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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 466  of  2001

PETITIONER: MANOHAR LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VINESH ANAND & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/04/2001

BENCH: A.P. Misra & Ummesh C. Banerjee

JUDGMENT:

L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J BANERJEE,J.

Leave granted.

   Since  the  decision  in   Thawardass  case  [Thawardas Pherumal  & Anr.  v.  Union of India:  AIR 1955 SC 468], the issue of identifying the Arbitrator, as a court, did come up for  consideration before this Court on more occasions  than one.  Thwaradas (supra) negatived it with a positive finding that  the Arbitrator is not a Court within the meaning  of the  Code of Civil Procedure.  Since then there has however, been  sea  change  of  events:  the repeal  of  the  earlier statute   of  Arbitration  (Arbitration   Act,   1940)   and introduction  of the new Arbitration Act, 1996  (Arbitration and  Conciliation Act, 1996) in the statute book has brought about a major change in the sphere of Arbitration.  Based on uncitral   model   of  law   on   International   Commercial Arbitration  and Conciliation Rules, the Act is stated to be best  suited  and to sub-serve the Indian conditions  having regard  to  the  economic  conditions   and  the  effect  of globalisation  of  trade.  Incidentally, the  Statements  of Objects  and Reasons of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act records  it  to be an act to consolidate and amend  the  law relating  to domestic arbitration, international  commercial arbitration  and  enforcement of foreign arbitral awards  as also  to  define  the law relating to conciliation  and  for matters  connected  therewith or incidental thereto.   While the earlier enactment of 1940 was to be the most expeditious methodology of adjudication and disposal of disputes through arbitration  but  practicability  of  the  situation  lately produced  a rather dismal picture and proved contrary to the normal  belief and expectation that arbitration would be  an otherwise  expeditious method to do so.  The uncitral  model on  the basis of which this Act of 1996 was engrafted in the statute  book,  in  no  uncertain  terms  recognises  party autonomy  philosophy  and  minimum  interference  from  the Courts.   In  England also, similar such situation  was  the felt-need  and resultantly in 1996, a similar enactment came into  force  but neither of the legislations however can  be attributed  to be an exact copy of the uncitral model though

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undoubtedly based thereon.

   Having   given  a  brief   introduction  to  the  recent legislation  and adverting to the matter in issue presently, it  would  be  worth noting that the issue  involved  though short  but interesting enough to involve a useful debate  on the same  Debate, of course, we will avoid, but discussions we will indulge so that the law remains settled once for all on  this  issue as involved in the matter.  The issue  being applicability  of the provisions of Section 340 Cr.   P.Code in  a  proceeding  before the arbitrator    undoubtedly  an ingenious  effort  but  let us see as to how  far  the  same succeeds.

   Before however, embarking on a discussion on the subject issue, a look at the provisions would be best suited at this juncture:   The  relevant provisions being Sections 340  and 195  sub-section (1) (b) and sub-Section (3) of the Code  of Criminal  Procedure.   The  provisions   read  thus:   340: Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195 -

   (1)  When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or  otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is  expedient in  the interests of justice that an inquiry should be  made into  any  offence referred to in clause (b) of  sub-section (1)  of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may  be,  in  respect  of a document produced  or  given  in evidence  in  a  proceeding in that Court, such  Court  may, after  such  preliminary  inquiry,  if  any,  as  it  thinks necessary,-

   (a) record a finding to that effect;

   (b) make a complaint thereof in writing;

   (c)  send  it to a Magistrate of the first class  having jurisdiction;

   (d)  take sufficient security for the appearance of  the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable  and  the Court thinks it necessary so  to  do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate;  and

   (e)  bind  over any person to appear and  give  evidence before such Magistrate.

(Corresponding Law: S.476 (1) of Act V of 1898)

(2) The power  conferred on a Court by sub-section

   (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court  has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect  of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such  former  Court  is subordinate within  the  meaning  of sub-section (4) of Section 195.

(Corresponding  Law : S.476A of Act V of 1898)

   (3)  A  complaint  made  under  this  section  shall  be signed,-

   (a)  where  the  Court making the complaint  is  a  High Court,  by  such  officer  of the Court  as  the  Court  may

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appoint;

   (b)  in any other case, by the presiding Officer of  the Court,

   (Correspondent Law:  S.476 (1)Proviso of Act V of 1898)

   4)  In this section, Court has the same meaning as  in Section 195.

   Section  195:   Prosecution  for   contempt  of  lawful authority  of  public servants, for offences against  public justice  and  for  offences relating to documents  given  in evidence  (1) No court shall take cognizance-

   (b)  (i)  of  any offence punishable under  any  of  the following  sections  of the Indian Penal Code (45 of  1860), namely,  Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to  211  (both  inclusive)  and 228, when  such  offence  is alleged  to  have been committed in, or in relation to,  any proceeding in any Court, or

   (ii)  of  any  offence  described  in  Section  463,  or punishable  under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the  said  Code, when such offence is alleged to  have  been committed  in  respect  of a document produced or  given  in evidence in a proceeding in any court, or

   (iii)  of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or  attempt to  commit,  or  the abetment of, any offence  specified  in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii),

   except  on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.

(2)

Section 195 (3):

   (3)  In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term Court means  a  Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and  includes  a tribunal  constituted  by or under a Central, Provincial  or State  Act,  if declared by that Act to be a Court  for  the purposes of this section.

   Before  adverting  to the matter in issue and the  rival contentions  advanced  one  redeeming feature  ought  to  be@@              JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ noticed  here pertain to Criminal jurisprudence:  To  pursue@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ an  offender in the event of commission of an offence, is to sub-serve  a  social need  Society cannot afford to have  a criminal  escape his liability, since that would bring about a  state  of social pollution, which is neither desired  nor warranted and this is irrespective of the concept of locus the  doctrine of locus-standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence.   This  observation of ours  however  obtains support  from  the decision of this Court in AR  Antulay  v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr.  :  1984 (2) SCC 500.

   Another  redeeming  feature  is   the  inclusion  of  an explanatory  provision by way of sub-section (3):  The  body of  sub-section (1)(b) refers to the expression Court  and the  same  stands explained in sub-section (3) :  Without  a

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reading of sub-section (3)  Court may be interpreted in a narrow  context, but with the inclusion of sub-section (3) widest possible connotation is to be made available provided however,  the  statute declares it to be so!!  The  language if declared by that Act seems to be very significant:

   A  plain  look thus at the provisions above depict  that inclusion  of sub- section 3 under Section 195 cannot but be taken  to be an explanatory provision.  The body of  Section 195  (1)(b)  refers to the expression Court and  the  same stands  thus  explained in sub-section 3.   The  restriction imposed  is easily ascertainable by reason of the  inclusion of  the words if declared by that Act to be a court for the purposes  of this Section (Emphasis supplied)  the user of the  words seems to be very significant.  One of the  golden canons  of  interpretation  is that the  Legislature  always avoid  surplusage and attributes a definite meaning to  each of  the  words  mentioned  in  the  statute.   By  the  very inclusion  of  sub-section  3 and the  language  as  noticed hereinbefore   in   this  paragraph,   the  intent  of   the Legislature  cannot thus be far to seek  it is  connotative of a definite meaning.

   Mr.   Yogeshwar Prasad, the learned Senior Advocate took some  pains  to take us through different provisions of  the Act  and contended that the whole tenor of legislation  will have to be considered in a much broader perspective so as to assess  the  intent of the legislature and citations on  the earlier  repealed  act  ought not to be looked  into  or  be considered since the answer for any inquiry ought to be kept within  the parameters of the new law and when  interpreting or  analysing the philosophy of party autonomy noticed above should  and  ought  to  be  the   basis  and  de  hors   the jurisprudential  effect of the legal decisions under the old Act.

   The  main  thrust  of the submission in support  of  the Appeal  however,  rests on a simple proposition  that  Court means  and  implies authority to decide controversy  between the  parties authoritatively and the decision being  binding amongst  the  parties.   Strong reliance was placed  on  the decision  of  this Court in the case of Brajnandan Sinha  v. Jyoti  Narain  (AIR 1956 SC 66) wherein this Court  observed that  the  pronouncement  of a definitive judgment  is  thus considered  the  essential  sine qua non of  a  court  and unless and until a binding and authoritative judgment can be produced  by  a  person  or body of persons,  it  cannot  be predicated that he or they constitute a Court.  It is on the basis  of the observations as above that the learned  Senior Advocate  in support of the Appeal contended that mere  look at  the  new enactment would reveal the total  exclusion  of courts  in  the  matter of interference  with  the  arbitral awards   there cannot be any manner of dispute that  awards are not to be interfered and the same, as per the provisions of  the  statute has the status of a decree of a  court  and thus  executable  forthwith  but does that mean  and  imply total  ouster  of  jurisdiction of courts or  one  need  not approach  the  court  at all in a arbitral  proceeding,  the answer  may not be in the affirmative by reason of different statutory provisions with which we presently deal though not in detail since the issue is little different from the usual discussion on a question as to whether Arbitrator is a Court or  not?  But before so doing another decision of this Court on  which  strong reliance was placed ought to  be  noticed.

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This  Court in Virindar Kumar v.  State of Punjab (AIR  1956 SC 153) in paragraph 5 of the Report observed:

   5.   The first question that arises for our decision is whether  the  order  of the District  Magistrate  passed  on 17.9.1952  as  returning  officer is open  to  appeal.   The statutory provisions bearing on this point are Sections 195, 476  and  476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   Section 195(1)  (a) provides that no court shall take cognizance  of any  offence  punishable  under Sections 172 to 188  of  the Indian  Penal Code except on the complaint in writing of the public officer concerned or of his superior.

   Section  195(1)(b)  enacts  that  no  Court  shall  take cognizance  of  the offences mentioned therein,  where  such offence  is committed in, or in relation to, any proceedings in  any  court except on the complaint in writing of  such Court  or  a Court to which it is subordinate.  The  offence under  Section 193 is one of those mentioned in Section  195 (1)(b).  Section 476 prescribes the procedure to be followed where  a Court is moved to lay a complaint and that  applies only  to  offences  mentioned  in  Sections  195(1)(b)   and 195(1)(c) and not to those mentioned in Section 195 (1)(a).

   Section  476-B  provides  for an appeal  from  an  order passed  under  Section  476 to the appropriate  Court.   The result  then  is that if the complaint relates  to  offences mentioned  in  Sections 195 (1)(b)and 195 (1)(c), an  appeal would  be  competent,  but  not if it  relates  to  offences mentioned  in  Section  195(1)(a).  Now, the  order  of  the Magistrate dated 17.9.1952 directs that the appellant should be  prosecuted for offences under Sections 181,182 and  193. There  is no dispute that the order in so far as it  relates to offences under Sections 181 and 182 is not appealable, as they fall directly under Section 195(1)(a).

   The  controversy  is  only as regards the  charge  under Section  193.  Section 193 makes it an offence to give false evidence  whether it be in a judicial proceeding or not, and it  likewise makes it an offence to fabricate false evidence for  use  in  a judicial proceeding or  elsewhere.   If  the offence  is not committed in a judicial proceeding, then  it will  fall  outside section 195 (1)(b), which  applies  only when  it  is committed in or in relation to a proceeding  in Court,  and  there is in consequence no bar to  a  complaint being made in respect thereof unaffected by the restrictions contained in Section 195(1)(b).

   But  if the offence under Section 193 is committed in or in  relation  to  a proceeding in Court, then it  will  fall under Section 195(1)(b), and the order directing prosecution under  Section  476 will be appealable under Section  476-B. The  point  for decision therefore is whether the  returning officer  in  deciding on the validity of a nomination  paper under  Section 36 of the Act can be held to act as a  Court. The  question  thus raised does not appear to be covered  by authority,  and  has to be decided on the true character  of the  functions  of the returning officer and the nature  and the extent of his powers.

   In  our view, however, the observations made in Virindar Kumars case (supra) does not, in fact, assist us in any way in  the  present  context.  Two decisions of  Calcutta  High Court  have also been relied upon.  The first being the case of  Sailaja Kanta Mitra and others v.  State of West  Bengal

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(AIR  1971  Calcutta 137) and the second being the  case  of H.C.  Ganti v.  F.L.  Harcourt (AIR 1931 Calcutta 436).

   Turning  attention on to the second case of H.C.   Ganti (supra),  Buckland,  J.  while deciding the matter  observed that  where a person is alleged to have given false evidence before  Arbitrator, an application under Section 476, in the Court in which the suit was initiated is necessary.  But the question  whether a preliminary inquiry is necessary or  not will  depend upon the facts and circumstances of each  case. Where the application is supported not by oral evidence, but only  by  documents,  no   further  preliminary  inquiry  is necessary beyond that which the Court makes on the materials before it.

   In  such cases it is not necessary that a notice  should be  given to the person against whom the order is sought  on an application under Section 476.

   The  decision in our view, however, does not render much of an assistance in regard to the issue.  The other decision of  the  Calcutta  High Court in Sailaja  Kanta  (supra),  a Division  Bench  of  the High Court in paragraph 17  of  the judgment observed as below:

   Thus  the  Arbitrator  decides the lis  before  it, having the powers like a Court, following the procedure as a Court has to follow in the exercise of its ordinary original civil  jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The  award  of the Arbitrator, so far as the parties to  the award  are  concerned,  if not appealed  against,  shall  be final.   In the appeal by either party to the award  against the Arbitrators award direct to the High Court a time limit has  been  prescribed for preferring such appeal  which  may also  be  admitted beyond the prescribed period if the  High Court  is  satisfied  about the grounds of  the  delay.   An appeal  to  the High Court against the award shall  not  lie only  where  the  amount of compensation  awarded  does  not exceed  Rs.5,000  in  lump or 250 per mensem.   The  dispute between the claimant claiming the compensation and the State resisting  such  claim is certainly a civil dispute and  the lis  between  the  parties  is of  a  civil  nature.   The arbitration  proceedings before the Arbitrator,  originating on  a  reference  at  the instance of the  claimant  by  the Collector  before  the Arbitrator under the D.I Act and  the Rules  mentioned  above in relation to such a civil  dispute are  proceedings  which refer to an original matter  in  the nature  of  a  suit.   The Arbitrator  in  such  arbitration proceedings  which refer to an original matter in the nature of  a  suit shall have the like powers and follow  the  like procedure  as  the Court has and follows in the exercise  of its  ordinary original civil jurisdiction under the Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908.  So, the Arbitrator under the Defence of   India  Act  and  the   Rules  discussed  above  in  the proceedings of an arbitration before it, is a Court of civil jurisdiction  and  it follows the procedure that a Court  of civil  jurisdiction follows in the exercise of its  ordinary original   civil  jurisdiction  under   the  Code  of  Civil Procedure, 1908.  The Arbitrator, under the Defence of India Act, 1939 and the Rules regarding arbitration for settlement of  compensation payable under Section 19 of the Defence  of India  Act,  1939  so  far as Bengal, now  West  Bengal,  is concerned, is, therefore, a Court of civil jurisdiction, and follows  the procedure in arbitration proceedings before it,

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as  provided  for  by the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908  in regard  to  suits since the Arbitrator under Rule  6  quoted above  shall have the powers like the Court and shall follow the  like procedure as the Court follows in the exercise  of its  ordinary original civil jurisdiction under the Code  of Civil  Procedure, 1908.  So, the combined effect of  Section 141  of  the Code of Civil Procedure read with  section  19, sub-section  (1), clauses (b),(e),(f),(g), sub-sections  (2) and  (3)  of  the Defence of India Act, 1939 and  the  Rules regarding Arbitration for settlement of compensation payable under Section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939 framed by the  Governor of Bengal as already discussed, is to make  an Arbitrator  under  the D.I.  Act, 1939 so far as Bengal  now West Bengal is concerned, a Court of civil jurisdiction that shall  have  the  like  powers and  shall  follow  the  like procedure  as  the Court has and follows in the exercise  of its  ordinary original civil jurisdiction under the Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908.

   The  decision  apparently  lend  some  credence  to  the submission  of  the appellant but by reason of  the  factual situation is clearly distinguishable of facts but as regards the  provisions  of law, we will deal with little  later  in this judgment.

   Mr.   Alok  Singh however appearing for  the  Respondent drew  our  attention to Section 27 of the Act of 1996  which provides as follows:

   (2  7)  Court  assistance in taking evidence-  (1)  The arbitral  tribunal,  or  a party with the  approval  of  the arbitral  tribunal may apply to the Court for assistance  in taking evidence.

(2) The application shall specify-

   (a) The names and addresses of the parties and the arbitrators;

   (b)  the  general  nature of the claim  and  the  relief sought;

   (c) the evidence to be obtained, in particular,-

   (i)  the  name and address of any person to be heard  as witness  or  expert witness and a statement of  the  subject matter of the testimony required;

   (ii)  the description of any document to be produced  or property to be inspected.

   (3)  The Court may, within its competence and  according to  its  rules  on taking evidence, execute the  request  by ordering  that  the  evidence be provided  directly  to  the arbitral tribunal.

   (4)  The  court  may, while making an order  under  sub- section (3), issue the same processes to witnesses as it may issue in suits tried before it.

   (5)  Persons  failing to attend in accordance with  such process,  or  making any other default, or refusing to  give their  evidence,  or guilty of any contempt to the  arbitral

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tribunal  during the conduct of arbitral proceedings,  shall be   subject  to  the   like  disadvantages,  penalties  and punishments  by order of the court on the representation  of the  arbitral  tribunal  as they would incur  for  the  like offences in suits tried before the Court.

   (6)  In this section the expression Processes includes summonses  and commissions for the examination of  witnesses and summonses to produce documents.

   Relying  on  the  aforesaid provision  Mr.   Singh  very strongly contended that it is not otherwise right to contend that the Arbitral Tribunal is supreme in its own field.  The Section  itself provides for assistance in taking  evidence. The  sub-sections 3, 4 and 5 have been strongly relied  upon so  as  to  conclude that even though the general  trend  of legislation  is  party autonomy but that does not  mean  and imply  total  exclusion of jurisdiction of the court or  the conferment  of such a power of court to the Arbitrator.   In any event Mr.  Singh contended that the issue in the instant Appeal  is rather restrictive and the general principles  of Arbitrator being identified as a Court need not be gone into by  reason  of  this issue under consideration.   The  clear language  of  Section 195 (3) of the Code of Cr.   Procedure unmistakably   depict   the  restrictive   intent   of   the Legislature  and  if  the intent was  otherwise  to  include Arbitral  Tribunal within the fold of Section 195 (3) of the Code,  that  is to say, if the Legislature wanted to  confer such   a  status  there  was  no  difficulty  as   such   in incorporating  thereunder  a provision as is contained in  a Debt  Recovery Act (vide Section 22):  Income Tax Act  (vide Section  136)  :  Motor Vehicles Act (vide Section 169  (2): Administrative  Tribunal Act (vide Section 22 (3):  Consumer Protection  Act:   M.R.T.P.   Act:  and Companies  Act  etc. etc.   since  these  statutes have definitely  included  and declared  the  Tribunal being ascribed to be a court  within the  meaning of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure  Code. The inclusion of explanatory provision by way of sub-section (3)  makes  the situation abundantly clear and we  need  not dilate thereon.

   Mr.   Singh  while relying strongly on the  decision  of this  Court  in  Dr.   Baliram Waman Hiray  v.   Justice  B. Lentin  and  Others  (1988 (4) SCC 419) contended  that  the decision  in  Balirams  case  has been  holding  the  field without  any  contra note being sounded  subsequently.   But before embarking to assess the situation, let us have a look at  the decision for its proper appreciation.  This Court in paragraph 24-25 of the Report, observed as below:

   24.   The crucial question that falls to be  determined in this appeal is whether sub-section (3) of Section 195 has brought about a change in the law and therefore the majority decision  in  Lalji Haridas case (1964) 6 SCR 700 no  longer holds  the field as submitted by Dr.  Chitale, appearing  on behalf  of  the appellant, or was merely declaratory of  the law  as  declared  by the court in Lalji  Haridas  case,  as argued  by  the learned Advocate-General, and therefore  the decision in Lalji Haridas case is still good law.  It cannot be doubted that sub- sections (3) of Section 195 of the Code has   been   enacted   by   Parliament  to   implement   the recommendations  of  the 41st report of the  Law  Commission which  brought about the unsatisfactory state of law due  to conflict  of opinion between different High Courts as to the meaning  of  the word Court in Section 195 (1)(b) read  in

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the  context  of Section 195 (2) of the earlier  Code.   The interpretative  exercise  undertaken by the courts over  the years  as  to  the precise meaning of the  term  Court  as defined  in  Section 195(1)(b) of the old Code prior to  the introduction  of  sub-  section (3) of section  195  of  the present  Code,  reveals an endless oscillation  between  two views  each verging on a fringe of obscurity and vagueness. As  echoed by Lord Macmillan in his Law and Other Things  at p.  48:

   In  almost every case except the very plainest, it would be  possible to decide the issue either way with  reasonable legal   justification  and  that  in  such  cases,   ethical considerations operate and ought to operate.

   25.   In that uncertain state of law, the Law Commission observed  in paragraph 15.99 of its Report that it felt that in  any  concrete  case  this question is  bound  to  create problem of interpretation and accordingly suggested a change in law for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code.  It felt that  the  term Court for the purposes of clauses (b)  and (c)  should  mean  a  Civil, Revenue or  a  Criminal  Court, properly  so called, but where a tribunal created by an  Act has  all  or practically all the attributes of a  court,  it might  be regarded as a court only if declared by the Act to be  a  court for the purposes of Section 195.   Indibutably, the  introduction of the inclusive clause in the  definition of  Court  in sub-section (3) of Section 195  has  brought about  a  change  in  the  law.   No  rule  is  more  firmly established  than  the principles enunciated in Heydon  case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a:  76 ER 637] which have been continually cited  with approval not only by the English courts but also by  the Privy Council as well as this Court.  The principles laid  down in Heydon case have been enunciated in Craies  on Statute Law, 6th edn.  at p.96 as follows:

   That  for  the  sure  and  true  interpretation  of  all statutes   in   general  (be   they  penal  or   beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered:  (1) What was the common law before  the making of the Act (2) What was the mischief  and defect  for  which the common law did not provide  (3)  what remedy  the  Parliament hath resolved and appointed to  cure the  disease of the commonwealth (4) The true reason of  the remedy.   And then the office of all the judges is always to make  such  construction as shall suppress the mischief  and advance  the  remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions  and evasions for the continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo,  and  to add force and life to the cure and  remedy according  to  the true intent of the makers of the Act  pro bono publico.

   These rules are still in full force and effect, with the addition  that  regard  must  now be had  not  only  to  the existing  law  but  also  to prior legislation  and  to  the judicial interpretation thereof.  The court applied the rule in  Heydon case in Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.  State of  Bihar  [AIR 1955 SC 661] in the construction of  Article 286  of  the Constitution.  After referring to the state  of law   prevailing  in  the  then   Provinces  prior  to   the Constitution  as  also to the chaos and confusion  that  was brought   about   in  interstate   trade  and  commerce   by indiscriminate  exercising of taxing powers by the different provincial legislatures founded on the theory of territorial

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nexus,  SR Das, Actg.  C.J.  speaking for himself and Vivian Bose and Jafer Imam, JJ.  proceeded to say:  (SCR p.635)

   It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve  the  free flow of interstate trade or commerce  in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial  barrier  that  the  Constitution-makers  adopted Article 286 of the Constitution.

   An  illustration of the application of the rule is  also furnished  in the construction of Section 2(d) of the  Prize Competitions Act, 1955.  In RMD Chamarbaugwalla v.  Union of India [1957 SCR 930] Venkatarama Ayyar, J.  speaking for the court  after referring to the previous state of the law,  to the  mischief  that  continued  under that law  and  to  the resolutions  passed  by different state  legislatures  under Article  252 (1) of the Constitution authorising  Parliament to pass the Act, stated:  (SCR p.  939)

   Having  regard  to the history of the  legislation,  the declared  object thereof and the wording of the statute,  we are  of opinion that the competitions which are sought to be controlled  and  regulated  by  the   Act  are  only   those competitions  in  which  success  does  not  depend  to  any substantial degree on skill. Balirams decision (supra) has taken  into  consideration  the  entire  judicial  precedent available  till  the  date  of the judgment and  came  to  a conclusion  upon  reliance of the Madhya Pradesh High  Court judgment  in Puhupram v.  State of Madhya Pradesh (1968 MPLJ 629)  that  the same lays down the correct law.  This  Court observed:

   36.   The  least that is required of a court is  the capacity  to  deliver  a definitive judgment,  and  merely because  the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has power to administer an oath will not impart to it the  status of a court.  That being so, it must be held that a  Commission  of  Inquiry   appointed  by  the  appropriate government  under Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act  is  not a court for the purposes of Section 195 of  the Code.

   Needless to record here that on a proper appreciation of judgment in Baliram (supra), there cannot be two opinions as the  scope and effect of Section 195 (3) of Code and we thus record our concurrence with the view expressed by this Court in Baliram:  The law thus laid down by the Bench decision of the  Calcutta High Court in Sailaja Kanta (supra) cannot  be said  to be good law and thus stands over-ruled even on  the basis  of  the  state  of law under the 1940  Act  (being  a repealed statute presently).

   On  the  wake of the aforesaid, we are unable to  record our  concurrence with the submissions made in support of the appeal  that  the  Arbitrator can be termed to  be  a  Court within  the  meaning  of Section 195 of the  Cr.   Procedure Code,  as  such  question of applicability  of  Section  340 Cr.P.Code in a proceeding before the Arbitrator does not and cannot  arise.  The issue thus is answered in the  negative. The  Appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed.  No order  as to costs.

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