http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: STATE OF MYSORE & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: T. V. SUNDARAM IYENGAR & SONS (P) LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/11/1979

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR  148            1980 SCR  (2)   1  1980 SCC  (1)  66  CITATOR INFO :  D          1981 SC 774  (12,17,18)  RF         1991 SC1650  (6)

ACT:      Motor Vehicles  Taxation Act, 1957-Section 3(2)-Vehicle passing through  a State  for short  period-If "kept" within the meaning of section.

HEADNOTE:      The respondent bought new cars and chassis manufactured in Bombay  and  brought them by road. In the course of their journey from  Bombay to  Madras the  vehicles passed through the territory of the State of Mysore for over 400 miles. The Road Transport  Authorities of  the State of Mysore demanded payment of  road tax  on the  vehicles under section 3(2) of the Mysore  Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 which provides that taxes are leviable on motor vehicles belonging to or in the possession or control of persons not ordinarily resident in the  State of  Mysore and  kept in  the State for periods shorter than a quarter but not exceeding thirty days.      Allowing the  respondent’s writ petition the High Court held that  vehicles which  passed through the State were not "kept" in  the State  within the  meaning of section 3(2) of the Act and so were not taxable under it.      In appeal  to this  court it was contended on behalf of the  appellant   that  the   vehicles  passing  through  the territory of  the State  over a  distance of 400 miles  with halts on  the way  could be said to have been "kept" for use on loads  in the State within the meaning of the section and were therefore taxable.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD : A vehicle in transit through the State of Mysore or even  making necessary  halt for  short intervals  during transit cannot be said to be a vehicle kept for use on roads in the State of Mysore. [6 B-C]      The word "kept", which has not been defined in the Act, has  to   be  interpreted  in  its  ordinary  popular  sense consistent with  the context. In association with the use of the vehicle  the word  "kept" has an element of stationeries which is  something different  from a  state of transit or a course of journey through the State. A mere state of running

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

through or  even halting of the vehicle in the course of the journey through  the State for its outside destination, will not be sufficient to constitute "keeping" of that vehicle in the State within the meaning of section 3(2). [4 C-E & 5 E]      Dudley v.  Holland [1963]  3 All.  E.R. 732,  Biggs  v. Mitchell (1862), 31 L.J.M.C. 163 referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 272 of 1970.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 14-4-1969  of  the  Mysore  High  Court  in  W.P.  No. 2889/67.      R. N. Nath and M. Veerappa for the Appellant. 2      M.  Natesan   and  Mrs.   S.  Gopalakrishnan   for  the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SARKARIA, J.  Whether a  motor vehicle  passing through the  territory  of  the  State  of  Mysore  on  way  to  its destination in  another State  is a  motor vehicle "kept" in the State of Mysore (now Karnataka) within the contemplation of Section  3(1) of  the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (hereinafter  referred to  as the Taxation Act), is the short question  that falls  for consideration in this appeal by special  leave directed  against a  judgment, dated April 14, 1969,  of the  High Court  of Mysore. The material facts bearing on the question are as follows :      The respondent,  M/s. T.  V. Sundaram  Iyengar &  Sons. Pvt. Ltd.,  whose registered office is in the State of Tamil Nadu, is  a dealer  in motor vehicles which are manufactured at Bombay.  Some of those vehicles are sold in Mysore State, while others  are  sold  outside  Mysore  State.  But  those vehicles which are sold outside the State of Mysore in other States  pass   through   its   territory   under   temporary registration number plates issued after receipt of token tax by the  Bombay Motor Vehicles Authority. Such vehicles enter the State of Mysore at its border in Belgaum District and go out at  its border  in Kolar  District, thus running through the territory  of Mysore  State by  road over  a distance of about 400 miles.      The R.T.O.,  Belgaum,  issued  a  communication,  dated September 27,  1966, to the respondent demanding tax on such vehicles  (new   cars  and   chassis)  passing  through  the territory of  Mysore. After  exhausting, his  remedies under the Taxation  Act, the  respondent filed  a  petition  under Article 226  of the  Constitution, to challenge the validity of the  demand notices  and the  Circular, dated October 10, 1966,  issued   by  the  Transport  Commissioner,  directing recovery of  tax at  the rates  specified  in  Part  of  the Schedule to  the Taxation  Act, in respect of those vehicles which do  no more  than pass  through the State of Mysore to reach their destination.      The Division  Bench of  the High  Court, who  heard the writ petition  held that  such vehicles  which  merely  pass through Mysore  State are  not those  "kept" in the State of Mysore within  the meaning  of Section  3(2) of the Taxation Act. and,  as such,  are not taxable under the Taxation Act. In the  result, the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the  direction of the Commissioner in paragraph 6 of his Circular  of October  10, 1966,  for the recovery of the tax in  question from  the respondent. Hence. this appeal by the State.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

3 The material part of Section 3 reads as follows :           "s. 3.  Levy  of  tax.-(1)  a  tax  at  the  rates      specified in  part A of the Schedule shall be levied on      all motor  vehicles suitable  for use on roads, kept in      the State of Mysore:           Provided that  in the  case of motor vehicles kept      by a dealer in or manufacturer of such vehicles for the      purpose of trade, the tax shall only be levied and paid      by such dealer or manufacturer on vehicles permitted to      be used on roads in the manner prescribed by rules made      under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.           Explanation.-A  motor   vehicle   of   which   the      certificate of  registration is  current shall, for the      purpose of this Act, be deemed to be a vehicle suitable      for use on roads.           (2) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-      section (1),  taxes at the rates specified in Part B of      the  Schedule   shall  be   levied  on  motor  vehicles      belonging  to  or  in  the  possession  or  control  of      persons, not ordinarily residing in the State of Mysore      and kept  in the  State of  Mysore by  such persons for      periods shorter  than  a  quarter,  but  not  exceeding      thirty days.           (3)............................................"      The appellant-State  maintains that  sub-section (2) of the Section  was applicable  to such  vehicles because while passing through  the territory  of the  State they  use  the roads of the State over a distance of 400 miles during their journey interspersed  by halts  in the State, and therefore, it can  be said that such vehicles are kept for use on roads in the  State within  the meaning of Section 3(2). According to the learned counsel for the appellant the test of whether a vehicle  is exigible  to tax under Section 3(2) is whether it is  suitable for use on roads and, in fact, substantially uses the  roads in the State of Mysore. In the present case, the argument  proceeds, this  test was satisfied because for an appreciable  period such vehicles remain in the territory of the  State and  use its  roads, and  as such, are taxable under sub-section (2) of Section 3.      The contention does not stand a close examination. Sub- section (2)  is to  be read with sub-section (1). Thus read, it is  plain that in order to be taxable under the Section a Motor vehicle must be capable of use on road, and further it must be  kept in  the State of Mysore, though in the case of vehicles belonging to persons not resident in the State, the duration of such ’keeping’ may be for a 4 period shorter than a quarter but not exceeding thirty days. In the  present case,  there is no dispute that the vehicles concerned are  capable of  use on  roads, and  in fact, they journey  by   road  through  the  State.  The  problem  thus resolves itself  into the issue : Whether the motor vehicles of the  respondent which  merely pass  through the  State of Mysore are  ’kept’ for  the duration of their journey in the State of  Mysore within the meaning of Section 3(2) ? In our opinion, the  High Court  has rightly answered this question in the negative.      The word  ’kept’ has  not been  defined in the Taxation Act. We  have, therefore,  to interpret  it in  its ordinary popular sense,  consistently  with  the  context.  The  word ’kept’ has  been repeatedly  used in  the Section.  In  sub- section (1),  it occurs  in association with the phrase "for use on  roads". In  that  context  the  ordinary  dictionary meaning of  the word ’keep in’ is ’to retain’, ’to maintain’

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

or cause  to stay or remain in a place ’to detain’, ’to stay or continue  in a  specified condition,  position  etc.’  In association with the use of the vehicle, therefore, the word ’kept’ has  an element  of stationariness.  It is  something different from  a mere  state of  transit  or  a  course  of journey through  the State. It is something more than a mere stoppage or  halt for  rest food or refreshment etc., in the course of transit through the territory of the State.      The unsoundness  of the  contention of  the appellant’s counsel, viz, that a vehicle capable for use on roads, owned by a  non-resident, remaining  for one  or two  days in  the territory of Mysore State in course of transit, will also be exigible to  tax under  section 3,  can be  demonstrated  by taking an  example. Supposing  the  respondents  take  their vehicles (capable  for use  on road)  by  rail  through  the territory of  Mysore State to their outside destination, and in the  course of  that journey, the train halts for a week, in all,  at stations  in Mysore  State, then,  if  the  wide interpretation demanded  by the  appellant is  adopted  such vehicles will  be exigible  to tax.  This indeed will  be an absurd result.  Such an  interpretation of  the word  ’kept’ will be wholly beyond the ken of the Legislature.      In the  view we  take, we  can derive  support from two decisions of the English Courts.      In Dudley  v. Holland,(1)  the appellant  carried on  a garage business  adjoining a  public road.  He had  bought a motor car in the course of 5 his business  and  was  offering  for  sale  in  the  garage showroom. He moved that car into the public road in order to allow the  showroom to  be rearranged.  There was  no excise licence in force for the car. It was found there by a police constable. The appellant was charged with unlawfully keeping on a  public road a mechanically propelled vehicle for which an excise licence was not in force, contrary to Section 7 of the Vehicles  (Excise)  Act,  1962.  The  question  for  the opinion of  the Court  was whether  the mere  presence of  a stationary mechanically  propelled vehicle on a public road, constitutes "keeping"  the vehicle  on the  road within  the meaning of  Section 7  of the  Vehicles (Excise)  Act, 1962. Lord Parker, C.J., who delivered the leading judgment of the Court, answered  this question  in the  negative,  in  these terms:           "I approach  the word  ’keeps’ in what seems to me      the ordinary  meaning of some continuing process; not a      mere isolated  moment, but  a keeping of the car there,      at any rate for some interval of time. It is no doubt a      matter of  degree and  fact in  every  case......In  my      judgment, ’keeping’  means something  more  than  that,      both according  to its  ordinary meaning  and  when  it      appears in conjunction with the other word ’uses’."      The principle is applicable to the present case. A mere state of  running through  or even halting of the vehicle in the course  of the  journey through  the State of Mysore for its  outside   destination,  will   not  be   sufficient  to constitute ’keeping’ of that vehicle in the State within the meaning of Section 3.      The other  case is  Biggs v.  Mitchell.(1) The ratio of this case  has been  extracted in  words and Phrases Legally Defined, Vol.  3 at  page 116.  In Biggs  v.  Mitchell,  the interpretation of  the word ’keep’, as used in Section 11 of Statute (1772)  12 Geo.  3 c. 61, came up for consideration. That Section  enacted that  no person or persons should have or ’keep’  at any  one time,  being a  dealer or  dealers in gunpowder, more  than 200  lb. of  gunpowder, and  not being

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

such more than 50 lb. of gunpowder in any house, mill, etc., occupied by  the  same  person  or  persons  within  certain limits. The  question before  the Court was whether a person who receives  powder in  the course  of transit, and makes a necessary halt, instead of sending it on immediately, can be said to  be "keeping’ the same within the meaning of Section 11. Crompton, J. answered this question thus: 6           "It seems  to me  that it is not made out that the      mere halting in London, for the purpose of sending from      one railway to another, when it is necessary that there      should  be  halting  in  some  place  or  other,  is  a      ’keeping’.....I think there can be no keeping within s.      11, when it is in course of transit."      On parity  of reasoning,  a vehicle  in transit through the State  of Mysore  or even  making a necessary halt for a short interval  during transit,  cannot  be  said  to  be  a vehicle ’kept’ for use on roads in the State of Mysore.      In the light of all that has been said above, we uphold the interpretation put by the High Court on Section 3 of the Taxation  Act,   and  answer   the  question  posed  at  the commencement of  this judgment  in the negative, and dismiss this appeal,  leaving the  parties to pay and bear their own costs in this Court. P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 7