21 February 1995
Supreme Court
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STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs MAHARAU SRAWAN HATKAR

Bench: RAMASWAMY,K.
Case number: Appeal (civil) 1800 of 1991


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PETITIONER: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHARAU SRAWAN HATKAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/02/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  (3) 316        JT 1995 (2)   582  1995 SCALE  (2)100

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: ORDER 1.  Since the respondent had not been represented,  we  have requested  learned Advocate Shri G.K. Bansal to  assist  the Court  which he accepted and has given good  assistancc  for which we express our gratitude to him. 2. This appeal by special leave. arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in First  Ap- peal No. 169/87, dated 24.4.1987. Notification under  s.4(1) of the land Acquisi- 585 tion  Act  1894  (for short, ’the  Act),  was  published  on 13.8.1979  in  the  State Gazette  acquiring  the  land  for percolation tank in village Kasampura.  The Land Acquisition Officer   by   his  award  dated  17.12.1981   awarded   the compensation.    At  the  instance  of  the  claimants,   on reference  under  s.  18 of the Act, the  Civil  Judge,  Sr. Division, Jalgaon in his award and decree dated  25.10.1983, enhanced  the compensation.  It would appear that no  appeal appears to have been preferred.  After the Land  Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1894 had come into force on  September 24, 1984, the claimants made an application to the reference court   for  awarding  the  enhanced  solatium,   additional compensation and interest under the Amendment Act The  Civil Judge  by  his  order  dated  March  31,  1986  allowed  the application and awarded as under:               "i)  All the petitioners are entitled  to  the               additional    amount   of   compensation    as               calculated  at  the rate of 12 per  cent  p.a.               from  the date of notification or the date  of               dispossession,  whichever  is earlier  to  the               date of Award on the entire market value, i.e.               the  market  value  as assessed  by  the  Spl.               L.A.0.  and increased by this Court  in  their               respective cases.               ii)   The petitioners are also entitled to the

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             solatium  at  the rate of 30%  on  the  entire               market value.               iii)  The petitioners are also entitled to the                             interest  at the rate of 9% p.a. from the  dat e               of  notification under s.4 of the L.A. Act  or               the   date  of  dispossession,  whichever   is               earlier, till the expiry of one year from that               date  and thereafter till the date of  payment               of  15%  p.a. on the  amount  of  compensation               i.e.the  total market value  plus  components,               plus  solatium  at  30  per  cent  for   their               respective cases.               iv)   Whatever   has  already  been  paid   on               account  of market value,  solatium,  interest               shall   be  deducted  from  their   respective               claims."               Dissatisfied therewith, the State carried  the               matter in appeal and the High Court  summarily               dismissed  the  appeal.  Thus this  appeal  by               special leave. 3.   The  only  question that arises  for  consideration  is whether the Civil Court has power and jurisdiction to  award the  benefits of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984, Shri  Bhasme, the  learned counsel for the State contended that the  Civil Court  gets  jurisdiction to  determine  compensation  under s.23(1)  of  the Act only on reference.  On its  making  the award  enhancing the  compensation under sub-s.(1) of  s.23, it would be a decree under s.26(2). The Court thereafter has no power to amend the decree except in accordance, with law. This  is not either a clerical or arithmetical  mistake  for correction under s. 152 of CPC or under s. 13 A of the  Act, but  is an independent exercise of power.  Unless the  Court is empowered to, do so by law, the civil court is devoid  of Jurisdiction to give the benefits under the Amendment Act. 4.   Shri  G.K. Bansal, learned counsel, on the other  hand, contended that since CPC is made applicable to the  proceed- ings  of reference under s. 18, by operation of s.53 of  the Act, the civil court gets inherent power under s. 151 of CPC to  grant  the benefits and that, therefore, the  court  can pass  a fresh order giving the benefits under the  Amendment Act. 5.   We find no force in the contention of Shri Bansal.   On receipt of reference under s. 18, the procedure prescribed 586 under  ss. 19 and 20 of the Act is required to  be  followed and  the  civil  court determines the  compensation  in  the manner  indicated under sub-s.(1) of s.23 of the  Act  which envisages that in determining the amount of compensation  to be  awarded for the land acquired under the Act,  the  court shall  take  into  consideration clauses  first  to  sixthly mentioned  thereunder  while determining  the  compensation. Sub-s.(1A) of s.23, which was brought by the Amendment  Act, and sub-s.(2) of s.23 provide that:               "(1-A) In addition to the market value of  the               land,  as above provided, the Court  shall  in               every  case award an amount calculated at  the               rate  of twelve per centum per annum  on  such               market value for the period commencing on  and                             from  the  date  of  the  publication  of the               notification under s.4, sub-s.(1), in  respect               of  such land to the date of the award of  the               Collector or the date of taking possession  of               the land whichever is earlier.               (2)   In  addition to the market value of  the

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             land  as  above provided, the Court  shall  in               every case award a sum of thirty per centum     on               such market value, in consideration of the               compulsory nature of the acquisition"                6.   Section 28 envisages that:               "28.    Collector  may  be  directed  to   pay               interest on excess compensation ...If the  sum               which,  in  the,  opinion of  the  Court,  the               Collector    ought   to   have   awarded    as               compensation is in excess of the sum which the               Collector did award as compensation, the award               of  the  Court may direct that  the  Collector               shall pay interest on such excess at the  rate               of nine per centum per annum from the date  on               which he took position of the land to the date               of payment of such excess into court:               Provided that the award of the Court may  also               direct  that  where such excess  or  any  part               thereof  is paid into Court after the date  of               expiry  of a period of one year from the  date               on which possession is interest at the rate of               fifteen per centum per annum shall be  payable               from the date of expiry of the said period  of               one year on the amount of such excess or  part               thereof  which  has not been paid  into  Court               before the date of such expiry." 7.   It  would  thus  be seen that  the  additional  amounts envisaged under sub-ss. (1A) and (2) of s.23 are not part of the component of the compensation awarded under sub-s.(1) of s.23  of the Act.  They are only in addition to  the  market value  of  the land.  The payment of interest also  is  only consequential to the enhancement of the compensation.  In  a case’  where the Court has not enhanced the compensation  on reference,  the  Court  is  devoid of  power  to  award  any interest under s.28 or the spreading of payment of  interest for  one year from the date of taking possession at  9%  and 15%  thereafter  till  date of payment  into  the  court  as envisaged under the proviso. 8.   Section 26 of the Act envisages that:               "(1)  Every award under this Part shall be  in               writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify               the amountawarded under  clause first of sub-               s.(1)of s.23, and also   the amounts (if any)               respectivelyawarded   under  each  of  the               other   clauses  of  the  same   sub-section,               together with the grounds of awarding each  of               the said amounts               (2)  Every such award shall be deemed to be  a               decree  and  the statement of the  grounds  of               every such award a judgment within the meaning               of s.2, clause                                    587               (2), and s.2, clause (9), respectively, of the               Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (5 of 1908)." 9.   Thus, it would be seen that a decree    having     been made under s.26(2), the civil court is left to correct  only either  clerical  or  arithmetical  mistakes  as   envisaged expressly  under  s. 13-A of the Act or under  s.  152  CPC. Though  s. 151 CPC gives inherent power to the Court, it  is intended  only to prevent abuse of the process of the  court or  to meet the ends of justice.  The present is not a  case of  such  nature.  Further, since s.23 is an  express  power under  which  the civil court has been  conferred  with  the jurisdiction  to determine compensation, and in addition  to the  market  value  certain  percentage  of  the  amount  is

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directed to be awarded as envisaged under s.23(1A) and 23(2) and the interest component under s.28, the invocation of  s. 151 CPC by necessary implication stands excluded. 10.  Thus, we hold that the civil court had inherent lack of jurisdiction  and  it was devoid of power to  entertain  the application to award additional benefits under the Amendment Act.   The order thereby is clearly a void order.  The  High Court has not applied its mind to this crucial consideration but summarily dismissed the appeal. 11.  The  appeal is accordingly allowed.  The order  of  the High Court and that of the civil court are set aside and the petition stands dismissed.  In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. 595