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PETITIONER: STATE OF RAJASTHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI B.K. MEENA & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       27/09/1996

BENCH: B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, K. VENKATASWAMI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.      Leave granted.  Heard counsel  for  the  parties.  This appeal  is  preferred  against  the  order  of  the  Central Administrative Tribunal,  Jaipur    staying  the  department enquiry against  the respondent  till the  conclusion of the criminal trial against him.      The respondent is a member of the Indian Administrative Service belonging  to the Rajasthan cadre. He was working as Additional  Collector,   Development-cum-Project   Director, District Rural  Development Agency (DRDA), Jaipur during the year  1989.  He  was  transferred  from  the  said  post  on 21.10.89. On 8.12.89, the successor to the respondent lodged a FIR  (No. 346  of 89)  against the respondent in Police in Police  Station   Bani  Park,  Jaipur  inter  alia  alleging misappropriation of  public funds  by the  respondent to the tune of  Rs. 1.05  crores. The Anti-Corruption Department of the State  of Rajasthan  investigated into  the said offence and found  that the  respondent was  involved in the offence and accordingly  registered FIR  No10/90 dated  12.3.90.  On 22.5.90, the  respondent was  placed under  suspension.  The respondent was  arrested on  26.3.90 and remained in custody till 10th August, 1990.      On  31.3.92,  the  State  of  Rajasthan  requested  the Government of  India for  grant of  sanction for prosecuting the respondent  under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. On 9.9.92, the Government of India, the Government of Rajasthan to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. Accordingly, on  13.10.92, the  State Government  issued the memo of  charges accompanies  by  articles  of  charges.  On 9.2.93,  the  respondent  submitted  his  written  statement (running into  90 pages) in reply to the charges served upon him.  At   our  direction,   the  learned  counsel  for  the respondent has  filed a  copy of the said written statement. It purports  to be  in response to the memo of charges dated 13.10.92  communicated  to  him.  Though  at  the  end,  the respondent reserves his "right to add new points when and if the documents  as mentioned  above are  furnished tome or if the  investigating   agency  furnish   other  documents   of additional points not disclosed to me till now", the written

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statement is  a detailed  rebuttal  of  the  charges  framed against the  respondent. The respondent, no doubt, says that since all  the document  were  not  furnished  to  him,,  he proposes to  file a  fuller statement  after receiving those documents but that does not mean that the respondent has not put forward  his case in reply to the charges framed against him. Putting  forward his  case in  reply to memo of charges cannot but mean putting forward his defence.      On 13.4.93,  the respondent  filed O.A.No.212  of  1993 before   the   Central   Administrative   Tribunal,   Jaipur challenging the  various orders passed against him including the memo of charges.      On 15.5.93,  charge-sheet was filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial  Magistrate, Jaipur,  against the  respondent and cognizance thereof taken by the learned  C.J.M.      At  the   instance  of   the  respondent,  the  Central Administrative Tribunal  issued an  order on  4.8.93 staying the disciplinary  proceedings against  respondent. The State of  Rajasthan   thereupon  re-instated   the  respondent  in service, revoking  the order  of suspension pending enquiry. The  respondent   amended  his   O.A.  requesting  that  the disciplinary enquiry  against  him  be  stayed  pending  the criminal trial.      When  the   Original  Application  came  up  for  final hearing, the  only ground  urged by  the respondent was that the departmental proceedings be not allowed to go on so long as the  criminal proceedings are pending against him. It was opposed by  the State  of Rajasthan  stating inter alia that inasmuch as  the respondent  has filed  a  detailed  written statement of  defence on  9.2.93 (in  response  to  memo  of charges framed  against him)  and because the respondent has disclosed  all   possible  defences   in  the  said  written statement, there  is no  occasion or warrant for staying the disciplinary proceedings.      The  Tribunal   found  that  the  charge-sheet  in  the criminal case  and the  memo of  charges in the disciplinary proceedings are  based upon  same facts  and allegations. It rejected the State’s plea that the respondent having already disclosed his  defence, will not be prejudiced in any manner by proceeding  with the  disciplinary enquiry.  The Tribunal observed :      "We cannot  say at  this stage what      will  emerge   during  the  enquiry      proceedings  after  examination  of      the  evidence.  The  applicant  may      well have  to put  forward  further      defence  as   and   when   material      against  him   emerges  during  the      enquiry proceedings  and disclosure      of his  defence at that stage could      well prejudice  his defence  in the      criminal trial."      Purporting to  follow the  decision of  this  Court  in Kusheshwar Dubey  v. M/s  Bharat  Coking  Coal  Limited  and Others [A.I.R.  1988 S.C.  2118 =  1988 (4)  S.C.C. 31], the Tribunal  allowed  the  respondent’s  plea  and  stayed  the disciplinary proceedings pending the criminal proceedings.      We are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal is unsustainable both  in law  and on the facts of the case. In S.A. Venkataraman  v. Union  of India  Another [A.I.R.  1954 S.C.  375],   the  petitioner   therein  was   subjected  to disciplinary proceedings  in  the  first  instance  and  was dismissed from  service on  17th September,  1953.  On  23rd February, 1954,  the police submitted a charge-sheet against the petitioner therein in a Criminal Court in respect of the

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very same  charges. The petitioner challenged the initiation of criminal  proceedings on  the ground  that it amounts  to putting him  in double jeopardy within the meaning of Clause (2)  of   Article  20   of  the  Constitution  of  India.  A Constitution Bench  of this  Court rejected  the  said  plea holding that  there is  no  legal  rejected  the  said  plea holding that  there is  no legal objection to the initiation or continuation  of criminal  proceedings merely  because he was punished earlier in disciplinary proceedings. It is thus clear -  and the  proposition is  not  disputed  by  Mr.  K. Madhava Reddy,  learned counsel for the respondent - that in law there  is no  bar to, or prohibition against, initiating simultaneous   criminal    proceedings    and    disclipnary proceedings. Indeed  not only  the said two proceedings, but if found  necessary, even  a civil  suit  can  also  proceed simultaneously. Mr.  Madhava Reddy, however, submits that as held by  this Court in certain later decisions, it would not be desirable  or appropriate  to proceed simultaneously with the   criminal   proceedings   as   well   as   disciplinary proceedings.      In Delhi  Cloth and  General Mills  Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan [1960 (3)  S.C.R. 227],  it was  held that the principles of natural justice do not require that the employer should wait for  the  decision  of  the  criminal  court  before  taking disciplinary action  against the employee. At the same time, the Court  observed : "We may, however, add that if the case is of  a grave  nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await  the decision  of the  trial  court,  so  that  the defence of  the employee  in the  criminal case  may not  be prejudiced." In  Tata Oil  Mills Company  Limited v. Workmen [1964 (7) S.C.R. 555], it was observed following D.C.M. that :      "It  is   desirable  that   if  the      incident giving  rise to  a  charge      framed  against   a  workman  in  a      domestic enquiry  is being tried in      a  criminal   court,  the  employer      should stay  the  domestic  enquiry      pending the   final disposal of the      criminal   case.    It   would   be      particularly appropriate  to  adopt      such  a  course  where  the  charge      against the  workman is  of a grave      character, because  in such a case,      it would  be unfair  to compel  the      workman  to  disclose  the  defence      which  he   may  take   before  the      criminal court.  But  to  say  that      domestic enquiries  may  be  stayed      pending  criminal   trial  is  very      different from  saying   that if an      employer   proceeds   with      the      domestic  enquiry  inspite  of  the      fact that  the  criminal  trial  is      pending,  the   enquiry  for   that      reason alone  is vitiated  and  the      conclusion  reached   in  such   an      enquiry is  either bad  in  law  or      malafide."      In Janq  Bahadur Singh  v. Baij  Nath Tiwari  [1969 (1) S.C.R. 134],  the contention that initiation of disciplinary proceedings during   the pendency of criminal proceedings on the same  facts amounts  to contempt  of court was rejected. After considering  the ratio  of these three decisions, this

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Court held in Kusheshwar Dubey :      "The view  expressed in  the  these      cases of this Court seem to support      the position that while there could      be no  legal bar  for  simultaneous      proceedings being taken, yet, there      may be  cases  where  it  would  be      appropriate to  defer  disciplinary      proceedings  awaiting  disposal  of      the criminal  case. In  the  latter      class of cases it would open to the      delinquent employee to seek such an      order of  stay or  injunction  from      the Court. Whether in the facts and      circumstances of  a particular case      there should  or should not be such      simultaneity  of   the  proceedings      would   then    receive    judicial      consideration and  the  court  will      decide in  the given  circumstances      of a  particular as  to whether the      disciplinary proceedings  should be      interdicted,    pending    criminal      trial. As we have  a already stated      that it  is  neither  possible  nor      advisable  to  evolve  a  hard  and      fast, strait-jacket  formula  valid      for  all   cases  and   of  general      application without  regard to  the      particularities of  the  individual      situation. For  the disposal of the      present case,  we do  not think  it      necessary  to  say  anything  more,      particularly when  we do not intend      to lay down any general guideline.      In the  instant case,  the criminal      action   and    the    disciplinary      proceedings  are  ground  upon  the      same set  of facts.  We are  of the      view    that    the    disciplinary      proceedings should have been stayed      and the High Court was not right in      interfering with  the trial court’s      order of  injunction which had been      affirmed in appeal."      It would  be evident from the above decisions that each of them  starts with the indisputable proposition that there is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously and then  say that  in certain  situations, it  may  not  be ’desirable’, ’advisable’  or ’appropriate’  to proceed  with the disciplinary  enquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charges.  The staying of disciplinary proceedings, it is  emphasised, is  a matter disciplinary proceedings, it is emphasised, is a matter to be determined having regard to the facts  and circumstances of a given case ad that no hard and fat rules can enunciated in that behalf. The only ground suggested in  the above  questions as  constitution a  valid ground for staying the disciplinary proceedings is "that the defence of  the employee  in the  criminal case  may not  be prejudiced." This  ground has,  however, been  hedged in  by providing further  that this  may be  done in cases of grave nature  involving   questions  of   fact  and  law.  In  our respectful opinion,  it means that not only the charges must be  grave   but  that  the  case  must  involve  complicated questions  of   law  and   fact.  Moreover,  ’advisability’,

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’desirability’ or ’propriety’, as the case may be, has to be determined in  each case  taking into  consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. The ground indicated in D.C.M. and Tata Oil Mills is not also an invariable rule. It is only a factor which will go into the scales while judging the advisability or desirability of staying the disciplinary proceedings. One of the contending consideration is that the disciplinary enquiry  cannot be  - and should not be delayed unduly. So  far as criminal cases are concerned, it is well- known that  they drag  on endlessly  where high officials or persons holding  high  public  offices  involved.  They  get bogged down  on one  or the  other ground.  They hardly ever reach a  prompt conclusion.  That is  the reality inspite of repeated advice  and admonitions  from this  Court and   the High Courts.  If a  criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself  be   a  good   ground  for   going  ahead  with  the disciplinary  enquiry   even   where   the      disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage. The interests of administration   and  good government  demand that  these proceedings  are   concluded  expeditiously.   It  must   be remembered that  interests of administration demand that the undesirable elements  are  thrown  out  and  any  charge  of misdemeanor is  enquired  into  promptly.  The  disciplinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the  administrative machinery  unsullied by getting rid of bad  elements.   The interest  of the  delinquent officer also  lies  in  a  prompt  conclusion  of  the  disciplinary proceedings. If  he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be  vindicated at the earliest possible moment and if he is  guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to law. It  is not  also in the interest of administration that persons accused  of serious  misdemeanor should be continued in office  indefinitely, i.e., for long periods awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. It is not in the interest of administration. It  only serves  the interest  of the guilty and dishonest.  While it  is not  possible to  enumerate the various factors,  for and  against the  stay of disciplinary proceedings, we  found it necessary to emphasise some of the important considerations  in   view of  the fact  that  very often the disciplinary proceedings are being stayed for long periods pending  criminal proceedings.  Stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot  be, and  should  not  be,  a  matter  of course. All the relevant factors, for and against, should be weighed and  a decision   taken  keeping in view the various principles laid down in the decisions referred to above.      We are  quite aware  of  the  fact  that  not  all  the disciplinary proceedings  are based  upon true charges; some of them may be unfounded. It may also be that in some cases, charges  are   levelled  with  oblique  motives.  But  these possibilities do  not detract from the desirability of early conclusion of  these proceedings.  Indeed, in such cases, it is all  the more in the interest of the charged officer that the proceedings  are expeditiously  concluded. Delay in such cases really works against him.      Now, let  us examine the facts of the present case. The memo of  charges against  the respondent  was served on him, alongwith the  articles of  charges, on 13.10.92. On 9.2.93, he submitted  a detailed   reply/defence  statement, running into 90  pages,  controverting  the  allegations    levelled against him.  The challan against him was filed on 15.5.93 n the criminal  court. The  respondent promptly applied to the Tribunal and  got the  disciplinary proceedings stayed. They remain stayed till today. The irregularities alleged against the respondent  are of  the year 1989. The conclusion of the criminal proceedings  is nowhere  in    sight.  (Each  party

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blames, the  other  for  the  said  delay  and    we  cannot pronounce upon  it in  the absence of proper material before us.) More  than six  years have  passed by. The charges were served  upon   the  respondent   about  4  years  back.  The respondent  has   already  disclosed   his  defence  in  his elaborate and  detailed statement  filed on 9.2.93. There is no question  of his  being compelled to disclose his defence in   the disciplinary  proceedings which would prejudice him in a  criminal case.  The charges against the respondent are very serious.  They pertain  to misappropriation  of  public funds to  the   tune of  more than  Rupees  one  crore.  The observation  of   the  Tribunal   that  in   the  course  of examination of evidence, new material may emerge against the respondent and  he may  be compelled to disclose his defence is,   at best,  a surmise  - a  speculator reason. We cannot accept it  as valid.  Though the  respondent  was  suspended pending enquiry  in May, 1990, the order has been revoked in October 1993.  The respondent is continuing in office. It is in his  interest and  in the interest of good administration that the  truth or  falsity of  the charges  against him  is determined promptly.  To wit,  if he  is not  guilty of  the charges, his  honour should be vindicated early and if he is guilty, he  should be  dealt with  appropriately without any avoidable delay. The criminal court may decide - whenever it does -  whether the  respondent is  guilty of  the  offences charged and if so, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The interest  of administration,  however, cannot brooke any delay in  disciplinary proceedings for the reasons indicated hereinabove.      There is  yet another  reason.  The  approach  and  the objective in   the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is  altogether distinct  and different.  In  the disciplinary  proceedings,   the  question  is  whether  the respondent is   guilty  of such  conduct as  would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be,   whereas in  the criminal  proceedings the  question is whether offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption  Act (and  the Indian  Penal Code, if any) are established and,  if established,  what sentence  should  be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the  rules governing  the enquiry  and trial in both the casea  are  entirely  distinct  and  different.  Staying  of disciplinary proceedings  pending criminal  proceedings,  to repeat,   should not  be matter  of course  but a considered decision. Even  if stayed  at one  stage, the  decision  may require reconsideration  if the  criminal case  gets  unduly delayed.      We must  make it  clear that  we have  not case, and we should not be understood to have cast, any reflection on the merits of either party’s case. What we have said is confined to  the   question  at  issue,  viz.,  the  desirability  or advisability of staying the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent  pending the criminal proceeding/case against him.      For the  above  reasons,  it  must  be  held  that  the Tribunal  was   in  error   in  staying   the   disciplinary proceedings pending  the criminal  proceedings  against  the respondent. The  appeal is  accordingly allowed  with costs. The order  of the  Tribunal is  set aside.  The disciplinary proceedings against the respondent shall go on expeditiously without waiting  for the result of the criminal proceedings. The costs of the appellant are estimated at Rs. 5,000/-.

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