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PETITIONER: STATE OF MYSORE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R. V. BIDAP

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/09/1973

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) PALEKAR, D.G. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BHAGWATI, P.N.

CITATION:  1973 AIR 2555            1974 SCR  (1) 589  1974 SCC  (3) 357  CITATOR INFO :  R          1974 SC 613  (45)  R          1982 SC 149  (240,708)  E          1984 SC 684  (33,34)

ACT: Constitution  of India. 1950, Arts. 316, 317 and  319-office of   member  and  office  of  Chairman  of  Public   Service Commission if different-Period for which office of  Chairman can  be held where member is appointed Chairman-’Ceasing  to hold  office as member in Art. 319, Scope  of-Policy  behind articles.

HEADNOTE: Article 316(2) of the Constitution provides that a member of a Public Service Commission should hold office for a term of six  years from the date on which he enters upon his  office or  until he attains, in the case of the  Union  Commission, the  age  of sixty five years, and in the case  of  a  State Commission  or a Joint Commission, the age of  sixty  years, whichever is earlier. The  respondent was appointed a member of the  State  Public Service Commission in March 1967.  About two years later  he was appointed as Chairman of the Commission the question  of the date from which the period of six years for which he was entitled to hold office should be counted. HELD : The office of member is different from the office  of the  Chairman.  and so the respondent was entitled  to  hold office  for  the  period of six years its  Chairman  of  the Commission  counted  from  the later date  when  he  assumed office is Chairman.  (a) Article 316 deals with the appointment of the  Chairman and members of the Commission their term of office and their ineligibility for ree-appointment.  It shows that a Chairman of  a  Public  Service Commission is also a  member  of  the Public Service Commission, that is a member can fill one  of two  offices-ordinary  member or member-Chairman.   But  Ar. 316(lA) shows that the office of a member is different  from that of the Chairman. [601E-G]  (b)  The  ineligibility  provided for  in  Art.  316(3)  is

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reappointment to that office.      Hence the disability  for re-appointment  attaches to the specific office, that is  no member  who  holds  the office of just a  member,  pure  and simple, shall be    re-appointed to that office, that is, to the  office  of member pure and simple.   But  Art.  319(d), which bars a member from taking employment under Government, expressly  declares  by way of  exception,  eligibility  for appointment  ",is  the Chairman of that or any  other  State Public  Service  Commission" on ceasing to  held  office  as member,  that is, a member of the Public Service  Commission of  a State, on ceasing to hold office as such, is  eligible for  appointment as Chairman of that Commission  itself.  it follows that a member when elevated to the higher office  of Chairman  is  not  reappointed  but  is  appointed  to   the different  office  of  Chairman.  The  prescription  of  the terminus a quo in Art. 316(2) is "from the date on which  he enters  upon  his office" which, in the case of  a  Chairman appointed  directly  as such or originally as a  member  and later   elevated   to  Chairman,  begins  when   he   starts functioning as Chairman. [601H-602D] (c)  Logically  and  legally there is  automatic  expiry  of office  of the member qua ordinary member on his  assumption of  office qua Chairman.  When a member holding office of  a member  takes  no  the office of Chairman  he  by  necessary implication and co instante, relinquishes or ceases to  hold his  office is member and the, requirement (if Art.  319  is satisfied. [6O2G-6O3H] (d)  Article  316(2) states that a member shall hold  office for  term  of   six  years or  until  he  attains  60  years whichever is earlier: which means that on the expiration  of the period of 6 years he ceases to hold office.  Logically 590 therefore, Art. 319 means that a member, on ceasing to  hold office  as a result of his six year term expiring, shall  be eligible for appointment as Chairman of the same Commission. There  is  no substance in the argument that, on  the  above interpretation, is member can be appointed, in violation  of Art. 316(2). as Chairman not merely when the six-year term expires, but also after he has attained the age of 60 years.  When an ordinary member is appointed as Chairman by virtue of the  permission written  into Art. 319(d), what really happens is  that  the incumbent  takes up a new office, namely, that of  Chairman. This  member--cum-Chairman,  in terms of Art.  316(2)  shall hold office. which in this case means his new office, for  a term  of  6 years or until he attains the age  of  60  years whichever is earlier. [603D-G] (e)  It could not be argued that the cessation  contemplated by  Art. 319 is not the category of persons  whose  six-year term  has  expired  but  those who  have  been  removed  for infirmities  under Art. 317, because, the wrote  purpose  of Art.  319 is to maintain purity is services  by  prohibiting temptation  in  future  offices or  employment  and,  it  is unlikely  that  the framers of the Constitution  would  have contemplated  by  a  special provision  the  appointment  to higher posts of persons who were unworthy, [6O3A-D] (f)  It  is  true  that an indefinite  term  of  office  and frequent  renewals  in the same State or in  the  Union  are fraught  with possible patronage and interference  with  the purity  of the functioning of the Public Service  Commission and  that  they  should  therefore  be  prevented  by  legal interdict.   But  in  fact the number of  instances  when  a member  of a Public Service Commission had held  office  for more  than 6 years are few.  Besides, anything between 6  to 12 years may not be so very long to justify the argument  of

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fear  that  the  above  object of  a  brief  term  would  be frustrated.   In  the last resort, the menace to  purity  of these  high offices comes as much from dubious pressure  and patronage  is from other causes and where the highest  seats of power do not guard against these evil$, no  constitution, no law, no court can save probity in administration.  [596H- 597G] The majority view in Dhivendra Krishna v. Corpn of Calcutta, A.I.R. 1966 Cal, 290 overruled. Upenda Pas v. State,  A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 205 approved.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE       JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 992 of 1973. Appeal from the judgment and order dated the June 4, 1973 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Writ Petition No.  774 of 1973. R.   N.  Byra  Reddy,  A.  K.  Sen,  M.  Veerappa,  for  the appellant. S.   S. Javali and B. R. Agarwala, for the respondent. L.   N.  Sinha, Solicitor General of India and S. P.  Nayar, for Intervener No. 1. O.   P. Rana, for Intervener No. 2. A.   R. Gupta and Narayan Nettar, for intervener No. 3. The Judgment of       the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.  A short issue as to the expiration of  the constitutionally guaranteed tenure of office of a Member  of the  Public  Service Commission, who, in the middle  of  his term,  reincarnates as its Chairman and claims a fresh  six- year spell, has lent itself to considerable argument at  the Bar,  the contributory causes being the differing  views  of courts,  varying practices of States,  apparent  incongruity between the paramount purpose and the expressed language of 591 the  provisions  and the slight obscurity  of  the  relevant articles,  the expert drafting and careful screening by  the ’founding fathers’ notwithstanding. One Shri Bidap, the respondent in this appeal, was appointed Member  of  the  State  Public  Service  Commission  by  the Governor  of Mysore on March 20,, 1967.  While his term  was still  running,  the  Governor was pleased  to  appoint  him Chairman  of  the Commission with effect from  February  15, 1969.  The State took the view that the six years assured to him  by  Article 316(2) commenced to run from  the  date  he became Member simpliciter and did not receive a fresh  start from  the  later date when he assumed  office  as  Chairman. Government’s view on the issue was revealed in answer to  an interpellation in the Legislative Council made on March  17, 1973.   On  this-reckoning the Chairman’s  term  would  have ended  on the 19th and so, the panicked respondent  hastened to the High Court to avert the peril of premature ouster and sought  an appropriate writ interdicting Government’s  move. The  timely interim order and the eventual allowance of  the writ  petition balked the hope of Government and  drove  the State to this Court in quest of a final pronouncement on the constitutional question involved.  While there is divergence of   judicial   opinion  at  the  High  Court   level,   the preponderance of authority, including a ruling of the Mysore High Court itself, militates against the appellant’s  stand- point.  A broad consensus of administrative practice evolved by  the Union Government in response to an opinion  tendered by  the Attorney General on a reference made to him  at  the instance  of the Conference of All India Chairmen of  Public

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Service  Commissions (prompted by divergent views  expressed in  a full Bench judgment of the Calcutta High, Court)  also goes against the appellant’s position.  Technically, neither the appellant nor, for that matter, any citizen is bound  by administrative  verdicts  on questions of law and  when  the High   Courts   disagree,   the   law   becomes    uncertain necessitating  resolution  of the conflict  by  the  Supreme Court.  It is apt to remember the words of Rich, J-               "One of the tasks of this Court is to preserve               uniformity of determination.  It may, be  that               in  performing  the task the  Court  does  not               achieve the uniformity that was desirable  and               what uniformity is achieved may be  uniformity               of  error.   However in that event  it  is  at               least uniformity".(1) Moreover, in a Government of laws like ours, the last  court has  the last word on a given law, it being  permissible  to the  Legislature, subject to constitutional limitations,  to amend  the law, if necessary.  The question in  the  present case  being  one  of general public  importance  has  to  be decided  by this Court silencing the present  and  potential disputes  and  laying  down a binding  rule  for  the  whole country. Counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that there is high  policy  animating  the  provisions,  which  limit  the official  life of a Member of the Public Service  Commission to  a significantly short term of six years coupled with  an almost blanket ban on the holding (1)  Waghorn v. Waghorn, 65 Commw.  L. R. 239, 293 (1942). 592 of  other  office  or taking up of  other  employment  under Government  on ceasing to be a Member.  Before, we focus  on the fasciculus of Articles 316 to 319 to assess the force of this  and other submissions, two basic questions fall to  be considered.   Is  there any public policy  of  great  moment behind  these  Articles and if so, what is  it  ?  Secondly, assuming  its  existence and importance, could  this  Court, while  interpreting  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution, listen to such extrinsic voices, however natural logical and persuasive  or  be guided by the olden rule  of  grammatical construction which treats the text of the statute as a  sort of forensic sound-proof room ? The  working life, of an Indian official  in  administration can  easily  be, and is, several times the six  short  years granted  to  a Public Service Commission Member  under  Art. 316(2).   Further employment in public service is  also  not unusual  for  superannuated officers,  particularly  at  the higher echelons.  And yet there is substantial, although not total,  prohibition  of  subsequent  employment  in   public service of Commission Members written into the  Constitution by Art. 319.  The learned counsel rightly stresses that  the Public Service Commission has vast powers of recruitment  of candidates for an immense and increasing host of  Government posts which in a country with considerable unemployment  are prom  to be abused if too close and too long  a  familiarity with  certain sectors were to be established.  The  prospect and  peril  of  the Executive,  tempting  with  renewals  of membership  to  influence the incumbents  may  corrupt  that institution,  which must zealously be kept above  suspicion. This is the reason detre of the narrow period prescribed  by Art.  316(2), the taboo on reappointment in Art. 316(3)  and on taking up of any Government service clamped down by  Art. 319.   This view gains strength from the proceedings of  the Constituent   Assembly,  particularly  the  speech  of   Dr. Ambedkar.  Maybe there is plausibility in the point that the

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three limitations on the office of membership (made a  shade more  rigorous  in the case of chairmanship)  were  directed towards  obviation  of abuse.  Even so, is that  a  dominant concern  of  court in the interpretation of the  statute  or altogether irrelevant?  Are Constituent Assembly Debates and objects  in  the mind of lawmakers put out of  the  judicial area of vision by the classical exclusionary rules which are part of our legal heritage from the British? Anglo-American  jurisprudence,  unlike  other  systems.  has generally frowned upon the use of parliamentary debates  and press  discussions  as throwing light upon  the  meaning  of statutory  provisions.  Willes, J. in Miller v.  Tayler,(1), stated  that the sense and meaning of an Act  of  Parliament must  be collected from what it says when passed  into  law, and  not  from the history of changes it  underwent  in  the House where it took its rise.  That history is not known  to the other House or to the Sovereign.  In Assam Railways  and Trading  Co.  Ltd.  v. I.R.C.,(2) Lord  Writ  in  the  Privy Council said:               "It  is clear that the language of a  Minister               of  the  Crown in proposing  in  Parliament  a               measure   which  eventually  becomes  law   is               inadmissible and the report of commissioners               (1) [1769] 4 Burr, 2303, 2332.               (2) [1935] A. C. 445 at p. 458.               593               is even more removed from value as evidence of               intention,  because  it does not  follow  that               their recommendations were accepted". The  rule of grammatical construction has been  accepted  in India  before  and  after Independence.   In  the  State  of Travancore-Cochin   and  others  v.  Bombay  Company   Ltd., Alleppey,(1)  Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri delivering  the judgment of the Court, said :-               "It  remains  only to point out that  the  use               made  by  the  learned  Judges  below  of  the               speeches   made   by  the   members   of   the               Constituent  Assembly  in the course,  of  the               debates   on   the   draft   Constitution   is               unwarranted.  That this form of extrinsic  aid               to  the  interpretation  of  statutes  is  not               admissible,  has  been generally  accepted  in               England,  and the same rule has been  observed               in  the  construction of Indian  statutes  See               Administrator  General of Bengal v.  Prem  Lal               Mullick,  22 nd.  Appl. 107 (P.C.) at p.  118.               The  reason behind the rule was explained  by,               one  of  us  in Gopalan v.  Slate  of  Madras,               (1.950) S.C.R. 88 thus :               "A speech made in the course of the debate  on               a  bill  could at best be  indicative  of  the               subjective intent of the speaker, but it could               not  reflect the inarticulate  mental  process               lying  behind the majority vote which  carried               the,  bill.   Nor is it reasonable  to  assume               that  the minds of all those legislators  were               in accord".               Or, is it is more tersely, put in an  American               case-               "Those  who did not speak may not have  agreed               with those who did; and those who spoke  might               differ from each other-United States v. Trans-               Missouri Freight Association, (1897) 169  U.S.               290 at p. 318 (sic)".               This  rule  of exclusion has not  always  been

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             adhered   to   in  America,   and.   sometimes               distinction   is  made  between   using   such               material to ascertain the purpose of a statute               and using it for ascertaining its meaning.  It               would seem that the rule is adopted in  Canada               and  Australia-see Craies on Statute Law,  5th               Edn. p. 122 (pp. 368-9)". In  the  American  jurisdiction, a  more  natural  note  has sometimes  been struck.  Mr. justice Frankfurter was of  the view(2) that-               "If   the  purpose  of  construction  is   the               ascertainment  of  meaning,  nothing  that  is               logically  relevant  should be  excluded,  and               yet, the Rule of Exclusion, which is generally               followed   in   England,  insists   that,   in               interpreting statutes, the proceedings in  the               Legislatures,  including  speeches   delivered               when  the statute was discussed  and  adopted,               cannot be cited in courts". (1) AIR 1952 S.     C. 366. (2)  See  reference  in   The  Indian  Parliament  and   the Fundamental Rights-Tagore Law Lectures-Chapter VI. p. 141. 594 Crawford on Statutory Construction at page 388 notes that-               "The   judicial  opinion  on  this  point   is               certainly  not  quite uniform  and  there  are               American  decisions  to the  effect  that  the               general  history of a statute and the  various               steps  leading  up to an  enactment  including               amendments  or modifications of  the  original               bill and reports of Legislative Committees can               be looked at for ascertaining the intention of               the legislature where it is in doubt; but they               hold  definitely that the legislative  history               is inadmissible when there is no obscurity  in               the meaning of the statute". The  Rule  of Exclusion has been criticised  by  jurists  as artificial.  Ile trend of academic opinion and the  practice in  the  European system suggest that  interpretation  of  a statute  being an exercise in the ascertainment of  meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible. Recently,  an eminent Indian jurist has reviewed  the  legal position  and expressed his agreement with Julius Stone  and Justice Frankfurter.(1) of course, nobody suggests that such extrinsic  materials  should be decisive, but they  must  be admissible.   Authorship  and interpretation  must  mutually illumine   and  interact.   There  is  authority   for   the proposition  that  resort may be had to these  sources  with great  caution and only when incongruities  and  ambiguities are to be resolved.(2) There is a strong case for  whittling down  the Rule of Exclusion followed in the  British  courts and for less apologetic reference to legislative proceedings and  like  materials to read the meaning of the words  of  a statute.   Where  it is plain, the  language  prevails,  but where  there  is  obscurity or lack of  harmony  with  other provisions  and  in other special circumstances, it  may  be legitimate to take external assistance such as the object of the  provisions,  the mischief sought to  be  remedied,  the social  context, the words of the authors and  other  allied matters.   The law of statutory construction is a  strategic branch of jurisprudence which must, it may be felt,  respond to  the great social changes but a conclusive  pronouncement on  the  particular point arising here need  not  detain  us because   nothing,  decisive  as  between  the   alternative

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interpretations  flows  from a reliance on  the  Constituent Assembly proceedings or the broad purposes of the  statutory scheme. A few excerpts from the drafting preludes to the framing  of the Constitution from the masterly study by B. Shiva Rao and relevant  quotes from a few important speeches in the  House may  be apposite and illuminating.  The Royal Commission  on Superior  Services  in  India,  popularly  called  the   Lee Commission (1924) observed(3)               "Wherever   democratic   institutions   exist,               experience   has  shown  that  to  secure   an               efficient  civil  service it is  essential  to               protect  it as far as possible from  political               or  personal  influences  and  give  it   that               position of stability and security               (1)   The    Indian   Parliament    and    the               Fundamental Rights-Tagore Law LeCtures,               p. 148.               (2)   A.  K. Gopalan v. State of  Madras,  AIR               1950 S. C. 27.               (3)   The  Framing of  India’s  Constitution-A               Study, pp. 724-725.               595               which  is vital to its successful  working  as               the  impartial  and  efficient  instrument  by               which   governments,  of  whatever   political               complexion, may give effect to their policies.               In  countries  where this principle  has  been               neglected,  and where the "spoils system"  has               taken  its  place,  an  inefficient  and  dis-               organised   civil   service   has   been   the               inevitable  result  and  corruption  has  been               rampant". As   a  result  of  these  recommendations  Public   Service Commissions  were set up in the country with the  objectives outlined  by  the Lee Commission.  B. Shiva  Rao  has  drawn attention to the doings of the drafting committee(1) -               ".... Santhanam, Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, Mrs.               Durgabai and T. T. Krishnamachari suggested an               amendment  to lay down... that a member  of  a               State   Commission  would  on  retirement   be               ineligible,  for  any office  other  than  the               Chairman  or a member of the Union  Commission               or  the Chairman of a State  Commission.   The               principle  of this amendment was  accepted  by               the  Drafting Committee which incorporated  it               in suitable terms in the revised draft of  the               article  moved by Ambedkar in the  Constituent               Assembly on August 22, 1949".               Dr. Ambedkar introducing the provisions  spoke               (2)               "Now  I  come to the  other  important  matter               relating to the employment or eligibility  for               employment  of  the  members  of  the   Public               Services  Commission-both the Union and  State               Public Services Commissions.  Members will see               that according to article 285, clause (3),  we               have  made both the Chairman and the  Members,               of  the Central Public Services Commission  as               well  as the Chairman of the State  Commission               and  the  members  of  the  State  Commission,               ineligible for reappointment to the same posts               :  that is to say, once a term of office of  a               Chairman  and Member is over, whether he is  a               Chairman  of  the  Union  Commission  or   the

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             Chairman  of a State Commission we  have  said               that  he  shall not be reappointed.   I  think               that is a very salutary provision, because any               hope that might be held out for reappointment,               or  continuation in the same appointment,               may  act  as a sort of  temptation  which  may               induce  the  Member not to act with  the  same               impartiality  that  he is expected to  act  in               discharging his duties.  Therefore, that is  a               fundamental bar which has been provided in the               draft article". Mr.  Jaspat Roy Kapoor tabled several amendments in  support of which the spoke at length.  One of the amendments,  which was turned down by the House but highlights portions of  the area  of the present controversy and his speech  in  support thereof, may be excerpted(3) here : (1)  The Framing of India’s Constitution-A Study-p. 734. (2)  Constituent Assembly Debates (Vol. 9) 1949. p. 575. (3)  Constituent Assembly Debates (Vol. 9) (1949) p. 58 1. 596               "That  at the end of the proposed new  article               285-C, the following proviso be added:-               Provided  that  a  member’s  total  period  of               employment  in  the different  public  service               commissions shall not exceed twelve Years".               "This amendment is more than important than my               other  amendments.   I was confirmed  in  this               view  from what I heard Dr. Ambedkar say  this               morning in moving his own amendment.  He said,               while  explaining  article 285 that  a  person               shall not hold office as a Member of a  Public               Service  Commission for more than  six  years.               That of course is partially provided in clause               (3) of article But that clause refers only  to               the   reemployment   of  a  person   to   that               particular  post.  So far as the  other  posts               are concerned, that clause does not apply.  So               according  to  article  285-C a  member  of  a               Public Service Commission can continue to be a               Member  of one or other of the public  service               commissions  for any number of years.   I  say               ’any, number of years’ because, for six  years               one can be a member of a State Public  Service               Commission.    Thereafter,  for  another   six               years,  he  can  be the Chairman  of  a  State               Public Service Commission.  It comes to twelve               years.  Thereafter again he can  be...........               "I submit this is not a satisfactory state  of               affairs."               Shri H. V. Kamath adverted, in his speech,  to               this topic then he said(1) :               "It is agreed on all hands that the  permanent               services   play  an  important  role  in   the               administration  of  any  country.   With   the               independence     of    our     country     the               responsibilities  of the services have  become               more  onerous.   They-  may make  or  mar  the               efficiency     of    the     machinery-     of               administration-call it steel frame or what you               will-a  machinery  which is so vital  for  the               peace and progress of the country."               "If a member of the Public Service  Commission               is  under the impression that by  serving  and               kowtowing  to those in power he could  get  an               office of profit under the Government of India

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             or  in  the Government of a State, then  I  am               sure  he  would not be able to  discharge  his               functions impartially or with integrity".               "The  public here have sometimes been made  to               feel that family or group interests have  been               promoted  at the expense of the national;  and               to  protect  the  Ministers  against  such   a               charge,  it  is  necessary  that  the   Public               Service  Commissions must be  kept  completely               independent of the executive.. . " .lm0 From  these  parliamentary proceedings the  focal  point  of constitutional  vigilance becomes manifest.   An  indefinite term  of office and frequent renewals for any, incumbent  in the same State or in the Union linked up with tendencies  of superannuating officials to prospect (1)  Constituent  Assembly Debates (Vol. 9) (1949) pp.  586, 589.               597 for   post-retirement  posts  are  fraught   with   possible patronage   and   interference  with  the  purity   of   the Commission’s  functioning and should be prevented  by  legal interdict.   Art. 316(2) sets a limit of six years  for  the office  of  a Member of a Public Service Commission  and  an outer limit of 60 years of age (65 in the case of the  Union Public  Service  Commission).  There is an  express  bar  on reappointment  on  the  expiration of the  first  term  Art. 316(2).   There  is  a  further  prohibition  against   the, securing   of  any  State  employment  by  Members  of   the Commission  on ceasing to be such Members, subject to a  few exceptions (Art. 319). if the argument of the appellant were to  be accepted. a Member, be he Chairman or not, or one  or the other in succession, will get a total term of six  years only.   That is to say’, even in the middle of his  term  as Member, if he is appointed Chairman, he wilt get only a  run of  six years to serve from the date he became  an  ordinary Member.   On the other hand, if the rival contention of  the respondent  were  to prevail, in the case of a Member  of  a State  Public Service Commission, there is a possibility  of his  getting a maximum of six years as ordinary  Member  and another six years as Chairman of the Commission in the  Same State.  of course, we are not concerned with the prospect of appointments  in other States as the mischief sought  to  be prevented is the possibility, of abuse by too long a ten-are in the same State.  The situation in which a Member may thus enjoy  a twelve-year term is so rare and, perhaps, may  fall to the good fortune of only a few exceedingly good  Members- and, indeed, anything between six to twelve years may not be so very long in the effective life of a public  servant-that the  apprehension  of  the  object of  a  brief  term  being frustrated  does  not disturb us.  In this  context,  it  is reassuring to note that in twelve states and the Union there have  been,  as disclosed by Ext.  ’G’, only  two  instances beyond  eight years of tenure and only 19 cases  where  more than a six year term is seen to have been obtained.  May  be Ext.   ’G’ is not exhaustive, and incidentally it  indicates the  practice which has prevailed in the country during  the last over two decades of reading Art. 319(d) as, enabling  a fresh  term  of  office  from the  date  of  appointment  as Chairman.  it  is  clear that though  mere  practice  cannot legitimise what is illegal it contradicts the  consternation raised  by the appellant of likely misuse of power.  In  the last resort the menace to purity of these high offices comes as  much from dubious pressures and patronage as from  other causes  and  where the highest seats of power do  not  guard against  these evils, no constitution, no law, no court  can

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save  probity  in Administration.  We cannot assent  to  the appellants argument of fear. Nor is this question of law res integra.  The Calcutta  High Court had considered it in a Full Bench decision reported in AIR  1966 Cal. 290.  The majority view was that the term  of office of six years was to be computed from the date of  the appointment  as  Member of the commission and  even  if,  in midstream he was made Chairman. time ran out finally at  the end of the first six years.  The minority opinion handed  in by  Mitter, J. took a contrary view based on  an  harmonious reading  of  Arts. 316 and 319 reaching the  result  that  a Member appointed as Chairman inaugurates a new term from the later date.  The Mysore High Court was confronted with  this question               598 in  Writ petitions Nos. 6492, 5031 and 3758 of 1969.   There the challenge to the validity of the Chairman’s  continuance in  office was made by certain disappointed  applicants  for the  post of District Educational officer.  The  High  Court followed the minority view of Mitter, J. and the  respondent in this appeal has produced a copy of the Mysore Judgment as Ext.  ’B’ along with his Writ Petition since the ruling  has not been reported.  The Orissa High Court also fell in  line with  Mysore, dissenting from the majority judgment  in  the Calcutta case.  That decision, reported in AIR 1970  Orissa 205,  reads into the appointment of a Member as Chairman  an ipso facto cessation of his former office as Member when  he enters upon the duties of his new office, and thus seeks  to reconcile  Art. 316 with Art. 319.  The High Court of  Patna responded  to  this  issue in a like manner  in  a  judgment rendered in C.W.J.C. 1997 of 1970 (reproduced at pages 54 to 61. of vol. II of the paper-book).  It may be noticed that a special  leave Petition against this judgment was  dismissed in  line by- the Supreme Court (the said order is Ext.   ’C’ in the writ petition). It now remains to understand the ratio of those decisions in the  light  of  the anatomy  of  the  constitutional  scheme contained  in Arts. 316 to 319.  At this stage we  may  read Arts. 316, 317 and 319 in extenso :               316  (1)  Appointment  and  terms  of   office               of Members.               The  Chairman  and other Members of  a  Public               Service  Commission shall be appointed in  the               case  of  the  Union  Commission  or  a  Joint               Commission  by the President, and in the  case               of a State Commission, by the Governor of  the               State :               Provided that as nearly as may be one half  of               the members of every Public Service Commission               shall  be  persons who at the dates  of  their               respective  appointments have held office  for               at least ten years either under the Government               of India or under the Government of State, and               in computing the said period of ten years  any               period   before  the  commencement   of   this               Constitution  during which a person  has  held               office  under the Crown in India or under  the               Government   of  an  Indian  State  shall   be               included.               (1A)  If  the office of the  Chairman  of  the               Commission  becomes  vacant or  if  any,  such               Chairman  is by reason of absence or  for  any               other  reason unable to perform the duties  of               his’  office, those duties shall,  until  some               person  appointed  under  clause  (1)  to  the

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             vacant  office  has  entered  on  the   duties               thereof  or,  as the case may  be,  until  the               chairman has resumed his duties, be  performed               by  such  one  of the  other  members  of  the               Commission  as the President, in the  case  of               the  Union Commission or a  Joint  Commission,               and the Governor of the State in the case of a               State Commission, may appoint for the purpose.               (2)   A member of a Public Service  Commission               shall bold office for a term of six years from               the date on which               599               he enters upon his office or until he attains,               in  the case of the Union Commission, the  age               of  sixty-five  years, and in the  case  of  a               State  Commission or a Joint  Commission,  the               age of sixty years, whichever is earlier :               Provided that-               (a)   a member of a Public Service  Commission               may,  by writing under his hand addressed,  in               the  case of the Union Commission or  a  Joint               Commission, to the President, and in the  case               of a State Commission, to the Governor of  the               State, resign his office;               (b)   a member of a Public Service Commission,               may  be removed from his office in the  manner               provided  in  clause  (1)  or  clause  (3)  of               Article               317.               (3)   A person who holds office as a member of               a  Public  Service Commission  shall,  on  the               expiration   of   his  term  of   office,   be               ineligible for reappointment to that office.               Removal and suspension of a Member of a Public               Service Commission.               317(1)  Subject  to the provisions  of  clause               (3),  the  Chairman or any other member  of  a               Public  Service  ,Commission  shall  only   be               removed  from  his  office  by  order  of  the               President on the ground of misbehaviour  after               the Supreme Court, on reference being made  to               it  by the President, has, on inquiry held  in               accordance  with the procedure  prescribed  in               that  behalf under article 145, reported  that               the Chairman or such other member, as the case               may  be,  ought  on  any  such  ground  to  be               removed.               (2)   The President, in the case of the  Union               Commission  or  a Joint  Commission,  and  the               Governor  in the case of a  State  Commission,               may  suspend from office the Chairman  or  any               other  member of the Commission in respect  of               whom a reference has been made to the  Supreme               Court under clause (1) until the President has               passed orders on receipt of the report of  the               Supreme Court on such reference.               (3)   Notwithstanding anything in clause  (1),               the President may by order remove from  office               the  Chairman or any other member of a  Public               Service  Commission  if the Chairman  or  such               other member, as the case may be-               (a)   is adjudged an insolvent; or               (b) engages during his term of office in   any               paid  employment  outside the  duties  of  his               office; or

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             600               (c)   is,  in  the opinion of  the  President,               unfit  to  continue in office  by,  reason  of               infirmity of mind or body.               (4)   It the Chairman or any other member of a               Public Service Commission is or becomes in any               way concerned or interested in any contract or               agreement  made  by  or  on  behalf  of   the,               Government  of  India or the Government  of  a               State or participates in any way in the profit               thereof or in any benefit or emolument arising               therefrom  otherwise than as a member  and  in               common  with  the other members of  an  incor-               porated  company’, he shall, for the  purposes               of  clause  (1),  be deemed to  be  guilty  of               misbehaviour.               Prohibition  as  to the holding of  office  by               members  of Commission on ceasing to  be  such               members.               319.  On ceasing to hold office-               (a)   the Chairman of the Union Public Service               Commission  shall be ineligible,  for  further               employment  either  under  the  Government  of               India or under the Government of a State;               (b)   the  Chairman of a State Public  Service               Commission  shall be eligible for  appointment               as,  the Chairman or any other member  of  the               Union  Public  Service Commission  or  as  the               Chairman  of  any other State  Public  Service               Commission,  but not for any other  employment               either under the Government of India or  under               the Government of a State;               (c)   a member other than the Chairman of  the               Union  Public  Service  Commission  shall   be               eligible  for appointment as the  Chairman  of               the Union Public, Service Commission or as the               Chairman of a State public Service Commission,               but not, for any other employment either under               the   Government   of  India  or   under   the               Government of a State;               (d)   a  member other than the Chairman  of  a               State  Public  Service  Commission  shall  be,               eligible  for appointment as the  Chairman  or               any  other member of the Union Public  Service               Commission  or as the Chairman of that or  any               other State Public Service Commission, but not               for  any  other employment  either  under  the               Government of India or under the Government of               a State. It is obvious from the language of the articles, admitted by both sides and accepted by all the decisions that a Chairman also  is  a Member.  The appellant’s argument is  that  Art. 316(2) fixes a term of office of six years for a member, who ex  hypothesi includes a Chairman, and so the incumbent,  be he member simpliciter or 601 member-cum-Chairman  or  for part of the period  member  and later Chairman, cannot exceed the legal span of six years in all,  membership  being a common denominator  covering  both offices.   The framers have taken care to limit the life  of member to a term of six years.  And wherever (unlike in Art. 316(2)  distinct treatment for the two offices is  intended, clear  language separately dealing with them, or  by  making references,  has been used, as is so evident from Arts.  316 (1A),  317 and 319).  To fortify the reasoning, reliance  is

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placed  on  Art.,  3  61 (3)  which  places  an  embargo  on reappointment  on expiry, of the term of office  of  member (which expression covers Chairman).  A  larger-than-six-year term  by taking on Chairmanship to membership would  violate sub-art.  2  and subvert sub-art. 3 of Art. 316.,  runs  the submission.   So presented, the’ argument seems  impressive. But  this apparent tenor gets a severe jolt when we turn  to Art. 319(1) (d), for, if full credit were to be given to the opening  words,  "on ceasing to hold office" a member  of  a Public  Service  Commission is declared to be  eligible  for appointment  as its: Chairman at the expiration of his  six- year  term  as  ordinary member.  A member  ceased  to  hold office when six years of service are over and remotely  when he  is  removed for infirmities (Art. 317).   To  deny  this effect  to the provision, which is an integral part  of  the scheme, and to confine its operation to recondite  instances of insolvents, delinquents and imbeciles dealt with in  Art. 317 is to argue Art. 319 into a reductio ad absurdum. A closer probe into the key Articles 316 and 319 informed by the  brooding  presence of a constitutional  purpose  behind them,  may  now  be undertaken.   A  subject-wise  dichotomy suggests  that  Art. 316 deals with the appointment  of  the Chairman and members of the Commission, their term of office and  their ineligibility for re-appointment, while Art.  319 relates  to  a different topic viz., the  prohibition,  with narrow  exceptions,  against  further  employment  in  State service.  Concern for purity of the office and vulnerability to abuse of powers are writ large on these provisions.  Even so, a few legal ideas, pervading the articles will  dissolve the difficulties conjured up based On Art. 31.6(2) and  (3). Let us itemise them.               (1)   A Chairman is also a member, as the very               first words of Art. 316 indicate.               (2)   Nevertheless,  the office of  member  is               different  from that of Chairman and  so  also               the duties attached to each, as is  eloquently               evident from Art. 316(1A). Thus  while both are members, they hold  different  offices. Sub-Art. (2) sanctions the holding of office by, a:  member for  six  years "from the date on which he enters  upon  his office"  which is signified by his entering ’on  the  duties thereof’,  to adopt the language of (1A).  An office, as  is thus  self-evident, has duties and a member simpliciter  has certain duties while a Chairman has other duties of. office. The  offices  are  different though  both  the  holders  are generally  members. The Prescription  of the terminus a  quo in (2) is ’from the date on which he enters upon his office’ which, in the case of a Chairman 602 appointed directly as such or originally as member and later elevated  as Chairman, begins when he starts functioning  as Chairman.  So far is clear. Article  316(3) neatly fits in and indeed the draftsman  has perspicaciously  focussed attention here on the office of  a person  (as  distinct from membership) and  the  incumbent’s ineligibility to reappointment to that office.  The cardinal point  is the identity of the office and the  injunction  is against  reappointment to that particular office.  A  member can  fill one of two offices-as an ordinary member ,or as  a member-Chairman   and  the  disability   for   reappointment attaches  to the specific office.  The distinction  is  fine but  real.  No member who holds the office of just a  member pure  and simple shall’ be re-appointed to that office  i.e. to the office of member pure Ind simple.  The offices being different   it  is  semantically  wrong  to   describe   the

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appointment  of  a  member  to the  office  of  Chairman  as reappointment.   To re-appoint to an office  predicates  the previous  holding  of   that identical office.   Re-,  as  a prefix  has the sense of ’again’. it follows  straight  from this  that  an ordinary member when elevated to  the  higher office   of  Chairman  is  not  reappointed  and  does   not contravene  Art.  316(2)  or (3) even if it be  on  he  full course of  six  years of the office of  ordinary  member having run out. Now let us study the ambit and limitations of Art. 319.   It primarily  enumerates  the  prohibitions  attached  to   the holders of offices of Chairman and member of Public  Service Commissions but carves ,out a few ’savings’ to the  ’dents’. We  are  directly concerned with sub-cl. (d)  which  bars  a member  from  taking  up  employment  under  Government  but expressly  declares,  by way of exception,  eligibility  for appointment  "as  the Chairman of that or  any  other  State Public  Service  Commission", an ceasing to hold  office  as member  (See  the careful accent on office  and  appointment without the re).  The fair meaning of this provision is that a member of Public Service Commission of a State on  ceasing to  hold  office  as such is  eligible  for  appointment  as Chairman  of  that  Commission itself.   Ordinarily  when  a member has run out his term under Art. 316(2), he ceases  to hold  office.  Art. 316(2) states that a member  shall  hold office  for  a  term of six years which means  that  on  the expiration of that period he ceases to hold office.  So  the normal way a member ceases to hold office is by his six-year term spending itself out (or by his crossing the age bar  of 60  or 65 as the case may be).  Logically,  therefore,  Art. 319  means  that a member on ceasing to hold  office,  as  a result of his six-year term expiring, shall be eligible  for appointment as Chairman of the same Commission.  There is no contravention of Art. 316(3) which prevents reappointment to the same office.  In the present case, the office of  member is different from the office of the Chairman and so there is no  re-appointment  to  that office when a  member  is  made Chairman.   Similarly, Art. 316(2) is not  breached  because there is a six-year term for each office.  The counter argu- ment  on the basis of Art. 316(2) and (3) fails  to  explain Art. 319 (1)(d) which expressly authorises appointment of  a member as                             603 Chairman  on  ceasing  to hold office.   The  very  strained argument   that  the  cessation  contemplated  is  not   the straightforward category of persons whose six-year term  has expired, but the condemned and recondite category covered by Art. 317(3) is too jejune for judicial acceptance.  For  one thing  it is extraordinary to think that persons covered  by Art.  317(3) will at all be considered for appointment to  a higher post of Chairman.  That sub-Article speaks of removal of   a  member  because  of  insolvency   or   objectionable engagement  in  paid employment outside the  duties  of  his office or ineffectiveness to continue in office by reason of infirmity  of  mind  or body.  The argument is  only  to  be mentioned  to  be  rejected and it is  hardly  fair  to  the framers  of the Constitution to think that they  would  have contemplated such unworthies to be appointed to higher posts by  a  special  provision under Art.  319  while  the  whole purpose of that Article is to maintain purity in service  by prohibiting temptation for future offices or employment. The learned Advocate General urged that Art. 316(2) would be stultified by the interpretation we adopt of Art. 319.  If a member  can  be  appointed as Chairman on  ceasing  to  hold office under Art. 316 (2), he could as well be appointed  so

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not  merely   when his six-year term has  expired  but  also after  he has attained the age of sixty years.  There  is  a fallacy  in  this submission. which will be  apparent  on  a careful reading of Art. 316(2).  That sub-article says  that a member shall hold office for six years or until he attains sixty years, whichever is earlier.  When an ordinary  member is  appointed chairman by virtue of the  permission  written into Art. 319(d), what really happens is that the  incumbent takes hold of a new office, namely, that of Chairman.  He is a  member  all  the same, as we  have  earlier  seen.   This member-cum-Chairman  in  terms  of Art.  316(2)  shall  hold office, which in this case means his new office, for a  term of six years or until he attains the age of sixty years.  If he  is appointed Chairman ’past sixty, the appointment  will be still-born because by the mandate of Art. 316(2) he shall hold office only until he attains the age of superannuation. This  date  having already transpired, he  cannot  hold  the office at all. Another  conundrum  raised  is as to how  when  an  ordinary member  in  the course of the six-year period  is  appointed Chairman we can read into such an appointment as ’ceasing to hold office’ as member this being a requirement for Art. 319 to apply.  The obvious answer is that when a member  holding the office of a member takes up the office of Chairman,  he, by  necessary implication and co instante,  relinquishes  or ceases to hold his office as ordinary member.  It is  incon- ceivable that he will hold two offices at the same time  and that will 604 also  reduce  the number of members of  the  Public  Service Commission.   Therefore, logically and legally we may  spell out an automatic expiry of office of the member qua ordinary member on his assumption of office qua Chairman. Nor is the public mischief sought to be avoided by Arts. 316 and  319 defeated by this interpretation.  In any case  they cannot  serve  indefinitely, nor remain  for  anything  like twentyfive  or thirty years which is the normal tenure of  a Government servant. The   various   rulings   we  have   adverted   to   earlier substantially adopt the arguments we have set out,  although in some of them there is marginal obscurity.  The thrust  of the  reasoning  accepted  in  all  but  the  Calcutta   case substantially  agrees  with what has appealed  to  us.   For these reasons we dismiss the appeal with costs. V.P.S.                  Appeal dismissed. 605