on behalf of the State that the  sum of  Rs. 5,49,234/12/3 was the unpaid amount of the liability  of Rs. 5,54,226/13/6, which was payable under a resolution of the Jaipur State Council dated July 1, 1936. After adding  the sum of Rs. 44,980.53 on account of arrears

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of tribute, the total realisable amount was stated to be Rs. 5,94,215.30. As  the State  was not  able to  give a  proper account of  the dues,  the Jagir  Commissioner made an order dated February  14, 1961,  that the  amount mentioned in the aforesaid certificate (in Form 10) could not be deducted. An appeal  was   filed  against   that  order   of  the   Jagir Commissioner, to the Board 98 of Revenue,  but it  was dismissed  on October 15, 1963. The State contended that it was challenging the decisions of the Jagir Commissioner  and the  Board of  Revenue "in  separate proceedings", but that was not done and it is not in dispute before us that the Jagir Commissioner’s order dated February 14, 1961,  which was  upheld by  the Board’s  decision dated October IS, 1963, became final.      In the  meantime, the  Tehsildar of  Aligarh  issued  a demand notice  on November  3, 1961,  which was  revised  on December 22,  1961, for the recovery of Rs. 594,215.30 under section 229  of the  Rajasthan Land  Revenue Act,  1956. The jagirdar raised  an objection  that  the  Tehsildar  had  no jurisdiction to issue the demand notice because of the Jagir Commissioner’s earlier  order dated February 14, 1961 (which had become  final and  binding  on  the  parties  after  the Board’s judgment  dated October 15, 1963), but the Tehsildar rejected it  by his  order dated  December 22,  1961. As the jagirdar did  not pay the amount which was claimed under the demand notice  proceedings were  started for  attachment and sale of  his property,  and the jagirdar made an application to the  Board of  Revenue for  a revision  of the Tehsildar’ order. It  was allowed  by the  order  of  the  Board  dated January 13,  1964. The Board took the view that although the certificate  for   recovery  had  been  sent  to  the  Jagir Commissioner in  Form 10,  the required particulars were not furnished in spite of several opportunities, and that as the State Government’s  claim for  the recovery of the money had been completely rejected on an earlier occasion by the Jagir Commissioner’s order  dated February 14, 1961, and the Jagir Commissioner had  refused to  deduct that  amount  from  the compensation with  reference to  the provisions  of sections 22(1)(e), 32(1)(b)  and 34  of the  Act, the jurisdiction of the Revenue  Court in respect of the same dues was barred by section 46  of the  Act and  the proceedings  which had been taken under  section 257A  of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act were without jurisdiction. As the Board quashed the order of the Tehsildar  dated December 22, 1961, the State Government filed the  writ petition,  which  has  given  rise  to  this appeal, in  the High Court, for the recovery of the "revenue dues" mentioned  in the  certificate in  Form 10,  and feels aggrieved because  of its dismissal by the impugned judgment dated March 13, 1968.      It may  be mentioned  that the  jagirdar traversed  the State Government’s claim in the writ petition altogether. He contended that  he never  agreed to the Jaipur State Council resolution of July 1, 1936, and he was never informed of the dues claimed by the State. He denied that any amount was due on account  of land  revenue or tribute, and averred that no loan had been taken by the Uniara jagir 99 from the State Government. It was contended further that the Jagir Commissioner  wanted to make an inquiry into the State Government’s claim  for the recovery of the amount stated in the certificate  in Form  10, but  the State did not produce the account  or proof of the dues so that the claim remained unexplained. That, according to the jagirdar, was the reason why the  Jagir Commissioner held in his order dated February

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14, 1961,  that the  amount could  not be  deducted from the compensation. As the appellate order of the Board of Revenue dated October  15, 1963,  upheld  the  Jagir  Commissioner’s order, it  was pleaded  that it  became final and conclusive and could  not be  challenged by  taking up  the proceedings under the  Rajasthan Land  Revenue Act  which were  in  fact barred by section 46 of the Act.      In its  impugned judgment in the writ petition the High Court has  taken the  view that  the  determination  of  the State’s dues  was a matter which was required to be settled! decided or dealt with by the Jagir Commissioner and that, by virtue of  section 46  of the  Act, a Civil or Revenue Court had no  jurisdiction in  respect of  it. Reference  has been made to  section 47  of the  Act  which  provides  that  its provisions  shall   have  effect   notwithstanding  anything therein contained being inconsistent with any existing Jagir law or  any other  law for the time being in force. The High Court has  taken note  of the provisions of section 34(2) of the Act  also and  has held  that "no other authority, be it the civil  or the  revenue court,  can go  behind" the Jagir Commissioner’s decision  in that respect and make a recovery from  the   jagirdar  by   setting  at   naught  that  Jagir Commissioner’s order  in that  respect. The  High Court  has thus upheld  the Board’s  decision dated  January 13,  1964, against the  State of  Rajasthan, by  which the  proceedings which were  taken for  the recovery  of the  money under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act were quashed.      We find  from the  High Court’s impugned judgement that the point  of controversy  there was  whether the  machinery provided under  The Rajasthan  Land Revenue Act could not be resorted to  in face of the provisions of sections 46 and 47 of the  Act. The High Court examined that question only, and we shall confine ourselves to it.      The controversy  thus is whether it was permissible for the State to recover the aforesaid arrears of "revenue dues" even after the Jagir Commissioner’s order dated February 14, 1961, under  section 32(2)  of the  Act by  which he clearly determined that  the money  was  not  recoverable  from  the jagirdar under  clause (e)  of sub-section (t) of section 22 of the  Act and  ordered that  it may not be deducted from H the final  amount of  the jagirdar’s  compensation. In other words the  question is  whether that  order was final and no Civil or Revenue Court 100 had jurisdiction  to reopen  it as  it related  to a  matter which was required to be settled or decided or dealt with by the Jagir  Commissioner, or  whether this was not so and the proceedings  under  the  Rajasthan  Land  Revenue  Act  were competent? In  order to  arrive at  a decision,  it will  be necessary for  us to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act so  that its  scheme and  scope may  be  understood  and applied to the controversy.      The Act  (No. VI  of 1952)  came into force with effect from February  18, ]952.  It provides  for the resumption of jagir lands  and other  measures o land reforms, and extends to the  whole of The State of Rajasthan. Section 2(g) of the Act defines  "Jagirdar", and  it is  not in controversy that Rao Raja  Sardar Singh  was the jagirdar of the Uniara jagir at the  relevant time.  Clause  (h)  of  section  2  defines "Jagir-land". Here  again, it  is not  in dispute  that  the Uniara jagir  formed  such  land.  Section  21  of  the  Act provides for  the resumption of jagir lands on the appointed date, and  once again  there is  no 13  controversy that the jagir lands of Uniara were so resumed.      Section 22  of  the  Act  states  the  consequences  of

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resumption Clause  (e) of  sub-section (1)  of that  section provides as follows:-           "(e)      all arrears  of revenue, ceases or other      dues in respect of any jagir land due from the jagirdar      for  any   period  prior  to  the  date  of  resumption      including any sum due from him under clause (d) and all      loans advanced  by the Government or the Court of Wards      to the  jagirdar shall  continue to be recoverable from      such jagirdar." The  clause  thus  expressly  provides  for  the  jagirdar’s liability to pay, inter alia, all arrears of revenue, ceases or other dues in respect of his jagir land. Section 30 deals with the  recovery of such arrears and we shall revert to it after making  a reference to section 26 which deals with the State Government’s  liability to  pay compensation  to every jagirdar for  the resumption  of his jagir land. That is the subject matter of Chapter VI and section 30 thereof reads as follows:-           "30. Dues and  Debts. -  The amounts  due  from  a      jagirdar under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section      22 shall be recoverable out of the compensation payable      to him under section 26." Chapter VII  deals with the payment of compensation. Section 31 of  that  chapter  requires  every  jagirdar  to  file  a statement  of   claim  for  compensation  before  the  Jagir Commissioner. Item (v) of sub-section 101 (2) of  that section  provides that  the statement  of claim shall contain  the following particulars also:-           "(v) the amount of dues and debts recoverable from      the jagirdar  under clause  (e) of  subsection  (1)  of      section 22;" These  provisions,  read  together,  thus  provide  for  the continuance of  the jagirdar’s  liability to  the payment of the arrears of revenue, cesses and other dues, in respect of the jagir land, which were due from him for any period prior to  the  date  of  resumption  of  the  jagir,  out  of  the compensation payable to him for the loss of the jagir lands, and a  duty has  been cast on him to make a specific mention on the  amount of  the dues  and debts  recoverable from him under section  22(1) (e),  in the statement of his claim for compensation.      Then  comes   section   32   which   deals   with   the determination of  the compensation after making such inquiry as the  Jagir Commissioner  may deem  necessary. Here  again sub-section (1)  of that section makes it obligatory for the Jagir Commissioner to provisionally determine:-           "(b) the  amount  recoverable  from  the  jagirdar      under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 22..". Sub-section (2)  requires that  a copy  of  the  provisional order shall  be served  on the  Government, the jagirdar and every other  interested person,  and the  Jagir Commissioner shall, after  giving all of them a reasonable opportunity of being heard  in the matter, "make a final order". That order would therefore be a final order in respect of the aforesaid item (b)  of the  amount recoverable from the jagirdar under clause (e)  of sub-section  (1) of section 22 also. In other words, the Act provides that the order under sub-section (2) of section  32 would  be  final  in  respect  of  the  items mentioned in  it, including  the amount recoverable from the jagirdar under  clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 22. Section 33  requires the  Jagir Commissioner to, communicate the "final order" under section 32(2) to the Government, the jagirdar and every other interested person.      Next is  section 34,  which provides  the mode  for the

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recovery of  the aforesaid  dues. Sub-section  (1)  of  that section is to the following effect:-           "34. Dues  and deductions  how payable.  - (1) The      amounts recoverable from a jagirdar under clause (e) of      sub-section (1)  of section  22 and those determined in      an order made under sub-section (2) of section 32 shall      be deducted  from the compensation payable to him under      section 26." 102 Sub-section (2)  of that section provides that the amount so finally determined,  namely, the  amount recoverable,  inter alia, under  clause (c)  of sub-section  (1) of  section  22 shall be payable in instalments. The sub-sections make clear reference to clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 22 and section 32  in providing  for the  deduction of  the amounts determined thereunder  from the  compensation payable to the jagirdar under section 26.      Section 35  deals with  the payment of compensation. It will be  sufficient for  us to  refer to  the first two sub- sections which read as follows:-           "35. Payment of compensation.-(1) After the amount      of compensation  payable to a jagirdar under section 26      is finally  determined under sub-section (2) of section      32 and  the amounts  specified in  clauses (b), (c) and      (e) of  that section as finally determined are deducted      therefrom, the  balance shall  be divided  into fifteen      equal annual  instalments  or  at  the  option  of  the      jagirdar into thirty equal half-yearly instalments.           (2) The  amounts finally  determined under each of      the clauses  (b), (c)  and (e)  of sub-section  (1)  of      section 32  shall be  deducted and  paid to each of the      persons entitled thereto from every instalment referred      to in  sub-section (1)  and the remaining amount of the      instalment shall  be payable  by the  Government to the      jagirdar." Thus sub-section  (2) of section 32, section 33, sub-section (2) of section 34 and sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 35 taken  together   categorically  provide   that  the   Jagir Commissioner’s order  determining, inter  alia,  the  amount recoverable from  the jagirdar  under  clause  (e)  of  sub- section (1)  of section 22 shall be final, and that it shall be deducted  from the  compensation payable  to the jagirdar under section 26.      The Act  thus contains  a comprehensive  scheme for the determination of the amount of dues and debts recoverable by the State  from the  jagirdar ill respect of the jagir lands and their  deduction from the amount of compensation payable to him.  The question  of appeal  has  been  dealt  with  in section 39.  Sub-section (1)  of that  section  specifically provides for  an appeal  against "any decision" of the Jagir Commissioner, inter  alia, under  sub-section (2) of section 32, to  the Board  of Revenue,  and sub-section (4) declares that the  decision of  the Board  in  an  appeal  under  the section shall be final.      Then  comes   section  46   which  raises  the  bar  of jurisdiction. It provides as follows:- 103           "46. -  Bar of jurisdiction.-(1) Save as otherwise      provided in  this Act,  no Civil or Revenue Court shall      have jurisdiction  in respect  of any  matter which  is      required to  be settled,  decided or  dealt with by any      officer or authority under this Act.           (2) No order made by any such officer or authority      under this  Act shall  be called  in  question  in  any      Court."

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So where  it is shown that any "matter" which is required to be settled,  decided or  dealt with  by any  officer or  any authority under the Act, e.g., the Jagir Commissioner or the Board of  Revenue, has  been so  settled? decided  or  dealt with, it  shall not  be permissible for any Civil or Revenue Court to settle, decide, or deal with it, except where there is, a  contrary provision  in that behalf in the Act itself. It is  also the  mandate of sub-section (2) that no order of any such  officer or authority shall be open to challenge in any Court.      These provisions  of the  Act are  quite  adequate  and comprehensive  and,  read  with  the  relevant  Rules,  they provide for  the determination  and recovery  of the amounts due from  the jagirdar  on account  of the jagir lands. This has  to  be  so  because  when  the  Act  provides  for  the resumption of  the  jagir  lands  and  thereby  deducts  the jagirdar of his resources, it is fair and reasonable that it should make  provision for the determination and recovery of the amount recoverable from the jagirdar under section 32(1) (a) .  The provisions of the Act to which reference has been made  and   the  Rules  made  thereunder,  are  therefore  a comprehensive code concerning the liability of the jagirdar.      If these  provisions  are  applied  to  the  facts  and circumstances of  the present case, it would appear that the following facts have been well established.      The  State  laid  a  claim  for  the  recovery  of  Rs. 5,49,234/12/3 in  Form 10,  exclusively on  the ground  that they were revenue dues of the jagirdar for a period prior to the resumption  of the  jagir lands.  The Jagir Commissioner asked for  information for  the determination  of the  State Government’s claim,  with particular reference to clause (b) of sub-section  (1) of  section 32  as respects  the  amount recoverable from  the jagirdar  under  clause  (e)  of  sub- section (1)  of section  22, and  made his  final  order  on February 14,  1961. It is not controverted before us that he did so  after complying with the requirements of the law and communicated his decision to the Government and the jagirdar under section  33. As  the Jagir  Commissioner’s order under sub-section  (2)   of  section  32  was  against  the  State Government, nothing  was deductible  on account of the State Government’s claim 104 in Form  10, under  section 34 of the Act, on account of the liability claimed  under clause  (e) of  sub-section (1)  of section 22  and clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 32. So when  the final  determination of  that claim  was ’nil’, inasmuch as  it was  held that  nothing was recoverable from the jagirdar on account of the "revenue dues", it inevitably followed  that   no  deduction   was  permissible  from  the compensation   payable    to   him.    The   decision    was disadvantageous to  the State and it preferred all appeal to the Board  of Revenue  but,  as  has  been  stated,  it  was dismissed on October 15, 1966. It will be recalled that even though it  was stated  in the  writ petition  that the State was challenging  the decisions of the Jagir Commissioner and the Board  of Revenue  "in separate  proceedings",  no  such action was  taken. The  fact therefore  remains that  as the order had  been made  by the  Jagir Commissioner  under  the provisions of the Act, and as there was no provisions in the Act for  challenging it  otherwise than  by an appeal to the Board of  Revenue which  was dismissed,  the High  Court was right in  raising the  bar of section 46 and in holding that no Civil or Revenue Court had jurisdiction in respect of the controversy as  it was  a  matter  which  had  been  finally decided by  the Jagir  Commissioner and the Board of Revenue

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under the  provisions of the Act. The belated attempt by the State to  get over  the bar by instituting proceedings under section 229  or section  257A of  the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, was therefore illegal, and was set aside by the Board’s decision dated  January 13,  1964. The  objection against it held no merit, and has rightly been rejected by the impugned judgment of the High Court dated March 13, 1968.      It was  argued on  behalf of  the  appellant  that  the resolution of  the Jaipur  State Council dated July 1, 1936, was the  final adjudication   of the liability of the Uniara Jagir for  the payment of the amount mentioned in it, to the State, and  was really  in the  nature of a decree which the Jagir Commissioner  had no  jurisdiction  to  examine  under section 32  or any  other section  of the Act and tile Jagir Commissioner’s order  dated February  14, 1961 was therefore quite illegal and could well be ignored by the State for the purpose of taking action under section 257A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue  Act. We find that a similar argument was urged for the  consideration of the High J Court, but was rejected for satisfactory  reasons. The  State did  not even  care to produce the Council resolution before the Jagir Commissioner and, as  has been  stated, the jagirdar took the plea in his reply to  the writ  petition that  he never  agreed  to  the passing of  that resolution,  he was  never informed  of the alleged arrears  for which  the resolution  was said to have been passed,  and nothing  was payable  by him on account of "revenue dues". He therefore asked the Jagir 105 Commissioner to  make an  inquiry into  the matter. That was undertaken by  the Jagir  Commissioner  under  the  relevant provisions of  the Act,  to which  reference has  been  made already. It will be recalled that the State Government filed an  appeal   against  the  adverse  decision  of  the  Jagir Commissioner,  but  it  was  dismissed,  and  the  appellate decision of  the Board became final under sub-section (4) of section 39  of the  Act. We have dealt with the consequences which arose  from, that  decision by  virtue of  the bar  of jurisdiction under section 46      It was  further argued  on behalf of the appellant that the Jagir  Commissioner’s order  under section 32 of the Act could possibly  relate only  to his final order in regard to the amount  recoverable from the jagirdar, inter alia, under clause (e)  of sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act, for the purpose  of enabling  its deduction  from the jagirdar’s compensation under  section 34, but could not possibly bar a civil action  for it  may well be that, in a given case, the amount  of   compensation  may  fall  short  of  the  amount recoverable from the jagirdar. It will be enough to say that such a  possibility could  not arise  in  the  instant  case inasmuch as the net compensation payable to the jagirdar was Rs. 16,00,000/-, which was far in excess of his liability to the State.  Reference in this connection may also be made to rule 37-C(4) of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir  Rules,   1954,  which  casts  a  duty  on  the  Jagir Commissioner not  only to effect the deduction of the amount payable by  the jagirdar, under section 34, but also for the deduction of  the  balance  from  the  rehabilitation  grant payable to  him under  section 38C of the Act. The said rule casts a duty’ on the authority to whom the amount is payable by the  jagirdar, to take necessary steps for the adjustment of the  recovery so  effected, and  "further recovery of the balance, if  any, that  might remain outstanding against the jagirdar." There  could therefore  be no  occasion  for  the recovery of  any balance  of revenue dues by civil action in the facts and circumstances of this case.

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    The appellant’s  learned counsel  made a  reference  to several cases including Ullel Venkatrava Kini v. Louis Souza (1),  G.  Venkatachala  Odavar  v.  Ramachandra  Odavar  and another (2),  Kulandaiswami Madurai  and Others v. Murunayya Madurai and  Others (3),  Rameshwar Prasad  and Others    v. Satya Narain  and  Others  (4),  Gurbasappa  Mahadevappa  v. Neelkanthappa Shivappa (5). A. R. Sarin v. B. C. (1) A. I. R. 1960 Mysore 209. (2) A. I. R. 1961 Madras 423. (3) A. I. R. 1969 Madras 14. (4) A. I. R. 1954 All. 115. (5) A. I. R. 1951 Bombay 136. 8-520SCI/78 106 Patil and  another(1) and Shivshanker Prasad Shah and others v. Baikunth  Nath Singh  and others(2)  for the  purpose  of showing that every adjudication of a dispute cannot oust the jurisdiction of a civil court. But they were different cases where the  jurisdiction of Civil Courts could not be said to have been ousted.      As we  find no  force in  this appeal,  it is dismissed with costs. N.V.K.                                     Appeal dismissed. 107