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PETITIONER: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DIGAMBAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/05/1995

BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) AHMADI A.M. (CJ) NANAVATI G.T. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 1991            1995 SCC  (4) 683  JT 1995 (9)   310        1995 SCALE  (4)98

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                  THE 12TH DAY OF MAY, 1995 Present:                  Hon’ble the Chief Justice                  Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.Venkatachala                  Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.T.Nanavati Mr. Ashok Desai, Mr. K. Madhava Reddy and Dr. N.M. Ghatate, Sr. Advs., Mr. A.S. Bhasme, Mr. S.V. Deshpande, Mr. N.B. Munjane, Mr. S.K. Adkani, Mr. P.D. Bhosle, Mr. Pramit Saxena, Mr. A.M. Khanwilkar, Advs. with them for the appearing Parties.                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6066 OF 1995        (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10723 of 1993) State of Maharashtra                            ...Appellant                            Versus Digambar                                       ...Respondent                       J U D G M E N T VENKATACHALA, J.      Leave granted.      During the  year 1971-72 when acute scarcity conditions prevailed in  nearly  23,  000  villages  of  the  State  of Maharashtra, large  scale scarcity  relief works  had to  be undertaken by  the State Government to provide employment to small  agriculturists   and  agricultural  labour  of  those villages for  earning their  livelihood. Such  relief  works included 38,  000 Km. of road works. As the State Government was not in a position to divert relief funds at its disposal for payment of compensation for lands to be utilised in road works,  Collectors,   put  in-charge  of  such  works,  were instructed not  to accord  sanction to them without ensuring that they did not involve any payment of compensation by the

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Government. Collectors, were, indeed specially instructed to impress upon  the non-official  and other  social workers to use their  good offices  in ensuring  that the land required for  such   scarcity  relief   works  were  donated  to  the Government without any claim for compensation.      In the  year  1991,  respondent,  an  agriculturist  of Vepani village  in District  Nandat of  Maharashtra, filed a writ petition,  W. P.  No. 3124/91  under Article 226 of the Constitution of  India in  the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench against  the appellant,  the State of Maharashtra. The relief sought  in that  writ petition  was for  issue  of  a direction  to   the  Government   of  Maharashtra  to  grant compensation to  him for  his  land  alleged  to  have  been utilised by  the Government without his consent for Vepana - Gogri Road -- a road work carried out by the agencies of the State Government,  in the  course of  execution of  scarcity relief works  undertaken by the State Government in the year 1971-72. When  the said  writ petition, as well as other 191 similar writ  petitions, had  been set  down  for  admission before the  Aurangabad   Bench of the Bombay High Court, the Hon’ble Judges  constituting that  Bench,  called  upon  the concerned Government  Pleader to  appear for  the  State  by waiving service  of notice  on it.  The  learned  Government Pleader, who,  accordingly, appeared  on behalf of the State in those  writ petitions,  urged for  dismissal of  the writ petitions on  the ground  of laches  on  the  part  of  writ petitioners, i.e.,  undue  delay  of  20  years,  which  had occured in  the filing of the writ petitions. But, the Bench of the  High Court  refused to entertain the ground of undue delay urged  by the  learned Government  pleader against the grant of  the relief  sought for  in the  writ petitions and allowed the writ petitions by its judgment dated October 10, 1990. The portion of the judgment which could be regarded as material, reads thus:           "Mr.  Kakade,   learned  Government      Pleader faintly urged that assuming that      the petitioner/petitioners  were  right,      but since  possession was taken sometime      in  the  year  1972,  the  present  Writ      petition filed  in  the  year  1991  are      hopelessly time  barred and  this  delay      itself  is   sufficient  to  reject  the      petition. We  are afraid,  in a  welfare      state, the  State Government cannot take      such attitude  when citizens come before      the Courts  and complain  that they have      been deprived  of their property without      following due process of law and without      paying the  compensation.  It  certainly      affects  the   valuable  right   of  the      citizen to  receive compensation.  There      is no  dispute that  the  possesison  of      lands was  taken sometime in 1972. There      is no  investigation on  factual aspects      by any agency so far. The question as to      whether any  land of  the petitioner has      been taken  possession of  in  the  year      1971-72 as  alleged in the petition will      have to  be enquired into by a competent      Officer.  We   accordingly  direct   the      Collector or any other Officer nominated      by him  but not below the rank of Deputy      Collector to  initiate  the  proceedings      under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."      S.L.P.(C) No.  10723 of  1993 filed  by  the  State  of

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Maharashtra relates  to the  said judgment  rendered in W.P. No. 3124  of 1991  by the  High Court.  S.L.P’s filed by the State of  Maharashtra in  respect of  judgments in other 191 similar writ petitions rendered by the High Court, following the above  judgment, are  not yet  registered on  account of non-removal of  defects pointed  out by the Registry of this Court in respect of them.      When the  above S.L.P. No. 10723 of 1993 had come to be listed for hearing before a two Judge Bench of this Court on 15.11.1993, an order is made by that Bench which read thus:      "The Registry  is directed  to post  the      matter before  a  three-Judge  Bench  as      similar  matters   in  other  S.L.P.Nos.      15132-47/90 have  already been dismissed      on 11.12.1990  by  two-Judges  Bench  of      this Court  and the  matter  involves  a      decision on merit."      Having heard  the S.L.P.  No. 10723  of 1993  which had come up  for hearing before us, because of the said order of the Division  Bench of  this Court, we have granted leave to appeal as sought for therein.      The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant - the State  of Maharashtra  against the sustainability of the judgment of the High Court under appeal by Shri Ashok Desai, its learned  counsel, relates  to exercise  of  directionary power conferred  on the  High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for  grant of relief of payment of compensation to the  writ  petitioner  (respondent  here)  for  his  land alleged to  have been  utilised by  officers  of  the  State Government in  the year 1971-72 for construction of a public road against  his wish  refusing to  consider  the  plea  of laches or  undue delay  of 20  years raised on behalf of the State  Government   as  a   ground  disentitling   the  writ petitioner for grant of such discretionary relief. According to  him,  High  Court’s  power  under  Article  226  of  the Constitution to  grant  relief  to  a  person  by  issue  of directions, orders or writs for  any other purpose’ when was purely discretionary,  judgment of  the High  Court by which such relief is granted becomes unsustainable, if it is shown that the same has not been founded on sound discretion, that is,  on  consideration  of  recognised  judicial  principles governing exercise of such discretion, to wit, laches, undue delay, acquiescence,  waiver or  the like on the part of the person seeking relief. Further, according to him, when it is well-settled that  High Court’s  discretionary  power  under Article 226  of the Constitution could be exercised to grant relief only  to a  person whose  conduct does not disentitle him to  obtain such  discretionary relief,  the  High  Court cannot  refuse   to  take  into  consideration  petitioner’s conduct which disentitles him for such relief merely because it is  the State against which such relief is sought. When a citizen complains  against the  State which is interested in protecting his  legal rights,  by filing  a  petition  under Article 226  of the  Constitution, of  infringement  of  his legal right and seeks exercise of High Court’s discretionary power to  grant him  relief, the need for the High Court, to look into  the  conduct  of  the  citizen  disentitling  the discretionary relief  sought is,  if  any  thing,  of  great public importance for grant of such relief against the State would result  in loss  to the State, i.e., public money. His contention, therefore,  was that  impugned judgment by which relief had  been granted  to the writ petitioner (respondent here) refusing  to consider  the ground  of laches  -  undue delay of  20 years,  urged on  behalf of  the State  against grant of  such relief  was liable  to be interfered with and

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set aside  as that  made by the High Court in wrong exercise of  its   discretionary  power  under  Article  226  of  the Constitution. The  judgments of  the High Court in 191 other writ petitions  rendered by  following the judgment impugned in  this  appeal  were  also  liable  to  be  anulled  as  a consequence.      The said  contentions urged  against the sustainability of the  judgment impugned  in this  appeal were sought to be refuted by  Dr. Ghatate,  the learned  Counsel appearing for the  respondent  in  this  appeal  and  by  learned  counsel interested in  supporting the judgments in other 191 similar writ  petitions  rendered  following  that  judgment.  Their contention was  that when  the State  of Maharashtra had not preferred appeals  to this  Court against  some  of  earlier judgments rendered  in similar  writ petitions  filed before the High Court in the year 1987 and when some of the S.L.P’s against a  few  of  the  other  judgments  in  similar  writ petitions are rejected in limine by this Court, there can be no valid  justification for  the  State  of  Maharashtra  to challenge the  judgment  under  appeal  and  the  other  191 similar judgments  in the  writ petitions rendered following that judgment  on the ground that the High Court had wrongly exercised  its   discretion  under   Article  226   of   the Constitution in  granting relief  to respondent  and  others similarly situated,  without considering  their  conduct  in approaching the  High Court  after undue  delay of  about 20 years.  It   was  also   their  contention  that  the  State Government when  had not  obtained gift  deeds in respect of citizens’ lands  in relief  works carried out in the drought affected areas  of the  State, it  was not open to the State Government to contend that the delay of 20 years on the part of citizens  for seeking  relief under  Article 226  of  the Constitution has  to be  regarded as  that which showed that the citizens  had either  voluntarily given away their lands or acquiesced  in the  taking of such lands by State without compensation or waived their right to claim compensation for such lands.      Shri Ashok  Desai, in his reply to the submissions made on behalf  of the  respondent and  others who  had  obtained judgments in  their favour  from the High Court on the basis of the judgment impugned in this appeal, did not dispute the position that certain judgments of the High Court in similar matters had  not been  appealed against by the State in this Court.  But,  according  to  him  such  thing  had  happened obviously under an impression that they were stray cases and not fit  enough to  be appealed  against before  this Court, having regard to smallness of the amounts involved. When the High Court allowed certain other writ petitions based on its earlier judgments  in similar  matters, the State, according to him, inevitably filed S.L.P’s in this Court in respect of latter judgments,  but, unfortunately those S.L.P’s had come to be  dismissed. But,  when the High Court allowed the writ petition by the judgment under appeal and when that judgment was followed  in allowing  other 191 writ petitions and when innumerable persons  were trying  to take  advantage of  the said judgments  of the  High  Court  to  file  further  writ petitions which  was estimated  to involve an expenditure of about 400  crores of  rupees for  the State  of Maharashtra, there was  no escape  from filing the Special Leave Petition out of  which  the  present  appeal  has  arisen  and  other S.L.P./S.L.P’s  to   wriggle  out   of   the   unanticipated situation. It  was his submission that in the peculiar facts and circumstances  adverted to  by  him,  the  earlier  non- questioning of  certain judgments  of the High Court in this Court and  the dismissal  of S.L.P’s in limine by a Division

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Bench of  this Court  filed against  a few  judgments of the High Court,  cannot be  a bar  against the State filing this appeal against  the judgment concerned seeking a decision of this Court  on merits, when the judgment impugned was wholly unsustainable and  called for interference so that the State Government may  be saved from the calamitous situation which it had  to  face  otherwise  on  account  of  191  judgments rendered  by  the  High  Court  by  following  it  and  when innumerable persons  were waiting  to take  advantage of the judgment by filing fresh writ petitions in the High Court.      When in  the year  1987 some  villagers of the State of Maharashtra filed  writ petitions  in the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench,  claiming  compensation  for  their  lands alleged to  have been  used without acquisition for scarcity relief works  got carried out by the State in the year 1971- 72, they were granted some amounts as compensation on ad hoc basis. Such  grant of compensation, has not been questioned, by the  filing of  the appeals  in this Court. Non-filing of such appeals may be for the bonafide reason that being stray cases, were  regarded not  worth appealing  as it was stated before us,  or for  want of  proper  advice  or  even  sheer negligence of  officers of Government concerned, which often would be  the cause for non-filing of appeals in time. Later judgments rendered  by the High Court in some of the similar matters although  have been sought to be appealed against by filing S.L.P’s.,  such S.L.P.’s. are rejected in limine by a two-Judge Bench of this Court obviously refusing to exercise its  discretion  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution. Whether the said non-filing of appeals in similar matters or rejection of  S.L.P’s in  similar matters, could come in the way of  this Court  entertaining the  present appeal  of the State under  Article 136  of the  Constitution  even  if  it relates to a similar matter, is the question.      As seen  from the  judgment under  the present  appeal, when the  writ petition  out of which the present appeal has arisen and other 191 similar writ petitions out of which the S.L.P’s, which  are yet  to be registered by the Registry of this Court,  have arisen,  were listed before the High Court for preliminary  hearing, the  High Court  has required  the Government Pleader  to appear for the State of Maharashtra - the common  respondent in  all of them by waiving service of notice upon  it and  heard learned counsel appearing for the writ  petitioners   and  the   learned  counsel-High   Court Government Pleader, by treating the writ petitions as listed for final  hearing.  As  the  relief  claimed  in  the  writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution in the year 1991  against the  State of  Maharashtra, the appellant here, was  for directing  it to  pay compensation  for  writ petitioners’ lands  alleged to  have been used without their consent by  the State  or its  agencies for carrying out the scarcity relief works in the drought striken villages of the State of  Maharashtra, during the year 1971-72, the grant of that relief  by the  High Court  is resisted  by the learned Government Pleader on the ground of laches or undue delay of 20 years on the part of the writ petitioners in seeking such relief.      Again, as  seen from the judgment, the portion of which is excerpted by us earlier, the High Court has not chosen to consider the  ground of laches or undue delay on the part of the writ  petitioners as that which disentitled them to seek relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, because of its view that  the  ground  of  laches  or  undue  delay  cannot disentitle a  citizen to  obtain relief  from the High Court under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  when  he  claims compensation from  the State  for his  land alleged  to have

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been taken away by the State or its agencies.      The said  view taken  by the High Court that the ground of laches  or undue  delay on the part of a citizen does not disentitle him  to obtain  relief under  Article 226  of the Constitution,  when   his  claim  for  relief  is  based  on deprivation of his property by the State or its agencies has since made it (High Court) to grant relief to the respondent in this  appeal and other similarly situated, sustainability of such view requires our examination in this appeal.      How  a   person  who   alleges  against  the  State  of deprivation  of   his  legal   right,  can   get  relief  of compensation from the State by invoking writ jurisdiction of the High  Court under  Article 226  of the Constitution even though, he  is guilty  of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend,  when it is well settled by decisions of this Court that  no person,  be he  a citizen  or  otherwise,  is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution  if his  conduct is blame-worthy because of laches, undue  delay, acquiescence,  waiver  and  the  like. Moreover, how  a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226  of the  Constitution against  a State, could be relieved of  his obligation  to establish  his unblameworthy conduct for  getting such  relief, where  the State  against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend.  Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution  by a  person against  the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need  to explain  laches or  undue delay  on his part to obtain such  relief, should,  if anything, be more stringent than in  other cases,  for the  reason that the State due to laches or  undue delay  on the  part of  the person  seeking relief, may  not be  able to  show that the executive action complained of  was legal  or correct  for  want  of  records pertaining to  the action  or  for  the  officers  who  were responsible for  such action  not being  available later on. Further, where  granting of  relief is  claimed against  the State on  alleged unwarranted  executive action, is bound to result in  loss to  the public  exchequer of the State or in damage to  other public  interest,  the  High  Court  before granting such  relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in  approaching   for  relief   under  Article  226  of  the Constitution on  the alleged  violation of  his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring  the same  or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view,  persons seeking  relief against  the State  under Article  226  of  the  Constitution,  be  they  citizens  or otherwise,  cannot   get  discretionary   relief  obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and  circumstances of  the case  clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant  of such  discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court  grants relief  to a  citizen or any other person under Article  226 of  the Constitution  against any  person including the  State without  considering  his  blame-worthy conduct, such  as laches  or undue  delay,  acquiescence  or waiver, the  relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief  was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State.      Learned Counsel  for the  respondent (writ  petitioner) and others  similarly situated,  it must  be stated to their credit, even  did not choose to address any arguments before us supporting the view of the High Court that a citizen when complains before  the High  Court under  Article 226  of the Constitution of  the violation  of his  legal right  by  the

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State, the  High Court  could grant  relief to  him  without examining the  question of laches or undue delay on his part in  invoking  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  for  relief thereunder. What  was contended  on behalf of the respondent and persons  similarly situated  against whom  S.L.P’s filed are not  yet registered,  was that the State Government when had not  chosen to question some judgments of the High Court in writ petitions of the year 1987 whereunder certain ad hoc compensation had  been granted  on the allegation that their lands had  been taken  away for scarcity relief works by the agencies of the State in the year 1971-72 and further when a few S.L.P’s filed in respect of some subsequent judgments of the High  Court in  similar matters  had  been  rejected  in limine by  a  two-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court,  the  State Government should  not be  allowed  to  pursue  the  present appeal or other S.L.P’s filed by it in similar cases.      We  are  unable  to  appreciate  the  objection  raised against the  prosecution of  this appeal by the appellant or other S.L.P’s filed in similar matters. Sometimes, as it was stated on  behalf of the State, the State Government may not choose to file appeals against certain judgments of the High Court rendered in Writ petitions when they are considered as stray cases  and not  worthwhile invoking  the discretionary jurisdiction  of   this  Court  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution,  for  seeking  redressal  therefor.  At  other times, it  is also  possible for  the  State,  not  to  file appeals before  this Court  in some  matters on  account  of improper  advice   or  negligence  or  improper  conduct  of officers concerned.  It is further possible, that even where S.L.P’s are  filed by  the State  against judgments  of High Court, such  S.L.P’s may not be entertained by this Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the  Constitution either  because they  are considered as individual cases or because they are considered as cases not involving stakes  which may adversely affect the interest of the State.  Therefore, the circumstance of the non-filing of the appeals  by the  State in  some similar  matters or  the rejection of  some S.L.P’s  in limine  by this Court in some other similar matters by itself, in our view, cannot be held as a bar against the State in filing an S.L.P. or S.L.P’s in other similar  matter/s where  it is considered on behalf of the State  that non-filing  of such  S.L.P. or  S.L.P’s  and pursuing  them   is  likely  to  seriously  jeopardaise  the interest of the State or public interest.      In any event, in our considered view, the non-filing of appeals before this Court by the State in similar matters or rejection of S.L.P’s by this Court in limine or otherwise in similar matters,  by themselves cannot operate as a bar or a fetter for  this Court  in entertaining S.L.P’s subsequently filed even  if they  are considered  to  relate  to  similar matters where it finds, as in this case, that the High Court was wholly  wrong in  granting relief  of compensation  to a writ  petitioner   by  the  judgment  under  appeal  by  not considering his  entitlement for  such relief  under Article 226 of  the Constitution on account of laches or undue delay on his  part or  where such  wrong judgment  is followed for granting similar  relief by  rendering 191  judgments, which are the  subject of S.L.P’s in this Court and where there is every possibility  of the High Court granting similar relief at the instance of persons who may go before it with similar complaints, which  ultimately may  result in  the  estimated loss of  Rs. 400 crores to the State, as stated on behalf of the State, and cause grave injustice to the interests of the State.  Hence,  non-filing  of  appeals  before  this  Court against certain  judgments of the High Court or rejection of

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appeals filed before this Court against certain judgments of the High  Court, cannot  be held  to  come  in  the  way  of exercise of  this Court’s  wide  discretionary  power,  with which it  is especially  invested under  Article 136  of the Constitution of  entertaining an appeal or appeals against a similar  judgment   or  judgments  at  the  instance  of  an aggrieved  party  including  the  State  when  it  is  found necessary to  remedy manifest injustice. Therefore, the fact that the State has failed to file appeals in similar matters or this  Court has  rejected  S.L.P’s  in  similar  matters, cannot be  held to be a total bar or a fetter for this Court to entertain  appeals under  Article 136 of the Constitution against similar  judgments  of  High  Court  where  need  to entertain such  appeals is  found necessary to meet the ends of justice,  in that,  the ambit  of power  invested in this Court under  Article 136 allows its exercise, where-ever and whenever, justice  of the matter demands it for redressal of manifest injustice. When by an order, already adverted to by us, a  two-Judge Bench  of this  Court, has got referred the S.L.P out  of which  the present appeal has arisen for being entertained and  decided on merits by a three-Judge Bench of this Court,  notwithstanding the  rejection  of  S.L.P’s  by another two-Judge Bench of this Court in similar matters, it has desired  the exercise  of this  Court’s wide power under Article 136  of the Constitution to meet the ends of justice and remdey the manifest injustice caused to the State by the judgment  of   the  High   Court  under  Appeal,  cannot  be overlooked.      Coming to the exercise of power conferred upon the High Court under  Article 226  of the  Constitution  for  issuing orders, directions or writs for ‘any purpose’, such power is discretionary,  being   a  matter  well-settled,  cannot  be disputed.      Power of  the High  Court to be exercised under Article 226 of  the Constitution,  if is discretionary, its exercise must be  judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is  for that  reason, a  person’s entitlement  for relief from a  High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against  the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation  of infringement  of his  legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblame-worthy conduct of the person seeking  relief,   and  the   Court  refuses  to  grant  the discretionary relief  to such  person in  exercise  of  such power, when  he approaches  it with  unclean hands or blame- worthy conduct.      Laches or  undue delay,  the blame-worthy  conduct of a person in  approaching a  Court of  Equity  in  England  for obtaining discretionary  relief which  disentitled  him  for grant of  such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long  ago, in  Lindsay  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Prosper Armstrong [(1874) 5 PC 221], thus :      "    Now  the   doctrine  of  laches  in      Courts of  Equity is not an arbitrary or      a technical  doctrine. Where it would be      practically unjust  to  give  a  remedy,      either because  the party  has,  by  his      conduct, done that which might fairly be      regarded as  equivalent to  a waiver  of      it, or  where by his conduct and neglect      he has,  though perhaps not waiving that      remedy, yet  put the  other party  in  a      situation, in  which  it  would  not  be      reasonable to  place him  if the  remedy      were  afterwards   to  be  asserted,  in      either of these cases, lapse of time and

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    delay are  most material.  But in  every      case, if  an  argument  against  relief,      which  otherwise   would  be   just,  is      founded upon  mere delay,  that delay of      course not  amounting to  a bar  by  any      statute or  limitations, the validity of      that  defence   must   be   tried   upon      principles substantially  equitable. Two      circumstances, always  important in such      cases, are,  the length of the delay and      the nature  of the  acts done during the      interval,  which   might  affect  either      party and  cause a balance of justice or      injustice in  taking the  one course  or      the other,  so far  as it relates to the      remedy."      Whether the  above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in  exercise   of  its   power  under  Article  226  of  our Constitution,  when  came  up  for  consideration  before  a Constitution Bench  of this  Court in The Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher,  President, Industrial  Court, Bombay and Others [AIR 1967  SC 1450],  it was  regarded as  a principle  that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.      A three-Judge  Bench of this Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport  Corporation v.  Shri Balwant  Regular  Motor Service, Amravati  & Ors. [1969 (1) SCR 808], reiterated the said principle  of laches  or  undue  delay  as  that  which applied in exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.      Therefore, where  a High Court in exercise of its power vested under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  issues  a direction, order  or writ  for granting  relief to  a person including a  citizen without  considering his disentitlement for such  relief due  to his  blame-worthy conduct  of undue delay or  laches in  claiming the  same, such  a  direction, order  or  writ  becomes  unsustainable  as  that  not  made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily.      Since we  have held  earlier that  the  person  seeking grant of  relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, even if it  be against the State, is required to satisfy the High Court that  he was  not guilty  of laches  or undue delay in approaching it  for relief,  need arises  for us to consider whether respondent in the present appeal (writ petitioner in the High Court) who had sought for relief of compensation on the alleged  infringement of  his legal right, had satisfied the High  Court that  he was  not guilty  of undue  delay or laches in  approaching it  for relief. The allegation of the petitioner in  the writ  petition, as becomes clear from the judgment under  appeal, was  that although certain extent of his land was taken away in the year 1971-72 by the agency of the State  for the  scarcity relief road works undertaken by the State  Government in  the year 1971-72, to find work for small agriculturists  and agricultural labourers in the then prevailing severe  drought conditions,  without his consent, he was  not compensated  therefor, despite  requests made to the State  Government and  various agencies  in that  regard eversince till  the date  of filing  of the writ petition by him.      In  our  view,  the  above  allegation  is  in  no  way sufficient to  hold that  the  writ  petitioner  (respondent

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here) has  explained properly  and satisfactorily  the undue delay of  20 years  which had  occured between  the  alleged taking of  possession of  his land and the date of filing of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot overlook the fact that it  is easy  to make  such kind  of allegations against anybody that  too  against  the  State.  When  such  general allegation is  made against  a State in relation to an event said to  have occured 20 years earlier, and the State’s non- compliance with  petitioners’ demands,  State may not at all be in  a position  to dispute such allegation, having regard to the  manner in  which it  is required  to  carry  on  its governmental functions.  Undue delay of 20 years on the part of  the  writ  petitioner,  in  invoking  the  High  Court’s extraordinary  jurisdiction   under  Article   226  of   the Constitution for  grant of  compensation to his land alleged to have  been taken  by  the  Governmental  agencies,  would suggest that  his land  was not  taken at  all, or if it had been taken  it could not have been taken without his consent or if  it was taken against his consent he had acquiesced in such taking  and waived  his right  to take compensation for it.      Thus, when  the writ  petitioner (respondent  here) was guilty of  laches or  undue delay  in approaching  the  High Court, the  principle of  laches or  undue delay adverted to above, disentitled the writ petitioner (respondent here) for discretionary relief  under Article  226 of the Constitution from the High Court, particularly, when virtually no attempt had been  made by  the writ petitioner to explain his blame- worthy conduct  of undue  delay or  laches. The  High Court, therefore, was  wholly wrong  in granting relief in relation to inquiring  into the  allegation and granting compensation for his  land alleged  to have been used for scarcity relief road works in the year 1971-72. As seen from the judgment of the High  Court, the allegation adverted to above, appear to be the  common allegation  in other 191 writ petitions where judgments are  rendered by  the  High  Court  following  the judgment under  appeal and  which are  subject of S.L.P’s in this  Court   that  are  yet  to  be  registered.  We  have, therefore, no  hesitation in holding that the High Court had gone wholly  wrong in granting the relief which it has given in  the   judgment  under  appeal,  and  judgments  rendered following the  said judgment  in other  191 writ  petitions, said to be the subject of S.L.P’s or otherwise. All the said judgments of  the High Court, having regard to the fact that they were  made in writ petitions with common allegation and seeking common  relief, are liable to be interfered with and set aside  in the  interests of  justice  even  though  only learned counsel  appearing for  a few  writ petitioners were heard by us.      In the  result, we  allow this  appeal, set  aside  the judgment under appeal, dismiss the writ petition of the writ petitioner (respondent  here)  and  also  annual  all  those judgments rendered  by the High Court following the judgment under appeal,  even though  the S.L.P’s  filed in respect of them before  this Court  are yet to be registered or even if no S.L.P’s  are filed  in respect  of them.  However, in the facts and  circumstances of  the present  case, we  make  no order as to costs.