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PETITIONER: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ISHWAR PIRAJI KALPATRI

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/11/1995

BENCH: KIRPAL B.N. (J) BENCH: KIRPAL B.N. (J) MUKHERJEE M.K. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  722            1996 SCC  (1) 542  JT 1995 (9)   345        1995 SCALE  (6)674

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T KIRPAL,J.      These are  appeals by special leave granted against the judgment of  a Single Judge of Bombay High Court in exercise of his  jurisdiction under  Section 482  Criminal  Procedure Code (hereinafter  referred to  as the Cr.P.C.’) and Article 227 of  the Constitution  of India  whereby the  proceedings under the  Prevention of  Corruption Act,  1988  which  were pending against  the respondent  herein before  the  Special judge at Greater Bombay, were quashed.      The respondent  had joined the police force as a P.S.I. Cadet on  1.6.1966 and  after completion of his training, he was posted  as Police  Sub-Inspector in  the Police force in 1968. He was promoted to the post of Police Sub-Inspector in September, 1974  and in  *,1981, he was promoted to the post of *  Commissioner  of  Police.  It  was  the  case  of  the respondent that  he had  held various  important assignments and that his record was unblemished.      It  appears   that  one  A.C.P.R.B.  Kolekar  of  Anti- corruption Bureau,  Bombay on  1.1.1987 made  enquiries with regard to  the respondent who was, at that time, holding the post of  Vigilance Officer  in the  office of  the Transport Commissioner,  Bombay.   A  first   information  report  was recorded by  ACP Kolekar  on  16.2.1988  and  the  case  was registered vide  C.R.No. 4/88  under Section  5(2) read with Section 5(1)  (e) of  the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred  to as  the Act).  Thereafter  vide  a letter dated  8.6.1988, respondent  was  informed  that  the Bureau was  investigating an offence under Section 5(2) read with Section  5(1) (e)  of the  Act and  the case  had  been registered   on   16.2.1988   for   possession   of   assets disproportionate to  his known sources of income. As Section 5(10) (e)  of the  Act envisaged  that  the  public  servant should satisfactorily  account for  the pecuniary  resources and property standing in his name or in the names of others,

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the respondent  was, by  the  said  letter  dated  8.6.1988, required to  attend the  office of Anti Corruption Bureau on 20.6.1988  for   the  purpose  of  giving  a  satisfactorily explanation   in    respect   of    properties   valued   at Rs.15,00,764.06/- which  were found  to be in his possession or in  the names of others on his behalf. By his reply dated 20.6.1988, the respondent wrote back saying that as the Anti Corruption Bureau had registered a complaint against him, he was protected  by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and, therefore,  he could not be compelled to make statement which may  prejudice his  case. The respondent, accordingly, stated that  he will  not say anything regarding the queries put to him.      On 3.2.1990, the Government of Maharashtra accorded, in exercise of  its powers  under Section  197  (1)(b)  of  the Cr.P.C. and  clause (b)  of sub-section  (1) of Section 6 of the Act,  1947 (equivalent  to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section  19 of the Act, 1988, sanction to the prosecution of the  respondent. In  the recital  of  the  said  sanction order, it  was stated that the Government of Maharashtra had fully examined  the material before it and it had considered all the  facts and  circumstances discussed  therein and was satisfied that there was a prima facie case made out against the respondent  and that it was necessary in the interest of justice  that  he  would  be  prosecuted  in  the  court  of competent jurisdiction for the said offence. In the schedule to the charge-sheet, the only person who was accused was the respondent  and   the  said   schedule  also  contained  the allegations on  the basis  of which he was accused of having committed the said criminal mis-conduct. It was, inter alia, stated  that  during  the  course  of  his  service  between 1.1.1965 to  16.2.1988, he  was found to be in possession of pecuniary resources  or Property  in his  name and/or in the names of  the members  of his  family, close  relations  and associates which  were found  to be  disproportionate to his known sources  of income to the extent of 5,66,604,01/-. The annexures  to   the  schedule   indicated  the   details  of properties in his name and in the name of his family members and close  relations and  associates as  well as  the  total income derived  by him  and members of his family from their known sources,  the total  minimum expenditure  estimated to have been  incurred by him and members of the family as well as the  savings which  the respondent  may have  had. It was also stated  therein that the respondent’s wife, his nephew, second brother-in-law and two other associates had aided and abetted the  respondent in  the commission  of the aforesaid offence by  holding the pecuniary resources or properties in their names,  for and  on behalf  of the  accused persons as particularised in  one of the annexures to the said schedule attached to  the sanctioned  order. Soon  after the sanction was received, charge-sheet was filed on 8.2.1990 against the respondent,  Tarulata  Ishwar  Kalpatri,  his  wife,  Ramesh Dharmaji Kalpatri,  his  nephew,  Ravindra  Nagendra  Pakale (brother-in-law) and Mukesh Bagwandas Goglani (a friend).      The respondent  then filed  Criminal Writ  Petition No. 854 of  1991 and the case was mentioned for admission before Mr. Justice  M.F. Saldanha.  After the  rule was  issued, an affidavit in  reply was  filed and  by the impugned judgment dated 16.10.1992,  the proceedings,  then pending before the Special Judge,  Greater Bombay  being Special Case No. 18/90 were quashed. Simultaneously, orders such as attachment etc. were also  set aside  and the  appellants were directed that whatever assets  were seized  or taken  charge of,  shall be restored forthwith.      The High  Court allowed  the said writ petition despite

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an objection  having been  taken on  behalf of the appellant herein that  the Court  should refrain  from exercising  its jurisdiction under  Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 227 of the  Constitution once  the First  Information Report had been lodged,  government sanction  received and charge-sheet filed. This  contention was  not accepted and the High Court quashed the  criminal proceedings  by, inter  alia,  holding that:      (a)Principles of  natural justice  had been  denied and the provisions  of the  Section 5  of the  Act had  not been complied with  because the respondent should have been given an  opportunity  of  giving  an  explanation  prior  to  the registration of  the offence  alleged against  him  and  the failure to do so was fatal to the prosecution; (b)  That it  was essential  for the  Sanctioning Officer to mention in  the body of the Sanction Order that the property was disproportionate to his known sources of income and that the public  servant could not satisfactorily account for the same and  this statement  had not  been recorded in the said order; (c)  While granting  the sanction,  there had  been  a  non- application  of   mind  on   the  part  of  the  sanctioning authority; (d)  The manner  in which  the respondent had been suspended and the  suspension order served on him at the time when his juniors were  ordered to be promoted and other circumstances showed the  mala fides of the authorities and on this ground alone, the proceeding was liable to be quashed.      Impugning the judgment of the aforesaid Single Judge of the Bombay  High Court,  it had  been contended  by Mr. S.K. Dhoklakia, learned  Sr. Counsel  for the appellant, that the learned Single  Judge ought  not to have interfered with the prosecution, once  it had  been launched  and it  would have been open  to the  respondent herein to raise any contention which he  wanted before  the Special Judge. It was also open to the respondent, it was submitted, to apply to the Special Judge and  make a  case for his discharge. In support of his contention, learned  counsel has  relied  on  the  following decisions, namely;  K.Veeraswami  Vs.  Union  of  India  and others, (1991)3  SCC 655,  State  of  Bihar  and  other  Vs. P.P.Sharma, IAS and another, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222, Minakshi Bala Vs.  Sudhir Kumar and others, (1994) 4 SCC 142 and Mrs, Ruoan Deol  Bajaj &  Anr, Vs.  Kanwar  Pal  Singh  Gill  and another, JT  1995 (7) SC 299. It was also contended that the learned Single  Judge had  not only erred in law in quashing the prosecution  but had  also not appreciated the facts, on record, correctly.      On behalf  of the  respondent,  Mr.  G.L.  Sanghi,  Sr. Counsel reiterated  the contentions  which had  found favour with the  learned Single Judge and it was submitted that the respondent would  be unduly and unnecessarily narassed if he was required  to take  part in  a protracted  trial. It  was submitted that  there were serious allegations of mala fides against the  authorities and  principles of  natural justice were violated  because no  opportunity was  granted  to  the respondent before  the First  Information Report  was filed. Faced with  some difficulty, Mr. Sanghi submitted during the course of  his  argument,  that  the  respondent  should  be allowed to withdraw the original writ petition and he should be permitted  to agitate  all the  contentions which  he had raised before  the Special  Judge. According  to the learned counsel, the  effect of  allowing the withdrawal of the writ petition, at  this stage,  would be that the judgment of the Single Judge  of the  Bombay High Court would become non est and no prejudice would be caused to any party.

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    Taking the  last submission  first, it  appears strange that when  a petition  had been  filed in  the  High  Court, judgment obtained and the losing party comes to the Superior Court, then  in order  to avoid  an  unfavourable  order,  a request should  be made  for the  withdrawal of the original proceeding in  an effort  to avoid  an adverse decision from the Superior  Court with  a  view  to  re-agitate  the  same contentions once  again before  the subordinate  court.  The High Court  had exercised its jurisdiction by observing that there was  no proper  sanction accorded  by the  Government, principles of  natural justice had been violated and conduct of the appellant showed the mala fides. In our opinion there was no  warrant for  the  High  Court  coming  to  the  said conclusion and the judgment has to be set- aside. A party to the proceedings cannot be allowed, at this stage at least to take a chance and if he gets the impression that he will not succeed  to   seek  permission   to  withdraw  the  original proceedings obviously  with a  view  to  regitate  the  same contentions, which have been or may be, adjudicated upon, by a higher  court  before  the  subordinate  court  though  in different proceedings. We strongly deprecate a practice like this, if  it  exists.  This  will  be  opposed  to  judicial discipline and  may lead  to unhealthy  practices which will not be  conducive.  On  the  facts  this  case,  we  see  no justification for  permitting the respondent to withdraw his writ petition.      In coming  to the  conclusion that  the  order  of  the sanction was  not valid,  the High Court first held that "in the absence  of sanctioning  authority recording and holding that  the  accused  could  not  satisfactorily  account  for disproportionate assets,  no sanction  could ever  have been granted". Without  going into  the question as to whether in the order  according sanction  it is  necessary for  such an averment being  made, the  record clearly  discloses that in the schedule  annexed to the sanction dated 3.2.1990, such a statement was  made. After  stating that  the respondent and his family  and/or associates were found to be in possession of pecuniary resources or properties disproportionate to the extent of Rs. 5,66,604.01/-, it was specifically stated that with  regard   to  this   "the  accused   person  failed  to satisfactorily account  for". It  is clear  that the learned Judge had wrongly observed that such a statement was absent.      Another reason  as given by the High Court for quashing the sanction was that the order of sanction was Single Judge made observations to the effect that the manner in which the sanction order  had been  passed would  show that  a  rather cavalier treatment  has been  meted out in the present case. We do  not see  any justification  for the court making such observations in  the present case because the perusal of the order of sanction does not show any legal infirmity and such remarks by the Judge were clearly uncalled for.      The main  thread which  runs throughout the judgment is the alleged  non-compliance with  the principles  of natural justice insofar  as applicability  of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act is concerned, which Section reads as follows:      "5(1)(e) if  he or  any  person  on  his      behalf is  in possession  or has, at any      time during  the period  of his  office,      been in possession, for which the public      servant cannot  satisfactorily  account,      of  pecuniary   resources  or   property      disproportionate to his known sources of      income."      Interpreting this provision, the learned Judge had come to the conclusion that opportunity to satisfactorily account

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for must  be afforded  before an  offence is  registered. In this connection, it was observed as follows:           "Having  regard  to  the  procedure      followed    in     relation    to    the      investigation  of   corruption   charges      under Section  5(1)(e) of the Prevention      of Corruption  Act, one needs to bear in      mind that unlike in the case of offences      under    the     I.P.C.,     substantial      inquiries/investigations are carried out      and completed  prior to  arriving  at  a      conclusion as  to whether  or not, there      is ground  to hold  that an  offence has      been completed. That procedure cannot be      one-sided in  the face  of  a  statutory      requirement which  prescribes  that  the      accused must  be afforded an opportunity      of being heard. Undisputedly, therefore,      that opportunity  has to  come prior  to      the stage  when conclusions are reached,      if at all it is to be meaningful."      In our  opinion, there is a complete mis-reading of the aforesaid provision  by the High Court. It is, no doubt true that a  satisfactory explanation was required to be given by the Delinquent  Officer. But  this opportunity is only to be given during  the course  of the  trial. It is no doubt true that evidence  had to  be gathered and a prima facie opinion found that  the provisions of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act are attracted before  a first  information  report  was  lodged. During the  course of  gathering of  the material,  it  does happen that  the officer  concerned or  other person  may be questioned or  other querries  made. For  the formation of a prima facie  opinion  that  an  officer  may  be  guilty  of criminal mis-conduct  leading to  the filing  of  the  First Information  Report,   there  is  no  provision  in  law  or otherwise which  makes it  obligatory of  an opportunity  of being heard  to be given to a person against whom the report is to  be lodged.  That such  satisfactory account had to be rendered before  a court is also borne out from the judgment of this  Court in  Veeraswami s case (supra) where referring to Section  5(1)(e) of  the Act  at page  713  of  the  said judgment, it was observed as follows:           "Clause  (e)  creates  a  statutory      offence which  must  be  proved  by  the      prosecution. It  is for  the prosecution      to prove  that the accused or any person      on his behalf, has been in possession of      pecuniary    resources    or    property      disproportionate to his known sources of      income. When  that onus is discharged by      the prosecution,  it is  for the accused      to  account   satisfactorily   for   the      disproportionality  of   the  properties      possessed  by  him.  The  Section  makes      available statutory  defence which  must      be  proved  by  the  accused.  It  is  a      restricted defence  that is  accorded to      the   accused   to   account   for   the      disproportionality of  the  assets  over      the income.  But  the  legal  burden  of      proof placed  on the  accused is  not so      onerous  as  that  of  the  prosecution.      However, it  is just  not throwing  some      doubt on  the prosecution  version.  The      legislature  has   advisedly  used   the

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    expression "satisfactorily account". The      exphasis   must    be   on    the   word      "satisfactorily". That means the accused      has to  satisfy the  court that that his      explanation is worthy of acceptance. The      burden of proof placed on the accused is      an  evidential   burden  though   not  a      persuasive burden. The accused, however,      could discharge that burden of proof "on      the  balance  of  probabilities"  either      from the  evidence  of  the  prosecution      and/or evidence from the defence."                              (emphasis added)      The aforesaid  passage leaves  no manner  of doubt that the opportunity  which is  to be  afforded to the delinquent officer under  Section 5(1)(e)  of the Act of satisfactorily explaning about his assets and resources is before the Court when the  trial commences  and not  at an earlier stage. The conclusion arrived  at by  the  learned  Single  Judge  that principles of  natural justice  had  been  violated,  as  no opportunity was  given before  the registration of the case, is  clearly   unwarranted  and  contrary  to  the  aforesaid observations of this Court in K. Veeraswami’s case (supra).      Further the  conclusion of  the learned  Judge that the opportunity of  hearing must be granted and the non-grant of the same  would vitiate  the order  of sanction  is  clearly contrary to the following observations of this Court in P.P. Sharma’s case (supra) which reads as under:      "It is  equally well settled that before      granting sanction  the authority  or the      appropriate Government  must have before      it the necessary report and the material      facts which  prima facie  establish  the      commission of  offence charged  for  and      the appropriate  Government would  apply      their mind  to those facts. The order of      sanction is  only an  administrative act      and not a quasi-judicial one nor is a is      involved.  Therefore,   the   order   of      sanction  need   not  contain   detailed      reasons  in   support  thereof   as  was      contended by  Sri Jain.  But  the  basic      facts that  constitute the  offence must      be apparent  on the  impugned order  and      the record  must bear out the reasons in      that regard.  The question  of giving an      opportunity to  the  public  servant  at      that stage  as  was  contended  for  the      respondents  does   not  arise.   Proper      application of  mind to the existence of      prima facie  evidence of  the commission      of the offence is only a precondition to      grant or  refuse to grant sanction. When      the   Government    accorded   sanction,      Section  114(e)   of  the  Evidence  Act      raises  presumption  that  the  official      acts have  been regularly performed. The      burden is  heavier  on  the  accused  to      establish  the   contra  to  rebut  that      statutory presumption. Once that is done      then it  is the  duty of the prosecution      to produce necessary record to establish      that  after   application  of  mind  and      consideration thereof to the subject the      grant or  refusal to  grant sanction was

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    made by  the appropriate  authority.  At      any  time   before   the   court   takes      cognizance of  the offence  the order of      sanction could  be made.  It is  settled      law that  issuance of the process to the      accused to  appear before  the court  is      sine qua non of taking cognizance of the      offence. The  emphasis of Section 197(1)      or other  similar  provisions  that  "no      court  shall  take  cognizance  of  such      offence   except   with   the   previous      sanction"  posits   that  before  taking      cognizance of the offence alleged, there      must  be  before  the  court  the  prior      sanction   given    by   the   competent      authority. Therefore, at any time before      taking cognizance  of the  offence it is      open to the competent authority to grant      sanction and the prosecution is entitled      to produce the order of sanction. Filing      of charge-sheet before the court without      sanction per  se is  not illegal,  nor a      condition precedent.  A perusal  of  the      sanction order  clearly  indicates  that      the Government  appears to  have applied      its mind  to the  facts placed before it      and considered  them  and  then  granted      sanction. No  evidence has  been  placed      before  us   to  come   to  a  different      conclusion. Accordingly we hold that the      High Court  committed manifest  error of      law to  quash the charge-sheets on those      grounds."                              (emphasis added)      The last  ground which  had been  given by  the learned Judge for  quashing the  prosecution is  that the appellants are quality of mala fides. What is the ingredient of showing mala fide,  according to  the learned  Judge, was  that  the rules of  natural justice had not been followed prior to the lodging of  the First  Information Report.  This ground, for the  reasons   stated  hereinabove,  is  clearly  untenable. Reference has  also been  made by  the learned  Judge to the service  of  the  suspension  order  by  affixation  at  the respondent’s  residence.   It  is   to  be  noted  that  the suspension order  was passed on 17.10.1988 and it was served by affixation  on 19.1.1989. The comment which has been made by the learned Judge was that the respondents were unable to give any respectable or plausible explanation for not having served the suspension order on the petitioner for over three months. In  this connection  and as  a circumstance  showing mala fides, the learned Judge has also observed as under:      "The petitioner  has pointed  out a list      of  officers   against  whom  corruption      charges were under investigation or were      pending and  who have not been suspended      and   the    irresistible    conclusion,      therefore,  is   that   the   order   of      suspension itself which has its roots in      the present corruption charges was being      used as  a handle  to cover  up for  the      supersession."      The order of suspension was passed on 17.10.1988. It is not necessary  to  go  into  the  question  as  to  why  the suspension order  was not  served for three months, but that mala fide  should be  inferred by  reason of  the fact  that

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order of  suspension was  passed  and  that,  in  collateral proceedings, the said suspension order had been set-aside or revoked, is  wholly irrelevant. Full facts are not available on the  record of  this case regarding the other proceedings which had  taken place  with regard  to the  passing of  the suspension order, the same being set-aside or with regard to the order  of transfer  which was  passed. What is, however, important, is  that  the  order  of  suspension  was  passed against the  respondent, who was a police officer, after the filing of  the First Information Report in the present case. A prima facie opinion had been formed that the provisions of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act were attracted and a notice dated 8.6.1988 had  been sent  to the  respondent asking  for  his explanation. It  is wrong to infer mala fides because of the passing of  an order  of suspension.  While the Single Judge had mentioned about the order of suspension being passed and set-aside, the  appellants, in  this appeal,  have placed on record an  order dated  14.1.1991 passed  by this  Court  in Special Leave  Petition (c)  No. 14487 of 1990 filed against the order  dated 10.10.1990  of the  Bombay  High  Court  in favour  of  the  respondent  herein.  This  order  reads  as follows:      "Heard counsel for the parties.      We  find  that  the  respondent  is  now      facing a  trial in  respect  of  charges      under Section  5(2) read with 5(1)(a) of      the Act  II of 1947 and the charge sheet      was  submitted   on  8.2.1990.   He  had      earlier   been    suspended   and    the      suspension came  to terminate with lapse      of time. The present suspension has been      vacated  by   the  High   Court  with  a      direction that  the respondent should be      given a posting.      We are  of the  view  that  taking  into      account the  fact that the respondent is      already subjected  to a criminal charge,      the suspension  was not  unjustified and      the High Court should, in normal course,      not  have  interfered.  We  accordingly,      reverse the  order of the High Court and      hold that the suspension would revive.      We would, however, make it clear that in      case the  State of  Maharashtra is  in a      position  to   give  a  posting  to  the      respondent, not  connected  with  normal      police work  and  away  from  the  place      where the  trial takes  place, the  same      may be explored.      The   Special    Leave    Petition    is      accordingly, disposed of."      Therefore, the  aforesaid order  seems to  suggest that the first suspension order had lapsed and with regard to the second suspension  order, this  Court observed that the same should not have been interfered by the High Court and it was by order of this Court that the suspension of the respondent was revived.      On the  facts of  this case,  we are not satisfied that the appellant  had acted  in the mala fide manner and we are constrained to  observe that  the observations  made by  the High Court  with  regard  to  the  mala  fides  were  wholly unjustified and without any basis.      In fact,  the question of mala fides in a case like the present is  not at  all relevant.  If the complaint which is made is correct and an offence had been committed which will

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have to  be established  in a  court of  law, it  is  of  no consequence that  the  complainant  was  a  person  who  was enimical or  that he  was  guilty  of  mala  fides.  If  the ingredients which establish the commission of the offence or mis-conduct exist  then, the  prosecution cannot fail merely because there  was an  animus  of  the  complainant  or  the prosecution against  the accused.  Allegations of mala fides may  be  relevant  while  judging  the  correctness  of  the allegations or  while examining  the evidence.  But the mere fact that  the complainant is guilty of mala fides, would be no ground for quashing the prosecution. In the instant case, specific averments  of facts  have been  made whereby it was alleged that  the respondent  had  disproportionately  large assets. Mala  fide intention  of the  appellant in launching prosecution against the respondent with a view to punish him cannot be  a reason  for preventing  the court  of competent jurisdiction from  examining the  evidence which  may be led before it,  for coming  to the conclusion whether an offence had been  committed or  not. Allegations  of mala fides were also made in P.P.Sharma’s case (supra) against the informer. It was held by this Court that when an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala  fides   of  the   informant  would   be  of  secondary importance.  It   is  the   material  collected  during  the investigation and  evidence led  in court  which decides the fate of  the accused  person. The  allegations of mala fides against the  informant are  of no  consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings.      This Court  has consistently  taken the  view that  the Court should  not, except  in extra-ordinary  circumstances, exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. so as to quash the  prosecution  proceedings  after  they  have  been launched. In K.P.S. Gill’s case (supra), it was, inter alia, observed, that "we also give a note of caution to the effect that the  power of  quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very  sparingly and  with circumspection  and that too in  the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness  or otherwise  of the allegations made in the First Information  Report or  the  complaint  and  that  the extra-ordinary or  inherent power do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on  the Court  to act  according to its whim or caprice".      The position  of law,  in this  regard, has  been  very succinctly stated in the abovesaid case that at the stage of quashing an  First Information Report or complaint, the High Court is  not justified  in embarking  upon an enquiry as to the  probability,   reliability  or   genuineness   of   the allegations made  therein. This  is precisely  what has been done by  the learned  Judge in  the present  case. The First Information Report  having been  lodged, the  Government  of Maharashtra having  accorded sanction  and  thereafter,  the charge  having   been  filed,   there  was   absolutely   no justification for  the High Court to have stopped the normal procedure of  the trial being allowed to continue. It cannot be presumed  that there  was no application of mind when the First Information  Report was  prepared and  the sanction of the Government  obtained. The  allegations as  made  in  the First Information Report and the order granting sanction, if true,  would  clearly  establish  that  the  respondent  was rightly prosecuted  and was  guilty of criminal mis-conduct. The truthfulness of the allegations and the establishment of the guilt  can only  take  place  when  the  trial  proceeds without any interruption. There was no justification for the High Court  to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article

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227 of  the Constitution  and Section  482 of the Cr.P.C. in quashing the  prosecution. For  the abovesaid  reasons,  the appeals are  allowed and  the judgment  of the High Court is set-aside.