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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BAKHSHISH SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       05/05/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA.

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R                   THE 5TH DAY OF MAY, 1997 Present,                Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswamy                Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.P.Wadhwa A.S. Sohal, Adv. for R.S. Sodhi, Adv. for the  appellants.                          O R D E R The following order of the Court was delivered:      Though all  steps have been taken to ensure the service of  notice,  the  respondent  could  not  be  contacted  for service.   Even the  last know  address was tapped to effect the service; but  that has also proved abortive. Under these circumstances, notice must be deemed to have been served.      Leave granted.      The respondent,   who  was a  Constable in  the  police service of  the state of Punjab,  absented himself from duty for a  long period,  i.e., from November 7, 1986 to March 1, 1988, without  any leave.   As a result, disciplinary action was conducted.   The  disciplinary authority on the basis of finding of dereliction  of non-reporting for duty, dismissed him from  service. The  ci trial  court dismissed  the  suit filed by  the respondent.   On  appeal, the  first appellate Court   remanded the   matter  for   reconsideration  by the trial court on the point of punishment.  The  High Court has dismissed the  Second Appeal  No. 155/96  summarily  by  its judgment and  order dated  August  21,  1996.    Thus,  this appeal by special leave.      The  appellate court recorded the finding as under:      "I have  gone   through the   above      authorities   and    am   of    the      considered opinion   that  although      the  plaintiff     was   admittedly      guilty of  misconduct in  absenting      himself but misconduct could not be      classified as  the gravest  act  of      misconduct within  the  meaning  of      the  sub-rule.     The   contention      appears to  be well-founded.  It is      true that,  generally speaking,  it      is for  the punishing  authority to

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    determine   the    seriousness   of      punishment and it is not within the      ambit of  the powers  of this Court      to interfere with the direction  of      the authority.  But then there rule      and that  is that  the  court  will      strike down  an order    which  has      been     passed  illegal  only  and      arbitrarily. In  the present  case,      it was  incumbent on the punishment      of dismissal,  to come to a finding      that the  misconduct attributed  to      the respondent  was a  ’gravest act      of misconduct’.   It  is  true that      in  the   context  in   which  that      expression is used it does not mean      an act  of misconduct  and means,on      the other  hand, an  act denoting a      very high  degree of  misconduct as      opposed to a merely grave or a very      grave act  of misconduct.  But then      it appears that the defendants when      awarding   the punishment  were not      alive to the provisions of the sub-      rule otherwise  he would  not  only      not have  awarded the punishment of      dismissal  without   coming  to   a      finding   that    the    misconduct      attributed to the respondent was of      the Gravest  type but  would at all      for the reasons that the misconduct      even though  grave was  not of  the      Gravest type.   The lack of finding      about the  misconduct being of thre      requisite tupe  makes the  impugned      order  arbitrary   in  nature  and,      therefore, liable to be quashed."      It is  settled  legal  position  that  it  is  for  the disciplinary authority  to pass appropriate punishment;  the civil Court  cannot substitutte  its own view to that of the disciplinary as  well as  appellate  authority on the nature of the  punishment  to  be  imposed  upon  the    delinquent officer.   In view  of the   finding  of the appellant Court that it is a grave misconduct, the appellate Court ought not to have  interfered with the decree of the trial Court.  The High Court  dismissed it without application of the mind and ignoring the settled legal principles.      The appeal  is accordingly  allowed.  The orders of the High Court and the appellate Court stand set aside  and that of the  trial Court stands  confirmed  No. costs.