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PETITIONER: STATE OF PUNJAB (NOW HARYANA) AND, ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AMAR SINGH AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/01/1974

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. PALEKAR, D.G. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR  994            1974 SCC  (4) 305  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC1952  (6,7)  RF         1992 SC 248  (53)

ACT: Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953) Ss.10A  and 18--Scope of Interpretation of Statutes.

HEADNOTE: Section  10A(B) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures  Act, 1953, provides that no transfer or other disposition of land which  is  comprised  in a surplus area [as  defined  in  s. 2(5a)],  at  the commencement of the Act, shall  affect  the utilization thereof for the resettlement of ejected tenants; and  s. 10A(C) provides that for the purpose of  determining the  surplus area, any judgment, decree or order of a  court or other authority,which diminishes the surplus are  a,shall be  ignored.   Under the Act, land owners who  had  land  in excess   of  the  ’permissible  area’  could   reserve   for themselves lands to the extent of the permissible area;  and the rest, excluding the permissible area of the tenants, was the surplus area of the landowner.  Section 18 provides that a tenant, who has been in continuous occupation of the  land comprised  in his tenancy for a minimum period of  6  years, shall  be entitled to purchase from the landowner, the  land so held by him. At  the  commencement  of  the Act  on  April  15,  1953,  a landowner  owned three items of property which did not  form part  of her reserved area.  One of the items was under  her self-cultivation while there were tenants on the other  two. Those  tenants  later gave up possession and  abandoned  the lands.   The  landowner made a gift of the 3  items  to  her daughter, who sold them to her husband and his brother,  the 1st   and  2nd  respondents  respectively.   The   Collector (Surplus  Area), while determining the surplus area  of  the landowner,  ignored the gifts and sales, and included the  3 items  in  the landowner’s surplus  area.   The  respondents appealed  to  the Commissioner.  They also  applied  to  the Assistant  Collector under s. 18, for purchase of the  lands in  their possession on the ground of continuous  occupation for 6 years.  The applications were allowed on the basis  of a  compromise between the applicants (respondents)  and  the

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landowner,  and  the  respondents paid  the  purchase  price determined  by  the Assistant Collector.  On  the  basis  of those purchase orders the Commissioner, set aside the  order of the Collector (Surplus Area) declaring the surplus   area of  the  landowner,  and directed him to  inquire  into  the matter afresh.  The collector    [the Asstt.  Collector  who had  allowed  the purchases by the respondents had  by  then become  Collector (Surplus Area)] thereupon  determined  the surplus area of the landowner under s. 10A(c).  He, however, held  that  the  leases  granted  to  the  respondents  were collusive  and that the orders of purchase under S. 18  were ineffective,   and  included  the  3  items  again  in   the landowner’s surplus area. The High Court allowed the Writ Petitions of the respondents on  the  ground that the authority acting  under  s.  10A(c) could not ignore the purchase orders passed under s. 18. Allowing the appeals to this Court, HELD  :  Per  Palekar and Krishna  lyer,  JJ.  (Sarkaria  J. dissenting)  :  1(a) The public policy of S. 10A  cannot  be outwitted  by  consent  orders  calculated  to  defeat   the provision, and, without the statutory authority charged with the  inquiry  being  satisfied about the  bonafides  of  and eligibility for, the purchase. [175G] When  high public policy finds expression  in  socioeconomic legislation  contractual  arrangements  between   interested individuals,  sanctified into consent or compromise  decrees or orders cannot be binding on the instrumentalities of  the State  called  upon  to enforce the  statute,  although  the tribunals,  enjoined to enforce the law, may take  probative note   of  the  recitals  in  such  compromise  or   consent statements  in  proof of facts on which  their  jurisdiction depends.  Neither the materials on 153 record  in  the  present  case,  nor  the  recitals  in  the compromise,  disclose the application of the judicial  mind. [174C] (b)  It was found by the Collector (Surplus Area)  that  the leases  in question have been collusively got up to  dwindle the surplus area of the landowner and that the landowner had conspired with her son-in-law and big brother to retain  the area  in contravention of the law.  Further, S.  18  applies only  to  persons who are legally tenants.  In  the  present case’  the lease was granted by the landowner after  gifting the property to her daughter.  Also, the section requires  6 years continuous occupation by the tenant; but the Collector found  that the respondents had not completed the period  at the  time  of their application under S. 18.  The  order  in fact  is  thus  a  nullity.   Therefore,  it  could  not  be contended  that  the  orders of purchase in  favour  of  the respondents passed by the concerned officer under S. 18  had become  final and not having been set aside bind  the  other authority determining the surplus area. (c)  There  is no provision in s. 18 to give notice  to  the Collector  who  is to declare the surplus area and  so,  the State  (represented  by  the Collector),  which  is  vitally concerned   in  the  resettlement  of  ejected  tenants   by utilising  the surplus area, has no opportunity  to  present its case against the fraudulent character of the proceedings under s. 18 before the Assistant Collector.  The State,  not being a party to that order, in any case, cannot be bound by it,  whatever  may be the effect as between the  parties  to those proceedings.  Since the State is not a party it has no right of appeal or review.[172B] (2)  The authority under s. 10A may ignore the order of  the authority under s. 18.

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(a) There is an apparent conflict between Ss. 10 and 18  and the  basic judicial approach should be to harmonise the  two sections.   The major premise of statutory  construction  is that the rule of law must run close to the rule of life  and the court must read into an enactment, language  permitting, the  meaning  which promotes, the benignant  intent  of  the legislation  in  preference to the one  which  perverts  the scheme  of the statute.  The objects of the agrarian  reform underlying  the Act are : (a) to impart security of  tenure; (b) to make the tiller the owner; and (c) to trim large land holdings thus creating peasant proprietorships ensuring even distribution  of  land  ownership.  The  intendment  of  the statute is that reservation was to be made by a landowner to enable  self-cultivation,  and so,  landowners  could  eject tenants.   But,  since  agrarian  reform  must  promote  not eviction but security of tenure, it became necessary for the State  to create surplus area of a considerable  extent,  so that,  the  evicted tenants could be rehabilitated  on  such surplus lands, enjoying fixity of tenure and paying. rent to the owners.  The success of the scheme depends on preventing leakages  through private alienations, collusive awards  and decrees and the like, and so, care was taken in s. 10A(C) to interdict alienations and to ignore decrees and orders which diminished  the  surplus pool.  Such a  strategic  provision must  receive  a benignantly spacious  construction.  [160H, 161F, 157H] (b)  There  is no force in the contention that  the  benefit under s. 18 would be completely nullified and obliterated if s.  10A(c) were to prevail and apply to orders under s.  18. Though S. 10A(C) uses the words ’shall be ignored it is  not every  order under s. 18 that would have to be  ignored  but only  those orders which have the effect of diminishing  the surplus area.  The person who is entitled to purchase  under s. 18 is a person lawfully inducted on the land as a tenant. The cases under the section would be, (i) of tenants who are eligible  to  purchase  by  virtue  of  6  years  continuous occupation  of land in their permissible area, and  (ii)  of tenants resettled on surplus area of the landowner, after  6 years continuous occupation.  The purchase in the first case being  from  the tenant’s permissible area  is  outside  the surplus  area of the landowner and does not have the  effect of diminishing the landowner’s surplus area.  In the  second case,  the  purchase fulfils the object of  the  statute  of making  the  tiller  the  owner.   The  principal   category adversely affected would be post statutory collusive tenants and  perhaps  some  bonafide tenants, who,  however  do  not deserve   sympathy  since  they  damage  the  prospects   of displaced  persons  to  be  resettled.   Section  18(1)(iii) apparently contemplates purchase rights for persons who  had no  possession  when  the  Act  came  into  force,  but  the exception  was  made only in case of those persons  who  had been  deprived of their rights by unjust eviction  prior  to the Act coming into force. [169H-170D] 154 (3)  The purchase order by the Assistant Collector under  s. 18  was rightly ignored by the Collector (Surplus Area),  as ’other  authority’ in s. 10A(c) includes the officers  under s.  18.   The plain meaning of the sub-section is  that  any order by any authority which shrinks the surplus area of the landowner is invalid to the extent laid down in that clause, and  orders under s. 18, if they diminish the  surplus  area suffer the same fate.  The High Court was wrong in inferring from  the  statement  of objects  and  reasons  that  ’other authorities’  in  s.  10A(C) are arbitrators  or  such  like agencies and not authorities under the Act.  The objects and

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reasons  relating  to the clause of a bill may be  read  for finding  the  object  of  the law and  not  to  control  its amplitude.   The  purpose as revealed in  the  statement  of objects  is  that  the  legislature  wanted  to  ensure  the invulnerability of the surplus pool provision to attacks, by ignoring  judicial and quasi-judicial orders of every  sort. This  object  of s. 10A(C) cannot be  fulfilled  unless  the widest meaning were given to the expression ’court or  other authority’.  Nor is there any basis for truncating the ambit of  ’other  authority’.  ’Other authority’  is  every  other authority within or without the Act. [168F, 169B, 171A-B] (4)  Further, the expression ’transfer or other  disposition of  land’  in  s.  10A(b)  covers  leases,  which  by   very definition, are a species of transfer of land.  In the  pre- sent case, the lands in dispute fell outside the landowner’s reserved  area  and were therefore included in  her  surplus area.  The first respondent, to be entitled to be a  lessee, must prima facie show that the alienation in his favour,  as a  lessee,  does not violate s. 10A(b) which  prohibits  all transfers and other dispositions which diminish .the surplus area of the landowner.  Under s. 2(1), the word  ’landowner’ includes  also  the lessee and the permissible area  of  the tenant  is excluded from the surplus area of the  landowner. Merely  because of the outstanding leases in favour  of  the prior tenants at the commencement of the Act, the two  items which were earlier leased to tenants do not ipso facto  fall outside the surplus area of the landowner.  That would be so only  if they are comprised in the permissible area  of  the tenant on the relevant date but there is no evidence to that effect.  In relation to the prior tenants no such claim  has been  set  up  by  the  first  respondent,  and  the   first respondent was not a transferee from the prior tenants,  but a  de  novo  tenant.   After  the  prior  tenants  gave   up possession the lands came into the actual possession of  the landowner  and  the leases were extinguished.   It  follows, that one item was always in the possession of the  landowner and  other  two came into her possession subsequent  to  the coming  into  force of the Act, that those  three  items  of property  should  be  computed as part  of  the  landowner’s surplus area, and that s. 10A(b) operates to invalidate  the alleged  leases to the respondents, since they diminish  the surplus area of the landowner.  The respondents,  therefore, had   no   right,   as  tenants,  to   purchase   under   s. 18.[167D,167H-168D] (5)  It  could  not be contended that  even  if  leases  are prohibited  by  s. 10A(b) the sub-section  does  not  affect involuntary transfers and that since a purchase under  s.18, effects  an  involuntary transfer it is not affected  by  s. 10A(b).  The three subclauses of s. 10A, read together, show that  if  the  landowner,  by any act  or  omission  of  his suffered  a  diminution in the surplus area by  a  transfer, voluntary  or otherwise contrary to the right of  the  State Government to dispose of it, such a transfer is liable to be set  aside.   The expression ’transfer’ is  wide  enough  to cover transfers by operation of law, as in the present case, under  s. 18.  To uphold the contention of  the  respondents that  involuntary transfers are not affected would  stultify s.  10A  and the scheme of the statute  altogether  as  they would  diminish the available surplus area of  a  landowner. Moreover,  special  exclusion to save transfers  by  way  of inheritance  and  compulsory land acquisition by  the  State would  be  supererogatory  had  involuntary  transfers  been automatically excluded from s. 10A(b). [172H] The Court expressed the hope that land reform measures would be  quickly implemented, because, in the present case,  more

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than  a  score  of years notwithstanding  the  processes  of fixing reserved areas and surplus areas’ on the strength  of which alone confirment of proprietary rights on tenants  and resettlement  of a ejected tenants could proceed, are  still lingering. [176C] Mam Rai v. State of Punjab I.L.R. (1969) 2 Pun. & Har.  680; 682-683, over-ruled. 155 Chari v. Seshadri [1973] 1 S.C.C. 761, Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat  [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi v. K. L.  Bansal [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048 and Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal [1970] 3 S.C.C. 181, refeffed to. Per Sarkaria J. (dissenting) (1)  (a) The Collector (Surplus Area) would be  entitled  to ignore  the  order  of the Asstt.   Collector  under  S.  18 independently of s. 10A of the Act if the order based on the compromise  is  void  and  a nullity.  But  if  it  is  only voidable  or erroneous, it could be avoided only by  way  of appeal  review  or  revision or in  other  appropriate  pro- ceedings,  known  to law and the  Collector  (Surplus  Area) could  go behind it only when it is so set aside, or if  the provisions of s. 10A entitle him to do so. (b) An order is null and void if the quasi-judicial tribunal passing it lacks inherent jurisdiction over the parties  and the  subject  matter.  In the present  case,  the  Assistant Collector  who made the order under s. 18 was duly  invested with  jurisdiction under the section.  The respondents  were tenants   and  merely  because-they  were  related  to   the landowner they could not be denied the rights and privileges under the Act.  The allegations in the purchase  application about the applicants’ being in continuous occupation of  the lands  comprised in their tenancy for the requisite  Period, coupled  with admission by the landowner in the  compromise, furnished  sufficient  material on the basis  of  which  the authority  could have been satisfied about the existence  of all the facts essential for the exercise of his jurisdiction under s. 18. [191F, 192E] (c)  It  is  not correct to say, that on the  facts  of  the instant  case  the  Assistant Collector  passed  the  orders solely  on the basis of the compromise without applying  his mind  to  the  facts of the case.  Application  of  mind  is evident from the circumstance that he assessed the price  to be  paid  by each of the applicants who thereafter  did  so. The  mere fact that he did not record a finding in  so  many words  that he was satisfied from such and such material  in regard  to the existence of the basic  conditions  necessary for making the order under s. 18 did not render his order  a nullity  when  such material was otherwise  evident  on  the record.  Therefore, the order under s. 18 was not a  nullity and  it  could not be ignored as non-est  by  the  Collector (Surplus Area). [192E] K.  K.  Chari v. R. M. Seshadri [1973] 1 SCC  761,  Nagindas Ramdas  v.  Dalpatram  Ichchram  Civil  Appeal  No.  2479/72 decided  on  30-11-1973, Smt.  Ujjam Bai v. State  of  Uttar Pradesh,  AIR 1962 S.C. 1621=[1963]1 SCR 778  and  Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, A.I.R, 1964 S.C. 907 (910)= [1964]1 SCR 495, followed. (d)  The Collector (Surplus Area) and the  Collector  acting under s. 18, are coordinate authorities exercising  separate and  distinct jurisdictions’.  If one feels that  a  certain order  passed by the other in the exercise of  his  distinct jurisdiction  is erroneous it was open to that authority  to get  it rectified in the appropriate manner provided by  the Act,  that  is, by way of appeal, review or  revision.   The provisions in regard to appeal, review and revision  against

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an  order of the Assistant Collector under s. 18 are,  under ss. 24 and 25 of the Act, ss 80 to 84 of the Punjab  Tenancy Act, 1887.  There is nothing in the Act or the Rules  framed under the Act, or in the Tenancy Act, as to who can file  an appeal  or  revision against the decision or  order  of  the Collector exercising jurisdiction under s. 18; and, in  view of the long Practice there could be no doubt that the  State Government or its department can, if aggrieved or prejudiced by  such a decision, go in appeal or revision against it.  A person who is not a party to a decree or order, may with the leave of the Appellate Court prefer an appeal and as a rule, leave  will not be refused to a person who might  have  been made a party to the proceedings.  In any case, the State  or the  department could have moved the Financial  Commissioner to set right the illegality or impropriety in revision.  The Financial Commissioner under the Tenancy Act has wide powers in  revision  to correct errors committed  by  the  inferior authorities  and there is no time limit to the  exercise  of the  revisional power.  Once the application of  the  tenant under s. 18 has been allowed and the order is not set  aside in  appeal or revision, it becomes final and remains  immune to  an attack against its validity on any ground,  including that  of collusion, before the coordinate authorities  under the  Act dealing with the question of the  determination  of surplus  area.  In the present case the  Collector  (Surplus Area) could not go behind the orders under s. 18 or  himself sit  in  appeal over them, especially when the  officer  who passed  the  two  orders happended to be  the  same  person. [194C] 156 Amir  Chand  v. State of Haryana 1971 PLJ.  449,  Securities Insurance  Co. [1894] 2 Ch. 410, Province of Bombay v. W.  L Automobile Association A.I.R. 1949 Dom. 141, Heera Singh  v. Veerka, A.I.R.  1958 Raj. 181, Shivaraja v. Siddamma  A.I.R. 1963  Mys. 127, Executive Officer v. Raghavan Pillai  A.I.R. 1961 Kerala    114, B. an Infant, [1958] 1 Q.B. 12;  Govinda Menon  v.  Madhvan Nair A.I.R. 1964 Kerala  235(DB),  Punjab State v. Dr. Iqbal Singh [1965] Punjab Law Journal 110, Man Raj  and  ors v. State of Punjab I.L.R. [1969]  2  Punj  and Haryana 680 and Shyamlal v. State of Gujrat [1965] 2  S.C.R. 457, referred to. (2)The  view  taken by the High Court with regard  to  the interpretation  and  inter-relation of s. 10A and s.  18  is sound  and therefore s. 18 prevails over s. 10A and so,  the authority  under  s.  10A cannot ignore  the  order  of  the authority under s.  18. [197B] (a)  The  two  canons of interpretation  applicable  to  the statute  are,  (i) if choice lies  between  two  alternative constructions,  that alternative is to be chosen which  will be  consistent with the smooth working of the  system  which the statute purports to be regulating; and that  alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty  friction or  confusion  into the working of the system and,  (ii)  if there  is an apparent conflict between different  provisions of the same enactment they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both. [195E] King  Emperor v. Benori Lal Sarma [1944] 49 CWN 178  (PC)=72 IA 57, referred to.’ (b)  Section  18 is designed to promote one of  the  primary objects of the Act, namely of procuring ownership    of  the land  to  the  tiller on easy  terms.   The  self  sufficing machinery  of  this  section is available  for  purchase  of their  tenancies to the tenants inducted   before or   after April  15,  1953,  by the landowner,  equally  with  tenants settled  by  the Government  on the  surplus area.  The  Act

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does not takeaway  the right  of the landowner  to  induct tenants  on such area. Every sale made by the  operation  of s.18 in favour of a tenant admitted by the landowner on  the surplus  area  causes  diminution of  the  surplus  area  or affects  the utilisation thereof  by the  Government.  Under s.10A(C)  every judgment, decree or order of a court or  the authority,  which  diminishes  the  surplus  area  shall  be ignored.If  sales  in  favour of  tenants  inducted  by  the landowner  after April 15, 1953 were to be ignored under  s. 10A(c) then it will reduce the working of the system of  the Act  to a mockery, because it will present the spectacle  of manifest  contradiction  and absurdity of an  Act  giving  a right  with  one hand and taking it away  by  another.   The adoption  of  such  an  interpretation  may  not  completely obliterate.  s. 18 but it will certainly truncate  it,  with reference  to  the  category  of  tenants  inducted  by  the landowner after April 15, 1953. [195G] (3)  The conflict between the two provisions can be  avoided only if the general words ’other authority’ in s. 10A(c) are read  ejusdem  generis with the  specific  words  ’judgment, decree or order of a court’ which immediately precede  them. Thus construed, the general words ’or other authority’  will not take in an authority exercising jurisdiction under s. 18 of the Act. [196B-C] (4) The lease created by the landowner in the present  case, ceased  to subsist as soon as the Collector made  orders  of purchase  under  s.  18 in favour of  the  respondent.   The question  whether  the  extinct  lease  which  preceded  the purchase  orders  was a transfer or not, did  not  therefore survive for decision. [197A] Bhajan  Lal  v. Punjab State [1968] 70  I.L.R.  664,  Bishan Singh  v. Punjab State [1968]47 LLt 284 and Lakshmi  Bai  v. State  of Haryana [1971] LXXIII Punj.  L.R. 8 1 5,  referred to. Further,  the  land  comprised in the  lease  of  the  prior tenants  was far less than their permissible limit  and  the High Court rightly presumed that the lands were within their permissible  area,  since there was. no evidence  that  they held any other land.  Surplus area has to be determined,  as appears  from s. 19F, with reference to the situation as  on April 15, 1953, when the Act came into force.  The  disputed land held by the prior tenants was within their  permissible area  and therefore it could not be included in the  surplus area  of  the landowner.  At the time  when  the  ,Collector (Surplus  Area ) took up determination of the surplus  area, these lands were still comprised in a tenancy though under a different tenant, namely the first 157 respondent.  Such change of the tenant does not amount to  a future  acquisition of land, comprised in that  tenancy,  by the landowner within the contemplation of s. 19A or S. 19B of the Act. [197H-198D] Bhagwan  Das  v.   The State of Punjab, [1966]  2  SCR  511, followed. Harchand  Singh v. Punjab State, (1964) 66 P.L.R. 285;  1963 P.L.J. 144, approved- (5)  The expression ’transfer and other disposition of  land in s.10A(b) does not include completed sales effected  under s.  18.   The words transfer or other disposition  of  land’ must be restricted to voluntary dispositions of land made by the  landowner and cannot be extended to  cover  involuntary transfers brought about by operation of law or circumstances beyond  the  control  of the landowner.  This  is  the  only reasonable  interpretation of the words ’transfer  or  other disposition of land’ in s. 10A (b) which is consistent  with

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s.  18  and  can  reconcile  and  keep  effective  both  the sections.   The two types of involuntary  transfers.  namely compulsory  acquisition of land by Government or by an  heir by inheritance are only illustrative of the intention of the legislature. [196 D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals 1756 of  1967. Nos. 1755 and From  the judgment and order dated the 4th October, 1966  of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 854 and 855 of 1963. V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants. S. K. Dhingra for the respondents. The  Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR and V. R. KRISHNA  IYER,  JJ. was delivered by Krishna lyer, J. R. S. SARKARIA, J. gave  a dissenting, Opinion. KRISHNA IYER, J.  These two appeals by the State of  Haryana challenge the High Court’s approach to an interpretation  of two,  crucial provisions of a land reforms law, namely,  Ss. 10-A and 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (X Of 1953)  1953 (for short called "the Act").  Counsel  for  the appellants  complains; that if the view upheld by  the  High Court  of subordinating S. 10-A to S. 18 were not  upset  by this Court, large land’ holders may extricate their  surplus land in excess of the ceiling set, through legal  loopholes, such  as have been practised in the present case.  If  make- believe  deals  and collusive, proceeding,  he  argues,  may maneouvre  through the legal net cast by S. 10-A of the  Act interdicting  alienations  and  orders  which  diminish  the surplus  pool  intended for re-settlement by  the  State  of ejected  tenants,  the  agrarian  reform  measure  would  be reduced   to  a  paper  tiger  or   socioeconomic   eyewash. Certainly,  land  reforms  are  so  basic  to  the  national reconstruction   of   the  new  order   envisaged   by   the Constitution that the issue raised in this case deserves our anxious  attention.  We have to bear in mind, the  activist, though inarticulate, major premise of statutory construction that the rule of law must run close to the rule of life  and the court must read into an enactment, language  permitting, that  meaning  which promotes the benignant  intent  of  the legislation  in  preference to the one which  perverts  the, scheme of the statute 158 on  imputed  legislative presumptions  and  ’assumed  social values  valid in a prior era.  An aware court,  informed  of this  adaptation  in the rules of  forensic  interpretation, hesitates to nullify the plain object of a land reforms  law unless compelled by its language, and the crux of this  case is  just  that  accent  when  double  possibilities  in  the chemistry of construction crop up. A breif survey of the relevent facts leading up to the legal controversy  seeking resolution in these appeals  will  help focus forensic attention on the provisions of the Act  which bear   upon  the  issue.   A  lady  by  name  Lachhman   had considerable  agricultural  property, far in excess  of  the relatively  liberal ceiling set by the Act which  came  into force on April 15, 1953.  She had a daughter Shanti Devi and son-in-law  Amar Singh, respondent in Civil Appeal No.  1755 of  1967,  whose  brother Indraj is the  respondent  in  the connected appeal No. 1756 of 1967.  Annexure (B) to the writ petitions  is an order dated May 11, 1962 passed  under  the Act and the Rules by the Collector (Surplus Area) Sirsa.  It

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is  this order which has been successfully attacked  in  the writ  petitions  and is the subject-matter  of  the  present appeals.  The facts stated therein have not been reversed in the judgment of the High Court and we have to proceed on the assumption  that  those  statements  are  correct.   We  are concerned  with three khasras Nos. 177, 265 and 343, in  all over  131  acres of land.  At the commencement of  the  Act, khasra  No. 177 was under Mst.  Lachhman’s self  cultivation but there were two tenants under her, Chandu and Sri  Chand, on other two plots.  Together, these three, plots constitute a  large slice out of her surplus areas and are now  claimed by  the  respondents, Amar Singh and Indraj,  as  their  own under  a purchase ordered by the Assitant Collector  who  is the  competent authority under s. 18 of the Act (Annexure  A to the writ petitions).  Appellant’s counsel urges that  the history of the derivation of title of these claimants  needs to  be sceptically studied, the relationship of the  parties being  that of mother and daughter, son-in-law  and  brother and the heavy impact being slicing off a good chunk from the surplus  area,  otherwise  available  for  re-settlement  of evicted tenants. At  the  outset it must be mentioned that the  two  tenants, Chandu   and  Sri  Chand  who  were  on  the  land  on   the determinative  date  (April 15, 1953) presumably  showed  no interest  in  claiming rights granted to tenants  under  the Act,  which  were subject, of course,  to  their  possessing lands   less  than  the  permissible  area’.   We  have   no information  in this case what the total extent of lands  in the possession of these two tenants was and whether they had chosen  to keep other lands in preference to the ones  under Mst.   Lachhman.  We need not speculate on how or  why  they left  the  suit  plots but may note that they  were  on  the holding  on the key date in 1953 and if later they  did  not keep their possession (abandoned or surrendered) the tenancy terminated and on the facts of this case the lands came into the actual possession of the land holder, Mst.  Lachhman, no other legal inference being possible than that the 159 leases  were  extinguished  and the lands  reverted  to  the landlady on general principles of law.  In short, we have to proceed on the assumption that one plot, namely, khasra  No. 177 had always. been in the self-cultivation of the landlady and  that the two tenanted plots, namely, khasras  Nos.  265 and  343,  came  into the khas possession  of  the  landlady subsequent to the crucial date.  Apprehending the  statutory peril  to  these  lands which were  admittedly  outside  her "reserved areas" Mst.  Lachhman went through the exercise of making  a  gift  of the three lands  to  her  daughter  Smt. Shanti  (vide mutation No. 445 decided on December 24,  1953 and  referred to in Annexure B).  Subsequently, it  is  seen that  Amar Singh, husband of Shanti and Indraj,  brother  of Amar   Singh  purported  to  apply  for  purchase   of   the landholders  right in these three plots under s. 18  of  the Act  making Lachhman and Shanti co-respondents and  alleging that they were tenants qualified for the statutory  benefit. The Assistant Collector before whom the application was made for  purchase under s. 18 has said in Annexure ’A’  to  both the writ petitions that these two ladies "are said to be big land-owners but had not got this land reserved for their own purpose".  Curiously enough, in both the purchase  petitions the  parties  avoided  even  an  enquiry  by  the  Assistant Collector  as is evident from the following  statement  from Annexure ’A’.               "Before   the  proceedings  could  start   the               parties  have  come  to terms  and  they  have

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             actually put in court a compromise deed  which               they have backed up by their statements." May be, because these dubious moves if exposed to the exami- nation  of  an  officer  might prove  a  fiasco,  the  close relations  who figured as petitioner and respondents  lulled the  Assistant  Collector into mechanically  acting  on  the compromise  without  enquiring into any of  the  eligibility factors before a purchase could be ordered. There  is another, set of facts which needs mention at  this stage.  Even before the purchase proceedings were  initiated by  the  writ petitioners, the Collector had,  as  early  as April  1961, declared the surplus area of Lachhman  ignoring alienations and including the three khasra numbers.  But  on appeals  carried both by the landholder and  her  son-in-law and his brother the Commissioner ordered a further  enquiry. Meanwhile, purchase proceedings were started and by a  quick compromise, orders of purchase were obtained.  But all these proved exercises in futility because the Collector,  Surplus Area,  again ignored the leases to the writ  petitioners  as collusive  and the orders of purchase as ineffective in  the impugned order, Annexure B. However the High Court set aside Annexure ’B’ so that the petitioners before it, the  son-in- law  and his brother, were restored to their purchases,  and the  State  lost  the lands from  the  surplus.  pool.   The aggrieved   State   canvasses  the   correctness   of.   the supersession  of s. 18 and of certain other legal  reasoning approved  by the Court, as its impact on the working of  the land  reform  scheme would be disastrous.  Anyway,  the  law laid down in this case was affirmed by a Full Bench of  that Court.   Having regard to all those circumstances  a  series analysis  and  attempt  at  harmonisation  of  the   various provisions of the Act is necessary now. 160 A  flash  back to the genetic evolution of the act  and  the legislative  mutations by amendatory effort to make the  law effective,  and to unmake judicial decisions which  weakened the   working  of  it  will  help  understand  the   current biochemistry of the Act.  Any interpretation unaware of  the living  aims ideology and legal anatomy of an Act will  miss its  soul substance--a flaw which we feel, must  be  avoided particularly  in socio-Economic legislation with  a  dynamic will  and mission.  Now to the legislation itself.  A  brief introduction  is  found in the reference order of  the  Full Bench (Shamsher Bahadur, J.) in Mam Raj v. State of Punjab : (1)               "The  Act passed on 15th of April,  1953,  was               not  the first legislation on the subject  and               the  contours  of  many of  the  concepts  had               already   taken  shape  in  the  two   earlier               enactments on the subject, namely, the  Punjab               Tenants  (Security of Tenure) Act,  1950  (Act               No.  22 of 1950) and Punjab Tenants  (Security               of  Tenure) Amendment Act,  1951  (President’s               Act  5  of  1951).  The  Act,  which  at  once               consolidated  and amended the existing law  on               the subject, was designed "to provide for  the               security  of land tenure and other  incidental               matters".  As is clear from the preamble,  the               primary  object was the protection of  tenants               whose  ejectments recently from holdings  held               by landowners owning vast tracts of lands, had               taken place on a massive scale.  In  restoring               the  rights of tenants ejected after  15th  of               August,  1947, care was taken  that  landlords               with  small  holdings were  not  subjected  to

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             harassment by the tenants.For this reason, the               concepts  of "small  landowner",  "permissible               area"  and "reservation" were  introduced.   A               small  landowner  was described  as  a  person               whose  entire holding in the State  of  Punjab               did  not  exceed the  permissible  area  which               though fixed at 100 standard acres in the  Act               of  1950 was reduced to 30 standard  acres  in               the Act.  A Landowner owning larger areas  was               entitled to reserve the permissible area,  and               many  of the provisions of the Act dealt  with               the manner and exercise of this right of  res-               ervation.  The right of the landowner to eject               tenants from the reserved or permissible areas               was recognized in the Act though under section               9-A(introduced  by Punjab Act II of 1955)  the               tenants liable to ejectment on this score  had               to be accommodated in surplus areas, a minimum               period  of ten years’ tenancy was fixed  under                             section  7  in respect of tenants who  were  in               occupation of land outside the reserved  areas               and  the  right of the tenants  who  had  been               ejected  after  the  15th  August,  1947,  for               restoration  to the tenancies was  recognised.               Provisions  were made for the exercise of  the               other   rights  of  the  tenants,   the   most               important of these being the right to purchase               the leased lands under section 18 of the Act." The  triple objects of the agrarian reform projected by  the Act  appear  to be (a) to impart security of tenure  (b)  to make  the  tiller  the owner, and (c)  to  trim  large  land holdings,   setting  sober  ceilings.   To   convert   these political slogans into legal realities to combat the evil of mass  evictions,  to create peasant proprietorships  and  to ensure even dis- (1) I.L.R. [1969] 2 Pun. & Har. 680; 682-683. 161 tribution   of  land  ownerships  a  statutory  scheme   was fashioned, the cornerstone of which was the building up of a reservoir  of land carved out of the large landholdings  and made  available for utilization by the State for  re-setting ejected tenants. The  scheme of agrarian re-organisation contemplated by  the statutes  is  simple.   The legislature  fixed  a  limit  on ownership expressively described as "permissible area" land- owners  who exceeded this area were allowed to  reserve  for themselves  the  best lands they desired to  keep  and  this parcel  or parcels of land was meaning fully  designated  as "reserved  area".  Of course, if he failed to  intimate  his selection within six months from the commencement of the Act to  the  Patwari  concerned, the  prescribed  authority  was empowered to select the parcel or parcels of land which such person was entitled to retain for himself.  The  legislature found   that  many  land-owners  had  failed  to  make   the reservation in time and so by the Amending Act 46 of 1957  a further  period of six months from the commencement  of  the later Act was given for selecting the land/lands they  meant to  keep,  and further again gave the  prescribed  authority power  to select the parcel or parcels of land on behalf  of the  defaulting landholders.  The intendment of the  statute was that the reserved area war, to be self cultivated and so land-owners  were  competent  to  eject  tenants  from   the reserved  area, although, generally speaking, evictions  had been barred.  As a matter of fact, landholders were directed

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to start self cultivation within six months from the date of reservation  or  the date on which they  got  possession  by eviction.  Small holders, i.e., persons who owned less  than the  permissible  area were not only not  disturbed  by  the statute  in regard to their ownership but were also  allowed to evict tenants from their parcels of land so that they may also  become self-cultivators.  This process of  making  the proprietor  cultivator  naturally would result  in  the  co- existence  of  possession  and  ownership  at  the  cost  of ejectment  of tenants from their holdings.   Since  agrarian reform must promote not eviction of lessees but security  of tenure for them it became necessary for the State to  create a  considerable  surplus pool of lands coughed up  by  large owners  who  held  beyond the permissible  areas.   All  the tenant refugees from resumed lands were to be  rehabilitated on surplus lands and such tenants, enjoying fixity of tenure ,Would continue to pay rents to the owners.  Another limb of the  peasant proprietorship plan was the conferment  of  the right  to  purchase the landlord’s  right  on  long-standing tenants  with six years continuous occupancy. if the  scheme in the book had worked well on the ground the Act would have paved the way for a new rural map of economic relations even though  the  problem of the landless poor may  perhaps  have survived.   Such  was  the  conspectus  of  the  legislative scheme. It   is  obvious  that  this  blue-print  for   a   peaceful transformation    of   agrarian   relations   assumes    the availability of a large surplus area on which the State  can settle   tenants   from  the  reserved   areas   and   small landholders’  holdings.  Thus the key to the success of  the scheme  is the maximising of the surplus land reservoir  and sealing off legal leakages 162 through  private alienations, collusive orders  and  decrees and the like, and so care was taken to interdict alienations and  ignore decrees and orders which diminished the  surplus pool. At  this  stage  it may be useful to sketch  out  the  broad outlines  of  the  statute with specific  reference  to  its provisions,  and changes.  The Act of 1953 had been  amended often, for the professed reason, atleast once, that judicial pronouncements   have  had  the  effect  of  defeating   the objectives  with  which the law  was  enacted.   Substantial amendments  were made in 1955, 1957 and 1962.   The  objects and  reasons  of  Punjab Act 14 of 1962,  which  brought  in certain   significant   restrictions  on   alienations   and acquisitions  of large landholders starts off in the  state- ment of objects thus :               "Some  of the recent  judicial  pronouncements               have  the effect of defeating  the  objectives               with which the Punjab Security of land Tenures               Act,  1953, was enacted and amended from  time               to  time.   It was intended that  the  surplus               area  of every land-owner recorded as such  in               the revenue records should be made  utilisable               for the settlement of ejected tenants." Certain   specific  decisions  and  their  impact   on   the legislative operation were mentioned, and then the statement of objects proceeded :               "In  order to evade the provisions of s.  10-A               of  the Parent Act interested  persons,  being               relations, have obtained decrees of courts for               diminishing  the surplus area.  Clause (4)  of               the  Bill seeks to provide that  such  decrees               should  be  ignored in computing  the  surplus

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             area." We. mention this only to emphasize that the legislature  has been  anxious to, guard against erosion of the surplus  pool by alienatory maneouvres or even decrees and orders obtained through judicial or quasi-judicial processes. The Act defines "permissible area" "in relation to landowner or a tenant as 30 standard acres and where such 30  standard acres  on  being  converted into ordinary  acres  exceed  60 acres,  such  60 acres." (s. 2(3), The landlord  who  has  a vaster  extent  may utilise the specific lands he  wants  to keep for himself and this is called "reserved area." Section 2(4) defines "reserved area" as "the area lawfully  reserved under the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenures Act) 1950 (Act XXII  of 1950). as amended by President’s Act  of  1951,..." The area other than the reserved area, ie. the balance  left over, is defined as ,surplus area".  Section 2 (5-a) defines "surplus  area" a concept introduced by Act XI of 1955.   It is useful to extract the definition which runs thus :               "Surplus  Area" means the area other than  the               reserved  area, and, where, no area  has  been               reserved,   the   area  in   excess   of   the               permissible area selected under section 5-B or               the  area which is deemed to be  surplus  area               under  sub-section  (1)  of  section  5-C  and               includes the area in excess of the permissible               area selected under section 19-B, but it  will               not include a tenants permissible area 163               Provided  that  it will include  the  reserved               area, or part thereof, where such area or part               has  not been brought  under  self-cultivation               within  six  months of reserving the  same  or               getting  possession thereof after  ejecting  a               tenant from it, whichever is later, or if  the               land-owner  admits a new tenant, within  three               years of the expiry of the said six months". At this stage it may be mentioned that landowner is not only entitled to self-cultivate his reserved area but is  obliged to  do,  so within the period stipulated in the  proviso  to s.2(5-a)  test such un-self-cultivated land  become  surplus area.   But for fear that absentee landlords may pretend  to be self-cultivating while really leasing out their lands  to close  relations, the statute defines "self cultivation"  as cultivation  by  the’ land-owner personally or  through  his wife or children or through prescribed relations.  It may be noted that a son-in-law is not one of those relations  (vide rule 5 of the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956.). Sections 5, 5-A and 5-B deal with the reservation of land by large  landholders and the procedure in that behalf What  is important to note is that in the present case the landholder has made her reservation and the properties in dispute  fall outside  it and are therefore included in the surplus  area. Immunity from eviction of tenants is conferred by s. 9 but a landlord  is  entitled  to  eject a  tenant  from  the  area reserved under this Act.  However, such ejectment shall  not be  given  effect  to  by way  of  disposession  unless  the displaced   tenant"is   accommodation  surplus  are   a   in accordance  with  the  provisions of s.  10-A  or......’  Of course,  if the tenant is a close relation of  the  landlord within  the  prescribed category this  protection  does  not enure to him as per the second proviso to s-9-A.  It is note worthy  that a son-in law is not one such relative.   It  is obvious  that a large number of tenants would be ejected  by small landholders and large landholders from their  reserved areas under s. 9 of the Act.  Naturally, legislative concern

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for  their  rehabilitation found expression  in  s.  10-A(a) which runs thus               10-A(a)  The State Government or  any  officer               empowered  by  it  in this  behalf,  shall  be               competent to Utilize any surplus area for  the               resettlement  of  tenants ejected,  or  to  be               ejected,  under clause (i) of sub-section  (1)               of s. 9." The success of the scheme, therefore, depends on the  extent of the surplus pool.  For one thing, large landholders, when deprived of their excess area, as well as small landholders, in  order to be viable, have to secure actual possession  of what  they are eligible to keep, this being the  legislative justice  shown to landowners by the Act.  Actual  possession could follow only if the potential for re-settlement of dis- possessed   tenants  were  sufficient.   That  is  why   the legislature  has jealously protected the surplus pool  which plays  a  pivotal  role in the whole  programme.   For  this purpose s. 10-A(b) was brought in in 1955 and it reads 164               "10-A(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in               any other law for the time being in force  and               save  in  the  case of land  acquired  by  the               ’State  Government under any law for the  time               being in force or by an heir by inheritance no               transfer or other disposition of land which is               comprised   in   a   surplus   area   at   the               commencement  of  this Act, shall  affect  the               utilization there of in clause (a)." Plainly,  there is a wide interdict against any transfer  of other disposition of land comprised in the surplus area,  if it will affect the utilisation thereof for the re-settlement of tenants ejected or to be ejected under cl. (i) of  sub-s. (1) of s. 9. Such a strategic provision which takes care  of the  surplus  reservoir of land must receive  a  benignantly spacious  construction.  There can, therefore, be  no  doubt that the expression "transfer or other disposition of  land" must definitely cover leases which, by very definition,  are a species of transfer of land.  It looks as if other devices were resorted to by large land-owners to defeat the  surplus area  scheme of s. 10-A.  Courts and other authorities  were approached and, through their processes, decrees and  orders were secured whereby lands out of the surplus area could  be salvaged  by the land-owner.  The legislature  finding  this anti-ceiling  phenomenon clamped down a blanket ban  on  the adverse  operation  of "any judgment, decree or order  of  a court or other authority, obtained after the commencement of this Act and having the effect of diminishing" the area of a person which could have been declared a,-, his surplus area. Section 10-A(c) may be usefully reproduced in this context.               "10-A(c)  For the purposes of determining  the               surplus area of any person under this section,               any  judgment, decree or order of a  court  or                             other authority, obtained after the  c ommenment               of   this  Act  and  having  the   effect   of               diminishing  the  area of  such  person  which               could  have been declared as his surplus  area               shall be ignored." It  is  extremely  important to  remember  that  while  this provision   was  enacted  in  1962  and  while  s.   10-A(b) prohibiting  alienations  was  passed in  1955,  both  these provisions  were  given  retrospective effect  as  from  the decisive date, namely, April 15, 1953.  The deep concern  of the legislature is clear from all this.

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Right  from the beginning one of the primary objects of  the statute   had  been  to  enable  tenants  to  purchase   the Landlord’s  right and become full owners and in this  behalf was  enacted  S.  18  which has figured  very  much  in  the controversy in these appeals, It states : "18(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any  law, usage or contract, a tenant of a  landowner  other than a small land-owner- (i)  who  has  been in continuous  occupation  of  the  land comprised in his tenancy for a minimum period of six  years, or (ii)........ (iii)....... 165               shall  be entitled to purchase from the  land-               owner the land so held by him but not included               in the reserved area of the landowner, in  the               case of a tenant falling within clause (i)  or               clause (ii)     at  any time, and in the  case               of a tenant falling within clause  (iii)within               a  period  of  one  year  from  the  date   of               commencement of this Act:               Provided that....               Provided further that.. . . The  further sub-sections of s. 18 deal with the process  of purchase,  the  Assistant  Collector  being  the   authority empowered to order such purchase. In  the appeals before us there is an  apparent  competition for  primacy  between  s. 18 and s.  10-A(b)  and  (c),  and perhaps  it  may be relevant to refer to s. 23  also.   This last section reads:               "No decree or order of any court or  authority               and no notice of ejectment shall be valid save               to  the extent to which it is consistent  with               the provisions of this Act. As we will presently see we are called upon to reconcile the claims  and  contentions put forward by either side  on  the strength of the provisions we have just mentioned. Let  us  interpret and apply the law to the  facts  of  this case.  The learned judge, Narula, J., stated at the outset:               "I  have  to  take the fact as  found  by  the               Collector for the purposes of determining  the               surplus area of the landowner and consequently               for determining the rights of the  petitioners               so  far  as they are sought to  be  interfered               with by the impugned order." We  agree.   The same judge formulated the  legal  questions falling for decision in these words:               (1)  Whether  the  expressions  "transfer"  or               "other  disposition of land" in clause (b)  of               section  10-A of the Act, include  involuntary               transfer  of  a  part  of  the  holding  of  a               landowner by operation of an order forcing the               landowner  to sell a part of his holding to  a               tenant under section 18 of the Act;               (2)  Whether the order of any other  authority               referred  to in clause (c) of section 10-A  of               the  Act includes an order of the  authorities               under  the Act itself passed under section  18               thereof in favour of a tenant, which order has               become  final either at its original stage  or               at the appellate or revisional stage; and               (3)   In case of conflict between section 10-A               and  section 18 of the Act, which of  the  two               provisions has supervening effect or overrides

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             the other." We do not wholly agree with this itemisation but it is  good enough  to  focus attention of the relevant  area  of  legal controversy. one further point pressed in both courts may be noticed,  viz., that the order of purchase of the  concerned officer not having been set aside binds the other 166 authority  determining the surplus area and so the  question is  whether one officer under the Act could ignore an  order by  another officer under a different provision of the  Act, having  regard  to comity of courts and  jurisdictions.   As indicated already, the principal discussion in the  judgment under appeal has turned on the claim to primacy of s. 18  as against s. 10-A and so it is as well that we state right now what  stand  we  propose  to  take  in  resolving   apparent conflicts in the provisions of a socially-oriented, project- implementing legislation.  Every such statute has a soul and an  integrated  personality-minor deformities may  mar  this unity,  especially when piecemeal amendments  and  unskilled drafting  occur.   The basic judicial approach  must  be  to discover  this soul of the law and strive to  harmonise  the many limbs to subserve the pervasive spirit and advance  the social  project  of the enactment.   Seeming  confrontations between  provisions must be resolved into a cooperative  co- existence.   This  interpretative activism persuades  us  in this case to reconcile what the High Court has conceived  to be a conflict between s. 10-A and s. 18. Here,  there are 3 khasra nos., two of which (nos.  265  and 343)  were outstanding on tenancy with Chandu and Sri  Chand at  the relevant date, April 15, 1953 (which admittedly,  is the  date  with  reference  to  which  "Permissible   area", "reserved  area" and "surplus area" have to be fixed).   The third  item, khasra no. 177, had on the relevant  date  been with the landowner directly.  The High Court treats them  as two ,categories, not without reason.  What was with  tenants on  the relevant date may well be part of their  permissible area   since  ’landowner’  in  s.2(1)  includes  a   lessee. Moreover,  a  permissible area of a tenant  is  excluded  by definition from ’surplus area’, obviously because the tenant can stabilise himself on his permissible area and it is  not intended  to  dislodge him therefrom for  re-settling  other tenants under s. 10-A.  Therefore, Narula, J., concludes:               " A survey of the above-mentioned provision of               the Act leave no doubt that if Chandu and  Sri               Chand  who  were the tenants of the  land  now               comprised  in  the tenancy of  Amar  Singh  on               April  15,  1953,  had  continued  to  be  the               tenants  of that parcel of land,  subsequently               the  land  in  their  tenancy  could  not   be               included  in  the  permissible  area  of   the               landowner.   On the other hand it  would  have               been  the  right of Chandu and  Sri  Chand  to               either get the said land declared as heir  own               permissible  area or to exercise  their  right               under  section 18(1) of the Act by  making  an               application  under sub-section (2) thereof  to               purchase the said parcel of land." The learned Judge proceeds to negative the argument that the legal  result is different when the sitting tenants  on  the relevant  date have quit and new tenants have been  inducted subsequently: "Surplus area and Permissible area of a  land- owner  has to be determined in view of the situation  as  it existed   on  the  15th  of  April,  1953   and   subsequent alienations   have   to  be  completely   ignored.    Though subsequent  acquisitions  by the landowner  may  in  certain

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circumstances   be  included  in  the.,  surplus   area   as accretions,  no  such thing can happen in  respect  of  that parcel of land which could not be included in the sur- 167 plus area of the landowner on 15th of April, 1953, which was again not with the landowner on the date when the  Collector sought  to determine his/her surplus area.  In other  words, once a piece of land is excluded from the surplus area of  a landowner  on account of its forming the subject  matter  of the holding of a tenant in occupation (who is not related to the  landowner  in  the prohibited manner) on  the  15th  of April, 1953, the mere subsequent change of the holder of the tenancy  will  not make the tenancy premises revert  to  the surplus area of the landowner.  It is, therefore, clear that the  land  comprised in Khasras Nos. 265  and  343  (subject matter  of  the tenancy in favour of Amar Singh)  could  not fall  within the definition of surplus area in the hands  of the landowner and Section 10-A of the Act could not apply to it." We  are afraid there is a fallacy in this reasoning.  It  is true that a mere change in tenancy by transfer of the  lease as  such, as distinguished from a landlord inducting  a  new tenant  on  land  the  prior  lease  over  which  has   been terminated  and possession restored to the lanlord, may  not perhaps offend s.10-A although situations may arise even  in such  cases leading to a different conclusion.  We need  not investigate this possibility further.  In the present  case, the  exclusion  of  the two khasras from  the  surplus  area depends  on  their  being part of the  permissible  area  of Chandu  and Sri Chand.  To salvage the lease in his  favour, Amar Singh, the new tenant, must prima facie show that  this alienation  does not violate s.10-A(b) which  prohibits  all transfers and other dispositions which diminish the  surplus area of the landowner concerned.  He has, therefore, to make out  (a)  that  the demised lands do not form  part  of  the landlord’s  surplus  area  or (b) that,  as  was  vehemently argued but may with little legal qualms be rejected, a lease is  not a ’transfer or other disposition of property’.   The High  Court has disposed of this latter submission with  the simple  but  impeccable observation"that the creation  of  a lease is a transfer or a demise referred to in s.105 of  the Transfer  of Property Act admits of no doubt".  The  purpose of   the  prohibitive  provision  is  to  strike  at   every alienatory  essay and the natural meaning of  ’transfer’  or other  disposition  of  land.  apart  from  the   contextual compulsion, embraces leases.  The contention that even  wide words must oblige the landlord’s plea for a narrow  meaning, viz.,  absolute  transfer  of ownership,  is  beyond  us  to accept. Do  the  lands,  khasras  nos.  265  and  343,  because   61 outstanding  leases  on  April 15, 1953,  swim  out  of  the surplus area ipso facto?  We think not.  For that they  must be comprised in the permissible area of the tenant.  Here we have  no  information placed by him who wants  to  prove  it affirmatively  that these plots lie within  the  permissible area  of 30 standard acres, by definition of Chandu and  Sri Chand.   That they did not continue in possession after  the Act  is not disputed.  If that were in possession  of  other lands  either as owners or tenants, and such holding was  30 acres or more, it was open to them to relinquish these lands being  in excess of their permissible area, in  which  case, not  being the permissible area of the tenant and  being  in excess  of  the reserved area of the landlord,  these  lands would be surplus area of the landlord within the  definition under  s.2(5-a). In the absence of proof that the  lands  in

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dispute were comprised in the permissible area of the  prior it is not possible to hold that they do not come within the 168 surplus  area  of  the landlord,  Mst.   Lacchman.   On  the contrary,   the   likely   inference   flowing   from    the disappearance  from the scene of Chandu and Sri Chand  their failure to claim to remain as tenants or to purchase is that these  were  not their permissible area.  It is  not  as  if every bit of land that is with a tenant on the relevant date is his permissible area. it has to fulfil the requirement of s.2(3). No such test has been satisfied here.  Nor can it be argued  that even if a tenant gives up his interest  in  the holding  the statute will haunt him with  rights.   ’Permis- sible area’ is not a concept in the abstract but, as  s.2(3) mentions,  is ’in relation to a landowner or a tenant’.   In relation  to  Chandu and Sri Chand no claim  to  permissible area or consequential rights has been set up and Amar  Singh is  not  a transferee from them but a de  novo  tenant.   It follows  that the two khasras should be computed as part  of the surplus area of Mst.  Lacchman and s.10-A(b) operates to invalidate  the  alleged lease to Amar Singh  as  its  clear impact is to diminish the surplus area of the landowner.  He had,  therefore, no right as a tenant to purchase  under  s. 18. The more serious question raised turns on the effect of  the purchase  orders, Annexure A, on s.10-A(c). The  High  Court reasoned-and  this  was  repeated  before  us  as  counsel’s argument-that  while  it is true that  for  determining  the surplus area of a person ’any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority’ obtained after the commencement of the  Act  and having the effect of diminishing  his  surplus area  ’shall  be ignored’, this mandate does  not  apply  to orders  of  authorities under the Act,  like  the  Assistant Collector  exercising powers under s. 18. The learned  judge quotes the object of s. 10-A(c):               "In  order to evade the provisions of  section               10-A  of  the parent Act  interested  persons,               being  relations,  have  obtained  decrees  of               Courts  for  diminishing  the  surplus   area.               Clause  4  of the Bill seeks to  provide  that               such  decrees should be ignored  in  computing               the surplus area." From  this the Court infers that ’other authorities’  in  s. 10-A(c)  are  arbitrators  or such  like  agencies  and  not authorities under the Act.  It is useful to read the objects and reasons relating to the clause of a bill to illumine the idea of the law not to control its amplitude.  Moreover, the purpose,  as revealed in the statement of object  is  plain. The legislature wanted to insure the invulnerability of  the surplus pool provision to attacks, by ignoring judicial  and quasi-judicial  Orders  of every sort.  In this  behalf  two provisions  were made namely ss. 10-A. and a. 23,  primarily the  former.  In fact, we are concerned only with  s.10-A(b) and (c). The  High  Court has taken the view that s.  10-A(b)  cannot affect  involuntary transfers and since a purchase  effected under S. 18 effects an involuntary transfer it is not hit by s.  10-A(b).  The further view taken is that the  expression "other  authority" in s. 10-A(c) refers only to  authorities other than those under the Act; the Assistant Collector  who has  ordered the purchase under s. 10 being outside  s.  10- A(c),  his order cannot be ignored by the Collector  on  the strength of S. 10-A (c).A third point converging to the same conclusion taken by the 169

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Court  is that when an order under s. 18 has  become  final, the Collector acting under S. 10-A(c) cannot but be bound by it  until  it is set aside in appeal or  revision  or  other appropriate   proceedings   even   though   the    Assistant Collector’s  order  under s. 18 was passed on  a  compromise between the parties. We  may now consider the soundness of these grounds  separa- tely.   The object of s. 10-A(c) cannot be fulfilled  unless the  widest meaning were given to the expression  "court  or other authority".  Nor is there any basis for truncating the ambit of "other authority" in the manner the High Court  has done.  "Other authority" is every other authority within  or without the Act.  The reason given by Narula, J., to exclude the  officer passing orders under s. 18 from  "other  autho- rities" is that "the result would be that the benefit sought to be conferred by s. 18 on the tenants would be  completely nullified  and obliterated".  In this connection he  further observed :               "In every case, order under section 18 of  the               Act,  would be passed after the Act came  into               force.  If an order under section 18 has to be               ignored  by  the operation of  clause  (c)  of               section  10-A, every order under  section  18,               must   be   ignored   while   declaring    the               permissible  area of the Landowner.  There  is               no discretion in the authorities to apply  the               provisions of clause (c) of s. 10-A or not  to               apply  them.  The provision is mandatory,  if,               therefore, clause (c) of section 10-A could be               utilised for abrogating the effect of an order               under section 18 of the Act, the whole  scheme               of  the  Act of distribution of  land  to  the               tenants and for conferring a right on a tenant               to  purchase  the land within  the  limits  of               permissible area, would be flouted." Having  given serious consideration to the pros and cons  we are  not  satisfied  that this argument  is  valid;  on  the contrary,  if upheld it may stultify s. 10-A and the  scheme of  the  statute altogether.  Obviously, if every  order  of purchase  sanctioned under s. 18 can  successfully  diminish surplus  area of a landowner, a spate of such, orders  would be  procured by previous arrangement between  the  landowner and  his  nominee tenants or even bona fide  alienees.   The present  case  is a capital illustration of  the  fraud  and collusion  that  may  follow  on  such  an   interpretation. Indeed, there is no provision in s. 18 to give notice to the Collector  who  is to declare the surplus area  and  so  the State  which  is vitally concerned in the  re-settlement  of ejected   tenants   utilising  the  surplus  area   has   no opportunity  to  present  its case  against  the  fraudulent character  of  the  proceedings  under  s.  18  before   the Assistant  Collector.  The State, not being a party to  that order,  in any case cannot be bound by it, whatever  may  be the effect as between the parties to those proceedings.   We are  concerned  here with a challenge by the  State  to  the efficacy  of the order, Annexure A, and so we cannot  muzzle the plea of the State that the order under s. 18 is void  if there are good grounds to hold with it. Nor is there force in the argument that benefit under s.  18 would  be "completely nullified and obliterated" if  s.  10- A(c) were to apply to it.  It is wrong for the Court to have said that "in every 170 case " orders under s. 10 would have to be ignored.  That is not  the  result of s. 10-A.  All the three  sub-clauses  of

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that section read together show that if the landlord by  any act or omission of his suffered a diminution in the  surplus area  by  a transfer, voluntary or otherwise, in  favour  of another,  contrary to the right of the State  Government  to dispose  of  it, such a transfer only is liable  to  be  set aside.   The tenants described in s. 18 in whose favour  the authority  sanctions  the  purchase  of  the  land  are  not transferees  whose transfers have to be set aside  as  being contrary  to the right of the State  Government.   Actually, the  bulk of the cases under s. 18 would be by  tenants  who are eligible to purchase by virtue of six years’  continuous occupation  under s. 18(1).  Their purchases would often  be from  land  which is their permissible area.   Every  tenant with  six  years’ ending, be it before or  after  the  comm- encement of the Act, will be entitled to buy the  ownership. Of course. if he is within the reserved area he is liable to be evicted even before he purchases but if he is outside the landlord’s  reserved area he can move for purchase.  Such  a purchase  being from the permissible area of the  tenant  is outside  the  surplus  area of the  landlord  and  does  not diminish  "the  area of such person which  could  have  been declared as his surplus area".  Ex hypothesi "surplus  area" excludes  a tenant’s permissible area.  Therefore,  even  if that land falls outside the reserved area of the  landowner, if it is within the tenant’s permissible area, its  purchase by the tenant cannot diminish the landowner’s surplus  area. (emphasis supplied) Another  substantial  category,  who may  buy  under  s.  18 without  reducing  the  surplus  area,  is  the   re-settled tenants.    When   the  State  acting   under   s.   10-A(c) accommodates  an  ejected  tenant  the  utilization  of  the surplus  land pro tanto is fulfilled.  Such a  rehabilitated tenant  of  the  landlord, after the six  years’  term,  can qualify  to buy under s. 18.  Such a purchase  only  fulfils the  second object of the Statute of making the  tiller  the owner  and does not in any way diminish the-surplus area  of the  landlord.   For, with the re-settlement of  an  ejected tenant  that land, for all practical purposes, is no  longer available for the only purpose for which the surplus pool is meant, viz., re-settlement of ejected tenants.  Thus, it  is clear  that  s. 18 is not rendered otiose by the  view  that orders  thereunder which diminish the surplus area  are  bad for violation of s. 10-A(c).  Indeed, the principal category adversely  affected  by  our view  would  be  post-statutory collusive  tenants,  who  are in most  cases  likely  to  be brought in by landlords experimentally to rescue those lands from  the surplus pool, and even in bonafide cases  they  do not  deserve  sympathy since they damage  the  prospects  of displaced tenants from being re-settled.  It may as well  be noted here that the person who is entitled to purchase under s.  18 is a tenant. i.e. a person lawfully inducted  on  the land  as  a tenant.  Once a land is held to be part  of  the surplus  land  of  the landlord, it  rests  with  the  State Government for being disposed of for resettlement of tenants and any disposition of the same by the landlord after  April 15,  1953  would be invalid against the  State  Government’s claim  to dispose of it.  That is the effect of  s.  10-A(a) &(b).  Therefore, in respect of any land to which the  State Government makes a claim for resettlement, on the ground  of its being surplus 171 land,  any person inducted by the landlord after  April  15, 1953 would have no title to it as a tenant and, would not be able to avail of s. 18. To    sum     up,     the     ’other authorities’  in  s. 10-A(c) include  officers  under  s.16.

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Secondly, the plain meaning of s. 10-A(c) is that any order by   any  authority  which shrinks the surplus area  of  the landlord is,invalid to the extent laid down in that  clause. Thirdly,  orders  under s. 18 if they diminish  the  surplus area  suffer the same fate and Annexure ’B’ fails to  shield Mst.   Lacchman’s lands against orders  re-settling  ejected tenants thereon. Shri   Dhingra  relied  on  Sahib  Ram  v.  The    Financial Commissioner, Punjab (1) but that decision only rules that a tenant,  who  completes his 6  years  qualifying  occupation required  by  s. 18 after April 15, 1953, is  not  excluded. Vaidialingam,  J.,  took  care to refer to  the  case  under appeal  now before us (Amar Singh’s case) and said  that  it dealt  with the scope of s. 10-A and did not bear  upon  the point before them. The last point urged by Shri Dhingra for the  respondent-and accepted  by the High Court-is that the order,  Annexure  A, having become final could not have been ignored in  Annexure ’B’.   Here  it serves the discussion to remember  that  the leases in question have been found by the Collector to  have been  collusively got up to dwindle the surplus area of  the landowner.  The Collector in Annexure ’B’ finds:A               "  ......and  it is crystal  clear  that  Amar               Singh and Indraj had not  been  in  continuous               cultivating possession of this land for  full               six years, the other copy of Khasra  Girdawari               put  in this case and which is to be found  at               page 27 of the file, shows the possession over               this  land of Indraj and Amar Singh only  from               the year 1957-58, and so their possession over               it for full six years is not complete as yet." He has also stated that he was convinced "that the landowner has conspired with her son-in-law Amar Singh and his brother Indraj  to retain this area in contravention of the law."  A third pregnant fact is that the proceedings under s. 18 were prima  facie  collusive, and to burke an  enquiry  into  the eligibility  of the alleged tenants to purchase under s.  18 an expedient was resorted to.  "Before the proceedings could start"  says Annexure ’A’, "the parties have come  to  terms and they have actually put in court a compromise deed  which they  have backed up by their statements." Thus, no  finding on  the  basic facts of entitlement to  purchase  have  been recorded by the authority under s. 18 because he has  merely stated in Annexure ’A’.               "As  per  statements of the parties,  I  allow               Amar Singh to purchase the land in suit." These  facts have to be assumed since a controversy  thereon in the writ court or in this Court cannot be permitted.   We are,  therefore, concerned to see whether on such a  factual basis any legal consequences compelling the court to  uphold Annexure’A’,  and thus judicially condoning what is a  fraud on the statutory scheme, follow. (1) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 790 172 An order like Annexure ’A’ ordinarily binds the parties only and  here  the  State which is the  appellant  is  seriously prejudiced  by  that  order  but  is  not  a  party  to  it. Therefore, it cannot bind the state proprio vigore.  It  was argued  by Shri Dhingra that the State could have  moved  by way of appeal or review and got the order set aside if there was  ground and that not having done so it was bound by  the order.  As a matter of fact, the State, which is not a party to  the proceedings, does not have a right of  appeal.   The ordinary  rule  is  that only a party to  a  suit  adversely affected  by  the decree or any of  his  representatives-in-

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interest  may  file an appeal.  Under such  circumstances  a person  who  is not a party may prefer an  appeal  with  the leave  of the appellate court "if he would be  prejudicially affected  by the judgment and if it would be binding on  him as  res-judicata under Explanation 6 to s. 11." (see  Mulla- Civil  Procedure Code-13th edn vol. I, 421).  Section 82  of the  Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, which may perhaps be  invoked by a party even under the Act, also speaks ,of  applications by  any party interested.  Thus, no right of review  or  ,of appeal  under  s. 18 can be availed of by the  State  as  of right. If the State is not precluded from proving the invalidity of Annexure   ’A,   it  is  clear  that  the  said   order   is unsustainable.   Section 18 applies only to  tenants,  i.e., not  anyone who  claims to be, but legally is one.-Here  who has  granted  the lease ? Mst.  Lacchman?   How  could  she, after  gifting  away  to her daughter?  And  no  lease  from daughter Shanti is set up although obscurely both mother and ,daughter  are made respondents.  Secondly,  s.18  qualifies for purchase ,only those tenants who had 6 years  continuous occupation.  Here, on the Collectors finding, Amar Singh and Indraj came by possession ,only in 1957-58 and, as he points out in Annexure ’B’, the six year period is not complete  at the  time of application.  The reason why ,even  before  the proceedings  began  parties  presented  a  compromise   ,and avoided an enquiry is not far to seek.  In short, the  State could  and did make out the incompetence of the  respondents to  purchase  under  s.  18 and  Annexure  ’A’,  being  also stricken by the vice of s. 10-A (b) and (c). Shri   Dhingra  urged  that  s.18(1)(iii)  did   contemplate purchase  rights for persons who had no possession when  the Act  came  into force and their purchases  must  necessarily diminish  the  surplus area.   This  seeming  attractiveness vanishes when we notice that s.18(1) (ii) ,and (iii) provide for  two classes of hard cases where unjust evictions  prior to  the  Act coming into force had deprived  them  of  their rights.   For  all practical purposes the Act  clothes  them with  such  rights as they would have enjoyed had  they  not suffered  unjust evictions.  That is why specific  provision was made in s. 18 for them.  The exception proves the  rule. The   paramountcy  of  s.  10-A  cannot  be   subverted   by illegitimate use of the processes under s. 18. Purchases  under s. 18 being involuntary, s.  10-A(b)  would not  be  hit,  as it deals only  with  voluntary  transfers, according  to  Shri  Dhingra.  While  we  need  not  finally pronounce  on this argument, it is worthy of note  that  the expression  ’transfer’ is wide enough to cover transfers  by operation of law unless expressly excluded as 173 s. 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act.  Moreover,  special exclusions  to  save  transfers by way  of  inheritance  and compulsory  land acquisition by State have been  made  which would  have-been  supererogatory had  involuntary  transfers automatically gone out of the pate of s. 10-A(b). Another  argument was suggested that the order  even  though passed    on  a compromise was as valid and binding  as  one passed  on contest, May be that as a broad  proposition  one may  assent  to it.  But where a compromise goes  against  a public  policy  prescription  of a statute  or  a  mandatory direction  to  the  Court  to  decide  on  its  own  certain foundational  facts,  a razi cannot operate  to  defeat  the requirement  as,  specified or absolve the  court  from  the duty.   The resultant order will be ineffective.  After  all by  consent  or agreement, parties cannot  achieve  what  is contrary to law and a decree merely based on such  agreement

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cannot   furnish   a  judicial  amulet   against   statutory violation.   For,  ’by private agreement’ converted  into  a decree,  parties cannot empower themselves to do that  which they  could not have done by private agreement alone’.  (see Mulla,  C. P. C., vol.  II, P 1300).  The true rule is  that "the contract of the parties is not the less a contract, and subject  to  the incidents of a contract, because  there  is superadded  the command of the Judge".  The learned  author, Mulla,  in  his  Commentary  on  Order  XXIII  r.  3  (Civil Procedure   Code,  vol.  II,  pp.  1299-1300)   cites   many authorities for this proposition and observes               "If  a decree is passed under this rule  on  a               compromise  which  is not  lawful,  the  Court               should  not  enforce the decree  in  execution               proceedings.   Thus,  a  sale  of  an   office               attached to a temple is against public policy.               Hence, if in a suit against the holder of such               an  office a compromise is arrived at  whereby               the  holder  of  the office  consents  to  the               office being sold in satisfaction of the  debt               due  to the plaintiff, and a decree is  passed               on  the  compromise,  the  Court  should   not               withstanding the consent decree refuse to sell               the office in execution.  It is clear that  if               the  matter had rested in contract  only,  the               Court  could not have  enforced the sale in  a               suit brought for that purpose.  The mere  fact               that the contract is embodied in a decree does               not alter the incidents of the contract." it  may  be right to conclude that any authority,  like  the Collector  here,  enjoined to apply s. 10-A(b) and  (c)  may decline  to  act on a compromise which has ripened  into  an order  if  the  agreement between the  parties  disposes  of property  in violation of a statutory mandate.  He  can  and must lift the veil and look the agreement of the parties  in the  face.  The vice of contravention of s. 10-A(b) is  writ large in Annexure ’A.’ A  few decisions of this Court bearing on the efficiency  of consent  decrees  were  cited  at  the  bar  and  they   are exhaustively dealt with in Chari v. Seshadri(1).  The  other rulings  of this Court-all rendered under the  Rent  Control Law-are Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat(2) (1) [1973] 1 S.C.C. 761.    (2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432. 174 Kaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal(1), and Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal(2).   The  core principle or ratio that is  revealed  in these  cases is that in cases ,where a statute,  embodies  a public policy and consequentially prescribes the presence of some conditions for grant of reliefs,parties can not by-pass the  law by the exercise of a consent decree or  order,  and mere  judicial imprimaturs may not validate such  decree  or order  where  the  ,court or tribunal is not  seen  to  have applied  its mind to the existence ,Of those conditions  and reached  its affirmative conclusion thereon.  Such  mindless orders are a nullity but where the stage of the proceedings, the  materials  on record and/or the recitals  in  the  razi disclose the application of the judicial mind, the order  is beyond  collateral attack merely on the score that  it  does not ritualistically write into ,the judgment what is  needed by the statute.  The important facet of the law clarified in these  decisions  is  that where high  public  policy  finds expression in socioeconomic legislation contractual  arrange merits   between  interested  individuals  sanctified   into consent or compromise decrees or orders cannot be binding on instrumentalities  of the State called upon to  enforce  the

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statute, although the tribunals enjoined to enforce the  law may  take probative note of the recitals in such  compromise or  consent  statements  in proof of facts  on  which  their jurisdictions  may have to be exercised.  Further, if  there is  no  evidence  either by way  of  admissions  in  consent statements and razis or otherwise on the record, the reliefs sanctioned  by the statute cannot be granted and  orders  or decrees which purport to grant them sans proof of the  legal requirements will be a nullity. In  Kaushalya  Devi  v.  K. L.  Bansal  (1)  the  Court  was concerned  with a suit for eviction under the  Rent  Control law.   On  being satisfied about the statutory  grounds  the Court  could decree possession.  The plaintiff set  out  two grounds both of which were, denied in the written statement. When  the pleadings of the landlord and the tenant  were  in this  state, both parties filed a compromise memo in and  by which  they  agreed to the passing of a decree  of  eviction against the tenant.  Representations to the same effect were also made by the counsel for both parties.  The court passed the following order :               "  In  view of the statement  of  the  parties               counsel  and the written compromise, a  decree               is passed in favour of the plaintiff.  against               the defendant." The  tenant  did  not vacate the premises  within  the  time mentioned as per the compromise memo.  On the other hand, he filed an application under s. 47, C.P.C., pleading that  the decree  is  void as being in contravention of s. 13  of  the Delhi  statute.  The High Court held ’that the decree was  a nullity, as the order was passed solely on the basis of  the compromise  without  indicating that any  of  the  statutory grounds mentioned in s. 13 existed.  Following the  decision in Bahadur singh v. Muni  Subrat(supra), this  Court  upheld the order of the High Court. In Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal(2), the landlord’s grounds for eviction  were  denied  by  the  tenant  but  they  reported compromise  with  prayer for a decree  for  eviction.   This Court ruled (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048,    (2) [1970] 3 S.C.C. 181. 175               "From the facts mentioned earlier, it is  seen               that at no stage, the Court was called upon to               apply  its mind to the question  wheather  the               alleged  ’subletting  is true or  not.   Order               made by it does not show that it was satisfied               that  the subletting complained of  has  taken               place,  nor  is there any  other  material  on               record to show that it was so satisfied. it is               clear  from  the  record that  the  court  had               proceeded   solely   on  the  basis   of   the               compromise  arrived  at between  the  parties.               That  being so there can be hardly  any  doubt               that  the court was not competent to pass  the               impugned  decree.   Hence  the  decree   under               execution must be held to be a nullity." In both these cases the decrees based solely on the razi and without the courts applying their mind, were a nullity.  The order  of  the  Assistant  Collector,  Annexure  ’A’,  bears resemblance  to  the situation in these two cases.   On  the other  hand  K.  K.  Chari’s case  (supra)  is  a  study  in contrast.   There  was  plethora of evidence  to  prove  the ground of eviction and the court directed eviction based  on the terms of the compromise and after making a reference  to the   provisions  for  eviction.   Vaidialingam,   J.,   has explained this aspect elaborately.

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The order, Annexure ’A’, was passed before evidence was  let in  because  even before the trial  began  parties  reported compromise and gave statement accordingly.  Not a word is to be  found  in  the  order   indicating,  the  court’s   mind adverting  to  the  requirements of s. 18 of  the  Act;  the contrary  being  the  evidence.  Indeed,  unlike  in  K.  K. Chari’s  case,  no material existed on record to  warrant  a finding (a) regarding the tenancy, (b) continuous occupation for  over  6 years, (c) the surplus area  being  unaffected. Nor  even  recitals  amounting to  admissions  on  facts  of entitlement to purchase were made.  The order was a nullity, denuded  of  evidence  and  absent  judicial   satisfaction. Strictly  speaking, collusive razis cannot affect the  State which has the right to utilise surplus lands for re-settling tenants.   Certain proceedings, e.g. election petitions  and actions  under s. 92, C.P.C., once set in motion,  transcend private interests and public authorities cannot pass  orders on  collusive  representations  without  regard  to   public interest or independent satisfaction.  Annexure ’A’ ex facie was  a  nullity.   It  is  unfortunate  that  the  Assistant Collector   has,  with  insipient  insouciance,   lent   his authority to a compromise, where care and  conscientiousness would  have  averted  the  error.   We  are  satisfied  that Annexure  ’A’  is  unavailing  against  the  State  and  its officers  in accommodating ejected tenants on the  lands  in question.  The public policy of s. 10-A cannot be  outwitted by  consent  orders calculated to defeat the  provision  and without  the  statutory authority charged with  the  enquiry being satisfied about the bona fides of and eligibility  for the  purchase.  So viewed, the respondents in these  appeals cannot on the strength of the purchase orders exclude  those lands from the operation of s. 10-A(a) of the Act. The legislature, charged with the constitutional mandate  of art.  38 and art. 39 has passed the Act and amended it  from time  to  time  in  furtherance  of  the  major  purpose  of distributive  justice.   The  judicial wing  of  the  State, viewing the law in the same wavelength, 176 interprets    and   applies   it.    But    the    Executive instrumentality of the State has an activist role to play if the arm of the law were not to hang limp and social  justice is  not  to  be a cynical phrase.   Good  laws  and  correct interpretations  are not enough.  Quick,  conscientious  and public minded enforcement, of the provisions is the  respon- sibility  of  Government and its officers.  In  the  present case  the  Assistant Collector’& order,  Annexure  ’A’,  has fortified an attempted fraud on the statute.  It was  stated at  the  Bar  that a score  of  years  notwithstanding,  the processes of fixing reserved areas and surplus areas on  the strength  of which alone conferment of proprietory right  on tenants and re-settlement of ejected tenants could, proceed, are still lingering.  If this is true Government has much to answer for and litigation a bounds where delays in executive enforcement  occur. We expect that this land reform  measure will  not  be a slow motion picture but  a  strictand  swift procedure  so  that  parties affected may  know  where  they stand.   There is an ’executive’ dimension to  law’s  delays which  defeats the rule of law.  It must be remembered  that the third reading of a bill and the last appeal in court are not  the  final scene in the drama of law  and  society.   A post-audit  on  the enforcement of social  legislation,  all social scientists will agree, is a material aspect of law in action, inter-alia to avoid the administrative cutting  edge of the law becoming blunt. With  these hopeful observations we allow the State  appeals

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but  we  direct that in the circumstance parties  will  bear their costs throughout. SARKARIA J.-I have gone through the judgment prepared by  my learned  brother,  Krishna  lyer J.  Since  I  cannot  fully subscribe  to  the reasoning and the view taken  therein,  I have thought it fit to record my own opinion separately. These   two  appeals  (Nos.  1755  and  1756  of  1967)   on certificate granted under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution by the Punjab High Court, raise questions with regard to the interpretation  and  interrelationship of the  provision  of Sections 2(5-a), 10-A and 18 of the Punjab Security of  Land Tenures Act (X of 1953) (for short, the Act).  The questions for determination, as formulated by the High Court, are :               "(i)  Whether  the  expression  "transfer"  or               "other  disposition of land" in clause (b)  of               section 10-A of the Act., includes involuntary               transfer of a part of the holding of a landow-               ner  by  operation  of  anorder  forcing   the               landowner  to cell a part of his holding to  a               tenant under section 18 of the Act;               (ii)   Whether   the  order  of   any   "other               authority"  referred  to  in  clause  (c)   of               section  10-A of the Act includes an order  of               the  authorities under the Act  itself  passed               under  section  18  thereof  in  favour  of  a               tenant, which order has become final either at               its original stage or at the appellate or  re-               visional stage; and 177               (iii) In case of conflict between section 10-A               and  section 18 of the Act, which of  the  two               provisions has supervening effect or overrides               the other." To  the above, I may add a fourth question which  arises  in Amar  Singh’s  case (C.A. 1755 of 1967) and has  been  dealt with by the High Court.               (iv) Whether any land held by tenants on April               15, 1953 within the permissible area of  those               tenants, can be included in the ’surplus area’               of the landowner, if, at the time the  surplus               area  collector takes up the determination  of               the matter, that land is found to be comprised               in  the  tenancy  of persons  other  than  the               original tenants."               The material facts are these: On  April  15,  1953  when the Act  came  into  force,  Smt. Lachhman (hereinafter referred to as the ’landowner’)  owned 101 .6 standard acres, equivalent to 404.10 ordinary  acres, of  land  in the revenue, estates of two  villages,  namely, Darba  Kalan  and Nahran Wali.  Out of this holding  of  the landowner,  we are concerned only with Field Nos.  177,  265 and  343,  situate  in  the area of  Darba  Kalan.   On  the determinative date (April 15, 1953), Field No. 177 measuring 64 bighas and 12 biswas which is the subject matter of C. A. 1756/67,  was in the personal cultivation of the  landowner, while  Field  Nos. 265 and 343, measuring 67 bighas  and  19 biswas  were in the occupation of two tenants,  namely,  Sri Chand and Nathu. It  is not clear from the record whether the  landowner  had made the reservation or selection of her permissible area in the prescribed manner, within time.  But the learned Counsel for  the parties before us are agreed that Field  Nos.  265, 343  and 177 in question do not form a part of her  reserved or permissible area. It  appears from the Surplus Area Collector’s order that  in

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1955  (vide mutation No. 144), the landowner tried  to  gift this  land  in favour of her daughter Shanti Devi,  who,  in turn, attempted to sell the same to her husband, Amar Singh, and  the latter’s brother, Indraj.  These  alienations  were ignored by the Surplus Area collector as per his order dated April  24,  1961, while declaring the surplus  area  of  the landowner.   Against  that order, Amar  Singh  and.   Indraj carried  an appeal to the Commissioner.  The landowner  also preferred a separats appeal. On  May 2, 1961, Amar Singh made an application under a.  18 of  the Act before the Assistant Collector, 1st  Grade,  for purchase of the land comprised in Field Nos. 265 and 343, on the ground that he has been in its continuous occupation  as a  tenant for the requisite period.  A  similar  application was  made on the same date, by his brother, Indraj, for  the purchase  of  Field No. 177.  After serving  notice  on  all concerned, Shri Hardyal Singh, Assistant Collector 1st Grade allowed  these  applications on September 15, 1961,  on  the basis  of  a  compromise  between  the  applicants  and  the landowner.   In  compliance  with that  order,  Amar  Singh, deposited in the Treasury,. 178 Rs. 13,590/- which had been determined as the purchase price by  the said Collector.  Indraj also in his  case  deposited the  price  assessed by the Collector, The effect  of  these proceedings  and  the order of the Collector was  that  Amar Singh and Indraj the tenants, in the words of s. 18, itself, "shall be deemed to have become the owners of the land". The Commissioner on December 21, 1961, taking notice of  the statutory purchases of these fields by Amar Singh and Indraj under  s. 18, allowed their appeal and remanded the case  to the  Collector  for de novo enquiry regarding  the  area  in occupation  of  Amar Singh and Indraj as tenants  under  the landowner. After the remand, in the course of de novo enquiry, the same Officer,  Shri  Hardyal Singh, as Collector,  Surplus  Area, passed  the impugned order, dated May 11, 1962,  whereby  he declared  408 .10 ordinary acres equal to 101  .61  standard acres as the surplus area of Smt.  Lachhman and included  in that area the land in question (comprised in Field Nos. 265, 343  and 177) of which according to his earlier  order  Amar Singh  and Indraj were deemed to have become owners by  pur- chase  under s. 18.  He ignored his order,  dated  September 15,  1961 on the ground that Amar Singh and Indraj  has  not been in continuous occupation of these fields as tenants for the full terms of six years and that "in fact the  landowner has  conspired  with  her son-in-law, Amar  Singh,  and  his brother, Indraj, to retain this area in contravention of the law".  It was added that the said order was based on a  com- promise and was a "collusive one". Amar  Singh  and Indraj filed two  separate  writ  petitions under  Art. 226 of the constitution for the grant of a  writ of certiorari for bringing up and quashing the order,  dated May  11, 1962, of the Surplus Area Collector and for a  writ of Mandamus directing the respondent State not to dispossess them from the fields purchased by them under s. 18. The  High  Court by its common Judgment,  dated  October  4, 1966,  answered  the three questions referred to  above.  as under               "(i)  The  expression  "transfer"  and  "other               disposition  of land in clause (b) of  section               10-A  of the Panjab Security of  Land  Tenures               Act 10 of 1953, do not include completed sales               effected tinder s. 18 of the Act ;               (ii)  In exercise of the powers  conferred  by

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             clause  (c)  of section 10-A of the  Act,  the               authorities under the Act cannot exclude  from               consideration     and     order     of     the               Assistant Collector or Collector under section               18 of the Act, where by a part of the  holding               of the landowner has vested absolutely in  the               erstwhile tenant; and               (iii)  If any conflict were  detected  between               section  10-A and section 18 of the  Act,  the               special  provision  or law  contained  in  the               latter section would override the earlier  and               general provision." 179 Regarding  Question (iv) in Amar Singh’s case, it  was  held that  since Field Nos. 265 and 343 were, on April 15,  1953, comprised  in the tenancy of Sri Chand and Nathu as part  of their  permissible  area,  they could not, in  view  of  the definition  given in s. 2 (5-a), be included in the  surplus area  of  the landowner, and the subsequent  change  of  the holder  of the tenancy did not make the tenancy land  revert to the Surplus Area.  That was, according to the High Court, an  additional reason why s. 10-A was not attracted in  Amar Singh’s case. In  order that the questions raised in these appeals may  be considered  in  the proper perspective, it is  necessary  to notice  briefly  the  object, the scheme  and  the  relevant provisions of the Act. Chronologically, the Act is not the first measure enacted by the  State  to  give  effect to  its  policy  of  abolishing intermediaries and regulation of agricultural tenancies with the object of securing tenure or procuring ownership of land to  the  tiller.   The first piece of  legislation  was  the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950.  The contours of the concepts "permissible area" and "reserved area" first made  their appearance in this statute.  Under that  Act,  a landowner was entitled to reserve 100 standard acres for his self-cultivation  ; and the protection against eviction  was not available to tenants on the reserved area.  The 1950 Act was amended by Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Amendment Act, 1951 which reduced the permissible area of a  landowner to 50 standard acres, and extended the tenure of the tenants from 4 to 5 years. The Acts of 1950 and 1951, were repealed and replaced by Act 10  of 1953 with which we are concerned.  The preamble  says that  the Act is a piece of legislation "to provide for  the security of land tenure and other incidental matters".   The Act classifies landowners into "small landowners" and "other landowners".   A  "small landowner" as defined in  s.  2(2), means  a  landowner whose entire land does  not  exceed  the "permissible area".  Owners other than small landowners fall in the second category.  "Landowner" means a person  defined as  such in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act  XVII  of 1887)  and  also  includes an  "allottee"  and  "lessee"  as defined in clauses (b) and (c) respectively, of section 2 of the  East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Resettlement)  Act, 1949.   Under  the  Explanation  added  to  the  clause,   a mortgagee, in respect of the land mortgaged with  possession is  also  to be deemed a ’landowner’.   "Landowner"  is  not comprehensively defined in the Land Revenue Act, clause  (2) of  Sec. 3 of that Act makes it clear that "landowner"  does not  include a tenant.  Thus, it is to be noted that  lesses from the landowner (being other than those falling under  s. 2(e) of the Land Resettlement Act, 1949) do not come  within the definition of "landowner-" given in the Act. The  fivefold object of the Act., endorsed by Subba  Rao  J.

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(as he then-was) speaking for this Court in Gurbax Singh  v. State of Punjab(1) is to- (1) [1967] 1,S.C. R. 926. 180 (i)  provide  a permissible area of 30 standard acres  to  a landowner/tenant which he can retain for self cultiation (ii) provide security of tenure to tenants by reducing their liability to ejectment as specified in s. 9 ; (iii)  ascertain surplus areas and ensure  re-settlement  of ejected tenants on those areas ; (iv) fix maximum rent payable by tenants ; and (v) confer rights on tenants to pre-empt and purchase  their tenancies in certain circumstances. We  are primarily concerned with the provisions relating  to (i),  (iii)  and (v).  What is to be borne in mind  is  that while self-contained and comprehensive provisions in Section 17 and 18 for effective achievement of object (v) were  made from  the  very inception of the Act, object (iii)  did  not assume  shape  and contant till Punjab Act XI  of  1955  was enacted. The  concepts  ’permissible area’ and ’reserved  area’  were reshaped  by  the  Act  of  1953.   ’Persmissible  area’  in relation to a landowner or a tenant has been defined to mean "30  standard  acres and where such 30  standard  acres  are being converted into ordinary acres exceed 50 acres, such 60 acres".   ’Reserved area’ as defined in s. 2(4)  mean  "area lawfully  reserved  under the Punjab  Tenants  (Security  of Tenure)  Act,  1950  (Act  XXII  of  1950),  as  amended  by President’s  Act  of 1951, hereinafter referred  to  as  the "1950-Act or under this Act". "Reserved  area" is dealt with in sections 2, 5, 5-B, 9  and 18 of the Act. Section  5  lays down that "any landowner who owns  land  in excess of the permissible area may reserve out of the entire land  held by him in the State of Punjab as  landowner,  any parcel  or  parcels not exceeding the  permissible  area  by intimating this selection in the prescribed form and  manner to  the patwari of the estate in which the land reserved  is situate  or  to such other authority as  may  be  prescribed within  six months from the date of the commencement of  the Act".   Since, for one reason or the other  many  landowners could  not  exercise their right of reservation  within  the period  of  six  months originally fixed by  the  1953  Act, Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C were inserted by the Amending  Act 46  of  1957  which came into force on  December  20,  1957. Section  5-B enacts that "a landowner who has not  exercised his  right  of reservation under this Act,  may  select  his permissible   area  and  intimate  the  selection   to   the prescribed authority within the period specified in sec. 5-A and  in  such  form and manner as  may  be  prescribed.  The requisite   form   was  prescribed  by   Punjab   Government Notification No. 3223-LR-11-57/1624 published in the Gazette Extraordinary  of March 22, 1958, consequently, a  landowner could make the selection of his permissible area within  six months of date. In Gurbax Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), this Court  held that ,selection’ in s. 5-B is similar to ’reservation’ in s. 5 and that, in terms, 181 s.  5-B  gives  the landowner another  chance  to  make  the reservation if he had not exercised his right of reservation earlier  under s.5. It was clarified that "reservation"  and "selection"  involve  the same process and indeed,  to  some extent,  they are convertible, for, one can reserve land  by selection and another select land by reservation.

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Thus if the right of selection is exercised under s. 5-B, by the  landowner,  his  permissible  area  would  become   his ’reserved  area’;  to that extent, the  two  concepts  would represent one and the same thing. The next provision to be noticed is in s. 9 which says inter alia that ’no landowner shall be competent to eject a tenant except  when  such tenant is a tenant on the  area  reserved under  this Act or. is a tenant of a small landowner".   Its sub-s. (2) provides that "notwithstanding anything contained hereinbefore  a  tenant shall also be liable to  be  ejected from  any  area which he holds in any capacity  whatever  in excess of the permissible area." Before proceeding to s. 18, it will be proper at this  stage to  advert to the concept "surplus area".  This concept  was born  in  1955  when Act XI of that  year  inserted  in  the principal  Act general provisions including s. 2(5-a)  which (as modified by a subsequent Act) runs thus:               "Surplus  area" means the area other than  the               reserved  area, and, where, no area  has  been               reserved,   the   area  in   excess   of   the               permissible area selected under s. 5-B or  the               area which is deemed to be surplus area  under               (1)  of section 5-C (and includes the area  in               excess of the permissible area selected  under               section  19-B)  but  it  will  not  include  a               tenant’s permissible area;               Provided  that  it will include  the  reserved               area, or part thereof, where such area or part               has  not been brought  under  self-cultivation               within  six  months of reserving the  same  or               getting  possession thereof after  ejecting  a               tenant from it, whichever is later, or if  the               landowner  admits a new tenant,  within  three               years of the expiry of the said six months:                      (emphasis supplied). This  definition  will be considered further  while  dealing with proposition (iv).  At this place it will be  sufficient to  have  a  general  idea  of  the  inter-relationship   of "permissible area" and ",surplus area", and the right of the landowner  to deal with the surplus area.  A full  Bench  of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri,  (1) speaking  through  Mehar Singh C. J. summed  up  the  inter- connection between these concepts thus:               "According to these provisions (of sections 5,               5-A  5-B,  5-C read with Rule 6  of  the  1956               Rules  framed under the Act) a landowner or  a               tenant who has more than 30 standard acres  of               land has to select or reserve his  permissible               area  and the excess is available  as  surplus               area.   The Collector attending to such  cases               has  to  determine, therefore,  three  things;               (a), the permissible (1) (1970) LXXII PLR 882. 182               area of a landowner, (b) the permissible  area               of  a tenant, and (c) the surplus  area.   The               details for the determination of these matters               are to be found in 1956 Rules Rule 6 is really               material No doubt in the Act,there is    no               specific provision which says that a  decision               has  to  be given by any authority  whether  a               permissible  area has or has not been  rightly               reserved or selected by a landowner or  tenant               concerned, but when the provisions of the  Act               with  the  rules are  considered,  it  becomes

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             plain that while determining the surplus  area               with  a landowner or a tenant the question  of               his permissible area comes to be determined so               that, if there is a question in regard to  the               validity   of  reservation  or  selection   of               permissible    area,   it   must   come    for               consideration  before  the Collector  when  he               disposes  of the surplus area of a  particular               landowner or tenant......."                             (Parenthesis added). Declaration  of ’surplus area’ does not have the  effect  of expropriating  the landowner of that area.  The only  effect of  such declaration is that the Government gets a right  to utilize  the  surplus are, if necessary, for  settlement  of ejected  tenants.  The tenants, thus settled on the  surplus land  become by operation of law, the tenants of  the  land- owner.   They are bound under the rules, to attorn  and  pay rent  to  the landowner.  The latter’s rights  of  ownership remain  intact,  who is even entitled to evict  the  settled tenants in certain contingencies specified in the Act.   The landowner’s  right to transfer the surplus area is also  not taken  away, but the transferee even if a small  landowner,- will  not  be rid of the liability  to  accommodate  evicted tenants  whom the Government may wish to resettle  under  s. 10-A(a).   The  Act  does not take away  the  right  of  the landowner  to induct tenants on such area, or the rights  of the tenants so inducted, to purchase the land under s. 18 if it has continuously remained comprised in their tenancy  for the requisite period. Section 9(1) (i) provides for eviction of a tenant from  the area  of  a landowner reserved under the Act.   Section  9-A safeguards  such  a  tenant  against  dispossession  of  his tenancy so long as he is not accommodated on a surplus  area or other land by the State Government.  There is a  positive indication in the 2nd proviso to s. 9-A that a landowner has a  right  to  induct  tenants on his  land  even  after  the commencement  of  the  Act.  The Proviso  says  "that  if  a tenancy  commences after the commencement of this  Act,  and the  tenant is also an owner and is related to his  landlord in  the manner prescribed, he shall not be entitled  to  the benefit of this section".- Now  let  us have a close look at the provisions of  s.  18, which, as amended by Punjab Act 11 of 1955 runs thus:               "18   (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  to   the               contrary   contained  in  any  law  usage   or               contract,  a tenant of a landowner other  than               small landowner-               (i)  who has been in continuous occupation  of               the  land  comprised  in  his  tenancy  for  a               minimum period of six years, or 183               (ii)  who  has been restored  to  his  tenancy               under  the  provisions of this Act  and  whose               periods of continuous               occupation  of  the  land  comprised  in   his               tenancy   immediately  before  ejectment   and               immediately  after restoration of his  tenancy               together amount to six years or more, Or               (iii)  who was ejected from his tenancy  after               the  14th  day of August 1947 and  before  the               commencement  of  this  Act, and  who  was  in               continuous occupation of the land comprised in               his tenancy for a period of six years or  more               immediately before his ejectment,. shall be entitled to purchase from the landowner the land so

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held  by  him but not included in the reserved area  of  the landowner, in the case of a tenant falling within  clause(i) or clause (ii) at  any  time, and in the case  of  a  tenant falling within clause (iii)within a period of one year  from the date of the commencement of this Act; Provided.. Provided further....               (2) A tenant desirous of purchasing land under               subsection  (1) shall make an  application  in               writing  to  an Assistant Collector  of  First               Grade  having jurisdiction over the land  con-               cerned  , and the Assistant  Collector,  after               giving  notice  to the landowner  and  to  all               other persons interested in the land and after               making  such inquiry as he thinks  fit,  shall               determine  (formerly the word was  ’fix,)  the               average  of the prices obtaining  for  similar                             land   in   the  locality   during   1 0   years               immediately  preceding the date on  which  the               application is made.               3.          xxx      xx          xx               4(a)       xxx      xxx            xx               (b)  On  the  purchase  price  or  the   first               instalment thereof, as the case may be,  being               deposited, the tenant shall be deemed to  have               become   the:owner  of  the  land,   and   the               Assistant Collector shall where the tenant  is               not already in possession, and subject to  the               provisions  of the Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI  of               1887) put him in possession thereof..               (C)            x                x               (5) to (7)  x             x" This  section  is  the  keystone of  the  arch  of  peasant- proprietors’ complex which the Act seeks to build.  The non- obstante clause with which the section starts, indicates the overriding operation of its provisions.  It provides a self- sufficing  machinery  enabling tenants,  to  purchase  lands comprised   in  their  tenancies.   Broadly  speaking,   the existence of three conditions is necessary for the  exercise of  this right.  They are: (a) the landowner whose  area  is sought  to be purchased is not a ’small landowner’ i.e.  one owning  less  than  30 standard acres. (b) the  land  to  be purchased does not form a part of the ’reserved 184 area’ of the landlord which has become fixed by  reservation under s. 5, or selection under s. 5-D; (c) the applicant has been in continuous Occupation of the land, as a tenant,  for a  period  of  six  years  or  more  on  the.  date  of  the application. For  our purpose, condition (b) is the most  important.   By excluding  a landowner’s reserved permissible area from  the operation of s. 18, it confines a tenant’s right of purchase to that land which either falls within the ’surplus area’ of the  landowner,  or,  was  on  April  15,  1953  within  the ’permissible area’ of that tenant. As  observed  by  this  Court  in  Sahib  Ram_v.   Financial Commissioner Punjab and Ors.(1)               "Under  s. 18(1) three categories  of  tenants               have  been given a right to purchase from  the               landowner the land so held by him.  They are :               (i)  a  tenant  who  has  been  in  continuous               occupation of the land for a minimum period of               six years ;               (ii)  a tenant restored to his  tenancy  under

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             the   Act  and  whose  period  of   continuous                             occupation of the land comprised in hi s tenancy               immediately   before   ejectment   and   after               restoration amounts to six years or more and               (iii)  a  tenant  who  was  ejected  from  his               tenancy after-August 14, 1947 and before April               15, 1953, and who was in continuous occupation               of  the  land comprised in his tenancy  for  a               period of six years or more immediately before               his ejectment." Category  (iii)  has become extinct and clause (iii)  of  s. 18(1) has become redundant because the exercise of the right of purchase by this category was limited to a period of  one year, only, after the commencement of the Act.  Only a small number  of  cases  fall under category (ii).   Most  of  the tenant-purchasers  belong  to  category  (i)  which  may  be further divided into these sub-categories : (a)  Tenants  who  were on the land on April  15,  1953  and continued  to  be in occupation of their land  for  the  re- quisite period upto the date of the application ; (b)  Tenants  who were inducted on the surplus area  by  the landowner  sometime  after the determinative  date  and  who thereafter remained in continuous occupation of the land for the requisite term ; (c)  Tenants who were resettled on the surplus area  by  the Government, and thereafter remained in continuous occupation of  the  land  for the requisite period.Quite  a  number  of tenants who invoke s. 18, come under sub-category (b).In the instant case, Amar Singh and Indraj are tenants (1)  [1970] 3 S. C. R. 796 at p. 805. 185 of  this  sub-category.  In Sahib Ram’s case  (supra)  also, this  Court was dealing with a case of tenants of this  sub- category.    Vaidialingam   J.  speaking  for   the   Court, enunciated the law on the point, thus               "So   far  as  we  could  see  there   is   no               prohibition   under   the  Act   placing   any               restrictions   against   the  right   of   the               landowner  creating  new tenancies  after  the               date of the Act.  In fact, the second  proviso               to  s. 9-A clearly indicates to the  contrary.               It  deals with contingency of  tenancy  coming               into force after the commencement of the Act.               Section  18(1)(ii) gives a right to tenant  to               purchase  the  land and that right has  to  be               examined  when an application under s.  18  is               made  and cannot be deemed on the ground  that               he was not a tenant for more than six years on               April 15, 1953.  There is no limitation placed               under  clause (i) of s. 18(1) that the  tenant               who exercises his right should be a tenant  on               the  date  of the Act or that be  should  have               completed the period of six years on April 15.               1953 and there is no warrant for reading in s.               18(1)(i)  clauses which it does  not  contain.               It  is enough if the continuous period of  six                             years  has been completed on the date when  the               tenant  files the application for purchase  of               the land". The  Validity  or otherwise of the orders of  purchase  made under  s.  18 by the Collector in favour of Amar  Singh  and Indraj will be discussed a little later, at its  appropriate place.   Suffice  it to say here, that in view  of  the  law

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settled  in Sahib Ram’s case (supra), Amar Singh and  Indraj provided  the  other  conditions  were  satisfied-would   be entitled  to purchase the land comprised in their  tenancies notwithstanding  the fact that the said land was a  part  of the  surplus area of the landowner and these tenancies  were created by her after April 15, 1953. It will now be appropriate to examine s. 10-A.  It is one of the question.  It reads               10--A (a) The State Government or any  Officer               empowered  by  it  in this  behalf,  shall  be               competent  to utilise any surplus area or  the               resettlement  of  tenants ejected,  or  to  be               ejected,  under clause (i) of sub-section  (1)               of section 9.               (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in  any               other  law for, the time being in  force,  and               (save  in  the case of land  acquired  by  the               State  Government under any law for  the  time               being in force or by any heir by  inheritance)               no transfer or other disposition of land which               is   comprised  in  a  surplus  area  at   the               commencement  of  this Act, shall  affect  the               utilization thereof in clause (a).               Explanation--Such  utilization of any  surplus               area   will-not  affect  the  right   of   the               landowner  to receive rent from the tenant  so               settled. 186               (c)  ’For the purposes of determining  surplus               area  of  any person under this  section,  any               judgment, decree or order of a court or  other               authority, obtained after the commencement  of               this  Act and having the effect of  dimnishing               the area of such person which could have  been               declared   as  his  surplus  area   shall   be               ignored." Section  10-A with its sub-clauses (a) and (b) was added  by Punjab  Act XI of 1955.  Punjab Act 4 of 1959  inserted  the saving  clause (within brackets) in clause (b) Later  Punjab Act  14 of 1962, inserted clause (c) and gave  retrospective effect to all the provisions of s. 10-A from April 15, 1953. The Statement of Objects and Reasons published in the Punjab Gazette Extraordinary on April 16, 1955, lists among others, the main objects of Act XI of 1955 :               "to prevent large scale ejectment of  tenants.               to introduce new concepts of surplus area  and               its  utilization by the State  Government  for                             the  resettlement  of ejected tenants  ....  to               coordinate the ejectment of tenants with their               resettlement  on surplus area .... to  prevent               sales and other dispositions of land adversely               affecting the continuance of tenancies and the               extent  of available surplus area ; to  reduce               the  period (from 12 to 6 years)  entitling  a               tenant  to purchase the land comprised in  his               tenancy  and  to provide for easier  terms  of               purchase and other incidental matters. The  professed object of the concept of "Surplus  area"  and resettling   ejected   tenants  on  such  area   finds   its manifestation in the insertion of s.2(5-A) and S. 10-A(a)  ; while  the  object of entitling tenants  to  purchase  their tenancy lands on easier terms is reflected in the amendments made in s. 18. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons  published

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in  Punjab Gazette Extraordinary, dated April 27, 1962,  the main purpose the Amending Act 14, of 1962 was two-fold : the First was to neutralize the effect of certain decisions  and to  plug the loopholes revealed in the interpretation  among others,of  sections  2(5-a), 6, 10-A (b), 18,  19-B.   Among those  decisions  was  one  of  the  Financial  Commissioner holding that section 6 did not protect the claim of  tenants under  section  18  to purchase the  proprietary  rights  in respect of the land held by them in tenancy.  The second was to  ignore in computing the surplus area "decrees of  courts for diminishing the surplus area" which "interested persons, being  relatives,  have obtained." "in order  to  evade  the provisions  of Section 10-A the parent Act".  That  was  why clause (c) was inserted in s. 10-A. I have referred in extenso to the Objects and Reasons  which led  to these Amendments to show that while the  Legislature was  anxious  to  preserve surplus area  for  settlement  of evicted tenants and for that purpose enacted S. 10A, it  did not  in  its wisdom, think it fit, to curtail the  ambit  of s.18  so as to exclude tenants inducted by the landowner  on the surplus area from purchasing their tenancy lands through the  mechinery  of  this section.  So far as  the  right  to purchase their 187 tenancies  is concerned, tenants inducted by  the  landowner and’ tenants settled by the Government, on the surplus area, remain  on  an, equal footing.  The Amendments  did  not  in relation  to  the  new Section 10-A, relegate  s.  18  to  a position of "subordinate alliance".. The non-obstante clause of s. 18 has not been touched.  Indeed, the amendments of s. 18 inter alia, by providing for easier terms of purchase and reducing the qualifying period from 12 to 6 years, have made the  machinery of the section more comprehensive,  efficient and  attractive  for tenants desirous  of  purchasing  their tenancies. The Amendments have not changed the basic scheme of the Act, according  to  which,  the jurisdiction  of  the  Prescribed Authority  assessing the surplus area under ss. 5-B and  5-C read  with Rule 6 of the 1956.  Rules, and acting  under  S. 10-A  is distinct and separate from the jurisdiction of  the Assistant  Collector 1st Grade dealing with  an  application under s. 18.  "Collector" has been defined by Rule  2(iii-A) of the 1956 Rules, to mean "the Collector of the district or any other officer not below the rank of Assistant  Collector 1st Grade empowered in this behalf by Government". (emphasis supplied)  Rule 4-B provides that the  Prescribed  Authority for the purposes of Section 5B(12) and Section 5-C shall  be (i)  the  Collector  if  the lands  owned  or  held  by  the landowner  or tenant are situate in one district : and  (ii) the Special Collector-as defined in Rule 2(iv)-if the  lands so  owned  or held are situated in more than  one  district. Section 18(2), however, confers the jurisdiction to try  and determine applications for purchase made under that  section specifically, on Assistant Collector of First Grade. An  order  of  the  Prescribed  Authority  made  under   the aforesaid’  provisions has been made appealable  under  Sub- Rule  (8)  of Rule 6 ;. whereas the provision in  regard  to appeal,  review  and  revision  against  an  order  of   the Assistant Collector First Grade made under s. 18, by  virtue of  Section 24 of the Act, the same as provided in ss.  80,, 81, 83 and 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. Section 80 of the Tenancy Act provides for "Appeals", s.  82 for "Review" and s. 84 for "Revisions".  Sections 81 and  83 of  that  Act  relate  to  limitation  and  computation   of limitation  for Appeals and applications for review.   Under

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s.  82 of Tenancy Act, Revenue Officers have the  powers  of reversing their own orders and those of their pre-decessors, if  no appeal against those orders has been filed.   In  the case of Assistant Collectors of all Grades, the exercise  of this power is always subject to the previous sanction of the Collector.   Though  a  period  of 90  days  for  making  an application for review is provided in sub-clause (b) of  the proviso  to  s. 82(1), yet no limitation has  been  provided within  which a Revenue Officer may suo moto review or  move for   sanction  to  review  an  order.   Under  s.  84   the Commissioner   and  the  Financial  Commissioner  have   the concurrent  revisional jurisdiction.  The revisional  powers of the Financial Commissioner unders. 84 are in no way  less extensive than those of the High Court under 115 of the Code of  Civil Procedure.  In a sense, his revisional powers  are wider.   He has power to revise an order against  which  an. appeal lies (gee Amir Chand v. State of Haryana (1)  decided by a Division (1) 1971 P.L.J. 449. 188 Bench  of the Punjab and Haryana High  Court.   No.statutory limitation  for making an application for revision has  been provided, but as a matter of practice the revision-petitions are  ordinarily  not entertained after a period of  90  days unless  sufficient  cause  for  the  delay  is  shown.   The Financial Commissioner can interfere in revision suo moto at any time, if the circumstances of the case so warrant. There  is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed  thereunder or in tie Tenancy Act saying as to who can file an appeal or revision  against  the decision or order  of  the  Collector exercising  jurisdiction  under s. 18.  But in view  of  the long  array  of  judicial decisions including  that  of  the Financial Commissioner, there can be no doubt that the State Government   or  its  Department  can,  if   aggrieved,   or prejudiced  by  such a decision, go in  appeal  or  revision against it. Firstly  there is a catena of authorities  which,  following the  doctrine  of Lindley L.J. in  re  Securities  Insurance Co.(1)  have laid down the rule that a person who is  not  a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the  Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he’ "is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected  by  it." As a rule, leave to appeal  will  not  be refused  to a person who might have been made ex  nominee  a party-see   Province   of   Bombay  V.   W.   1   Automobile Association(2)  Heera  Singh v. Veerka(3) and  Shivaraja  v. Siddamma(4);  Executive Officer v. Raghavan Pillai(5) In  re B. an Infant (6); Govinda Menon v. Madhavan.  Nair (7). Secondly, the ruling of the Financial Commissioner in Punjab ,State  v. Dr. lqbal Singh (8), which is binding on all  the authorities  and  Revenue Officers  exercising  jurisdiction under  the Act clinches the matter.  There the  decision  of the Special Collector declaring surplus area was reversed by the Additional Commissioner.  The State, filed against  that decision of the Additional Commissioner, a revision petition before the Financial Commissioner.  Objection was taken with regard to the competency of the State to file that petition, on two grounds : (i)  that  the  order was appealable and  the  revision  was incompetent and; (ii)  that  the  State  was not  a  party  to  the  original proceeding. The  Financial  Commissioner  treated  the  revision  as  an appeal, and ,overruled the objection in these terms "The  argument  on behalf of the Respondents  overlooks  the

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fact  that  the  Revenue Officers act  in  a  quasi-judicial capacity  deciding  such cases and if the  Punjab  State  is aggrieved by their orders it is as much entitled to  contest them  through  a remedy provided under the  law  as  private parties  arc.  In fact. there will be no  justification  for discrimination against the Punjab (1)  [1894] 2 Ch. 410. (3)  A.I.R. 1958 Raj. 181. (5)  A.I.R. 1961 Kerala 114. (7)  A.I.R. 1964 Kerala 235(DB). (2)  A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 141. (4)  A.I.R. 1963 Mys. 127. (6)  [1958] Q.B. 12. (8)  [1965] Punjab Law Journal 110. 189               State  in this regard and for holding that  it               suffers  from any disability in the matter  of               agitating  against decisions which are  to  to               detriment." The  above  being  in accord  with  the  general  principles settled  by the long chain of authorities, noticed  earlier, appears to be a correct exposition of the law on the point. In  the present case, neither the landowner, nor  the  State made any attempt to get the decision, dated 15-9-1961 of the Collector  under  s.  18 set aside or  modified  by  way  of appeal, review or revision or other appropriate proceedings. In  a sense, therefore, that decision had become  final  and conclusive. The stage is now set for examining the contentions canvassed at  the bar with regard to the correctness or  otherwise  of the findings of the High Court. Mr.   Mahajan,  learned  Counsel  for  the   appellant-State contends  that  the  Collector,  Surplus  Area  had  rightly ignored  the  sale orders dated September 15, 1961,  of  the Collector purportedly passed under s. 18, in favour of  Amar Singh  and Indraj and that the view taken by the High  Court is wrong, because-               (a) the lease made by the landowner in  favour               of  these Respondents, was itself a  "transfer               of land" effecting the utilization of  surplus               area, and as such, was Mt by clause (b) of  of               s. 10-A, and the orders obtained on the  basis               of  that  lease could not stand  on  a  better               footing;               (b) the expression "transfer" in clause (b) of               this section includes. involuntary  transfers,               also, brought about by operation of law,  with               only  two  exceptions which  are  specifically               mentioned in that clause;               (c) these orders were consent orders and  were               not  based on any independent finding  of  the               Collector  as  to  the existence  of  the  the               essential condition viz., that the  applicants               were  in continuous occupation of the  lands,’               as tenants, for the requisite period, but were               the result of compromise and collusion between               the landlady and her relation-tenants, and  as               such, were null and void ;               (d) these orders had the effect of diminishing               the  surplus area and as such, were orders  of               "other authority" bit by clause (c) of s.  10-               A;               (e)   Section  18  has to be  construed  in  a               manner which does not defeat the object of  s.               10-A.   These two sections can  be  reconciled

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             only if the operation of s. 18 is confined  to               those purchases which do not adversely  affect               the extent or utilization of surplus area. In  reply,  Mr.  S.  K. Dhingra,  learned  Counsel  for  the respondents,. maintains that a "lease" cannot be regarded as a  "transfer or disposition of land" within the  meaning  of clause  (b)  of s. 10-A, because according  to  its  general scheme and object, the Act not only recognise 190 the  right  of a landowner to create new  tenancies  on  his surplus area after April 15, 1953, but further gives to such a  tenant  the right to purchase his tenancy  under  s,  18. Reliance  has been placed on this Court’s decision in  Saheb Ram’s  case (supra).  Laying stress on the omission  of  the word   "lease"  from  clause  (b)  of  s.   10-A.    Counsel has  .referred to the use of the word"lease"in  addition  to the word "transfer" in some what similar provision  relating to  future acquisitions ins.19-A and 19-B,to show that  when ever the Legislature intended to bring a "lease" within  the sweep of such a provision, it expressly did so. Reiterating  the  reasoning of the High Court,  Mr.  Dhingra submits that a "sale"made in accordance with an order of the Collector  under s. 18 cannot be ignored by  the  Prescribed Authority.   Surplus  Area,  either as  a  "transfer"  under clause (b) or as an order of "other authority" under  clause (c) of s. 10-A.  Any other interpretation, according ,to the Counsel,  will  render  nugatory  s.  18  which  is  a  self contained  provision intended to achieve one of the  primary objects of the Act.  In support of these arguments, reliance has been placed on a later Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and  Haryana  High Court in Matti Rai and ors. v.  State  of Punjab (1) which affirmed the propositions of law laid  down in  the judgment under appeal Shyamlal v. State ,of  Gujarat (2) was also cited. Replying  to Mr. Mahajan’s contention (c),  Counsel  submits that  this was not a case where the orders of the  Collector passed  under  s.  18 could be said to be  a  nullity.   The Khasra Girdawari before the Collector with the admission  of the  landowner, superadded, was sufficient material, on  the basis  of which the Collector making the orders of  purchase in  favour  of the tenants could be satisfied  about  ,their being  in continuous occupation of their tenancy  lands  for the requisite period.  Great emphasis has been placed on the fact  that in reply to the writ petition of Amar Singh,  the State  in their written statement had admitted Amar  Singh’s averment  as  to  his being a tenant of  the  land  for  the requisite  period.  Even the Surplus Area Authority,  it  is pointed  out, conceded in his impugned order that  according to the copy of the Khasra Girdawari on the file, Amar  Singh and  Indraj were in occupation of the land as tenants  since 1957-58, though such occupation was held to be of less  than six  years.  In these circumstances proceeds  the  argument, the  order dated September 15,1961, passed by the  Collector under  s.  18,  on the basis of  compromise,  could  not  be treated as totally void and non-est; at the most ,they  were erroneous orders passed by the Collector in the exercise  of the  distinct jurisdiction particularly conferred on him  by s. The only remedy-adds the Counsel-of the aggrieved person  or the  ’State was by way of appeal or revision as provided  by the  statute and since those orders were not so  challenged, they had become final. The  Prescribed  Authority, Surplus Area-it  is  emphasised, while assessing the surplus area, had no jurisdiction to sit in  appeal  or  revision  over  the  orders  of  the  Asstt.

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Collector, 1st Grade passed under s.18. (1)  I.L.R.(1969) Panj. and Haryana 680 (2)  [1965] 2 S.C.R. 457. 191 Reference  in this behalf has been made to ss. 24 and 25  of the  Act,  ss. 80 to 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act  and  R.K. Chari  v. Seshadri; (1) Mohanlal v. Goenka(2);  Dhaunkal  v. Man Kauri (3) and Mam Raj v. Punjab State (supra). It  will  be  appropriate to  take  contention  (c),  first, canvassed by Mr. Mahajan because it is the linch-pin of  the entire case. The question is, whether the compromise order,, were  wholly void  or merely voidable.  If they were of the former  kind, they would be a nullity which does not from its very  nature needs setting aside, and consequently, they could be treated as  non-existant whenever and wherever their legality  comes in  question.   And, the Prescribed Authority  Surplus  Area would   be  entitled  to  ignore  such  orders  as   non-est independently of the provisions of s. 10-A.  In that view of the matter, the necessity of determining as to whether those orders are hit by clauses (b) and (c) of that section  would not arise. If  the  orders were of the latter type,  i.e.  voidable  or erroneous, passed by the Asstt.  Collector acting within his jurisdiction   under  s.  18,  they  could  be  avoided   or questioned  only  by way of appeal,’ review or  revision  as provided by the statute or in other appropriate  proceedings known  to  law, and the Prescribed Authority  or  Collector, Surplus  Area  would not be entitled to go behind  them  and question  their  validity or propriety.  He  shall  have  to accept  them as they are.  In that view of the  matter,  the question  will  still remain whether such an  order  of  the Assistant  Collector  passed by him in the exercise  of  his jurisdiction  in  favour  of a tenant under s.  18,  can  be ignored as a ,,transfer" under clause (b) or as an order  of "other authority" under clause (c) of s. 10-A on the  ground that  it  adversely  affects the utilization  or  extent  of surplus area. An  order is null and void if the  quasi-.judicial  tribunal passing it lacks inherent jurisdiction over the parties  and the  subject  matter.   Such was not  the  case  here.   The Assistant Collector who made the orders dated September  15, 1961, was duly invested with the quasijudicial  jurisdiction tinder  s. 18(2).  All the jurisdictional facts  for  making the orders under that section existed.  There is no  dispute that  Smt.   Lachhman was not a "small  landowner".   It  is common  ground that Field Nos.263, 343 and 177 did not  fall within  her reserved area.  It was not controverted that  in May  1961, when the purchase applications were  made,  Field Nos. 263 and 343 were comprised in the tenancy-of Amar Singh and  Field  No.  177 in that of Indraj.   According  to  the observation  of the Surplus Area Collector, the copy of  the Khasra Girdawri on the file showed that their possession  as tenants  was from 1957-58 i.e. for about 4 1/2  years  only, preceding  the applications and thus according to  him  they had  failed  to  show their continuous  possession  for  the requisite period of six years.  It is important (1) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 848.      (2) [1953] 4 S.C.R. 377 (392). (3) [1970] LXXII P.L.R. 882 (F.B.). 192 to  note  further  that Amar Singh in para  2  of  his  writ petition pleaded:               "That  on the 2nd of May 1961, the  petitioner               having  been in continuous occupation of  land               comprised  in his tenancy for a period of  six

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             years  applied under s. 18 of the.. ..Act  for               purchase  of the above land, and by his  order               dated 15th September 1961, Shri Hardial Singh,               Assistant  Collector 1st Grade Sirsa  District               Hissar, allowed the petitioner to purchase the               above land at a price of Rs. 13,590/-.. .. " This  averment  of Amar Singh was admitted in  the  counter- affidavit filed on behalf of the State in these terms "Para 2 of the petition is admitted" In  the written statement filed by the State--apart  from  a general  statement that "in view of the facts  explained  by the  Collector  in  his  order  dated  11-5-62  the  surplus area .... has been rightly declared"it was not  specifically pleaded  that the purchase order dated September  15,  1961, made  by  the Collector under s. 18 was collusive,  void  or without  jurisdiction  on  the ground that  Amar  Singh  and Indraj  had not been in occupation of these fields  for  the full  statutory period.  Nor could Amar Singh and Indraj  be denied the status of ’tenants’ and the rights and privileges attaching  thereto, merely because they were related to  the landowner,  the ’son-in-law’ and ’son-in-law’s brother’  not being among the "relatives" prescribed in Rule 5 of the 1956 Rules, whose cultivation [in view of s. 2(9) of the Act  may be deemed to be the "self-cultivation" of the landowner. To sum up, the allegation in the purchase applications about the  applicants’  being in continuous  occupation  of  these fields  comprised  in  their  tenancies  for  the  requisite period,  coupled  with the Khasra Girdawri on file  and  the admissions made by the landlady in the compromise, furnish,- Id  sufficient material on the basis of which the  Assistant Collector,  at the time of making the orders of purchase  on September  15,  1961, could have been  satisfied  about  the existence of all the facts essential for the exercise of his jurisdiction under s. 18.  It is not correct to say that  on the  facts  of  the instant case,  the  Assistant  Collector passed  those orders solely on the basis of the  compromise, without applying his mind to the case.  Application of  mind is   evident  from  the  circumstance  that  the   Assistant Collector  further assessed the price to be paid by each  of the  applicants  who thereafter, deposited the same  in  the Government  Treasury on September 29, 1961.  And, it was  on the making of such deposits that the respondents were deemed to  be the owners of those fields.  The mere fact  that  the Assistant  Collector  did not record a finding  in  so  many words  that he was satisfied from such and such material  in regard  to the existence of the basic  conditions  necessary for making the order under s. 18, did not render his order a nullity  when  such material was otherwise  evident  on  the record. In  the view I take I am fortified by the decision  of  this Court in K. K. Chari v. R.N. Seshadri (1).  That was a  case of a compromise (1) [1973] 1 S.C.C. 761. 193 order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under  s. 10  of  the Madras Building (Lease and  Rent  Control)  Act, 1960.   But  by analogy, the ratio of that  decision  is  an apposite  guide  for the present case.  There  the  landlord brought  an action under said Rent Act, for eviction of  his tenant, Seshadri from a house on the ground that he required it  for  his bona fide use and occupation.   The  tenant  at first  controverted  the landord’s claim  but  subsequently, both  the parties filed a compromise in terms of  which  the court passed a decree of eviction.  The tenant resisted  the execution of that decree, on the ground that the decree  was

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based  on  compromise or consent without  the  court  having satisfied  itself by an independent consideration  regarding the  bona fide requirement of the property by  the  landlord for  his own occupation; and as such the decree  contravened s. 10 of that Act, and was a nullity.  The Bench unanimously rejected  this  objection of  the  judgement-debtor  tenant. Vaidialingam J. (Dua J. concurring) laid down the law thus               The true position appears to be that an  order               of eviction based on consent of the parties is               not  necessarily  void if  the  juri-dictional               fact viz., the existence of one or more of the               conditions  mentioned in s. 10 were  shown  to               have  existed when the Court made  the  order.               Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a               pre-requisite for the order of eviction,  need               not  be  by the manifestation borne out  by  a               judicial  finding. If at some stage the  Court               was  called  upon  to apply its  mind  to  the               question  and  there was  sufficient  material               before  it, before the parties invited  it  to               pass an order in terms of their agreement,  it               is  possible to postulate that the  Court  was               satisfied. about the grounds on               which the’. order of eviction  was Passed". The above principle was reiterated and applied by this Court in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichchram (1). Judged  by  the  basic principle enunciated  in  the  above’ decisions,the  order dated September 15, 1961 passed by  the Assistant  Collector  under s. 18, was not a  nullity  which could  be  ignored as non-est by the  Prescribed  Authority. Even if those orders were erroneous, they could be impeached only  by way of appeal etc. as provided in the  Act  because the error was committed by the Collector within the exercise of his jurisdiction. A court or any quasi-judicial  tribunal acting within its jurisdiction can decide rightly as well as wrongly.  To use the felicitious words of S. K. Das J.  vide Smt.  Ujjam  Bai  v.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  (2),   such administrative   bodies  or  officers  acting  in   judicial capacity" are deemed to have been invested with the power to err  within  the’, limits of their jurisdiction"  and  their decisions  must  be accepted as valid unless  set  aside  in appeal. This general principle was reiterated by this  Court in Ittayavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey (3) as under               "It  is  well  settled  that  a  court  having               jurisdiction  over the subject matter  of  the               suit and over the parties thereto, though (1)  civil Appeal No. 2479/72 decided on 30.11.73. (2)  A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621=[1963]1, SCR 778. (3)  A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 907(910)=[1964]1, SCR 495. 194               bound  to  decide right may decide  wrong  and               that even though it decided wrong it would not               be   doing   something   which   it   had   no               jurisdiction  to do.  It had the  jurisdiction               over  the subjectmatter of the suit  and  over               the  party and, therefore, merely  because  it               made an error in deciding a vital issue in the               suit,  it  cannot be said that  it  has  acted               beyond  its jurisdiction.  As has  often  been               said courts have jurisdiction to decide  right               or to decide wrong and even though they decide               wrong  the decrees rendered by them cannot  be               treated  as nullifies........ It merely  makes               an error or law (which) can be corrected  only               (on  appeal)  in the manner laid down  in  the

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             Civil Procedure Code." The above principle are applicable with greater force to the present  case.  The Prescribed Authority, surplus Area,  and the  Collector  competent to make an order under s.  18  are both  Assistant  Collectors  of  the  1st  Grade,  that   is coordinate  authorities  exercising  separate  and  distinct jurisdictions.   One cannot sit in appeal or  revision  over the orders of the other.  If one feels that a certain  order passed by the other in the exercise of distinct jurisdiction is  erroneous  it  is  open  to  get  it  rectified  in  the appropriate  manner  provided  by the Act  i.e.  by  way  of appeal,  review or revision.  As has already  been  observed earlier,  the  State  or the  Department.  if  aggrieved  or prejudiced by a decision of an authority under this Act  can avail  of the- remedy of appeal available under the  Act  in any  case,  it can move the Financial  Commissioner  to  set right  the  illegality  or  impropriety  in  revision.   The Financial Commissioner it may be recalled has wide powers in revision  to correct such errors committed by  the  inferior authorities in the exercise of their jurisdiction and  there is no time limit to the exercise of this revisional power by the Financial Commissioner.               Section 25 of the Act provides               "Except  in accordance with the provisions  of               this  Act, the validity of any proceedings  of               order  taken or made under this Act shall  not               be  called in question in any court or  before                             any other authority. On  analysis of the section it is clear that it gives a  two fold  mandate.  on one hand it debars  the  jurisdiction  of courts or other authorities to question the validity of  any proceeding  or order taken or made under the Act and on  the other  it  prohibits  the  impeachment  of  such  orders  or proceedings in a manner which is not in Accordance with  the provisions  of the Act. it indicates that decisions  of  the authorities  under the Act can be challenged only by way  of appeal review or revision as provided in ss. 80, 81, 82,  83 and  84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, made applicable  by s. 24 of the Act or in the Rules made under the Act. The  Punjab  and Haryana High Court has  consistently  taken this view.  The Full Bench in Dhankel v.  Matz Kauri (supra) also  held that the Assistant Collector while  dealing  with the  purchase application under s 18 has no jurisdiction  to sit in appeal or revision over the order of the Surplus Area Collector  passed in surplus area proceeding and he  has  no jurisdiction to ignore that order. 195 The rule equally holds good in the con, verse.  In the  Full Beach  decision  in Mam Raj v. Punjab State (supra)  it  was held that once an application of the tenant under s. 18  has been  allowed  and the other is not set aside in  appeal  or revision,  the same becomes final and remains immune  to  an attack against its validity on any ground including that  of collusion, before the co-ordinate authorities under the  Act dealing with the question of determination of surplus  area. If  I may say so with respect this proposition laid down  by the Full Bench is unexceptionable. The  above being the law on the point, it is clear that  the orders dated September 15, 1961 not having been impeached by way of appeal, review or revision as provided by the statute or in other proceedings Authority Surplus Area was bound  to accept them as valid. He could not go behind them or himself sit in appeal over them.  It was all the more  disconcerting in  this  case because the Collector who passed  the  orders under  s.18  and the Collector who ignored those  orders  as

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Prescribe  Authority, Surplus Area happened to be  the  same Officer. This takes me to the next question viz, if the orders  dated September 15, 1961 were not a nullity could they be  ignored under s. 10 A on the around that they amounted to "transfer" or orders of "other authority" affecting the utilisation  or causing the diminution of surplus area? Before  embarking upon a consideration of this question,  it is   necessary  to  remember  two  fundamental   canons   of interpretation  applicable to such statutes.  The  first  is that  if choice ties between two alternative  constructions, "that  alternative is to be chosen which will be  consistent with  the  smooth working of the system  which  the  statute purports  to  be regulating; and that alternative is  to  be rejected  which  will  introduce  uncertainty,  friction  or confusion into the working of the system" (see Maxwell  12th Edn.  page 45).  The second is that if there is an  apparent conflict between different provisions of the same enactment, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect  may be given to both (see King Emperor v. Behari Lal Sharma (1). Let us now apply the above principles to the construction of ss. 10-A and 18.  It has already been noticed that s. 18  is designed  to pro.mote one of the primary objects of the  Act viz.,  of procuring ownership of land to the tiller on  easy terms.   It  has  also been  seen  that  the  self-sufficing machinery of this section is available for purchase of their tenancies to the tenants inducted before or after April  15, 1953,  by  the  landowner on land not being a  part  of  his permissible area, equally with tenants settled on such  area by  the  Government.   In  a way, every  sale  made  by  the operation of s. 18 in favour of tenant admitted by the land- owner on his surplus area, causes diminution of the  surplus area  or affects the utilisation thereof by the  Government. If such sales were to be ignored under s. 10-A, then it will reduce  the working of the system of the Act to  a  mockery. It  will  mean "war" between sections 18 and 10-A.   Such  a construction of the Act will present a spec- (1) 1944 [49] C. W. N. 178 P. C.=72 I. A. 57. 196 tacle  of  manifest contradiction and absurdity  of  an  Act giving  fight  by  one  hand and taking  away  the  same  by another.   The -adoption of such an interpretation  may  not completely  "obliterate" S. 18, as the High Court has  said, but   it  will  certainly  truncate  it.   A   ’Potent   and substantial limb of s. 18, which according to the ruling  of this Court in Sahib Ram’s case (supra) entities the category of tenants inducted by the landowner after April 15, 1953 to purchase their tenancies, would stand-as it were-"amputated" by  judicial  operation  such  an  interpretation  will  run counter to the fundamental principles of construction.   The conflict  between the two provisions can be avoided only  if we read the general words other authority" in cl. (c) of  s. 10-A,  ejusdem  generis with the specific  words  "judgment, decree or order of a court", which immediately precede them. Thus  construed,  these general words "or  other  authority" will not take in an authority exercising jurisdiction  under s. 18(2) of the Act. Nor can the words "transfer or other disposition of land’ in clause  (b) of s. 10-A, be construed to include  a  transfer which results by the process of s. 18.  The meaning of these words must be restricted to volitional dispositions of  land made  by  the  landowner, and cannot be  extended  to  cover involuntary  transfers brought about by operation of law  or circumstance  beyond the control of the landowner.  The  two type  of involuntary transfers, namely, acquisition of  land

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by  Government  under  legal compulsion or  by  an  heir  by inheritance  which  were inserted by the Amending Act  4  of 1959  in the saving clause of this provision and were  later given  a retrospective effect from April 15, 1953, are  only clarificatory or illustrative of the original intent of  the Legislature.  These two instances are not exhaustive of  the involuntary transfers which are outside the sweep of  clause (b). This  interpretation  of "transfer"  has  been  consistently adopted  by  the Punjab and Haryana High  Court  in  several cases.   Some  of them in which involuntary transfers  of  a kind  other than those specifically mentioned in the  saving clause of clause (b) came up for consideration are  reported in Bhajan Lal v. Punjab State(1) & BishanSingh v. State (2). This   case  decided  pretation  of  the  same   words   and Agricultural Lands Act,  10-A of the Punjab Act; Lakshmi Raj v. State of Haryana (3)  Punjab by Mahajan j. proceeds on an interused in s. 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy 1953, which is in pari material with s. The above is the only reasonable interpretation of the words "transfer  or other disposition of land" in s.10-A(b)  which is  consistent with the content and object of s.18, and  can reconsile and: keep effective both the sections. Though  the  contention  of  Mr.  Dhingra  that  the   words "transfer or other disposition" in the said clause(b) do not embrace  within their scope tenancies or leases ’created  by the  landowner-because  such  a right of  the  landowner  is reeognised by the Act vide sahib Ram’s case (supra)-is,  not altogether without force,yet I do not think it necessary (1) (1968) 70 P.L.R. 664.    (2) (1968) 47 LLT 284. (3) (1971) LXXIII Punjab L. R. 815. 197 to decide that point.  The lease created by Smt.   Lachchman ceased  to subsist as soon as the Collector made the  orders of purchase under s. 18 in favour of the erstwhile  tenants. The  question, whether the extinct lease which preceded  the purchase   orders  was  a  "transfer"  or  not,  does   not, therefore, survive for decision. In the light of what has been said above, I am firmly of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court with regard to the interpretation and inter-relationship of ss.10-A and  18 is  sound  and the answers given by it to  the  first  three questions  of  law  set  out at  the  commencement  of  this judgment, are correct.  I would, therefore, uphold the same. Now  I turn to question No. 4, which arises in Amar  Singh’s case only. It is common ground that Field Nos. 265 and 343 on April 15, 1953, were comprised in the tenancy of Sri Chand and  Nathu. The  total  area  of these two fields is 67  bighas  and  19 biswas  equivalent to 42 ordinary acres, approximately.   It is  apparent  from the, record that the land  in  these  two fields is entirely Barani and has no irrigation  facilities, whatever.  According to the scale adopted by the  Collector, Surplus  Area, for such land, these 42 ordinary  acres  will make 10.5 standard acres.  The total area of Smt.  Lachchman which  has  been found surplus is about 80  standard  acres. The  land  comprised in these two fields is thus  only  one- eighth of her surplus area. At no stage before the High Court was it contended that  Sri Chand  and Nathu held or owned in the state any  other  land apart from the said fields.  In this Court, also, either  in the  grounds of appeal or otherwise, no such  allegation  or contention has been made.  The "permissiable area" which can be held or retained by a tenant under the Act is 30 standard acres.   That is to say, the permissible limit of  the  area

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which could be held in common by Sri Chand and Nathu, was 60 standard  acres.  Since it has been no-body’s case that  Sri Chand and Nathu held any other area, and the land  comprised in these two fields being 10.5 standard acres, was far  less than their permissible limit, the High Court presumed-and  I think, not wrongly that Field Nos. 265 and 343 were held  by the  tenants  Sri Chand and Nathu within  their  permissible area. It  is well settled that surplus area has to  be  determined with reference to the situation as it obtained on April  15, 1953  when  the Act came into force.   This  proposition  is clear  from  s.19-F, also, which says  that  the  Prescribed Authority shall be competent to determine the surplus  area, referred  to  in s. 10-A, of a landowner out  of  the  lands owned by such land-owner immediately before the commencement of  the  Act.   If there still remained any  doubt  on  this point, the. same must be deemed to have been authoritatively dispelled  by the decision of this Court in Bhagwan  Das  v. The  State of Punjab(1).  A plain reading of the  definition of  ’surplus  area’ in s.2(5-a) which has been quoted  in  a foregoing  part of this judgment, shows that land held by  a tenant within (1)  [1966] 2 S. C. R. 511. 198 his permissible area, cannot be included in the surplus area of  the  landowner.  Since on the  determinative  date  i.e. 15-4-53,  Field  Nos. 265 and 343, measuring  10.5  standard acres  only, were held by the tenants, Sri Chand and  Nathu, within  their permissible area, these fields could  not,  in view of the mandate of s. 2(5-a), be included in the surplus area’  of  Smt.  Lachchman.  At the time, when  the  Surplus Area  Collector  took up determination of the  surplus  area (which  as  pointed out in Dhannkal’s case  (supra)  implies incidental  verification  of the permissible  areas  of  the landowner  and  the tenants, also) these fields  were  still comprised in a tenancy, though the holder of the tenancy was a  different tenant.  In these circumstances, the change  of the tenant will not make these Fields accrete to the surplus area  of the landowner.  Such change of the tenant does  not amount  to a future "acquisition of land comprised  in  that tenancy by the landowner within the comtemplation of ss. 19- A  or  19-B  of  the Act.  Such  a  situation  came  up  for consideration before a Division Bench (consisting of  Sharma and Khosla JJ) of the Punjab High Court in Harchand Singh v. Punjab  State. (1) Sharma J. who spoke for the  Bench,  made these observations:               "There  can  be no doubt that in  the  instant               case the surplus area was to be determined  on               the  date  the Act came into force  i.e.  15th               April  1953, and further that the area in  the               cultivating  possession of a tenant if  within               the  prescribed limit was also to be  excluded               from consideration.  Section 10-A governs  the               disposition  of land which was comprised in  a               surplus  area at the commencement of  the  Act               and not the land which was not surplus on that               date  or had become surplus after  the  coming               into  force of the Act.  The latter  case  was                             evidently  covered by ss. 19-A and 19- B of  the               Act.............. the mere change in tenancies               will  not  attract  the  provisions  of  these               sections  provided the area which  the  tenant               comes  to occupy there by does not exceed  the               permissible  area.   By changing a  tenancy  a

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             landlord  also  can  not  be  said,  to   have               acquired  the  land  comprising  the   tenancy               because  the  land  (which)  belonged  to  him               before  hand continued to belong to him  after               the change in tenancy.  The term "acquire" has               not been defined in the Act and so we have  to               accept  its  dictionary meaning as,  "To  make               property one’s own.  To gain permanently.   It               is regularly applied to permanent acquisition"               (Bouvier’s   Law   Dictionary   and    Concise               Encyclopaedia,  Eighth  Edition, Vol.   I.  P.               114)" (1) (1964) 66 P.L.R. 285; 1963 P.L.J. 144. 199 These  observations,  in  my  opinion,  contain  a   correct statement of law on the point. For  the  foregoing  reasons, I would hold  that  these  two fields  could  not be included in the surplus  area  of  the landowner,  Smt.  Lachman and s.10-A was not attracted to  a disposition of these fields either by an order made under s. 18 or otherwise. In  the result, I would dismiss both these appeals,  leaving the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.                            ORDER In accordance with the Judgment of the majority, the appeals are allowed, but in the circumstances, the parties will bear their costs throughout. V.P.S. 200