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PETITIONER: STATE OF ORISSA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIC & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/03/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (4)   288        1996 SCALE  (3)609

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This appeal  is treated as special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.      Leave granted.      We have heard learned counsel on both sides.      This appeal  arises from  the order  dated February 17, 1995 in  FA NO.510  of 1992  of the  National  Consumer  and Redressal Commission,  New Delhi.  The respondent-Haribandnu Setha filed  a claim  before the  State  Commission,  Orissa under the  Consumer Protection  Act, 1986  [for  short,  the ’Act’] for  damages. The  State Commission  awarded  damages against the  first respondent-LIC.  In appeal, the appellant was impleaded  as party-respondent  and the  National  Forum awarded damages against the State in a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- [Rupees one  lakh only]  and directed  to  pay  compensation within a  period of  three  months.  Thus,  this  appeal  by special leave.      The only  question is:  whether the appellant is liable to pay  compensation to  Haribandhu Setha  under the Act and whether the  claim is maintainable. Section 2 [1] (o) of the Act defines ’services’ as under:      "’services’ means  service  of  any      description which is made available      to potential users and includes the      provision    of    facilities    in      connection with banking, financing,      insurance,  transport,  processing,      supply  of   electrical  or   other      energy, board  of loading  or  both      housing construction entertainment,      amusement or  the purveying of news      or other  information, but does not      include  the   rendering   of   any      service free  of charge  or under a      contract of Personal service."                      [emphasis supplied]

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    A reading  of the  definition would  indicate that  the services contemplated  thereunder  alone  are  the  services within the  meaning of  the  Act  except  excluded  services mentioned thereunder.  The excluded  services  are  "service free of charge or under a contract of personal service". The concept of  contract of personal service was considered in a recent judgment  of this Court in Indian Medical Association v. V.P.  Shantha &  Ors. [(1995)  6 SCC 651]. This Court had held therein  that the  expression "personal  service" has a well known  legal connotation  and has been construed in the context of  the right to seek enforcement of such a contract under the  Specific Relief Act. For that purpose, a contract of personal  service has been held to cover a civil servant, the managing  agents of  a company  and a  professor in  the University. There  can be  a contract of personal service if there is relationship of master and servant between a doctor and the  availing of  his services  and in  that  event  the services rendered  by the  doctor to  his employer  would be excluded from  the purview of the expression under Section 2 [1] (o)  of the  Act by virtue of the exclusionary clause in the said  definition. The  other excluded service is service rendered free of charge.      It  is  not  in  dispute  that  the  respondent  was  a Government servant  and,  therefore,  he  is  bound  by  the service conditions and the State was rendering services free of  charge   to  the   contesting  respondent.  Under  those circumstances, the Government servant has been excluded from the purview  of the  Act to  claim any  damages against  the State under  the Act. Therefore, if any claim arises for the contesting respondent,  it would be open to him to claim, in any other  forum, but  not under  the Act.  If the  claim is barred  by   limitation,  time   taken  during   the  entire proceedings shall stand excluded.      The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.