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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  745 of 2000

PETITIONER: State of Rajasthan

RESPONDENT: Kashi Ram

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006

BENCH: B.P. Singh  & Tarun Chatterjee

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

B.P. Singh, J

       This appeal by special leave has been preferred by the State of  Rajasthan against the common judgment and order of the High Court  of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Criminal Appeal  No.622 of 1999, D.B. Jail Appeal No.619 of 1999 and D.B. Criminal  Murder Reference No.2 of 1999 whereby the High Court by its  impugned judgment and order dated December 21, 1999 allowed the  appeals preferred by the respondent and declined the murder reference  made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge for confirmation of the  sentence of death.  We notice that both the criminal appeals were  preferred by the respondent herein, one from jail and the other  presented through an advocate.  The judgment and order of the  Special Additional District and Sessions Judge (Women Atrocities),  Sri Ganganagar in Sessions Trial No.39 of 1998 dated September 29,  1999 sentencing the petitioner to death under Section 302 I.P.C. was  set aside.

       The respondent herein Kashi Ram was married to Kalawati  (deceased) about seven years before the occurrence.  They were  blessed with two children, Suman (deceased) and Guddi (deceased)  aged two and half years and two and half months respectively.  It  appears from the record that the relationship between them was not  cordial and there were incidents of the respondent assaulting Kalawati  and treating her with cruelty.  A Panchayat had also been convened at  the house of the father of the respondent, however, the respondent’s  father pleaded helplessness since the appellant did not pay any heed to  his advice.  The result was that Kalawati stayed with her parents for  about two years.  Later Harchand, father of the respondent assured her  parents that Kashi Ram had improved in his behaviour and, therefore,  Kalawati should be sent to her matrimonial home.  On being  convinced, Kalawati was sent to her matrimonial home.   

The case of the prosecution is that after some time Kashi Ram  again started mis-behaving in the same old manner and used to beat  his wife Kalawati off and on.

The case of the prosecution is that the respondent killed his  wife and two daughters on the night intervening 3rd and 4th February,  1998 and thereafter disappeared.  The first information regarding the  incident was given by Inder Bhan, PW-6, a cousin of the father of  Kalawati (deceased).  On the basis of information given by him, a  formal first information report was drawn up and a case registered  against the respondent under Section 302 IPC.  The first information  was recorded at 10.15 a.m. on February 6, 1998 in which the

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informant stated as follows:-

The respondent was married to Kalawati (deceased) about  seven years before the occurrence.  Kalawati used to come to her  parents off and on in the first six months after marriage but it appears  that there were frequent quarrels between Kalawati and her husband  (respondent herein) who used to complain that she had brought a  camel instead of a buffalo at the time of marriage.  He also  complained that she was dark complexioned.  Things came to such a  stage that Kalawati had to return to her parents.  On the very next day,  the informant along with the father of the deceased and others went to  the father of the respondent namely - Harchand and complained to  him about the behaviour of his son.   Harchand pleaded helplessness  in the matter and advised them to do whatever they liked, since his  son was not under his control.  In these circumstances, Kalawati  continued to stay with her parents for about one and half or two years.   One day, Harchand, father of the respondent came to the house of the  father of Kalawati and assured him that his son Kashi Ram  (respondent herein) had improved in his behaviour and assured him  that she will be cared for in her matrimonial home.  The father of the  deceased and other relatives after getting assurance from the brothers  of Harchand decided to send her back to her matrimonial home.  The  respondent along with his father Harchand came and the deceased  accompanied them to her matrimonial home.  The respondent and his  wife Kalawati (deceased) were blessed with two daughters who were  two and half years and two and half months old at the time of  occurrence.  The respondent and Kalawati (deceased) resided with the  respondent’s parents for some time but about two months before the  occurrence the respondent shifted to a rented premises in Prem Nagar.  Milk used to be sent to Kalawati’s house from her father’s  house, and her brother Mamraj, PW-2, used to supply milk everyday.   On February 3, 1998 as usual Mamraj, PW-2 had gone to supply milk.   His sister Kalawati told him not to bring milk in future.  On the next  day, that is on February 4, 1998 Mamraj PW-2 noticed that the  entrance of the house of the respondent was locked.  On enquiry, he  was told by a neighbour Gurdayal Singh that he had seen the  respondent and his family members till last evening but he did not  know where they had gone thereafter.

In the evening at about 5.30 p.m. the mother of Kalawati (PW- 5) came to the informant and told him that she suspected something,  and therefore, requested him to find out the whereabouts of the  respondent and his family members.  The informant went on a motor- cycle along with one Sheo Narayan (PW-1) to search for the  respondent and his family members.  On the way, he met Kashmiri  Lal and another son of Harchand on the bridge.  On enquiry they told  him that the respondent along with his family members may have  gone to the Suratgarh fair and that they were also waiting for them.  In  the meantime, Harchand father of the respondent also came.  The  informant asked them to come to the house of the respondent rather  than wait on the bridge.  Accordingly, they all proceeded towards the  house of the respondent on their respective vehicles, but as soon as  they came near Prem Nagar, the two brothers of accused disappeared  from his sight.  At about 7.30 p.m. the informant came to the house of  the respondent and found the main entrance locked.  The doors were  got opened and inside the house they found the dead body of Kalawati  lying on a cot and dead bodies of the two children lying on another  cot.  It was, therefore, alleged by the informant that the respondent  had committed the murder of his wife and two daughters and had  thereafter disappeared.

Dr. Prem Arora, PW-10 conducted the post mortem  examination of the dead bodies of Kalawati and her two children.  On  Kalawati he found the following injuries:- "Mark of ligature present on neck 2cm in width and

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knot present on back of neck, ligature mark is situated  just below the thyroid certilage and encircling neck  completely.  Base of mark is pale, dry and hard.  One  cut section tissue below ligature mark is dry and  white.  No external injury present anywhere in body".   Death in his opinion was caused by asphyxia.  In his opinion,  death of the two children was also caused by asphyxia.  In his opinion,  deaths had occurred 48 to 72 hrs. before the post-mortem examination  which was conducted on February 7, 1998.  

At the trial several witnesses were examined to prove the case  of the prosecution.  PW-1, Sheo Narayan, is the person with whom  PW-6 Inder Bhan had gone to search for the respondent and his family  members on the request of the mother of the deceased namely - PW-5,  Jai Kauri.  He fully supported the case of the prosecution to the effect  that he had gone with the father of the respondent and Inder Bhan,  PW-5 to the house of the respondent in the evening of February 6,  1998 and after opening the main gate and removing the door from the  entrance of the house they entered the house and found the dead  bodies lying on two cots inside the house.   

PW-5, Jai Kauri, mother of the deceased has also deposed to the  effect that her daughter was treated with cruelty by the respondent.   She has narrated the incidents which took place before deceased  Kalawati was sent back with her husband to her matrimonial home.   She has deposed that milk used to be delivered by her son Mamraj,  PW-2 at the house of the respondent and on February 3, 1998 when  Mamraj had gone to deliver milk Kalawati had asked him not to bring  milk thereafter since milk was to be supplied by her husband’s elder  brother.  She claimed that she had gone to the house of the deceased  on Thursday, i.e. on February 5, 1998, but finding the doors locked  she had returned.  She had made enquiries from the neighbourers, who  told her that they had seen them on Tuesday (February 3, 1998)  evening but not thereafter.  She had again gone to her daughter’s  house on Friday and it was again found locked.  She grew suspicion  and, therefore, requested Inder Bhan, PW-6 and Sheo Narayan, PW-1  to search for them.

PW-2, Mamraj, a brother of deceased Kalawati has also  narrated the incidents relating to the cruel treatment meted out to  Kalawati by her husband.  According to this witness, he used to  deliver milk at the house of the respondent, since the brother of Kashi  Ram, who used to supply milk to them, was ill. On February 3, 1998  when he had gone to supply milk he was told by the respondent and  his sister Kalawati (deceased) to stop further supply of milk.  On  February 4, 1998 while returning home he had found the house of  Kalawati (deceased) locked.  On the next day, when his mother PW-5,  went to the house of Kalawati, she also found the house locked.  The  neighbourers had informed them that Kalawati and Kashi Ram were  last seen on Tuesday evening (3.2.1998).  When his mother again  went to the house of Kalawati on February 6, 1998 she found the  house locked and, therefore, she had requested Inder Bhan and Sheo  Narayan to search for them.  This witness has been cross-examined at  length but nothing has been elicited in his cross-examination which  may discredit him.  The assertion of this witness that he has been told  by deceased Kalawati and her husband (respondent herein) on  Febraury 3, 1998 to stop supply of milk, went unchallenged in his  cross-examination.  Only with a view to assure ourselves that this  witness had also said so in his statement recorded under Section 161  Crl.P.C.  we read his police statement and we find that he had said so  even in the course of investigation.  We have looked into the case  diary not as substantive evidence but only to verify whether PW-2 had  omitted to say so in the course of investigation.  The substantive  evidence of PW-2 that he had seen his sister and the respondent on

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February 3, 1998, has gone unchallenged.  

The prosecution examined two witnesses Dinesh Kumar, PW-3  and Om Prakash, PW-4 to prove that the respondent had made an  extra-judicial confession before these two witnesses on February 17,  1998.  The prosecution also relied on the evidence of recovery made  at the instance of the respondent pursuant to which a waist chord and  keys of the locks put on the two doors were recovered from the  possession of the respondent on February 18, 1998.  The prosecution  also examined several other witnesses to prove its case.

The trial court on an exhaustive consideration of the evidence  on record came to the conclusion that the prosecution had successfully  established that the deceased Kalawati was last seen alive in her house  on February 3, 1998 and that Mamraj, PW-2 had seen her as well as  her husband in their rented premises.  It also held that the prosecution  had proved that the two doors of the house were found locked on the  morning of February 4, 1998 and that the concerned prosecution  witnesses entered the house after removing the door on February 6,  1998.  The house was also found locked on February 4, 1998 when  the mother of deceased Kalawati had gone to her house.  The trial  court relied on the recoveries made of the weapon of offence namely -  the waist chord, and the keys of the two locks, from possession of the  respondent pursuant to his statement recorded under Section 27 of the  Evidence Act.  Reliance was also placed by the trial court on the  extra-judicial confession said to have been made by the respondent  before PWs 3 and 4.  The trial court also found that the house was  found locked on February 4, 1998, and till he was arrested on  February 17, 1998, the whereabouts of the respondent were not  known.  Even after his arrest he did not offer any explanation and  even at the trial only denied the allegations made against him without  offering any explanation for his absence during the crucial days.   Relying on these circumstances, and finding that the deaths were  homicidal as proved by the medical evidence on record, the trial court  came to the conclusion that the only inference that could be drawn  from the proved facts and circumstances was that the respondent after  committing the murder of his wife and his two daughters locked the  house and disappeared from the scene.  He was arrested two weeks  later but failed to give any explanation in defence.  Accordingly, the  trial court finding the respondent guilty of the offence punishable  under Section 302 IPC sentenced him to death having regard to the  heinous nature of the crime committed by him in which three innocent  lives were lost including two infants.  

On appeal, the High Court reversed the findings of fact  recorded by the trial court and acquitted the respondent.  Before  adverting to the other incriminating circumstances we may at the  threshold notice two of them namely - the circumstance that the  respondent made an extra-judicial confession before PWs 3 and 4, and  the circumstance that recoveries were made pursuant to his statement  made in the course of investigation of the waist chord used for  strangulating Kalawati (deceased) and the keys of the locks which  were put on the two doors of his house.  The High Court has  disbelieved the evidence led by the prosecution to prove these  circumstances and we find ourselves in agreement with the High  Court.  There was really no reason for the respondent to make a  confessional statement before PWs 3 and 4.  There was nothing to  show that he had reasons to confide in them. The evidence appeared  to be unnatural and unbelievable.  The High Court observed that  evidence of extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and  though it is possible to base a conviction on the basis of an extra- judicial confession, the confessional evidence must be proved like any  other fact and the value thereof depended upon the veracity of the  witnesses to whom it was made.  The High Court found that PW-3  Dinesh Kumar was known to Mamraj, the brother of deceased

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Kalawati.  PW-3 was neither a Sarpanch nor a ward member and,  therefore, there was no reason for the respondent to repose faith in  him to seek his protection.  Similarly, PW-4 admitted that he was not  even acquainted with the accused.  Having regard to these facts and  circumstances, we agree with the High Court that the case of the  prosecution that the respondent had made an extra-judicial confession  before PWs-3 and 4 must be rejected.

So far as the recoveries are concerned, the High Court has not  accepted the same since PW-6, Inder Bhan admitted in the course of  his cross-examination that the waist chord which had been used for  strangulating Kalawati was recovered much earlier from the scene of  offence by the police itself.  Moreover, the waist chord as well as the  keys were not even produced before the Court.  It may be that some  other witnesses have stated that the waist chord was not recovered  from the spot, but in the facts of the case the benefit of doubt must go  to the accused.

The most important circumstance that the respondent was last  seen with the deceased on February 3, 1998 whereafter he had  disappeared and his house was found locked and that he had offered  no explanation whatsoever, was disposed of by the High Court in one  short paragraph observing that there was nothing unusual if the  accused was seen in the company of his own family members in his  house. On such reasoning, the High Court held that the circumstantial  evidence relied upon by the prosecution was not strong enough to  sustain the conviction of the respondent.  Accordingly, the High Court  allowed the appeals preferred by the respondent and declined the  death reference made by the trial court for confirmation of the  sentence of death.

We have been taken through the entire evidence on record.  The  medical evidence on record clearly proves that the death of Kalawati  and her two minor daughters was homicidal caused by strangulation.   The cause of death was asphyxia.  It is also established on record that  the deceased was last seen alive in the company of respondent on  February 3, 1998 at her house.  The prosecution has also successfully  established the fact that the house was found locked on the morning of  February 4, 1998 and continued to remain locked till it was opened  after removing the door on February 6, 1998.  Throughout this period  the respondent was not to be seen and he was arrested only on  February 17, 1998.  Neither at the time of his arrest, nor in the course  of investigation, nor before the Court, has the respondent given any  explanation in defence.  He has not even furnished any explanation as  to where he was between February 4, 1998 and February 17, 1998.  It  has been argued on behalf of the prosecution that this most important  circumstance has been completely ignored by the High Court. The  case of the prosecution substantially rested on this circumstance. The  respondent was obliged to furnish some explanation in defence.  He  could have explained where he was during this period, or he could  have furnished any other explanation to prove his innocence.  Counsel  for the respondent on the other hand, contends that though the  respondent furnished no explanation whatsoever, there is evidence on  record to prove that he had gone to attend Suratgarh fair with his  family members.  A question, therefore, arises whether the  presumption under Section 106 of the Evidence Act may be drawn  against the respondent in the facts of the case, since the facts as to  where he was during the relevant period and when he parted company  with the deceased, were matters within his special knowledge the  burden of proving which was cast upon him by law.  

Learned counsel for the State strenuously urged before us that  the High Court committed an apparent error in ignoring the evidence  on record which disclosed that the respondent was last seen with  deceased Kalawati in his house on February 3, 1998 late in the

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afternoon.  Thereafter, he was not seen by anyone and his house was  found locked in the morning.  The evidence of PW-5, mother of the  deceased Kalawati, and her brother Manraj, PW-2, clearly prove the  fact that the house was found locked on February 4, 1998.  The  evidence also establishes beyond doubt that the doors were removed  and dead bodies of the deceased Kalawati and her daughters were  found inside the house on February 6, 1998.  In these circumstances,  the disappearance of the respondent was rather suspicious because if  at all only he could explain what happened thereafter.  He, therefore,  submitted that in the facts of the case, in the absence of any  explanation offered by the respondent, an inference must be drawn  against the respondent which itself is a serious incriminating  circumstance against him.  He has supported his argument relying  upon several decisions of this Court.

Before adverting to the decisions relied upon by the counsel for  the State, we may observe that whether an inference ought to be  drawn under Section 106 IPC is a question which must be determined  by reference to proved.  It is ultimately a matter of appreciation of  evidence and, therefore, each case must rest on its own facts.

In Joseph s/o Kooveli Poulo Vs. State of Kerala (2000) 5 SCC  197; the facts were that the deceased was an employee of a school.   The appellant representing himself to be the husband of one of the  sisters of Gracy, the deceased, went to the St. Mary’s Convent where  she was employed and on a false pretext that her mother was ill and  had been admitted to a hospital took her away with the permission of  the Sister in charge of the Convent, PW-5.  The case of the  prosecution was that later the appellant not only raped her and robbed  her of her ornaments, but also laid her on the rail track to be run over  by a passing train.  It was also found as a fact that the deceased was  last seen alive only in his company, and that on information furnished  by the appellant in the course of investigation, the jewels of the  deceased, which were sold to PW-11 by the appellant, were seized.   There was clear evidence to prove that those jewels were worn by the  deceased at the time when she left the Convent with the appellant.   When questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant did not  even attempt to explain or clarify the incriminating circumstances  inculpating and connecting him with the crime by his adamant attitude  of total denial of everything.  In the background of such facts, the  Court held:-

"Such incriminating links of facts could, if at all, have  been only explained by the appellant, and by nobody  else, they being personally and exclusively within his  knowledge.  Of late, courts have, from the falsity of  the defence plea and false answers given to court,  when questioned, found the missing links to be  supplied by such answers for completing the chain of  incriminating circumstances necessary to connect the  person concerned with the crime committed (see State  of Maharashtra Vs. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471).  That  missing link to connect the accused \026 appellant, we  find in this case provided by the blunt and outright  denial of every one and all the incriminating  circumstances pointed out which, in our view, with  sufficient and reasonable certainty on the facts  proved, connect the accused with the death and the  cause for the death of Gracy".

In Ram  Gulam Chaudhary and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar (2001)  8 SCC 311; the facts proved at the trial were that the deceased boy  was brutally assaulted by the appellants.  When one of them declared  that the boy was still alive and he should be killed, a chhura blow was  inflicted on his chest. Thereafter, the appellants carried away the boy

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who was not seen alive thereafter.  The appellants gave no explanation  as to what they did after they took away the boy.  The question arose  whether in such facts Section 106 of the Evidence Act applied.  This  Court held:

"In the absence of an explanation, and considering the  fact that the appellants were suspecting the boy to  have kidnapped and killed the child of the family of  the appellants, it was for the appellants to have  explained what they did with him after they took him  away.  When the abductors withheld that information  from the court, there is every justification for drawing  the inference that they had murdered the boy.  Even  though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be  intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to  prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable  doubt, but the section would apply to cases like the  present, where the prosecution has succeeded in  proving facts from which a reasonable inference can  be drawn regarding death.  The appellants by virtue of  their special knowledge must offer an explanation  which might lead the Court to draw a different  inference".  

In Sahadevan alias Sagadevan Vs. State represented by  Inspector of Police, Chennai (2003) Vol. 1 SCC 534, the prosecution  established the fact that the deceased was seen in the company of the  appellants from the morning of March 5, 1985 till at least 5 p.m. on  that day when he was brought to his house, and thereafter his dead  body was found in the morning of March 6, 1985.   In the background  of such facts the Court observed:          "Therefore, it has become obligatory on the  appellants to satisfy the court as to how, where and  in what manner Vadivelu parted company with  them.  This is on the principle that a person who is  last found in the company of another, if later found  missing, then the person with whom he was last  found has to explain the circumstances in which  they parted company.  In the instant case the  appellants have failed to discharge this onus.  In  their statement under Section 313 CrPC they have  not taken any specific stand whatsoever".

   It is not necessary to multiply with authorities.  The principle  is well settled.  The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act  itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any  fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of  proving that fact is upon him.  Thus, if a person is last seen with the  deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted  company.  He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court  to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have  discharged his burden.  If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis  of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden  cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act.  In a case resting  on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable  explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself  provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved  against him.  Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a  criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution.  It lays down the  rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which  are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any  theory or hypothesis compatiable with his innocence, the Court can  consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link

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which completes the chain.  The principle has been succinctly stated  in Re. Naina Mohd. AIR 1960 Madras, 218.

There is considerable force in the argument of counsel for the  State that in the facts of this case as well it should be held that the  respondent having been seen last with the deceased, the burden was  upon him to prove what happened thereafter, since those facts were  within his special knowledge. Since, the respondent failed to do so, it  must be held that he failed to discharge the burden cast upon him by  Section 106 of the Evidence Act.  This circumstance, therefore,  provides the missing link in the chain of circumstances which prove  his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Counsel for the respondent submitted that no reliance can be  placed on the evidence of Mamraj, PW-2, the brother of the deceased,  who stated that when he had gone to the house of the deceased on  February 3, 1998 he had seen his sister as well as the respondent in  the house and he was asked not to bring milk thereafter since  alternative arrangement had been made.  This statement of Mamraj,  PW-2 was not even challenged in his cross-examination.  Even in the  course of investigation Mamraj, PW-2 had made a statement to the  same effect.  It cannot therefore, be said that he had introduced this  fact for the first time at the trial.  Learned counsel submitted that the  aforesaid statement of PW-2 was not specifically put to the accused  when he was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C.. That may be so,  but in the facts of the case, we find that by such omission no prejudice  has been caused to the appellant.  Mamraj, PW-2 had deposed in his  presence and was exhaustively cross-examined by counsel appearing  for him.  The statement of Mamraj, PW-2 regarding his having seen  the deceased last in the company of the respondent was not even  challenged in his cross-examination.  Moreover, from the trend of the  answers given by the respondent in his examination under Section 313  Cr.P.C., it appears that the respondent made only a bald denial of all  the incriminating circumstances put to him, and had no explanation to  offer.

It was then submitted on behalf of the respondent that the  neighbourers who had stated that they had seen the respondent and  deceased Kalawati on the evening of February 3, 1998 were not  examined by the prosecution.  In view of the evidence of PW-2,  Mamraj who proved this fact, the non-examination of those witnesses  does not have any adverse effect on the case of the prosecution.  It  was also submitted that there is no evidence to show that the  respondent No.1 was absconding after the occurrence.  From the facts  proved on record it is established that on February 4, 1998 the house  was found locked.  The same was the position on February 5, 1998.   when PW-5, Jai Kauri, mother of deceased Kalawati visited the house  of her daughter and found the house locked.  Finding the house also  locked on February 6, 1998, she became anxious to know about the  welfare of her daughter and, therefore, she went to the informant, PW- 6 and requested him to find out the whereabouts of her daughter  Kalawati and members of her family.  These facts clearly prove that  while the doors of the house of the respondent were locked, he was  nowhere on the scene.  The fact that PWs-1 and 6 went in search of  the respondent and the deceased and their children, and were informed  by the respondent’s brother that he may have gone to Suratgarh fair,  also points in the same direction.  Obviously, therefore he was  absconding after commission of the offence.  In fact, he never  appeared on the scene till his arrest on February 17, 1998.  There is,  therefore, abundant evidence to prove that the respondent was  traceless between February 4, 1998 and February 17, 1998.  Reliance  placed by counsel on the decision of this Court in P.  Mani Vs.  State  of Tamil Nadu (2006) 3 SCC 161, is of no avail in the facts and  circumstances of this case.  

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It was lastly submitted that in his examination under Section  313 Cr.P.C. though the circumstance regarding his having been seen  on the evening by his neighbourers on February 3, 1998 was put to the  respondent accused, the name of PW-2 was not mentioned as a person  who had also seen him on that day with the deceased.  The fact  remains that the incriminating circumstance was put to the accused  and his response was a bald denial.  We do not find that any prejudice  was caused to the respondent by not mentioning the name of PW-2,  when the incriminating circumstance appearing against him was put to  him.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that  this appeal ought to be allowed.   The High Court completely brushed  aside the most incriminating circumstance which was proved by the  prosecution namely - that the respondent was last seen with his wife  on  February 3, 1998 whereafter the house was found locked and the  respondent was not to be seen anywhere.  He continued to be traceless  till February 17, 1998 when he was arrested.  The respondent did not  offer any explanation in defence and his response to all the  incriminating circumstances put to him in his examination under  Section 313 Cr.P.C. was a bald denial.  

The following incriminating circumstances are clearly  established against the respondent : a)  That he was not on cordial terms with his wife Kalawati.

b)  On the evening of February 3, 1998 he was seen in his house  with his wife Kalawati (deceased). c)  The house of the respondent was found locked on the 4th, 5th  and 6th February, 1998. d)  On February 6, 1998 when his house was opened the dead  bodies of his wife and daughters were found, and the medical  evidence established that they had been strangulated to death, the  cause of death being asphyxia.    e) Since the respondent was not traceable the mother of the  deceased PW-5, Jai Kauri became anxious to know about their  whereabouts and requested PWs-1 and 6 to search for them. f)  In the course of investigation the respondent never appeared  at any stage, and for the first time he appeared on the scene when he  was arrested on February 17, 1998. g)  Even after his arrest he did not offer any explanation as to  when he parted company with his wife nor did he offer any  exculpatory explanation to discharge the burden under Section 106 of  the Evidence Act.

These incriminating circumstances in our view form a complete  chain and are consistent with no other hypothesis except the guilt of  the accused respondent.  If he was with his wife on the evening of  February 3, 1998, he should have explained how and when he parted  company and/or offered some plausible explanation exculpating him.  The respondent has not pleaded alibi, nor has he given an explanation  which may support his innocence.   

We are aware of the fact that we are dealing with an appeal  against acquittal, but having appreciated the evidence on record we  have come to the conclusion that the High Court has completely given  a go bye to the most important incriminating circumstance which  appeared against the accused respondent.  In the facts and  circumstances of the case the most incriminating circumstance about  the respondent being seen with his wife on February 3, 1998 and  disappearing thereafter, and his failure to offer any explanation when  arrested, has been completely ignored by the High Court by simply  recording the finding that there was nothing unusual in the husband  being found with the wife in his house.  The High Court failed to  appreciate the other co-related circumstances namely - his

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disappearance thereafter locking of the house, and his failure to offer a  satisfactory explanation in defence.  Thus, the High Court has ignored  important clinching evidence which proved the case of the  prosecution.  Therefore, interference with the judgment of the High  Court is warranted.

In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned  judgment and order of the High Court. On the question of sentence,  having regard to the fact that the offence took place in February 1998  and the respondent was acquitted by the High Court, we sentence him  to imprisonment for life.  The respondent may have been released  pursuant to order of this Court dated 1.9.2000 issuing bailable warrant  of arrest.  His bail bonds are cancelled and he is directed to be taken  into custody forthwith to serve out his sentence.