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PETITIONER: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MOHANLAL DEVICHAND SHAH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/03/1965

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. WANCHOO, K.N. MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  189            1965 SCR  (3) 461  CITATOR INFO :  R          1972 SC1177  (20)

ACT: Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), s. 2(b) Schedule  Part 1  Entry  8-Stone breaking or stone-crushing  in  a  quarry- Jurisdiction   whether  of  Central  or  State   Government- Competency to file complaint.

HEADNOTE: The Labour Inspector, appointed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948  filed  two complaints before the  Judicial  Magistrate alleging  that  the respondent,  doing  quarrying  operation work,  had  contravened certain provisions  of  the  Minimum Wages  (Control) Rules, 1950.  The respondent,  inter  alia, submitted that the Inspector was not authorised to file  the complaint,  and  only an Inspector appointed  by  the  State Government  was  competent  to  file  the  complaint.    The Judicial Magistrate held that the word "mine" in sub-cl. (1) of  s. 2(b) of the Act, does not include a stone quarry  and therefore,   the  appropriate  government  was   the   State Government and not the Central Government.  The  appellants’ appeals were dismissed by the High Court.  In appeal to this Court. HELD:     An  examination of the definition of  "appropriate Government"  in  s.  2(b) of the Minimum Wages  Act  in  the context and background of Government of India Act, 1935, and the  Mines  Act,  1923, shows that the  word  "mine"  in  s. 2(b)(i)  includes  quarries.  Also stone breaking  or  stone crushing  in  a quarry is within Entry 8 in Part  1  of  the Schedule of the Act.  Since the employment in stone breaking or  stone  crushing  is  in  a  quarry,  it  is  within  the jurisdiction  of  the Central Government, because  it  is  a scheduled  employment  in a mine Within the  meaning  of  s. 2(b)(i).   Therefore, the Inspector appointed under the  Act was competent to file the complaints. [465F; 466A-B, D] Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry  Association v. The Regional Labour Commissioner, Jabalpur, [19601 3 S.C.R. 476, applied.

JUDGMENT:

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CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos.  198 and 199 of 1963. Appeals from the judgment and order dated February 4,  1963, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 779 & 780  of 1962. S. C. Patwardhan, B. R. G. K. Achar for R. H. Dheber, for the  appellant. Avadh Behari, for respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri,  J. These are two appeals by certificate  granted  by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay against its  judgment dated February 4, 1963, in Criminal Appeals Nos. 779 and 780 of 1962.  By this judgment the High Court affirmed the order of (N)4SCI-3                    462 acquittal  passed  against the respondent  by  the  Judicial Magistrate, A First Class, Vadagaon (Mawal). The  relevant  facts are as follows:  The  Labour  Inspector (Central),  Bombay-1, appointed under the Minimum Wages  Act (XI  of  1948) (hereinafter called the Act) by  the  Central Government filed two complaints in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate  alleging  that the  respondent  had  contravened certain  provisions  of the Minimum Wages  (Central)  Rules, 1950.   It  was  alleged  that  the  respondent  was   doing quarrying  operation  work  in  quarry  survey  Nos.   23(1) Kusegaon  village near Lonavala, and while carrying on  this quarrying  operation  work  he, failed  to  observe  certain provisions in the Rules.  The respondent submitted a written statement admitting the facts but he contended, inter  alia, that the Inspector was not authorised to file the  complaint and  it was only an inspector appointed by  the  Maharashtra State  who was competent to file a complaint.  The  Judicial Magistrate,  treating this as a preliminary objection,  came to  the  conclusion that the Inspector was not  entitled  to file  the complaint.  According to him, the word  "mine"  in sub-cl.  (i) of s. 2(b) of the Act does not include a  stone quarry  and, therefore, the appropriate Government  was  the State Government and not the Central Government.  There upon he  acquitted the accused of the offence under s. 22A,  read with s. 18, of the Act and for contravening certain rules of the Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950. The State then filed two appeals before the High Court.  The High  Court also came to the conclusion that  the  Inspector was  not competent to file the complaints but the  reasoning of the High Court was different.  It was of the opinion that "a  stone quarry can fall within the category of a  mine  as defined  in the Mines Act of 1952 or the Mines and  Minerals (Regulation  and  Development) ,Act of 1957." But  even  so, according  to  it, "the Schedule does not mention  either  a mine  or a stone quarry and item No. 8, viz., Employment  in stone  breaking  and stone crushing, cannot,  therefore,  be said to be an employment in respect of a mine whether in its broadest sense so as to include a stone quarry or in  narrow sense  as given in the Oxford English Dictionary." The  High Court  further held that ’unless, therefore, the  Parliament amends  item  No.  8  of the  Schedule  so  to  include  the operation  of stone-breaking and stone-crushing in  a  stone quarry  or in all mines including a stone quarry, it is  not possible  to hold that the appropriate Government  would  be the  Central  Government, merely on the basis that,  in  its widest connotation, the words ’stone quarry’ may fall within the ambit of the word ’mine’." Section 2(b) of the Act defines "appropriate government"  as follows:

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             "2(b) "appropriate government" means-               (i)   in relation to any scheduled  employment               carried on                                    463               by  or  under  the authority  of  the  Central               Government  or a railway administration or  in               relation to a mine, oilfield or major port, or               any corporation established by a Central  Act,               the Central Government, and               (ii)  in  relation  to  any  other   scheduled               employment, the State Government." Sub-clause (g) defines ’scheduled employment" to mean in em- ployment specified in the Schedule, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment. The Schedule is divided into two parts, and Part 1  contains entry  8-Employment  in stone breaking  or  stone  crushing. Section 22 prescribes the penalties for certain offenses and s.  22A  provides that "any employer  who  contravenes  any. provisions  of  this  Act  or of  any  rule  or  order  made thereunder  shall, if no other penalty is provided for  such contravention by this Act, be punishable with fine which may extend  to five hundred rupees." Section 22B deals with  the cognizance  of  offences and provides that "no  Court  shall take  cognizance  of a complaint against any person  for  an offence...  under clause (b) of section 22 or under  section 22A except on a complaint made by, or with the sanction  of, an Inspector." The first question which arises is whether the quarry  which the  respondent  is alleged to be working and in  which  the employees  are  alleged to be carrying on the  operation  of stone breaking or stone crushing is a mine, within s.  2(b). Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the  definition  of the word mine" in the  Mines  Act,  1952 (XXXV  of 1952), and the Mines and Minerals (Regulation  and Development) Act, 1957 (LXVII of 1957).  Section 2(j) of the Mine  Act  defines  ’mine’, and the  relevant  part  of  the definition is as under:               "Mine"   means   any  excavation   where   any               operation for the purpose of searching for  or               obtaining  minerals  has  been  or  is   being               carried on, and includes-               (iv) all open cast workings." The word ’minerals’ is defined to mean all substances  which can be obtained from the earth by mining, digging,  drilling dredging, hydraulicing, quarrying or by any other  operation and includes mineral oils (which in turn include natural gas and  petroleum). he learned counsel says that a quarry is  a mine within this definition. In the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)  Act, 1957,  the expressions ’mine’ and ’owner’ have the  meanings assigned  to  them  in the Mines  Act,  1952.   The  learned counsel  contends that this meaning should be read into  the Minimum Wages Act. 464 The  learned  counsel  for the  respondents  relies  on  the observations of this Court in Pandit Ram Narain v. The State of  Uttar  Pradesh(1)  that "it is  no  sound  principle  of construction  to interpret expressions used in one Act  with reference  to  their use in another Act.   The  meanings  of words and expressions used in an Act must take their  colour from the context in which they appear." The learned  counsel further contends, relying on a number of English  decisions, that  in  its primary signification the  word  ’mine’  means underground excavations or underground workings.  He  relies in  particular  on the speech of Lord  Macnaughten  in  Lord

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Provost and Magistrates of Glasgow v. Farie (2) . The  House of Lords was concerned in that case with the  interpretation of  s. 18 of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, which was  in the following terms:               "The undertakers shall not be entitled to  any               mines  of  coal, ironstone,  state,  or  other               minerals  under  any land purchased  by  them,               except  only  such parts thereof as  shall  be               necessary to be dug or carried away or used in               the construction of the water-works unless the               same shall have been expressly purchased,  and               all such mines, excepting as aforesaid,  shall               be deemed to be excepted out of the conveyance               of  such  lands, unless they shall  have  been               expressly named therein and conveyed thereby." The   appellants  in  that  case  had  purchased  from   the respondent  a  parcel of land for the  purpose  of  erecting waterworks and the conveyance contained a reservation of the "whole  coal and other minerals in the land in terms of  the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847." Under the land was a seam  of valuable brick clay.  The respondent worked this clay in the adjoining land, and having reached the appellants’ boundary, claimed  the  right  to work out the  clay  under  the  land purchased  by the appellants.  The House of Lords held  that common clay, forming the surface or subsoil of land, was not included  in  the  reservation  in the  Act,  and  that  the appellants  were  entitled to an interdict  restraining  the respondent from working the clay under the land purchased by them.  It is true Lord Macnaughten first construed the  word ’mine’ in this enactment to mean under ground excavations or underground  workings,  and then proceeded to  construe  the section.   But Lord Watson was of the opinion that the  word ’mine’ did not necessarily mean underground excavations.  He said  that "it does not occur to me that an open  excavation of auriferous quartz would be generally described as a  gold quarry;  I  think most people would call it  a  cold  mine." Later  he  observed that "the word ’quarry’  is,  no  doubt, inapplicable   to  underground  excavations  but  the   word ’milling’  may  without impropriety be used to  denote  some quarries.  Dr. Johnson defines a quarry to be a stone mine". He  arrived at the conclusion that "the word ’mine’ must  be taken to signify all (1) [1956] S.C.R. 664 at 673. (2) 13 A.C. 657. 465 excavations   by   which  the  excepted  minerals   may   be legitimately worked and got." In  our  opinion, as stated in Halsbury’s Laws  of  England, Third  Edition, volume 26, p. 317, the word ’mine’ is not  a definite  term,  but  is one susceptible  of  limitation  or expansion according to the intention with which it is  used. In  s. 2(b) of the Act, we have to see the context in  which the word has been used.  What the legislature is  purporting to  do  is  to  demarcate  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State Governments and the Central Government in respect of minimum wages  to  be paid to persons employed  in  the  employments enumerated in the Schedule.  Entry 35 in List 1 of  Schedule VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, was "regulation of tabour  and  safety in mines and oilfields." Entry  36  read "regulation  of mines and oilfields and mineral  development to the extent to which such regulation and development under Dominion control is declared by Dominion law to be expedient in the public interest." It is not seriously contested  that in  Entries  35  and  36  the  word  ,mines’  would  include quarries.   The Mines Act, 1923 (IV of 1923) which  was  the

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existing  law  when the Government of India  Act  came  into force, made provisions regarding health and safety in  mines and  regulated  hours and limitations of employment  in  the mines.  The word ’mine’ had been defined to mean any excava- tion where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining  minerals  has been or is being  carried  on,  and includes all works, machinery, tramways and sidings, whether above  or below ground, in or adjacent to or belonging to  a mine,  provided that it shall not include any part  of  such premises  on which a manufacturing process is being  carried on  unless such process is a process for coke making or  the dressing   of  minerals.   Therefore,  if  we  examine   the definition  of  ’appropriate government’ in s. 2(b)  in  the context and in the background of the Government of India Act and  the  existing  law, it seems to  us  that  the  Central Legislature  must have intended to include quarries  in  the word  ’mine’, otherwise it would be rather incongruous  that some matters such as health and saftey, hours and employment in  quarries should be regulated by the  Central  Government and minimum wages by the State Governments.  Further.  there is no indication whatsoever in the Act that the word  ’mine’ has  the narrower meaning suggested by the  learned  counsel for the respondent. If  the  word ’mine’ is held to include a quarry,  the  next question  that  arises is whether stone  breaking  or  stone crushing  in  a  quarry  is  within  the  Schedule.    While interpreting Entry 8 in the Schedule, this Court observed in Madliva Pradesh Mineral Industry Association v. The Regional Labour Commissioner, Jabalpur(1) as follows:               "When  we  speak of stone-breaking  or  stone-               crushing  normally  we refer to stone  in  the               sense of "piece of rock"               (1)   [1960] 3S.C.R. 476.               466               and  that would exclude maganese.   Employment               in  stone-breaking or stone-crushing  in  this               sense would refer to quarry operations." This Court thus read Entry 8 to refer to quarry  operations, and  we  hold  that stone-breaking or  stone-crushing  in  a quarry is within the Schedule. Thus  reading item 8 of the Schedule and s. 2(b) of the  Act together, it seems to us that the definition demarcates  the jurisdiction  of  the  Central  Government  and  the   State Governments in this way: If the employment in stone-breaking or  stone-crushing  is  in a quarry then it  is  within  the jurisdiction of the Central Government; if the employment in stone-breaking  or stone-crushing is not in a quarry, it  is the  State Government that will have jurisdiction.   We  are unable to appreciate the observations of the High Court that the  operation  of stone-breaking and  stone-crushing  in  a stone quarry does not fall within item 8 of the Schedule and that it is necessary that Parliament should amend item 8  of the Schedule. In  the result, we hold that the Inspector was competent  to file  the complaints and the Magistrate and the  High  Court should  not have acquitted the respondent on the  ground  of his  being incompetent to file the complaints.  The  appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court and the order of the Magistrate are reversed and the cases remitted to the Magistrate to proceed with the complaints in accordance with law. Appeals allowed. 467

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