REPORTABLE

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL   APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5812   OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.5418/2006)

   The State of Punjab & Ors.   ...Appellants

Versus

    Prem Sarup                   ...Respondent                         

O  R  D  E  R

     Leave granted.

(1) This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated

22.11.2005 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular

Second Appeal No.1581/1988 whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by the appellants

herein from a judgment and decree dated 5.1.1988 passed by the Additional  District  Judge,

Patiala  reversing the judgment and decree dated 29.10.1985,  for declaration that the order of

the Senior Superintendent of Police dated 1.7.1981 endorsing and reviving that order as also

that  of   the  disciplinary  authority  thereby  punishing  the  respondent  herein  by  imposing  a

punishment of forfeiture of service on the respondent for a period of two years and the order of

the D.I.G., the appellate authority as also the Inspector General of Police, Revisional authority

were illegal.

(2) The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.  

(3) Respondent  was  a police  constable.  For commission of  the alleged offence

under Section 170 of the Indian Penal Code in the

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year 1974, he was prosecuted in the year 1979. He was convicted. However, a criminal appeal

was preferred by him. By a judgment and order dated 8.1.1979, the learned Additional Sessions

Judge, Patiala allowed the said appeal, holding:

" The learned P.P. has frankly conceded that he is unable to support the judgment of the learned Magistrate.  Both P.W.1 Bant Singh and P.W.2 Prem Singh did not support the prosecution  version  at  trial  and  consequently  they  were  declared  hostile.  The  learned Magistrate recorded conviction of the appellants on the basis of evidence given by Shri Jaswant Singh and Investigating Officer Shri Mohinder Singh. But their alleged guilt. The charge under Section 170 IPC that the appellant Sucha Singh pretended to hold office of DTO Ropar and did traffic checking partly could not be established in the absence of evidence of PW Prem Singh and PW Bant Singh. There witnesses stated that they did not know anything in this respect. That being so, the conviction of the appellant under Section 170 IPC could not be recorded."

(4) A disciplinary proceeding, however, was initiated against  respondent on the

same allegations wherein a punishment of forfeiture of salary was imposed upon him.  

(5) He filed Suit in the Court of Sub-Judge, IInd Class, Patiala in the year 1982

contending that as the respondent was acquitted after giving benefit  of  doubt and, thus, his

acquittal was not on merit, the order of punishment in the disciplinary proceeding should also

be set aside.

(6) The  said  suit  was  dismissed  by a  judgment  and decree  dated  29.10.1985.

Respondent herein preferred an appeal, thereagainst, which was allowed by the learned District

Judge, Patiala by a judgment and decree dated 5.1.1988. As noticed hereinbefore, the Second

Appeal preferred by the appellants has been dismissed by the High Court by reason of  the

impugned judgment.

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(7) The only contention which has been raised before us is that as  the perusal of

the judgment dated 8.1.79 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala in Criminal

Appeal No. 125 of 1979  would show that the principal prosecution witnesses were won over, the

criminal charges could not be proved and, thus, the matter comes within the purview of Rule

16.3 of the Police Rules, 1934 which reads as under:

" 16.3. Action following on judicial acquittal:

        (1) When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by criminal court he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not unless:

a) the criminal charges has failed on technical  ground; or

b) In the opinion of the Court or of the  Superintendent of Police, the prosecution witnesses

have been won over, or

c) the court has held in its judgment that  an offence was actually committed and  that suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned, or

d) the evidence cited in the criminal case  discloses facts unconnected with the charge  

before the Court which justify departmental proceedings  on  a different charges;

e) Additional evidence admissible under Rule 16.25 (1) in departmental proceedings is available.."

(8) The  report  of  the  Inquiry  Officer  is  not  before  us.  The  order  imposing

penalty by the disciplinary authority has also not been produced. We have noticed hereinbefore

that the only plea taken by appellant in the aforementioned suit filed by the respondent was

that he was acquitted by grant of benefit of doubt.

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Even in the Memo of Second Appeal, it was contended as under:

" 4. That the learned Lower Appellate Court has failed to appreciate that acquittal of the respondent/plaintiff was not on  merits, rather he was acquitted of the charge by giving the benefit of doubt and the authority relied upon by the learned Lower Appellate Court cannot be invoked in the present proposition as under Rule 16.3(1) enquiry proceedings can be initiated on the same charges if the acquittal is not on merits and the same exception is attracted in the present case."

(9) Application of Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 16.3 of the Police Rules,

1934, thus, had only been  the  bone of contention of the appellants in the said civil suit.

(10) We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been made out to interfere

with the impugned judgment.

(11)    There cannot be any doubt, whatsoever, that in a given situation, it is open to

the employer to initiate a  departmental proceeding despite the fact that the delinquent officers

on similar charges have been acquitted.

      { See:   Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Narender Singh                 (2006) 4 SCC 265]        

      (12)  Our attention, however, has been drawn by Mr. S. Prasad, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the respondent to a recent decision of this Court in Union of India and Ors. Vs.

Naman Singh Shekhawat -(2008) 4 SCC 1 wherein this Court, inter alia, on the premise that the

inquiry officer was biased upheld the judgment of the High Court and set aside the order of the

disciplinary authority imposing punishment.

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(13)  We, however, do not agree with the contention of Mr. Prasad, learned counsel

that this Court has taken a view different from the one taken in Commissioner of Police, New

Delhi Vs. Narender  

Singh - (2006) 4 SCC 265 as therein also this Court categorically stated the law to be  as under:

" 12. It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required in recording a finding of  conviction in a criminal  case  and in a departmental  proceeding  are distinct and different.  Wheres in a criminal case,  it  is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt, in a departmental proceeding preponderance of probability would serve the purpose ( See Kamaldevi Agarwal Vs. State of W.B.- (2002) 1 SCC 555).

 13. It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if  an employee has been acquitted of  a criminal  charge,  the same by itself  would not  be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed."

     (14) In view of the fact that the appellants before us have not been able to show that those

witnesses  who  turned  hostile  before  the  criminal  Court  have  been  examined  in  the

departmental proceedings and, furthermore, as no material is brought on record to prove that;

even otherwise, the charges against the respondent had not  been proved, we are of the opinion

that  no  case  has  been  made  out  for  our  interference  with  the  impugned  judgment.

Furthermore,  as  noticed,  hereinbefore  the  occurrence  took place  in  the  year  1974 and the

respondent  was  acquitted  in  the  year  1979  and,  thus,  at  this  distant  point  of  time,  no

interference with the impugned judgment is warranted, particularly, in view of the fact that the

appellants  

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have not placed before us any foundational fact in support of its plea that Clause (b) of Sub-

section(1) of Section 16.3 of the Police Rules, 1934 would be attracted in this case.

     (15) For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.

                      ......................J.                  [S.B. SINHA]

         .....................J                                       [ CYRIAC JOSEPH ] New Delhi, September 18, 2008.