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PETITIONER: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MUMBAI UPNAGAR GRAMODYOG SANGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/10/1968

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1157            1969 SCR  (2) 392  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1973 SC1461  (2130)  RF         1981 SC 873  (79)

ACT:     Bombay  Municipal  Corporation  Act  (3   of  1888),  as amended by Act 14 of 1961, ss. 372(g) and 385--Owner of dead animal  to  deposit  carcass  in  specified  place   without selling--Corporation having right to dispose of  carcass--If fundamental rights of owners and skinners affected.     Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 19(1)(f)  and  31(1), (2)  and  (5)--Taking  and  destroying  carcasses--If  owner entitled to compensation.

HEADNOTE:     To ensure against the grave nuisance which may be caused to the residents of a locality if carcasses of dead  animals are  allowed to remain on the premises within the  city,  ’a duty  is  imposed  by ss. 367, 372 and  385  of  the  Bombay Municipal  Corporation  Act, 1888, as amended by Act  14  of 1961,  upon  the owner of the animal or  the  person  having charge  of the animal or the occupier of premises  in  which the  animal .dies, to remove the carcass at his own  expense with  the  permission  of the Commissioner of  the  City  of Bombay.  or, to have. it removed through the agency  of  the Corporation,  for which he was required to pay a fee of  Rs. 20.   It  was further enacted that after it was  removed  it shall  be deposited in ’a receptacle, depot or  other  place set  apart  for  the purpose, either by  the  owner  or  the Corporation.  Thereupon, the owner lost his property in  the carcass  and’  it became the property  of  the  Corporation. Under the Act it was the duty of the Corporation to  arrange for its  disposal causing the least practicable nuisance.     The  second  respondent was the owner of   a  stable  of filch  cattle  in Bombay.  He was selling the  carcasses  of animals  dying  in  his  stable  for  a  price.   The  first respondent  was a purchaser of carcasses and carried on  the business  of  skinning the dead animals  and  utilising  the products  for industrial uses.  The  Corporation  prohibited the first respondent from removing carcasses and resolved to grant  the contract for the disposal of carcasses  deposited

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under  the  provisions  of  the  Act  to  Harijan  Workmen’s Cooperative Labour Society.     The  respondents challenged the provisions and the  High Court declared them ultra vires.     In  appeal to this Court, on the questions: (1)  Whether the obligation not to sell the carcass but to dispose it  of as  per the provisions of the Act infringe  the  fundamental rights  of the respondents under Art. 19(1)(f); (2)  Whether there  was infringement of the fundamental right because  of the obligation on the second respondent to incur expenditure for  its removal; (3) Whether fee of Rs. 20  was  excessive; (4)  Whether the second respondent’s loss of  ownership  and property  in  the  carcass  on  depositing  it  as  per  the provisions of the Act violated the. respondents’ fundamental right  under  Art. 31; and (5) Whether the granting  of  the contract  to the Harijan Society destroyed the  business  of the first respondent and infringed its fundamental right  to carry on business.     HELD: (1) The second respondent had a right of ownership in  the carcasses of his animals.  But he was only  entitled to    constitutional   protection    against    unreasonable restriction on his right to sell the carcasses. 393 Reasonableness  of restrictions imposed by a law has to  be. adjudged in the light of the nature of the right, danger  or injury  which may be inherent in the unbridled  exercise  of the  right  and the necessity of protection  against  danger which may result to the public by the exercise of the right. In  each  case  the  test  is  whether  the  restriction  is commensurate with the need for protection of public interest against the exercise of the right. [400 C; 402]   A  mere imposition of  an injunction  to remove a  carcass only  abates  the  nuisance  arising  from  a  dead   animal remaining on the premises: it does not eliminate the  graver hazard caused by the adulteration of food of the people from its  products.   Meat  and fat from carcasses  are  used  by unscrupulous  persons  for  adulterating  the  food  of  the community.   Even b.y imposing  stringent supervision   upon persons  carrying  on the business of  skinning  carcasses,, protection of the community against food adulteration cannot be  effectively  secured, because, a purchaser who  was  not subject  to the Corporation control could remove  it  beyond the  Corporation  limits and bring  back  contaminated  meat and fat.  Therefore, the Legislature has devised a scheme by which  reasonable restrictions are placed upon  a  citizen’s right  to  dispose  of  the carcass.   Under  the  Act,  the Corporation  has  to set apart a place  for  depositing  the carcass  and  it is implicit in the scheme of the  Act  that the Corporation shall provide a suitable place for  skinning it.   The  Corporation  has  control  over  the  contractors entrusted with the disposal of carcasses and has supervision over the disposal of the products.  A law which compels  the removal of a carcass to an appointed place and its  disposal under the supervision of the Corporation which has the  duty to  take  steps  for maintaining public  health,  cannot  be regarded as arbitrary or excessive.  The Corporation, has to arrange  for  effectively disposing of the  carcass  and  it would be necessary for  effectuating that purpose to provide that  the  tatle  of  the owner in  the  carcass  should  be extinguished.    Such  a  provision  is  not   beyond’   the legitimate  purpose for which it was intended, and the  fact that  the  owner is unable to sell for a price  the  carcass does not render a provision, which is essentially  conceived in  the interest of the general public,unreasonable.[401  E- H;402 B--D; 403 E; 404 D]

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   Restriction  upon  the right of the owner  to  sell  the carcass does not directly infringe the fundamental right  of the  purchaser. who, but for the restriction may  have  been able to purchase it.  Assuming however, that the  imposition by  law  of the restriction upon the owner  of  the  carcass involves  also  a restriction upon the right  of  the  first respondent   having   regard  to  the  character   of   t_he legislation  and its avowed object,the restriction upon  the first  respondents  right  to carry  on  his  occupation  or business  is  a  reasonable one within the  meaning  of  Art 19(5) and (6). [409 E--G]                             .     Chintaman  Rao v. State of M.P. [5950] S.C.R.   759  and State  Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597, followed.     (2) If the carcass is likely to be deleterious to public health  and  its removal from the place where  it  is  lying being  in the interests of the public health, imposition  of an  obligation upon the owner to remove the carcass  at  his own expense or to Pay for its removal cannot be regarded  as unreasonable, even if the charge which falls upon the  owner is   in addition to the loss which he suffers by  reason  of the extinction of his tetle in the carcass. [404 B--D]     (3)  Whether the fee of Rs. 20 levied on the owner of  a carcass  for  its removal was in excess of  the  expenditure which the Corporation may go. Cll69--s 394 have to incur. was not investigated into by the High  Court. and  therefore  the question could not, be  raised  for  the first time in this Court. [404 A--B]     (4) (a) In the present case, the restrictions imposed by the  impugned law upon the right of the owner  satisfy   the test    of   reasonableness  under  Art.  19(5)   and   (6). Therefore, though there is a deprivation of property, it  is by  a  valid  law and hence there is no  violation  of  Art. 31(1). [406 C--D]     Smt.  Sitabati  Debi v. Stale of West Bengal,  [1967]  2 S.C.R.  949, followed.     Kavalappara  Kottarathil  Kochuni v.  State  of  Madras, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887. referred to.     (b)  A  law  which  provides  for   extinction  of   the ownership   and creation of an interest in  the  Corporation for .the purpose of disposal of the carcass is not a law for acquisition  ’of property for a public purpose: its  primary purpose is destruction of a carcass in the public  interest, and not its utilisation for a public purpose. The case  does not,  therefore, fall within the terms of Art.  31(2).  [406 F--G]     (c)  In  any case the statute is squarely  protected  by Art.  31 (5) (b) (ii) and on that account the owner  is  not entitled  to compensation for loss of his  property.   Where the  State  acquires property and seeks to  utilize  it  for promotion  of public health or prevention of danger to  life or property the State is liable to pay compensation.  But  a law which directive and immediately seeks to promote  public health or to prevent danger to life or property falls within the exemption of cl. (5)(b)(ii) even if thereby, the owner’s interest  in the property is extinguished and is  vested  in the State for purposes of destruction. [406 G--H; 407 A--B]     (d)  Article 31(5)(b)(ii) is not confined to  ’temporary occupation  of  property.   In the case  of  acquisition  of immovable property, to have the protection of the clause the occupation  of the property must be temporary.  But  in  the case  of movable property, even if its possession  is  taken with a view to destroying it, if such destruction is in  the interests of general public, that is. for the prevention  of danger to life or property, it need not be temporary.   Even

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such taking of movable property will be protected by cl. (5) (b)  (ii)  and  the guarantee of Art.  31(2)  would  not  be attracted. [408 E--G]     Deputy  Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup v.  Durganath Sarma, A.I.R. 1968, S.C. 394, explained.     The first respondent cannot claim the protection of Art. 31(2),  because, until it purchases the carcasses  from  the owner it has no right in the property, and it cannot set  up a grievance for loss of property which it does not own. [409 H]     (5)  Whether  by virtue of the contracts  given  by  the Corporation to other persons who are claimed to be rivals in business  of the first respondent unreasonable  restrictions may  be  deemed  to be placed upon  the  first  respondent’s fundamental  right  is  a matter on which  no  argument  Was advanced  before  the High Court.  In any event,  it  cannot affect  the validity of the statute or its provisions.  [410 B-D]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1654  of 1966. 395        Appeal  from  the judgment and order, dated  March  8, 1963 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 7 of 1963.                   and Civil Appeals Nos. 1019 and 1020 of 1967.      Appeals  from the judgment and order, dated August  20, 1964  of the Bombay High Court in Appeals Nos. 53 and,55  of 1963.     C.K.   Daphtary,  Attorney-General,  N.S.   Bindra,   R. Gopalakrishnan  and S.P. Nayar, for the appellant  (in  C.A. No. 1654. of 1966).     Niren  De,  Solicitor-General, G.L. Sanghi,  and  1.  B. Dadachanji, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1019 and  1020 of  1967) and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 (in C.A. No. 1654  of 1966).     Sen  and 1. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2  (in C.A. No. 1654 of 1966)-     K.K.  Singhvi, S.C. Agarwala, R.K. Garg, D.P. Singh  and K. Gupta, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 1020 of 1967).     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Shah,  J.   The  High Court of Bombay  has  declared  s. 372(g)  and  a  part  of s.  385  of  the  Bombay  Municipal Corporation Act 3 of 1888 as amended by Act 14 of 1961 ultra vires  because in their view these provisions  infringe  the guarantee  of Arts. 19 (1 ) (f) & (g) of  the  Constitution. The  State of Maharashtra and the Municipal  Corporation  of Greater Bombay have appealed to this Court.     The  first  respondent in Appeal No. 1654 of 1966  is  a society  registered  under the Societies  Registration  Act, 1860,  and carries on, within the limits of Greater  Bombay, the  business  of  skinning carcasses of  dead  animals  and utilising  the  products for industrial  uses.   The  second respondent  is  an  owner of a  stable  of  milch-cattle  at Andheri  within the limits of Greater Bombay. By Act  14  of 1961 the Legislature of the  State  of  Maharashtra amended, amongst  others,  ss.  367, 372 and 385 of  Act  3  of  1888 enacting  that  an owner of the carcass of  a  dead   animal shall  deposit it at the place appointed in that  behalf  by the Corporation, and entrusted the Corporation with power to arrange for disposal of the carcasses.  On October 14,  1961 the  Assistant Head Supervisor of the Municipal  Corporation

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called   upon   the   first  respondent  to  stop   removing carcasses from the "K" Ward of the Corporation.  On November 27, 1961, the Corporation published a notification  inviting the  attention of the public concerned to the provisions  of s.  385  and  other provisions of the  Act  and  warned  the persons  concerned  that  violation of  the  provisions  was liable 396 to  be  punished.   On January  10,  1962,  the  Corporation resolved  to  grant  a  contract  authorising  removal   and disposal of carcasses under s. 385 of the Act in respect  of Wards, H, K, L, M, E, P, B & T to the Harijan Workmens   Co- operative  Labour  Society Ltd., and declared that no  other person  or  agency was authorised to remove and  dispose  of carcasses under the provisions of s. 385 of the Act. Respondents  Nos. 1 & 2 to this appeal moved a  petition  in the  High Court of Bombay for an order canceling or  setting aside   the   notice  dated  October  14,  1961,   and   the notification    dated  November  27,  1961,  for  an   order restraining  the  Corporation from demanding fee for removal of  such  carcasses, from taking any  steps  or  proceedings against the respondents for enforcement of the provisions of ss.  366,.  367(c),  372(g) and  385  of the  Act  and  from claiming  ownership in the carcasses of the dead animals  of private   owners.   The  State  of  Maharashtra  was   later impleaded as a party-respondent to the petition.     Kantawalla,  J., dismissed the petition.  He  held  that ss.  366,  367(c) and 385 of the Act were "enacted  for  the promotion of public health and for the prevention of  danger to  life of the community and in the larger interest of  the public",  and that the restrictions upon the rights  of  the owners  of  cattle  and  persons  carrying  on  business  in carcasses were, because of the special protection granted by Art. 31(5)(b)(ii) not inconsistent with or repugnant to  the fundamental  rights  guaranteed  under  Art.  31(2)  of  the Constitution,   and  since  the  impugned  provisions   were protected,  the second respondent could not claim  that  his fundamental  right  guaranteed  by  Art.  19(1)(f)  of   the Constitution  was infringed.  The learned Judge  also   held that   the  restrictions imposed by the impugned  provisions were  reasonable and in the interest of the  general  public and  were on that account not within the protection of  Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In  appeal under the letters patent the High Court  modified the  order passed by Kantawalla, J., and declared s.  372(g) and a part of s. 385 of the Act invalid.  The High Court did not  pass  any  order  consequential  on  the   declaration. Against  that order the State of Maharashtra  has  preferred this appeal  with  certificate granted by the High Court.     Section  3 (z) defines ’nuisance’: it includes any  act, omission,  place,  or  thing which causes or  is  likely  to cause .injury, danger, annoyance or offence to the sense  of sight,. smelling or hearing, or which is or may be dangerous to life or injurious to health or property.’ Section 61 sets out   the  obligatory  and  discretionary  duties   of   the Corporation.    It   is  thereby    incumbent    upon    the Corporation  to  make adequate provision,  inter  alia,  for scavenging,  removal  and disposal  of  excrementitious  and other filthy matters, 397 and  of  all  ashes, refuse  and  rubbish,  reclamation   of unhealthy  localities,  removal of  noxious  vegetation  and generally  the abatement of all nuisances. By ss. 365,  366, 367, 368, 372 and 385 it was provided that--                     S.  365--"For the purposes  of  securing

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             the efficient scavenging and cleansing of  all               streets  and premises. the Commissioner  shall               take measures for securing--                      (a)...............................                      (b) the removal of the contents of  all               receptacles    and   depots   and    of    the               accumulations   at  all  places  provided   or               appointed by him under section 367 or 368  for               the  temporary deposit of any of  the  matters               specified in the said sections."                      S.  366---"A11  matters  collected   by               municipal servants or contractors in pursuance               of  the last preceding section and of  section               369 and carcasses of dead animals deposited in               any  public receptacle, depot or  place  under               section  367  shall  be the  property  of  the               Corporation."                      S. 367--"The Commissioner shall provide               or appoint in proper and convenient situations               public receptacles, depots and places for  the               temporary deposit or final disposal of-               (a) dust, ashes, refuse and rubbish;               (b) trade refuse;               (c)    carcasses   of   dead    animals    and               excrementitious and polluted matter;               Provided that-                      (i)  the  said  matters  shall  not  be               finally disposed of in any place or manner  in               which  the  same have not heretofore  been  so               disposed  of, without  the  sanction   of  the               corporation  or in any place or  manner  which               the State Government think fit to disallow;                      (ii)   any  power  conferred  by   this               section  shall be exercised in such manner  as               to create the least practicable nuisance."                      S.  368--"(1) It shall be incumbent  on               the  owners and occupiers of all  premises  to               cause  all  dust, ashes, refuse,  rubbish  and               trade  refuse  to  be  collected  from   their               respective  premises  and to be  deposited  at               such  times  as the  Commissioner,  by  public               notice,  from time to time prescribes  in  the               public receptacle, depot  or 398               place  provided  or appointed under  the  last               preceding section or the temporary deposit  or               final disposal thereof.                    .       .        .        ."               S. 372--"No person--               (a) who is bound, under section 368 or section               370,  to  cause the removal  of  dust,  ashes,               refuse,   rubbish  and  trade  refuse  or   of               excrementitious  or  polluted   matter,  shall               allow  the same to accumulate on his  premises               for more than twenty-four hours or neglect  to               cause  the  same to be removed to  the  depot,               receptacle or place provided or appointed  for               that purpose;                    .        .         .       ."                    (g)  shall deposit the skin or  otherwise               dispose of the carcass of any dead animal at a               place  not  provided  or  appointed  for  this               purpose under section 367."                     S. 385--"(1) It shall be the duty of the               Commissioner to provide for the removal of the

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             carcasses of all animals dying within  Greater               Bombay;                     (2)  The occupier of any premises in  or                             upon which the animals shall die or in  or  upon               which  the  carcass  of any  animal  shall  be               found, and the person having the charge of any               animal which dies in the street or in any open               place,  shall  within three  hours  after  the               death  of such animal, or if the death  occurs               at  night, within three hours  after  sunrise,               report  the  death  of  such  animal  at   the               municipal  health  department  office  of  the               division  of the Greater Bombay in  which  the               death  occurred  or in which  the  carcass  is               found  and shall not unless authorised by  the               Commissioner in this behalf, remove or  permit               to be removed the carcass of any animal  dying               in or upon any place within Greater Bombay;                    "(3)  For  every carcass  so  removed  by               municipal  agency,  a fee for the  removal  of               such   amount  as  shall  be  fixed   by   the               Commissioner,  shall be paid by the  owner  of               the animal or, if the owner is not known,   by               the occupier of the premises in or upon which,               or  by  the person in whose charge,  the  said               animal died." The  provisions  are manifestly enacted with the  object  of ensuring  expeditious removal of carcasses .of dead  animals which,  if  allowed to remain, are likely  to  constitute  a grave  nuisance  and are likely to endanger  public  health. The  carcass of a dead animal is a noxious thing,  which  in the hot and humid climate of Bombay petrifies within a short time after the death of the animal and defiles the place and atmosphere with foul smells, and is likely 399 to spread disease if immediate and proper steps for  removal and  disposal are not taken.  The Municipal  Corporation  is entrusted  with  authority  to take steps  to’  protect  the health  of  the  residents within the  municipal  area.   To ensure  against a grave nuisance to the residents,  duty  is imposed by the Act upon the owner of the animal or  occupier of  the  premises in or upon which  the animal dies  or  the person  having  charge of the animal to remove  the  carcass with  the permission of the Commissioner in that  behalf  at his own expense, or to have it removed through the agency of the  Corporation.  If it is removed by the Corporation,  the owner  is  required  to  pay the  prescribed  fee  for  such removal.  After  it  is deposited by the  owner  or  by  the Corporation  in  a receptacle, depot or place which  is  set apart  for that purpose, the carcass may be disposed  of  by the  Corporation  in a manner which is likely to  cause  the least  public nuisance.  For that purpose the carcass is  at the  disposal of the Corporation. The Act does not make  any provision relating to the manner in which the Corporation is to dispose of the carcass, but it is implicit in the  scheme of the Act that the Corporation will provide a place removed from  the inhabitated localities where the carcasses may  be disposed  of without involving any danger to public  health. To  facilitate this object it is enacted by the  Legislature that  the carcasses of dead animals deposited in any  public receptacle,  depot  or place shall be the  property  of  the Corporation.   Unquestionably  it is in  the  interest   the residents of the Municipal Corporation and for promotion  of public health and for prevention of danger to the  community

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that  carcasses  of  the  dead  animals  shall  be   removed expeditiously and shall be disposed of in a manner which  is likely to cause the least nuisance.     The  carcass  of a dead animal is private  property  and belongs to the owner of the animal, and the carcass on  sale by the owner, when it. is of a bull, cow or buffalo, fetches a small price. Counsel for the second-respondent urged  that the provisions of the Act which place restrictions upon  the right of the owner to dispose of the carcass and compel  him to  incur expenditure for removal or to pay a fee  for  that removal to the appointed place, and extinguish his ownership in the carcass when it is deposited in the place  appointed, infringe the fundamental right to property guaranteed  under Art.  19(1)(f) and Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.  Counsel for  the  first  respondent  urged  that  by  the   impugned provisions the first respondent is deprived of his right  to carry.  on business, and on that account infringe the  right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.     Counsel  for the Corporation conceded that a carcass  is property which is capable of being owned.  Counsel, however, submitted that a carcass is not commercial property and  the first  respondent  could not claim to carry on  business  in disposal of 400 carcasses.  The judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States  in Gerrit W. Clason v. State of Indiana(1) on  which reliance  was placed by counsel for the  Corporation  merely decided  that a State statute requiring the owner of a  dead animal  not slaughtered for food to bury or burn such  .body on  his premises or to deliver it W the representative of  a disposal plant licensed to do business within the State, and prohibiting  transportation over the high ways of the  State of  the  body of such animal except to a  licensed  disposal plant  and  with  certain sanitary..  precautions,  did  not unduly discriminate against and burden toter-state commerce. The  judgment  does  not support the  plea  that  a  citizen carrying on the business in the disposal of the carcasses is not  entitled  to  the  constitutional  protection   against unreasonable restrictions  on  the carrying on of any lawful business  or  occupation.  The second respondent  is  not  a dealer  in  carcasses. He has a right of  ownership  in  the carcass.   He  claims  that  before  the  enactment  of  the impugned provisions he was accustomed to sell the carcass of an  animal dying in his/stable for a price; he is under  the Act  enjoined to deposit the carcass in an  appointed  place and for that purpose to incur expenditure for removal of the carcass or to pay a fee to the Corporation for arranging for its removal.  On account of the impugned provisions he  says that  he cannot sell the carcass, and when he  deposits  the carcass in the  appointed place his ownership in the carcass ceases and he has to pay for removal of the carcass. Article.  19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution  confers  upon  all citizens the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Carcass  of an animal belonging to a person is his  property and  he has the right of disposal of the carcass.  But  that fundamental right, like all other rights in Art. 19( 1 ). is not  absolute: it is subject to reasonable restrictions.  By el. (5) it is enacted that:               "Nothing  in sub-clauses (d), (e) and  (f)  of               the    said clause shall affect the  operation               of  any existing law in so far as it  imposes,               or  prevent  the  State from  making  any  law               imposing,   reasonable  restrictions  on   the               exercise of any of the rights conferred by the               said   subclauses either in the  interests  of

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             the  general public or for the  protection  of               the  general public or for the  protection  of               the interests of any Scheduled Tribes." 401 the  Municipal  agency with the least practicable  delay  is conceived  in  the interests of the general  public  and  no serious argument to the contrary was advanced before us.      A  law  designed  to abate a  grave  nuisance  and  for protection  of public health is prima facie one enacted  for the protection of the interests of the general public.   But that alone is not sufficient: the restriction imposed by the law  must be reasonable, i.e., the restriction must  not  be arbitrary or excessive, and must not place upon the right of the  citizen a limitation which is not calculated to  ensure protection of the interests of the general public.     In the view of the High Court the law which compels  the owner  to  deposit the carcass in the  appointed  place  and thereby  prevents him from selling it, and involves  him  in expenditure for removing it, or in the payment of a fee  for removal,  imposes  an unreasonable  restriction.   The  High Court  also observed that a law which declares that as  soon as the carcass--which is a valuable property--is  deposited, it  becomes  the  property  of  the  Corporation   makes  an unreasonable provision since "it makes no difference whether the carcass is disposed of by a purchaser from the owner  of the  carcass or by a contractor who purchased it  from   the Corporation".  But in so holding, in our judgment, the  High Court  ignored the hazard to the public health arising  from adulteration  of the food of the people.  There is  evidence on  the record which is not controverted that meat  and  fat from  the  carcasses are used by  unscrupulous  persons  for adulterating  the food of the community. Mere imposition  of an  injunction to remove the carcass within  the  prescribed period abates the nuisance likely to result from the carcass remaining  on  the  premises  of  the  owner:  it  does  not eliminate grave hazard to public health by the  adulteration of  the food of the people by the products  from  carcasses. By  merely  enacting  that  the  carcass  will  be   removed expeditiously,  the  second object cannot  be  served.   The Corporation  has  control over the contractor  to  whom  the carcasses  are entrusted for disposal.  It has set  apart  a place for skinning and has supervision over the disposal  of the  products. Even by imposing stringent  supervision  upon persons  carrying  on  the business  of  skinning  carcasses protection of the community against adulteration of its food cannot  be  effectively  secured, because it  would  not  be difficult for a purchaser not subject to the control of  the Corporation  to remove the carcasses beyond the  Corporation limits and then to bring contaminated meat and the fat  back into  the Corporation area. The Legislature has  designed  a scheme   by  which  reasonable restrictions are placed  upon the  right  of  a  citizen  to  dispose  of  his   property: possibility  of an alternative scheme which might have  been but  has not been designed, will not justifiably expose  the first  scheme  to the attack that  it  imposes  unreasonable restrictions. 402     Reasonableness  of restrictions imposed by a law has  to be adjudged in the light of the nature of the right,  danger or  injury which may be inherent in’ the unbridled  exercise of the right and the necessity of protection against  danger which may result to the public by the exercise of the right. In  each  case  the  test  is  whether  the  restriction  is commensurate with the need of protection of the interest  of the  public against the exercise of the right. But the  fact

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that the owner is unable to sell for a price the carcass and required to pay a fee for removal of the carcass does.  not, in  judgment,  render  a  provision  which  is   essentially conceived  in  the  interests  of  the  general  public,  as indicated  .earlier,  unreasonable. The Corporation  has  to arrange  for  effectively disposing of the carcass,  and  it would be necessary for effectuating that purpose to  provide that  the  title  of  the owner in  the  carcass  should  be extinguished.  Unless the title of the owner in the  carcass is extinguished, various complications may arise in the  way of disposal of the carcass. We are unable to agree with  the High Court, that for/he purpose of ensuring proper disposal, transfer  of ownership to the Municipal Corporation was  not necessary  or  that  the provisions  went  "far  beyond  the legitimate  purpose  of  making them."     In  determining the extent of the right which a  citizen may  claim to exercise, the Court is concerned to deal  with the  reasonableness  of  the restriction  imposed  upon  the exercise  of  the right. As observed  by  Patanjali  Sastri, C.J.,  in  State of Madras v. If. G.  Row(1)--"the  test  of reasonableness,  wherever prescribed, should be  applied  to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract  standard, or  general  pattern of reasonableness can be laid  down  as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged  to have   been  infringed,  the  underlying  purpose   of   the restrictions  imposed, the extent and urgency of  the:  evil sought  to  be remedied thereby, the  disproportion  of  the imposition,  the prevailing conditions at’ the time,  should all enter into the judicial verdict." As stated by  Mahajan, I., in Chintamanrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh(2) at p. 763:               The word ’reasonable’ implies intelligent care               and  deliberation.  that is the  choice  of  a               course  which  reason  dictates.   Legislation               which  arbitrarily or excessively invades  the               right cannot be said to contain the quality of               reasonableness and unless it strikes a  proper               balance between the freedom guaranteed in Art.               19(1) (g) and the social control permitted  by               clause  (6) of Art. 19 it must be held  to  be               wanting in that quality." The  High Court was of the view that looking to  the  object intended to be achieved it was not necessary to impose "such wholesale  restriction on the owner of carcasses as also  on those who carry (1) [1952] S.C.R. 597 607.       (2) [1950] S.C.R. 759. 403 on  the  trade  as  has been imposed."   We  do  not  think, however, that the provisions incorporated by Act 14 of  1961 were   arbitrary   or  excessive.  Reasonableness   of   the restriction  imposed  upon the right to  acquire,  hold  and dispose  of property must be evaluated in the light  of  the nature  of the commodity and its capacity to be  detrimental to  the  public  weal.  The power of  the  State  to  impose reasonable   restrictions   may   extend   to    prohibiting acquisition  holding  or  disposal of  a  commodity  if  the commodity is  likely  to involve grave injury to the  health or  welfare of the people.  In adjudging the  reasonableness of  restrictions imposed upon the holding or disposal  of  a carcass  which is noxious, maintenance of public  health  is the  paramount consideration. Restriction imposed  upon  the right  of  an  owner of a carcass to dispose it  of  in  the manner  indicated, in the Act, being enacted solely  in  the interest  of the general public, cannot be deemed  arbitrary or  excessive merely because they involve the owner  into  a small   financial burden.  Under the Constitution  a  proper

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balance is intended to be maintained between the exercise of the  right  conferred  by Art. 19(1 )(f)  and  (g)  and  the interests  of  a  citizen in the exercise of  his  right  to ’acquire,  hold  or dispose of his property or to  carry  on occupation, trade or business.  In striking that balance the danger  which  may  be  inherent  in  permitting  unfettered exercise of right in a commodity must of necessity influence the  determination of the restrictions which may  be  placed upon  the  right of the citizen to the commodity.   The  law which compels the removal of the carcass expeditiously  from the place where it is lying is not contended to be arbitrary or  excessive.   The  law  which  compels  removal  to   the appointed  place  and  disposal of  the  carcass  under  the supervision  of  the Corporation to which is  entrusted  the power  and duty to take steps to maintain the public  health cannot  also be regarded as arbitrary or  excessive,  merely because  the enforcement of the law involves some  pecuniary loss  to  the  citizen.   We are unable  to  agree  that  by compelling disposal of carcasses by leaving to the owner  of the  carcass  to  dispose it in any manner  he  thinks  fit, danger to the public health could  be  effectively  avoided. was  faintly  argued  that the levy of Rs.  20  as  fee  for removal  of  each carcass was excessive.  But  there  is  no evidence  before  the  Court about the  expenses  which  the Corporation  is required to incur in performing the  service relating to the removal  of carcasses of all animals some of which  may  yield in the disposal valuable  by-products  and others  not.  Evidently in a large and crowded  metropolitan city  it would be necessary to  maintain covered wagons  for removal  of carcasses, to maintain an inspecting staff.  to, make  adequate  arrangements  for deposit  of  carcasses  at certain places. and for their disposal under the supervision of  the  Municipal staff. Whether the fee  levied  from  the owner of the 404 carcass of an animal in excess of the expenditure which  the Corporation  will have to incur for the maintenance  of  the service  is  not  commensurate  is  a  matter  on  which  no investigation  appears  to  have been made  and  this  Court cannot enter upon that question for the first time.     It  was, however, urged that a provision which not  only extinguishes  the title of the owner in the carcass  thereby involving  him in the loss of the value which he would  have obtained by sale of the carcass, but’ simultaneously imposes upon  him  a  liability to remove the  carcass  at  his  own expense is per se unreasonable. We do not think so.  If  the carcass is likely to be deleterious to public health and its removal  from  the  place where it is  lying  being  in  the interests of the public health, imposition of an  obligation upon  the owner to remove the carcass at his own expense  or to pay for its removal, cannot be regarded as  unreasonable, even if the charge which falls upon the owner is in addition to the loss which he suffers by reason of the extinction  of his title in the carcass.     If  the owner’s right to dispose of his property  is  by the   enactment  of  the  impugned  section   subjected   to reasonable  restrictions, it must follow that the  right  of the skinner, assuming that he has a right in the carcass, is also  subjected to reasonable restrictions, imposed  in  the interests of the general public.     The  impugned provisions do not infringe the   guarantee of  freedom under Art. 19(f) of the Constitution.  But  even if it be established that the law which imposes a reasonable restriction upon the right of a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose  of property, is not on that account free  from  the

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challenge   that  it infringes the guaranteed freedom  under Art.   31.  Article  31,  after  it  was  amended   by   the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, provides:     "(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.      (2)  No  property  shall be  compulsorily  acquired  or requisitioned  save  for  a public  purpose  and   save   by authority  of a law which provides for compensation for  the property  so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes  the amount  of the compensation or specifies the  principles  on which,  and  the manner in which the compensation is  to  be determined  and  given; and no such law shall be  called  in question  in any court on the ground that  the  compensation provided by that  law  is  not adequate.      (2A)  Where a law does not provide for the transfer  of the ownership or right to possession of any property to  the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by 405 the  State, it shall not be deemed to provide for  the  com- pulsory  acquisition  Or  requisitioning  of  property,  not withstanding that it deprives any person of his property. (3).    .   .      .     .    .     .     . (4).   .    .    .    .     .    .     .   . (5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect- (a)  the provisions of any existing law other than a law  to which the provisions of  clause  (6) apply, or (b) the provisions of any law which the State may  hereafter make--- (i)   .      .     .     .      .     .    . (ii)  for the promotions of public health or the  prevention of danger to life or property, or (6)    .   .      .     .     .     .    . Before  the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act,  1955,  the prevailing opinion in this Court was that Arts. 31(1) &  (2) dealt  with  the same subject-matter and were  not  mutually exclusive  in  their scope and content, and should  be  read together  and understood as dealing with the  same  subject, namely,  the  acquisition or taking possession  of  property referred to in cl. (2) of Art. 31, and that Art. 31  (before amendment)  is  a  self-contained Article  providing  for  a subject different from that dealt with in Art. 19. But since the  enactment of the Constitution (Fourth  Amendment)  Act, 1955,  clauses (2) & (2A) of Art. 31 and cl. (1) of Art.  31 deal  with different subjects: Clauses (2) & (2A) deal  with acquisition  and  requisitioning of property; and  cl.   (1) with   deprivation   of  property  by  authority   of   law: Kavalappara  Kottarathil  Kochuni and Ors. v. The  State  of Madras  and Ors.(x)  It was also held in that case that  the word ’law’ used in Art. 31 (1 ) indicates its limitation and refers  back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31 (1  ) can  be  sustained only if the restrictions it  imposes  are reasonable  and in the interest of the general  public,  and that  the correct approach should be first to ascertain  the fundamental right and then to see whether the law  infringes that right. If ex facie it does so, it has to stand the test of   Art.   19(5).  In   certain   circumstances,   however, deprivation of fundamental right to property may also amount to a reasonable restriction under that Article. It was  also observed  that the word ’law’ in Art. 31 ( 1 ) must  mean  a valid law, and such a law must satisfy two tests-( 1 )  that the legislature is competent to enact it; and (2) that it (1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887. 916. 406 does  not  infringe  any  fundamental  right.   A  law  that deprives  a  citizen  of his  property  may,  therefore,  be

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invalid if it infringes Art. 19(1) (f) of the  Constitution, unless it is protected by cl, (5) of Art. 19.     It  was  however ruled by a unanimous decision  of  this Court in Smt. Sitabati Debi and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and  Anr.(1) that the decision in   Kavalappara  Kottarathil Kochuni’s   case(2)  was  not  concerned  with  a   law   of requisition or acquisition and a law relating to acquisition and requisition of property falling within the terms of Art. 31(2)  of  the  Constitution  need not  stand  the  test  of reasonableness under Art. 19 (5).     In  the  present case the restrictions  imposed  by  the impugned  law upon the right of the owner  however  satisfy, for reasons already stated, the test of reasonableness under Art. 19(5).  The question still remains whether the impugned law  is  void  because it does not provide  for  payment  of compensation  for  the loss occasioned to the owner  of  the carcass resulting from the extinction of his title  thereto. Since  the amendment by the Constitution (Fourth  Amendment) Act,  1955,  cls.  (2)  & (2A) of  Art.  31  deal  with  the acquisition   or  requisitioning  of  property--movable   or immovable--for  a public purpose. The protection of cl.  (2) is attracted only if there is acquisition or  requisitioning of  the  property for a public purpose i.e., for  using  the property  for some purpose which would be beneficial to  the public.   The   right  guaranteed  by  Art.  31(2)  is  that property   shall   not   be    compulsorily   acquired    or requisitioned for a public purpose save by authority of  law which  provides.  for  compensation  for  the  property   so acquired  or  requisitioned.  The  expression  "acquired  or requisitioned   .....  for a public purpose means   acquired or  requisitioned  for being appropriated to or used  for  a public purpose. But the law which provides for extinction of the ownership and creation of an interest in the Corporation for the purpose of disposal of the carcass is not a law  for acquisition  of property for a public purpose:  its  primary purpose  is  destruction  of  the  carcass  in  the   public interest,  and not utilisation of the property for a  public purpose.   The  case would not, therefore, fall  within  the terms  of Art. 31 (2).  In any case the statute is  squarely protected  by cl. (5)(b)(ii) of Art. 31 and on that  account the  owner is not entitled to compensation for loss  of  his property.  The words of Art. 31 (5) (b) (ii) are express and specific. Nothing in cl. (2) shall affect the provisions  of any law which the State may hereafter make for the promotion of  public  health or the prevention of danger  to  life  or property.  If a law is enacted directly for the promotion of public  health or for ,the prevention of danger to  life  or property, then, notwithstanding that it may incidentally (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 949.    (2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887. 407 fall  within  the  terms of cl.   (2),  no  compensation  is payable.  Where  the State acquires property  and  seeks  to utilise  it for promotion of public health or prevention  of danger  to  life  or property, the State is  liable  to  pay compensation.   But  a law which  directly  and  immediately seeks  W promote public health or to prevent danger to  life or property falls within the exemption under cl.  (5)(b)(ii) even  if  thereby  the interest of the  owner  in  perry  is extinguished and interest in that property is vested in  the State for destruction of that property.     Reliance was placed by counsel for the respondents  upon a  recent judgment of this Court in The Deputy  Commissioner and  Collector,  Kamrup and Ors. v. Durganath  Sarma(1).  In this  case the Government of Assam took possession of  lands belonging to a citizen.  Thereafter the Assam Acquisition of

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Land for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion Ordinance 2 of   1955  was promulgated by the Governor which  authorised the  State  Government to acquire lands for works  or  other development  measures  in connection with flood  control  or prevention of erosion.  The Ordinance was with the assent of the President replaced by the Assam Acquisition of Land  for Flood  Control  and  Prevention of Erosion Act  6  of  1955. Under the Act the owner of the land was not entitled to  the market  value  of the land at the date of  acquisition.  The owner  of  the  land  moved a petition  in  the  High  Court Assam for a declaration that the Act 6 of 1955 was  invalid, and  for an order directing the State Government to  forbear from giving effect to the notices of acquisition of his land issued  thereunder.  Act 6 of 1955 was enacted  before   the Constitution  (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, which Came  into force  on April 29, 1955.  The High Court held, inter  alia, that Act 6 of 1955 was a law for acquisition of property and was  not protected by cl. (5)(b)(ii) of Art. 31. This  Court confirmed  the  order  passed  by the  High  Court.  It  was observed by this Court (p. 402):                    "It is to be noticed that cl.  (5)(b)(ii)               saved laws for the promotion of public  health               or  the  prevention  of  danger  to  life   or               property.   It  did  not  save  laws  for  the               acquisition  of  property.  We  are  satisfied               that  cl.  (5) (b) (ii) was  not  intended  to               except laws for the acquition of property from               the  purview  of  el.  (2)   .....A  law   for               promotion  of public health or for  prevention               of danger to life or property sometimes has to                             provide for destruction and impairment  of value               of   private  property  and  the   taking   of               temporary  possession of the property  by  the               State.    It  may  be  necessary  to   destroy               contaminated  food or to burn  plague-infested               buildings for the promotion of public  health,               to pull down a building to prevent a fire from               spreading and consuming other (1) A.I.R. [1968] S.C. 394. 408               buildings  in  the  locality,  to  demolish  a               building  in  a ruinous condition  endangering               the safety of its occupants and other  persons               in  its  vicinity.  The destruction  and  .the               temporary   talking  of  property   for   such               purposes,   though  necessary  for   promoting               public health or preventing danger to life  or               property, mounted to taking of property within               cl.  (2).  But  for  cl.  (5)(b)(ii),  a   law               authorising  such a taking of  property  would               have  been  invalid  unless  it  provided  for               compensation.  Clause  (5)(b)(ii)  saved  such               laws from the operation of cl. (2 ) and  those               laws were not invalid because they  authorised               such a taking without payment of compensation.               A  law authorising the abatement of  a  public               menace  by  destroying  or  taking   temporary               possession of private properties if the  peril               cannot  be  abated in some other  way  can  be               regarded  as  a law for  promotion  of  public               health  or  prevention of danger  to  life  or               property    within   the   purview   of    cl.               (5)(b)(ii)."     Counsel for the second respondent, however, invited  our

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attention  to the following passage in the judgment  of  the Court:                   "Clause   5(b)(ii)   will   protect   laws               providing  for  requisitioning  or   temporary               occupation   of  property  strictly  necessary               for  promotion of public health or  prevention               of danger to life or property.  The  law   may               authorise   the  State  to   requisition   the               property  temporarily for abating  the  public               menace without payment of compensation if  the               menace   cannot  be  abated  in   some   other               recognised way.", and contended that el. (5)(b)(ii) only  applies where  there is  "temporary  occupation  of  property";  where  there  is deprivation  of property with a view to destroy it, el.  (5) (b)  (ii) has no application.  But evidently the  expression is  used  in  dealing with the  claim  to  compensation  for acquisition  of   immovable  property. Where  possession  of movable property is under the authority of law taken with  a view  to  destroy it in the interest of the  general  public i.e.,  for prevention of grave danger to life  or  property, the guarantee of Art. 31(2) is not attracted.     The  law  enacted by the Legislature  extinguishing  the interest  of  the  owner  in the  carcass  and  creating  an interest in the Corporation being a law directly enacted for _prevention  of grave danger to the health of the  community fell   within  the  terms  of  cl.  (5)  (b)  (ii)  and   no compensation  was  _payable in respect thereof,  Art.  31(2) notwithstanding.   We may observe that this Court in  Deputy Commissioner  Kamrup’s  case(1) _proceeded to  observe  that even though since the  amendment  by  the  Constitution  (1) A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 394. 409 (Fourth Amendment) Act, cls. (1) & (2) of Art. 31 dealt with separate. subject-matters, since el. (5) (b) (ii) of Art. 31 has not been amended, its connotation could not be deemed to have  been altered.  If originally it was intended to  be  a restriction  on the right to property as delineated by  cls. (1)  and  (2)  of Art. 31, it continued  to  have  the  same operation.   In  Deputy   Commissioner,  Kamrup’s   case(1), however,  the Court was not directly called upon to  declare the precise inter-relation between cl. (5) (b) (ii) and ’el. (2) as amended for the impugned Assam Act was enacted before the  amendment  of  the  Constitution  by  the  Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. It is sufficient for the purpose of this case to hold that a law  declaring  extinction  of the right  of  the  owner  in movable   property  not with a view to use it for  a  public purpose  but  to  destroy   it  for  abating  nuisance   and preventing  danger  to public health and vesting it  in  the Corporation  entrusted with power to take steps to  maintain public health is not a law for acquisition of property for a public purpose.  In any event the law is not, because of the exemption  contained  in el. (5)(b)(ii) of Art.  31  of  the Constitution,  invalid.  even  if It does  not  provide  for payment  of  compensation for deprivation of  the  right  to property.  The owner of the carcass is, therefore, unable to sustain  his  plea  that Art. 19(1)(f) or  Art.  31(2)  were infringed by the impugned provisions.     The  claim of the first respondent who. would,  but  for the law have been able to purchase carcasses from the second respondent  does not require any elaborate discussion.   The first  respondent  is carrying on business as a  skinner  of carcasses  and  claims protection of its  fundamental  right under  Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.  Evidently it  has

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no  right  in the carcass until it  purchases  the  carcass. Restriction upon the right of the owner to sell the  carcass does  not  directly infringe the fundamental  right  of  the purchaser, who, but for the restriction, may have been  able to  purchase it.  Assuming, however, that the imposition  by law  of  the  restriction  upon the  owner  of  the  carcass involves  also  a restriction upon the right  of  the  first respondent,  we  are  of  the view,  having  regard  to  the character  of the legislation and its avowed object that  it imposes  reasonable restrictions upon the right to carry  on occupation or business within the meaning of Art. 19 (6)  of the  Constitution.   The first respondent cannot  claim  the protection of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, because  until it purchases the carcasses from the owner it has no right in the .property, and it cannot set up a grievance for loss  of property which it does not own. (1) A.I.R. 968 S.C. 394. Sup. CI/69--9 410     It  was urged that the Corporation instead of  disposing of  the  carcasses  under  its  own  supervision  had  given contracts to the rivals in business of the first  respondent and  the  law  which authorised the Corporation, by exercise of  legislative  authority, to destroy the business  of  the first  respondent must be regarded as imposiag  unreasonable restrictions  upon  the right of  the  first  respondent  to carry on business.  The Act, however, contains no provisions about  the manner in which the Corporation shall dispose  of the  carcasses  which  may come into  its   possession;   it leaves it to the Corporation to take adequate and  effective steps for the purpose of disposal.  Whether by virtue of the contracts given by the Corporation to other persons who  are claimed  to  be rivals in business of the  first  respondent unreasonable  restrictions may be deemed to be  placed  upon their fundamental right is a matter on which no argument was advanced  at  any stage before the trial Court or  the  High Court,  though  it was strenuously urged before  us.   Prima facie, the argument has no substance: in any case, it cannot affect  the validity of the statute or the provisions  which have been declared to be invalid by the High Court.     The  facts which give rise to the two other appeals  are the  same and for reasons already stated the claim  made  by the respondents must be     The  appeals  are allowed and the orders passed  by  the High Court set aside.  The petitions shall stand  dismissed. No order as to costs throughout. V.P.S.                                      Appeals allowed.