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PETITIONER: STATE OF PUNJAB

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MST.  QAISAR JEHAN BEGUM AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/02/1963

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1604            1964 SCR  (1) 971  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1979 SC 404  (10)

ACT:     Limitation-Land Acquisition Act, (1 of 1894), s. 18.

HEADNOTE:        On  October 25,1953, the Collector made an  award  in respect  of  land  belonging to the  respondents,  who  were evacuees, in the District of Gurgaon.  The respondents  were not notified about the acquisition and they were not present at the time of the award.    The respondents filed an application before the Collector stating that they came to know of the contents of the  Award only  on July 22, 1955 when they received  the  compensation amount  and that the amount of Rs. 96 pet acre as  given  in the Award was too low and that the market value of the  land was  about Rs. 600/- per acre.  The Collector  accepted  the application and referred the matter under s. 18 of the  Land Acquisition  Act, to the Senior Subordinate judge,  Gurgaon. The Senior Subordinate judge held that the application for a reference  which was made on September 30, 1955,  was  filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by s. 18 and dis- charged  the  reference.  The matter was taken to  the  High Court  in  revision by the respondents and  the  High  Court accepted the revision petition and directed the  Subordinate judge to deal with the reference on merits, on the view that the civil court was preclued from going into questions other than  the matters specified in s. 18 of the Act.   The  High Court  did  not go into the correctness of the  decision  on merits on the question of limitation.  On appeal by  special leave.     Held,  assuming that the civil court could go  into  the question of limitation, the respondents who were entitled to notice  under  s. 12, sub-s. 2, of the  Act  had  admittedly received  no notice nor were they present at the  time  when the  Award  was made and therefore neither cl. (a)  nor  the first part of cl. (b) of the proviso to s. 18 applied.      The scheme of the Act requires that before applying for reference under s. 18, the parties concerned must have know- ledge  of  the essential contents of the award  and  in  the present

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972 case  the  petitioners though they had come to know  of  the award  earlier  did not know the essential contents  of  the award  till  July  22, 1955, therefore, the  period  of  six months  contemplated in the second part of cl. (b) of s.  18 would  commence  from  that date  and  the  application  for reference was within time.     Raja  Harish  Chandra  Raj  Singh  v.  The  Deputy  Land Acquisition Officer, [1962] 1 S. C. R. 676, relied on.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 592 of 1961. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated November 16, 1959, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No. 268 of 1958.       R.  Ganapathy  Iyer  and  R.  N.  Sachthey,  for   the appellant.      S.   P. Sinha and Saukat Hussain, for respondent No. 2.    1963.   February  11.   The judgment  of  the  Court  was delivered by    S.     K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 16, 1959 passed by the Punjab  High Court on an application in revision in  respect of  an  order dated December 17, 1957 by which  the  learned Senior Subordinate judge of Gurgaon held that a reference by the Collector of Gurgaon under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act  (Act  1  of  1894) was incompetent  by  reason  of  the circumstance that it was made on an application filed beyond time.   The appellant before us is the State of  Punjab  and the  respondents are two ladies being related as mother  and daughter.  We shall presently state the relevant facts,  but before  we do so it is necessary to say that the only  point on  which  the  High Court disposed of  the  application  in revision  before  it  made by the  respondents  herein,  was whether the civil court to which a reference is  973 made  by the Collector under s. 18 of the  Land  Acquisition Act  on  an application filed beyond time,  can  reject  the reference   on  the  ground  that  the  reference  made   is incompetent.  On this point there is a conflict of  judicial opinion.   In disposing of the application in  revision  the learned  single  judge who heard it proceeded on  the  basis that he was bound by the Division Bench decision of the same High  Court  in Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of  Pepsu  (1), which  held that- the jurisdiction of the civil court  on  a reference  under  s.  18 was  confined  to  considering  and pronouncing upon any of the four different objections to  an award  under  the Act which might have been  raised  in  the written  application for the reference and the  civil  court had  no jurisdiction to decide the question  of  limitation. Therefore,  the  learned single judge did not  go  into  the further  question as to whether the application made  for  a reference  in the present case was filed beyond time or  not as  prescribed  by the proviso to s. 18 of  the  Act.   That question  has however been agitated before us by  reason  of the decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The  Deputy Land  Acquisition  Officer (2) , a decision  of  this  court which was not available at the time when the learned  single judge  of the Punjab High Court disposed of the  application in revision.     We  proceed  now  to  state  the  relevant  facts.   The respondents who were evacuees were owners of 55 bighas and 7 biswas  of  land  in  two villages  known  as  Salarpur  and

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Nasirpur  in  the district of Gurgaon.  Their lands  in  the aforesaid two villages along with lands of other persons  in other  villages were acquired by the appellant for use as  a field  Firing and Bombing Range.  The respondents  were  not notified  about the acquisition and were not present at  the time  of the award.  The respondents alleged, and  this  was not  denied,  that  the Collector treated  the  property  as evacuee property and none of the notices contemplated by the Land Acquisition (1) A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 490. (2) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676. 974 Act, 1894 were issued to them.  The Collector made an  award on October 25, 1953 by which he allowed compensation at  the rate  of  Rs. 96/- per acre in respect of the lands  of  the respondents.  On December 24, 1954 that is more than a  year after the award, the respondents made an application to  the Collector in which they said that certain agricultural lands of villages Salarpur and Nasirpur were compulsorily acquired by the Collector by an award dated October 30,1953  (October 30  was presumably a mistake for October 25), but they  were not  given any notice of the acquisition  proceedings.   The respondents  further  stated that the awerd  had  fixed  the compensation to be given to the land owners affected by  the acquisition, but the amount to be paid to each owner was not apportioned  therein.   The respondents then referred  to  a judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court dated November, 13, 1944 under which they were held to be the owners of  the lands  in  question.   A prayer was made on  behalf  of  the respondents  for  payment of the compensation  money  at  an early  date for the purpose of defraying the expenses  of  a daughter’s  marriage, but without prejudice to the claim  of the   respondents   for  enhancement  of   the   amount   of compensation.   The amount of compensation appears  to  have been  paid  on July 22, 1955 and on September 30,  1955  the respondents  made  an  application to the  Collector  for  a reference  under s. 18 of the Act.  In this application  the respondents  stated that they knew about the award  on  July 22,  1955  when they received the  compensation  amount  and therefore  the  petition  was within  time.   The  principal objection which they raised to the award was that the market value of the land was not Rs. 96/- per acre as given in  the award, but about Rs. 600/- per acre.  The Collector accepted this application in a very short order which stated :               "Public  Prosecutor  has  been  heard.    Mst.               Timur                975               Jehan  Begum  has filed an  affidavit  to  the               effect that she had no knowledge of the  award               at the time it was made and that she only came               to  know  about  it in July,  1955,  when  she               received  the award money.  Nothing  has  been               shown to me to the contrary to prove that  the               award  was  made within the knowledge  of  the               petitioners.  Under the circumstances it would               be  only  fair  and  equitable  to  refer  the               petition   under  section  18  of   the   Land               Acquisition   Act   to  a  civil   court   for               determining  the compensation, which I  hereby               do." A reference was made accordingly to the civil court and  the Senior Subordinate judge of Gurgaon who heard it came to the conclusion that the application made to the Collector for  a reference war barred by time, because the Collector’s  award was  made  on  October 25, 1953 and the  application  for  a

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reference  was  made  on September 30,  1955.   The  learned Subordinate  judge  expressed some doubt as to  whether  the respondents  were  entitled  to  count  the  period  of  the limitation from the date of knowledge but he held that  even if they were entitled to do so, their date of knowledge must be taken to be December 24, 19-54 on which date they made an application  for  interim payment and  the  application  for reference  having  been made more than six months  from  the date of knowledge, the application was barred by time within the  meaning  of  the proviso to s. 18 of the  Act.   As  to whether  it  was  open to the civil court  to  go  into  the question   of  limitation  the   learned   Subordinate-judge referred to the conflict of .judicial opinion and said  that the preponderance of opinion was in favour of the view  that the. civil court could go into the question in order to find out  whether  the reference was competent or not.   In  this view of the matter, the learned Subordinate judge discharged the reference on the ground that it was incompetent.  It may be mentioned here that the 976 Division  Bench  decision of the Punjab High Court  in  Hari Krishan Khosla’s case (1), was not available to the  learned Subordinate  judge  on the day he passed  his  orders.   The matter  was  then  to the High Court on  an  application  in revision by the respondents and we have already stated  that the High Court dealt with it on the footing of the  decision in Hari Krishan Khosla’s case (1).  The High Court  accepted the  application  in revision, set aside the  order  of  the learned Subordinate judge and directed him to deal with  the reference  on  merits.  It is from this order  of  the  High Court that the appeal has come to us by special leave.               It  is necessary at this stage to set out  the               proviso to s. 1 8 of the Act               "............               Provided that every such application shall  be               made,-               (a)   if  the person making it was present  or               represented  before  the Collectorate  at  the               time when he made his award. within six  weeks               from the date of the Collector’s award;               (b)   in other cases, within six weeks of  the               receipt of the notice from the Collector under               section  12,  sub-section (2), or  within  six               months from the date of the Collector’s award,               whichever period shall first expire." Assuming  that  the  appellant  can  raise  the  ground   of limitation,  the  first question before us  is  whether  the application  made  on  September 30, 1955  was  within  time within the meaning of the aforesaid proviso.  Clause (a)  of the  proviso is clearly not applicable in the present  case, because admittedly the respondents were neither present  nor were (1)  A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 490.  977 represented  before the Collector when the latter  made  his award.   The first part of cl. (b) is also  not  applicable, because the respondents did not receive any notice from  the Collector  under sub-S. (2) of S. 12 of the Act.  That  sub- section  requires the Collector to give immediate notice  of his  award  to  such of the persons interested  as  are  not present  personally  or by their  representatives  when  the award is made.  Clearly enough, the respondents herein  were entitled  to  a  notice  under  sub-s.  (2)  of  S.  12  but admittedly no notice was issued to them.    As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true

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scope  and  effect thereof was considered by this  court  in Raja Harish Chandra’s Case (1).  It was there observed  that a  literal  and mechanical construction of  the  words  "six months from the date of the Collector’s award" occurring  in the  second  part  of cl. (b) of the proviso  would  not  be appropriate  an and "the knowledge of the party affected  by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement   of   fair  play  and  natural   justice,   the expression...... used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively." Admittedly the award was  never communicated to the respondents.   Therefore  the question  before  us  boils  down to  this.   When  did  the respondents know the award either actually or constructively ?  Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very  strong reliance  on  the petition which the  respondents  made  for interim  payment of compensation on December 24,  1954.   He has pointed out that the learned Subordinate judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents’ date of  knowledge and  there  are no reasons why we should  take  a  different view.   It seems clear to us that the ratio of the  decision in  Raja  Harish  Chandra’s  case (1),  is  that  the  party affected   by   the  award  must  know   it,   actually   or constructively and the period of six months will (1)  [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676. 978 run from the date of that knowledge.  Now, knowledge of  the award  does  not mean a mere knowledge of the fact  that  an award  has  been  made.  The knowledge must  relate  to  the essential  contents  of the award.  These  contents  may  be known  either actually or constructively.  If the  award  is communicated  to  a party under s. 12 (2) of  the  Act,  the party  -must  be  obviously  fixed  with  knowledge  of  the contents of the award whether he reads it or not.  Similarly when  a  party  is present in  court  either  personally  or through  his  representative when the award is made  by  the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award.  Having regard to the scheme of the Act we  think that  knowledge  of  the award must mean  knowledge  of  the essential contents of the award.  Looked at from that  point of  view, we do not think that it can be inferred  from  the petition  dated December 24, 1954 that the  respondents  had knowledge  of  the  award.   One  of  the  respondents  gave evidence before the learned Subordinate Judge and she said               "The application marked as Ex.  D-1 was  given               by  me but the amount of compensation was  not               known to me, nor did I know about  acquisition               of  the  land.   Chaudhari  Mohd.   Sadiq,  my               karinda  had  told me on the day I  filed  the               said  application  that  the  land  had   been               acquired by the Government."   This evidence was not seriously contradicted on behalf  of the  appellant  and the learned Subordinate  judge  did  not reject  it.  It is worthy of note that before the  Collector also the appellant did not seriously challenge the statement of  the respondents that they came to know of the  award  on July  22, 1955 the date on which the compensation was  paid. In  the reply which the appellant filed before  the  learned Subordinate judge there was no contradiction of the averment that the respondents had come to  979 know of the award on July 22, 1955.  That being the position we have come to the conclusion that the date of knowledge in this  case  was  July  22,  1955.   The  application  for  a reference was clearly made within six months from that  date

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and  was not therefore barred by time within the meaning  of the  second part of cl. (by of the proviso to s. 18  of  the Act.     In  the  view  which we have taken on  the  question  of limitation,  it  is unnecessary for us to decide  the  other question as to whether the civil court, on a reference under s.  18 of the Act, can go into the question  of  limitation. We have already stated that there is a conflict of  judicial opinion  on that question.  There is on one side a  line  of decisions Following the decision of the Bombay High Court in re.   Land  Acquisition Act (1), which have  held  that  the civil court is not debarred from satisfying itself that  the reference  which  it  is  called upon to  hear  is  a  valid reference.  There is, on the other side, a line of decisions which  say  that  the jurisdiction of  the  civil  court  is confined to considering and pronouncing upon any one of  the four  different objections to an award under the  Act  which may  have  been raised in the written  application  for  the reference.   The  decision of the Allahabad  High  Court  in Secretary of State v. Bhagvan Prasad (1), is typical of this line of decisions.  There is thus a marked conflict of judi- cial opinion on the question.  This conflict, we think, must be resolved in a more appropriate case on a future occasion. In the case before us the question does not really arise and is merely academic and we prefer not to decide the  question in the present case.    For the reasons given above, we would dismiss the  appeal with costs.                                      Appeal dismissed. (1) (1905) I.L.R. 30 Bombay 275. (2) (1929) I.L.R. 32  Allahabad 96. 980