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PETITIONER: STATE OF PUNJAB

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K.   R. ERRY & SOBHAG RAI MEHTA(With Connected Appeal)

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/09/1973

BENCH: PALEKAR, D.G. BENCH: PALEKAR, D.G. SHELAT, J.M. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN DWIVEDI, S.N. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.

CITATION:  1973 AIR  834            1973 SCR  (2) 405  1973 SCC  (1) 120  CITATOR INFO :  R          1974 SC  87  (11)  F          1976 SC 667  (3,4,5)  RF         1976 SC 676  (12)  R          1978 SC 803  (30)  R          1987 SC 943  (8)

ACT: Punjab   Pension  Rules-R.  6.4-Natural   justice-Government imposing cut in pension-Allegation of it-regularities  while in  Service-Requirement of reasonable opportunity  of  being heard.

HEADNOTE: Rule  6.4 of the Punjab Pension Rules provides "6.4 (a)  The full pension admissible under the rule is not to be given as a matter of course, or unless the service rendered has  been really approved. (b)  If  the service has not been  thoroughly  satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the pension should make  reduction in the amount as it thinks proper. The  respondents  were  employed  in  the  service  of   the appellant  State.  On their retirement the State  government imposed  a cut in their pension and in the gratuity  amount. It was alleged by the State government that the officers had committed  major irregularities and that the records of  the officers  showed  that  their  career  were  not  altogether satisfactory.    Thereupon   the  respondents   filed   writ petitions  in  the  High Court  contending  that  pensionary benefit  with  the  right  to  superannuation  pension  were property  to which the officers by reason of  their  service were entitled as a matter of right and therefore they  could not be deprived of any part of that property without notices to  show cause why the cut should not be imposed.  The  High Court quashed the orders imposing the cut.  It held that the right  to superannuation pension was a right vested  in  the government  servant and before that right  is  prejudicially affected  he is entitled to a notice to show  cause  against the  proposed  cut,  In  the appeal to  this  Court  it  was conceded on behalf of the St-ate government that in view  of

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the  decisions  of this Court in Deokinandan Prasad  v.  The State  of  Bihar and Others [1971] 2 S.C.C. 330  it  was  no longer open to contend that a pension was a bounty.  But  it was  contended  that the order of the  State  government  in applying the cut was an administrative order under rule  6.4 of the Pension Roles and therefore, the State government was not  liable  to  issue a notice to show  cause  against  the proposed cut.  It was pointed out that the St-ate government had  in  its  possession the  confidential  records  of  the officers and on consideration of the same it was open to  it reduce the pens-ion in its discretion. Dismissing the appeals, HELD:     The State government could not have applied a  cut in  the  pensions  of the officers  without  giving  them  a reasonable opportunity to make their defence.  Where a  body or  authority  is judicial or where it has. to  determine  a matter  involving  rights judicially because of  express  or implied  provisions  of principles of natural  justice  audi alteram  partem  applies.   Where a  body  or  authority  is characteristically  administrative the principle of  natural justice is also liable to be invoked if the decision of that body  or authority affects individual rights  or  interests, and  having regard to the particular situation it  would  be unfair  for  the  body or authority not to  have  allowed  a reasonable opportunity to be heard. [413C] 406 Advani & Ors. [1950] S.C.R. 621 (725); Board of High  School JUDGMENT: Gupta and Ors. [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 36; State of Orissa v. Dr.  (Miss) Biapani Dei & Ors., [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625; In  re. R.K.  (An Infant) [1967] 2 Q.B.D. 617; A. K. Kraipak &  Ors. v.  Union of India & Ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457 and Cooper  v. Wandsworth  Board of Works [1963] 14 C.D.N.S. 180,  referred to. M.   Narasimachar  v.  The State of Mysore, [1960] 1  S.C.R. 981, distinguished.

& CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1893- 1894 of 1967. Appeals  by  certificate from the judgment and  order  dated October  25, 1966 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh  in Civil  Writs  Nos. 504 of 1964- and 723 of  1965  and  Civil Appeal No. 735 of 1968. Appeal by certificate from the order dated March 8. 1967  of the Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in L.P.A.  No. 66 of 1967. V.   C.  Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the  appellant  (in all the appeals). Bhimsena Rao and S. Ramachandran, for the respondent (in C.   A. No. 735/68). B. R. Agrawala, for the respondent (in C. A. No. 1893/67). Respondent appeared in person (in C. A. No. 1894,/67). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- PALEKAR, J.-These appeals raise, a common question of law as to  whether the State Government is entitled to  reduce  the amount  of  pension  and gratuity  legally  payable  to  its officers on their superannuation without giving a reasonable opportunity  to  the  officers to  show  cause  against  the proposed reduction. In the first case the officer concerned is Shri K. R.  Erry. He  joined  the  Punjab  P.W.D.  Irrigation  Branch  as   an Assistant Engineer in 1926.  In due course he was posted  as

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a  Central  Designs  Officer and remained  attached  to  the Central  Designs  Office  first in the  capacity  of  Deputy Director  from  6-11-1951  to  30-4-1952  and  then  as   an Executive Engineer (Designs) from 1-5-1952 to 1-11-1955.  He was  promoted  from P.S.E. Class II to P.S.E. Class  I  with effect  from  22-9-1954 and was confirmed  as  an  Executive Engineer with effect from 12-8-1956.  Early in 1958, he  was promoted  to  the  rank  of  an  officiating  Superintending Engineer and was posted as Director of Central Designs.   In November, 1958 407 he   retired   from   service  on  reaching   the   age   of superannuation.   Shortly, thereafter he was reappointed  by the Government as a Professor and Head of the Department  of Civil   Engineering  in  the  Punjab  Engineering   College, Chandigarh,  which  post he held for about 16  months.   The question  of his pension was taken up by the  Government  in the normal routine and on 29-7-1963, Government informed him that  though he was entitled to a superannuation pension  of Rs. 423.05 n.p. per month and death-cum-retirement  gratuity of  Rs. 16,320/- the Government was pleased to impose a  cut of 20% in the pension and Rs. 2,000/- in the gratuity amount under Rule 6.4 of the Punjab, Civil Services Pension  Rules, since, in the opinion of the Government, the service  record of  Shri Erry was not satisfactory.  It is an admitted  fact that  before  this cut was applied Shri Erry  had  not  been furnished  the grounds nor had he been given an  opportunity to show cause against the-proposed cut. The  second case also runs on parallel lines.   The  officer concerned  is Shri Sobhag Rai Mehta.  He joined  the  Punjab Irrigation  Department as a temporary Engineer in  1939  and was  confirmed as Assistant Engineer in P.S.E. Class  II  in 1946.   He  was  promoted  to  P.S.E.  Class  I  and  as  an officiating Executive Engineer in 1949.  After a few  months he  was reverted as S.DO. as he was declared unsuitable  for the promotion by the Punjab Public Service Commission.   Two years  thereafter  i.e.  in 1951 he was  again  promoted  as Officiating Executive Engineer and confirmed as an Executive Engineer  with  effect  from 1-9-1956.   Thereafter  he  was promoted  as  an Officiating  Superintending  Engineer  with effect from 12-3-1959 and earned a year’s increment.  On 12- 12-1960  he  attained  the age of  superannuation.   As  his pension  papers  were not finalized soon thereafter  he  was allowed to draw anticipatory pension in the sum of Rs. 190/- per  month and Rs. 6,158/- as death-cum-retirement  gratuity pending final disposal of his case.  On 4-7-1964  Government decided that whereas the pension admissible to him under the rules  was Rs. 211.35 n.p. per month along  with  death-cum- retirement  gratuity  of  Rs. 8,211/- it  was  necessary  to impose  a  cut of 15% in his pension under rule  64  of  the Punjab  Civil  Service  Rules,  as in  the  opinion  of  the Government  the  service  record  of  Shri  Mehta  was   not satisfactory.  His pension was thus reduced from Rs.  211.35 n.p.  to  Rs. 179.60 per month.  It is admitted  that  while applying the cut to the pension, no opportunity was given to Shri Mehta to show cause against the proposed cut. In  the third case the officer concerned was  Shri  Khaushal Singh.  He was appointed as an Agriculture Assistant in  the Punjab  Government  in 1926.  Thereafter, he worked  in  the Department of Agriculture in various capacities and  finally in 1955 he was promoted to the post of District  Agriculture Officer 408 which  was  P.A.S. Class 11 post.  He was confirmed  in  the post  of the District Agriculture Officer with  effect  from

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13-1-1958.   Shri Khaushal Singh also acted for sometime  as the Deputy Director of Agriculture before retirement on 10th November, 1960 on reaching the age of superannuation.  After his retirement the Accountant General, Punjab calculated and declared  that  he was entilled under the rules to  be  paid pension of Rs. 175.50 np. per month and death-cum-retirement gratuity amounting to Rs. 5,589/-.  But on 7-10-1963 he  was informed  that his pension had been reduced from Rs.  175.50 to Rs. 160/- per month and the amount of  death-cum-gratuity of Rs. 5,589/- had been forfeited by the Punjab  Government. In  this case also it is admitted that Shri  Khaushal  Singh had not been given any notice to show cause ’why his pension should  not  be  reduced  or  death-cum-retirment   gratuity forfeited. In  all these three cases the aggrieved officer  filed  writ petitions  in the High Court of Punjab at  Chandigarh.   The principal contention was that pensionary benefits, with  the right  to  superannuation pension, which,  it  is  admitted, included death-cum-retirement gratuity under the rules, were property  to which the officers by reason of  their  service were  entitled  as  a matter of right.  They  could  not  be deprived of any part of that property without notice to show cause why the cut should not be imposed. The  contention on behalf of the State was  that  pensionary benefits  were in the nature of a bounty and under rule  6.4 clauses  (a)  &  (b)  of the  Punjab  Civil  Services  Rules (Pension  Rules) it was open to the Government to  impose  a cut, if in the opinion of the Government, the service record of  the  officers was not thoroughly satisfactory.   It  was also  contended  that  the order imposing  the  cut  was  an administrative order and the Government was not,  therefore, bound to give notice to the officers about the proposed cut. The  writ petitions of Shri Erry and Shri Mehta  were  heard together by a full bench of the High Court and were disposed of by a common judgment on October 25, 1966.  The High Court held  by majority that the right to  superannuation  pension was a right vested in the Government servant and before that right  is prejudicially affected he is entitled to a  notice to  show  cause against the proposed cut.  In view  of  that finding the orders imposing the cut were quashed. The  Writ Petition filed by Shri Khaushal Singh came on  for hearing before a single Judge of the High Court on  December 22, 1966.  The learned Judge held that the case was  covered by  the decision of the full bench in the, above  two  cases and the only 409 order  he  could pass was to quash the order  by  which  the State  Government had imposed the cut in his  pension.   The State of Punjab went in appeal to the Division Bench of that court but, as was to be expected, that appeal was  dismissed in limini on 8-3-1967. The present three appeals are filed by the State  Government challenging the view taken by the full bench. Much  of  the  argument  which  would  have  been  otherwise addressed  to  us has been cut short by a decision  of  this Court  in  Deokinandan  Prasad v. The  State  of  Bihar  and Others(1).   It  was  a petition under  Article  32  of  the Constitution by which the petitioner maintained that  denial of  pension  was an infringement of his  fundamental  rights under   Article   31(1)  and  Article  19(1)  (f)   of   the Constitution.   This Court held that the right of a  Govern- ment  servant to receive pension is property  under  Article 31(1)  and by a mere executive order the State did not  have the  power to withhold the same.  It was also held that  the claim to pension was property under Article 19(1)(f) and was

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not saved by sub-Article 5 of Article 19.  In coming to this decision  a  number of cases of the Punjab High  Court  were referred to and the view taken by that court in Shri  Erry’s case,  which is now in appeal before us’ was affirmed.   Mr. Mahajan  who  appeared  before us on  behalf  of  the  State conceded that in view of the decision in Deokinandan’s  case it  was no longer open to him to contend that pension was  a bounty. Mr. Mahajan, however, contended that the order of the  State Government  in applying the cut was an administrative  order under  rule  6.4 of the Pension Rules and,  therefore,  the, State  Government was not liable to issue a notice  to  show cause against the proposed cut.  It was pointed out that the State  Government  had in, its possession  the  Confidential records of the officers, and on a consideration of the  same it  was open to it to reduce the pension in its  discretion. It  was  alleged  in the written statements  filed  in  the, petitions  that  their  official careers  were  not  without blemish, that there were ups and downs in their service  and all  these matters were considered by the  State  Government before  applying  the  cut.   It  was  conceded  that  these officers  earned promotions and increments in due course  of their service but it was submitted that did not prevent  the State Government from applying the cut to the pension if, on a  consideration  of  the official career as  a  whole,  the officers were not entitled to unqualified approbation. Rule 6.4 of the Punjab Pension Rules is as follows :               "6. 4(a) The full pension admissible under the               (1)   [1971] (2) S.C.C. 330.               410               rule is not to be given as a matter of course,               or unless the service rendered has been really               approved.               (b)   If  the service has not been  thoroughly               satisfactory,  the authority  sanctioning  the               pension  should  make such  reduction  in  the               amount as it thinks proper." There are five notes appended to this rule.  But we are  not concerned  with  the  same  in  dealing  with  the   general principle. Some indication was given in the written statements field on behalf of the State suggesting that the careers of the three officers  were not thoroughly satisfactory.  In the case  of Shri Erry it was alleged that he had prepared the design  of the  Ghaggar  Syphon and when the same  was  constructed  in accordance  with  the  design, a defect  was  discovered  to remedy which the Government had to spend an extra amount  of rupees seven lakhs.  The State Government was of the opinion that the defect was in the design and not the  construction. So  far as this allegation is concerned Shri Erry has  given an, answer.  According to him the design for the Syphon  was prepared  by him under the able supervision and guidance  of his  superiors viz.  Shri Handa who was the Chief  Engineer, Bhakra Canals and Shri R. K. Gupta, Chief Engineer, who held charge of the post of Director, Central Designs.  Both these officers  had signed the design in token of its  correctness and approval.  Shri Erry himself was not concerned with  the later  construction  in  accordance with  the  design.   The construction   was   entrusted   to  Shri   A.   G.   Kalha, Superintending Engineer, Bhakra Main Line and his allegation was that it was a constructional defect which caused loss to the Government and not the design.  The matter was  actually investigated by a ’Committee of Enquiry’ which consisted  of three  Chief Engineers presided over by Shri S. D.  Khunger, I.S.E. General Manager, Bhakra Dam, and in the view of  that

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Committee  the  defect  was not in the  design  but  in  the construction.  That finding was questioned by Shri Kalha and thereupon  the Government set up a  high-powered  Commission presided over by Mr. Justice Dulat.  Mr. Justice Dulat held, contrary  to the finding of the Committee of  Enquiry,  that the  damage to the Ghaggar Syphon was due to  faulty  design and  not due to faulty construction.  The complaint of  Shri Erry  is  that  in  the  enquiry  before  the   high-powered Commission  of Mr. Justice Dulat he was not. even called  to explain  how his design was right and the  construction  was wrong.   Moreover, he contended it was wrong on the face  of it to hold him responsible for the design when, in fact  the design  was not the sole creation of Shri Erry but  also  of the two high officers Shri Handa and Shri Gupta who 411      had specifically examined and approved the design.   It is the grievance of Shri Erry that while these two  officers had  retired  and had been given their full pension  it  was wrong  to blame Shri Erry for the defect, if  any.   Indeed, the  High  Court  could  not  possibly  have  undertaken  an investigation  into the blameworthiness of Shri Erry in  the Writ  Petition.  But it is obvious that the finding  of  Mr. Justice  Dulat that there was a fault in the design and  not in the construction was a finding arrived at without  giving an opportunity to the petitioner to explain. In other words. if  the  defect  in the design of the Syphon  was  the  sole reason  for making a cut in the pension, Shri Erry would  be justified  in his contention that Such a finding would  have been  appropriate only if his explanation had been  obtained by Mr. Justice Dulat in the Course of the enquiry or by  the State Government before the cut was imposed. So far as  Shri Mehta is concerned the State Government also gave  an  indication  indication in para  5  of  its written statement  that Shri Mehta was involved   involved  ill Some official irregularities and these had attracted the comments of the Public Accounts Committee.  We do not know what  were the  findings  and whether those findings were  arrived   at after notice to Shri Mehta. So far the third officer namely Khaushal Singh is  concerned Government  stated in para 4 of its written  statement  that the  State Government  had Suffered a loss of  Rs. 11,399.50 p.  on account of irrecoverable   fertilizer loss  issued by Shri Khaushal Singh to bogus persons and also a further loss of Rs. 12,770,/- on account of irregularities   committed by the petitioner in the purchase of seed in the year 1959.  It does not appear that the State Government had instituted any enquiry  into  these losses with a view to  bring  home  the guilt to Shri Khaushal Singh. The  above allegations in respect of all the three  officers concerned  are undoubtedly serious.  But they have  remained mere  allegations.   The officers could have  been  properly charged  for  their delinquency.  This was not  done  either when  they  were in service  or  after  they  retired.  Were these  matters taken into account, as the  State  Government claims  to  have done before the imposition of the  cut,  it would  have beer) fair to have given an opportunity  to  the officers to put forward their defence before depriving  them of a large share in their pensionable benefits which. as we have already seen, are not mere bounty but property to which they were entitled. It  was also alleged by the State Government in the  written statements  that apart from the major defaults  referred  to above.  the  records of all the three officers  showed  that their careers were nor altogether satisfactory and here  and there were draw

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9--L498Sup.Cl/73 412 that  he was not allowed to cross the efficiency bar  for  a year  in  1953  and in the case of Shri Mehta  he  had  been superseded by his juniors on a number of occasions.  At  the same  time it cannot be ignored that in spite of some  small set backs here and there in their long official career these officers  earned  promotions and were selected on  merit  to fill  high  offices.   Shri Erry  started  as  an  Assistant Engineer in Class It service and in due course was  promoted as Executive Engineer in Class I service.  At the end of his career  lie was appointed as a Superintending Engineer,  the post being a selection post.  Similar is the case with  Shri Mehta.  The latter has pointed out that as early as 6-4-1951 Government had framed rules for the preparation of a ranking list  in respect of the selection posts and under the  rules no  person could get a selection post unless he was fit  and his  record of service was satisfactory.  He contended  that the   very   fact  that  he  got  the  selection   post   of Superintending Engineer on 11-3-1959 showed that he was  fit and his record of service was satisfactory. Shri  Khaushal  Singh started his career as  an  Agriculture Assistant  in  1927  in class III Service and  in  1955  was promoted  to  a  class 11 post and  appointed  the  District Agriculture Officer. He was confirmed in that post and  also officiated   for   sometime  as  the  Deputy   Director   of Agriculture.  When the career of an officer is assessed as a whole the fact that an officer, though with some impediments in  his long career, has obtained Successive  promotions  to higher  and  yet higher posts may well  raise  the  question whether  the State Government, at the time of  granting  him pension which is normally determined by the years of service and the last pay he receives at the end of his career, would be entitled to forfeit rights acquired by length of  service on  the ground that faults, which, at the time, were  either overlooked or condoned had now become so rave as to justify punishing him by inflicting a severe cut in the pension.  It is not necessary for us to deal with this point here  except to suggest that this aspect of the case could well have been urged  by the officers before the Government if  notice  had been  issued to them to show cause against the proposed  cut and the State Government would have had necessarily to apply its mind to that question. In  short it must be conceded that though the State  Govern- ment  may  have had some material before it for  imposing  a penalty by way of a cut in the pension it had failed to give a  reasonable  opportunity to the officers  to  put  forward their  defence  or facts in extenuation before the  cut  was imposed.   The case of Ridge v. Baldwin(1) comes to mind  in this connection.  Baldwin who was the Chief Constable of the borough police force was prose- (1) [1964] A.C. 40. 413 cuted  on grave charges.  Donovan J, the trial  Judge  made, while  acquitting  him, some observations  about  his  moral incompetence  to  afford  leadership to  the  police  force. Acting on this severe criticism by a Judge of the High Court the  Watch  Committee. entitled under Section  191.  of  the Municipal  Corporations Act 1882 to dismiss him on a  charge of  unfitness, dismissed him from service.   This  dismissal practically  at  the  end of his  official  career  had  the consequence  of depriving him of his pension.  The House  of Lords  held  that  the order had to  be  set  aside  because Baldwin  was not afforded an opportunity to defend  himself, though   the  statute  itself  did  not  require  any   such

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opportunity being given. The question for our consideration now is whether the orders imposing  a cut in the pension should be set aside  for  the reason   that  the  officers  were  not   given   reasonable opportunity  to show cause.  The law on the point is not  in doubt.   Where a body or authority is judicial or  where  it has  to  determine  a  matter  involving  rights  judicially because  of express or implied provision, the  principle  of natural justice audi ailteram partem applies.  See  Province of  Bombay  v. Kusaldas S. Advani & others(1) and  Board  of High  School  & Intermediate Education,  U.P.  Allahabad  v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta and others (2).  With the  proliferation of  administrative decisions in the welfare State it is  now further  recognised  by courts both in En-land and  in  this country, (especially after the decision of House of Lords in Ridge   v.  Baldwi  that  where  a  body  or  authority   is characteristically  administrative the principle of  natural justice is also liable to be invoked if the decision of that body  or authority affects individual rights  of  interests. and  having regard to the particular situation it  would  be unfair  for  the  body or authority not to  have  allowed  a reasonable  opportunity to be heard.  See : State of  Orissa v.  Dr.  Binapani  Dei  &  Ors.(3)  and  In  re  H.  K.  [An Infant(4)].  In the former case it was observed it page  628 as follows               "An  order by the State to the prejudice of  a               person in derogation of his vested rights  may               be  made  only in accordance  with  the  basic               rules of justice and fair play.  The  deciding               authority. it is true, is not in the  position               of  a  Judge called upon to decide  an  action               between   contesting   parties,   and   strict               compliance   with   the  forms   of   judicial               procedure  may  not be insisted upon.   He  is               however  under  a  duty  to  give  the  person               against   whom   ’in  enquiry   is   held   an               opportunity  to set up his version or  defence               and an opportunity to correct or to controvert               any   evidence  in  the  possession   of   the               authority               (1) [1950] S.C.R. 621 (725)               (2)   [1962] Sup. (3) S.C.R. 3.               (3)   [1967] (2) S.C.R. 625.               (4)  [1967] 2 Q.B.D. 617.               414               which  is  sought  to be relied  upon  to  his               prejudice.    For  that  purpose  the   person               against  whom  an  enquiry  is  held  must  be               informed of the case he is called upon to meet               and the evidence in support thereof.  The rule               that  a party to whose prejudice an  order  is               intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing               applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies               of   persons   invested  with   authority   to               adjudicate upon matters involving civil conse-               quences.   It is one of the fundamental  rules               of  Our  Constitutional  set  up  that  ever),               citizen  is  protected  against  exercise   of               arbitrary  authority  by  the  State  or   its               officers.    Duty  to  act  judicially   would               therefore  arise from the very nature  of  the               function  intended  to be performed;  it  need               not  be shown to be super-added.  If there  is               power to decide and determine to the prejudice               of  a  person,  duty  to  act  judicially   is

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             implicit  in the exercise of such  power.   If               the  essentials of justice be ignored  and  an               order to the prejudice of a person is made the               order is  nullity.  That is a basic concept of               the   rule  of  law  and  importance   thereof               transcends  the significance of a decision  in               any particular case."               These observations were made with reference to               an  authority  which  could  be  described  as               characteristically administrative. page 630 it               was observed :                "It is true that the order is  administrative               in character, but even an administrative order               which  involves civil consequences as  already               stated,  must  be made consistently  with  the               rules  of natural justice after informing  the               first respondent of the case of the State, the               evidence  in support thereof and after  giving               an  opportunity  to the  first  respondent  of               being  heard  and meeting  Or  explaining  the               evidence." This case And the English case in re H. K. (An Infant)  were specifically referred to with approval in a decision of  the constitution  bench of this Court in A. K. Kraipak  &  Ors.. etc. v. Union of India & Ors(1). It is, therefore, clear that the State in the case of  these three  officers could not have applied a cut in the  pension of the officers without giving them a reasonable opportunity to make their defense. The rule which declares that even  an administrative  authority has to act fairly after giving  an opportunity to the person rights and interests are  affected by  its decision is no more than an extension of  the  well- known  rule  which courts in England had recognised  in  the 19th century.  In Cooper v. Wandsworth (1)  [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457. 415 Board  of  Works(1) the Board, which had, under the  Act  of 1855, the authority to demolish any building constructed  if the owner thereof had failed to give proper notice, was held bound to give the owner an opportunity of being heard before the  demolition, It was contended in that case by the  Board that their discretion to order demolition was not a judicial discretion.  But the court decided unanimously in favour  of the owner.  Erle C. J. held that the power was subject to  a qualification  repeatedly recognised that no mean is  to  be deprived  of his property without his having an  opportunity of  being  heard. and that this had been  applied  "to  many exercises  of power which in common understanding would  not be  at all a more judicial proceeding than would be the  act of  the  district  board in ordering a house  to  be  pulled down." Wills.  J. observed: "that the rule was of  universal application,  and  founded upon the plainest  principles  of justice."  In  the  case before us the  officers  are  being deprived of part of their property by applying a cut to  the pension.  Therefore, it was quite essential in all  fairness and  elementary  justice that they should  have  been  given reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. Reference was made on behalf of the State to M. Narasimha v. The  State  of  Mysore(2)  and  particularly  the  following observations at page 889.  "Next the appellant contends that as  his  pension  has been reduced  to  two-thirds,  he  was entitled to notice in view of the provisions of Art.  311(2) of  the  Constitution,  before  the  Government  decided  to inflict that punishment on him and that this was not done in

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the notice dated December 30, 1954.     It is enough to  say that this contention is also baseless. Article    311    (2) does not deal with the question of pension at all; it  deals with  three situations, namely (i) dismissal, (ii)  removal, and  (iii) reduction in rank.  The appellant says  that  the reduction  in  pension is equivalent to reduction  in  rank. All that we need say is that reduction in rank applies to  a case of a public servant who is expected to serve after  the reduction.  It has ’nothing to do with reduction of pension, which  is  specifically  provided for in  Art.  302  of  the Regulations.  That article says that if the service has  not been  thoroughly satisfactory the authority sanctioning  the pension  should  make  such reduction in the  amount  as  it thinks  proper.  There is a Note under this  article,  which says that ’,he full pension admissible under the Regulations is  not to be given as a matter of course but rather  to  be treated  as  a  matter of distinction.  It  was  under  this article  that  the  Government acted  when  it  reduced  the pension to two-thirds. Reduction in person being a matter of discretion with the Government, it carrier therefore be said that it committed any breach of the Result (1) [1863] 14 C,13,N.S,. 180. (2) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 416 in  reducing  the  pension  of  the  appellant."  Particular reference was made to the last two or three sentences in the above  observations  for  the  contention  that  payment  of pension was a matter of discretion with the Government.   It is enough to say that the question did not arise in the case as  to whether pension is bounty or property. In  that  case the  appellant M. Narasimhachar had been charged in  respect of seven irregularities committed by him when he held  the post.   An  enquiry was held and six of  the  irregularities were found proved. A final notice was served on him  to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired and 50 %  of his  pension should not be adjusted towards the amount  clue from him on account of the shortage caused by the  irregula- rities.  He did not show cause.  In the meantime he  reached the age of superannuation and the Government passed an order directing  that he be retired from service from the date  on which had reached superannuation and given a reduced  pinion of  two-thirds to which he would be ordinarily  entitled  in view  of  the irregularities committed by him.  One  of  his contentions was that Article 311(2) applied to his case and, therefore,  lie was entitled to a notice before his  pension was  reduced  to two-thirds.  To that the  answer  was  that Article  311(2) did not apply to him and. under Article  302 of the Regulations his pension was liable to be reduced  Lit Government’s  discretion.   He had known  what  the  charges there  against  him and what punishment was proposed  to  be inflicted upon him.  Therefore, lie was not in a position to come that his pension was reduced without notice to him. In  the  result we hold that the three writ  petitions  were correctly  decided  by the High Court and the  appeals  must fail.  They are dismissed with costs. K. B. N.                  Appeals dismissed. 417