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PETITIONER: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MADHAVRAO DAMODAR PATILCHAND ORS.  ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/1968

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) SHAH, J.C. BACHAWAT, R.S. MITTER, G.K. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. HEGDE, K.S.

CITATION:  1968 AIR 1395            1968 SCR  (3) 712  CITATOR INFO :  E          1970 SC1972  (6)  RF         1972 SC 425  (16,33)  R          1972 SC2027  (51)  D          1972 SC2301  (33)  RF         1975 SC1193  (4)

ACT: Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 31B-Maharashtra Act 13  of 1962  amending  the  Maharashtra  State  Agricultural  Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act (27 of 1961)-1961 Act mentioned in Ninth  Schedule,  but  not  amending  Act-Amending  Act   it protected by Art. 31B-Seventeenth Amendment, if  valid-Entry 35,  of List II of Seventh Schedule-Scope  of--Order  passed under Defence of India Rules, r, 125B-If overrides s, 28  of the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961.

HEADNOTE: The   Maharashtra  State  Agricultural  Lands  (Ceiling   on Holdings)  Act,  1961,  as amended by Act 13  of  1962,  was passed for securing the distribution of agricultural land to subserve  the  common  good by imposing  a  ceiling  on  the holding  of  agricultural land.  Section 28 of the  Act  is, intrer alia, concerned with ensuring supply of sugarcane  to factories and ensuring that the persons to whom surplus land is  granted,  after it has vested in the  State  Government, also supply it at fair price.  The  Godavari  Sugar  Mills was a  public  limited  company owning two factories for the manufacture of sugar and allied products  and  held large areas of land for the  purpose  of cultivation  of sugarcane for its factories. in  proceedings under  the Act, large areas of land held by the  Mills  were declared surplus.  The validity of the Act was challenged on the following grounds : (1) Article 31B does not protect the Amending  Act  13 of 1962 from challenge on  the  ground  of violation  of  fundamental  rights, because,  in  the  Ninth Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the  Constitution (Seventeenth)  Amendment  Act, 1964,  only  the  Maharashtra

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Agricultural  Lands  (Ceiling on Holdings)  Act,  1961,  was included  and not the Amending Art of 1962, (2) in spite  of the decision of this Court in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, [1967]  2 S.C.R. 762, the Seventeenth Amendment is  invalid; (3)  The  State Legislature was not competent to  enact  the impugned Act; and (4) The order passed by the Stale  Govern- ment under r. 125B of the Defence of India Rules,  reserving certain areas for the factories mentioned by the schedule to the  order-one  of which was Mills-and prohibiting  (a)  the working  of  certain  power  crushers,  (b)  the  export  of sugarcane from the reserved areas except in accordance  with a  permit issued by the Collector, and (c) the  purchase  of sugarcane  for  crushing or for manufacture of gur,  gul  or jaggery by a khandsari unit or by a crusher not belonging to a  grower  or  body  of  growers  of  sugarcane  except   in accordance  with a permit issued by the Collector,  rendered ineffective s. 28 of the impugned Act. HELD  : (1) Even on a strict interpretation of Art. 31B  the only requirement laid down by the- Article for protecting an enactment  from  challenge  on the ground  of  violation  of fundamental  rights is that the Act should be  specified  in the Ninth Schedule.  Ordinarily, if an Act is referred to by its title, it means the Act with all the amendments made  in it  up to the date of reference, and there is no reason  for not  applying  this  rule of  interpretation  to  the  Ninth Schedule.   Certain amending Acts are, -no doubt,  mentioned in the Ninth Schedule, but the only reason for                             713 inserting  them  expressly  was that  some  States,  out  of abundant  caution,  recommended their amending  Acts  to  be specifically inserted in the Ninth Schedule. [719 D-E, F, H; 720 C-D] Observations  in  Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla  Banking  and Industrial Co.  Ltd., [1956] S.C.R. 603, 614, explained. (2)  The result arrived at in Golaknath’s case was that  the Seventeenth  Amendment was valid and this result is  binding on this Bench of this Court. [721 C] (3)  The  impugned  Act,  apart from s. 28, is  a  law  with respect to Entry 18 of List 11 which deals with ’Land  etc.’ and  Entry 42 of List III, which deals with Acquisition  and Requisition  of  Property.’ Section 28 itself  falls  within Entry  35  of  List II which deals with  ’Works,  lands  and buildings  vested in or in the possession of the State,’  as that section only deals with lands which have vested in  the State.   Therefore, the State Legislature was  competent  to pass the enactment. [721 F-G; 722 A-C] (4)  If an order made under the Defence of India Rules is in conflict  with the provisions of s. 28 of the impugned  Act, the order would override the section.  But the order  passed by  the  State Government, in the instant case, was  not  in conflict with the section and the two could stand  together. [7--2 G-H]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  2239  to 2250 of 1966. Appeals  from the judgment and order dated October 25,  1963 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Applications  Nos. 970,  884, 692, 963, 959 and 1124 to 1130 of 1963 and  Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated March 9, 10,  1965 of  the Bombay High Court in Special Civil  Application  No. 1642 of 1963.

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C.   K.  Daphtary, Attorney-General, M. S. K. Sastri and  S. P.Nayar,  for  the appellant (in C.A. Nos. 2239 to  2250  of 1966). F.   S.  Nariman, D. S. Nargolkar and K. R.  Chaudhuri,  for the respondents (in C.A. No. 2239 of 1966). R.   V.  S. Mani, for intervener No. 1 (in C.A. No. 2239  of 1966). D.   P.  Singh,  for intervener No. 2 (in C.A. No.  2239  of 1966). F.   S. Nariman, Bhuvanesh Kumari, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, D. M. Popat, S. I. Thakore and B. Parthasarathy, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967). C.   K. Daphtary, Attorney-General and S. P. Nayar, for res- pondents Nos.  1 to 3 (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967). S. K. Mehta, for the intervener (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967). 714 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J.-This judgment will dispose of Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967 and Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966. In September 1963, the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967  filed  a  petition  under Arts. 226  and  227  of  the Constitution (Special Civil Application No. 1642 of 1963) in the  High  Court  of Judicature at  Bombay  challenging  the validity   of  the  Maharashtra  State  Agricultural   Lands (Ceiling  on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act  XXVII  of 1961) as amended by Maharashtra Act XIII of 1962-hereinafter referred  to as the impugned Act.  The first appellant is  a public  limited  company  and owns  two  factories  for  the manufacture  of sugar and allied products situate at  Taluka Kopergaon   in   Ahmednagar  District  of   the   State   of Maharashtra.   The first appellant also held large areas  of land in several villages in Taluka Kopergaon for the purpose of  cultivation  of  sugarcane for its  factories.   In  the proceedings  under the impugned Act large areas held by  the first appellant were, declared surplus. Various  persons had earlier filed similar petitions in  the High  Court  challenging the validity of the  impugned  Act. The  High  Court  by its judgment dated  October  25,  1963, disposed of them.  The High Court held that "the Maharashtra Agricultural  Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Act, 1961,  is  a valid piece of legislation and within the competence of  the State Legislature to enact, except that the provisions of s. 28 thereof offend Art. 14 of the Constitution and are  void. The  effect of our decision however would not be to  entitle the  petitioners  to get any declaration  that  their  lands which are held by an industrial undertaking are exempt  from the  operation of the Act nor that the orders passed by  the first  respondent on the 28th of February 1963 are null  and void  and have no legal effect.  The lands will vest in  the State  but they will not be entitled to deal with the  lands under  any  of  the provisions of s. 28."  The  High  Court, subject  to the above declaration, dismissed the  petitions. The State having obtained certificates of fitness under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution filed appeals Nos.  CA  2239-2250 of 1966 against the above mentioned judgment. After  this  judgment, the Constitution was amended  by  the Constitution  (Seventeenth) Amendment Act,  1964-hereinafter referred  to  as the Seventeenth Amendment-which  came  into force  on  June 20, 1964.  This amendment included  44  more Acts,  as  items  21 to 64, in the  Ninth  Schedule  of  the Constitution.  Item 34 in the Schedule as amended reads "Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings)  Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961).                             715 The  petition  of the appellant in Civil Appeal No.  694  of

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1967  (Special  Civil  Application No.  1642  of  1963)  was dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated March  10, 1965.   The High Court held that the  Seventeenth  Amendment had  put  S.  28 and other provisions of  the  impugned  Act beyond challenge on -the ground that they were  inconsistent with  or take away or abridge any fundamental  rights.   The High Court also held that the impugned Act was not  rendered inoperative  because of the Defence of India Act, 1962,  and the Rules made thereunder. The appellants having obtained certificate of fitness  under Art. 133(1) (a) have appealed. Mr.  F. S. Nariman, who appears for the appellants in  Civil Appeal  No.  694 of 1967 and for the  respondents  in  Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966 submits the following  points before us               (1)   That  Art.  31B does  not  protect  from               challenge  on  the  ground  of  violation   of               fundamental  rights  the  provisions  of  Acts               amending  the Maharashtra  Agricultural  Lands               (Ceilings  on Holdings) Acts, 1961, as  origi-               nally enacted :               (2)   That the Seventeenth Amendment in  spite               of  the decision of this Court in I. C.  Golak               Nath v. State of Punjab(1) is invalid;               (3)   That  the  State  Legislature  was   not               competent  to enact the impugned Act in  sofar               as   it  affects  sugarcane  farms   held   by               Industrial  undertakings  and lands  on  which               sugarcane is grown; and               (4)   That  the  Defence of India Act  (LI  of               1962)  and the Rules made thereunder  override               or  render ineffective s. 28 of  the  impugned               Act.               In  order  to  appreciate  the  points  raised               before us it is necessary to notice the scheme               of  the impugned Act and set out the  relevant               provisions.               The preamble of the impugned Act gives broadly               the general purpose of the Act.  It reads :               "Whereas,  for  securing the  distribution  of               agricultural  land  as best  to  subserve  the               common  good,  it is expedient in  the  public               interest   to  impose  a  maximum  limit   (or               ceiling)  on the holding of agricultural  land               in  the State of Maharashtra; to  provide  for               the acquisition of land held in excess of  the               ceiling,  and for the distribution thereof  to               landless and other persons; and for               (1)   [1967] 2 S. C. R. 762.               716               matters connected with the purposes aforesaid;               it is hereby enacted The   provisions  of  the  impugned  Act  carry  out   these objectives by imposing a ceiling on holding of land (Chapter II)  and determination, declaration and vesting  of  surplus land  (Chapter  IV) Chapter V deals with  determination  and payment of compensation.  Chapter VI deals with distribution of  surplus land.  Chapter VII is concerned  with  procedure and  appeal,  and  in  Chapter  VIII  various  miscellaneous provisions  are made.  We may notice s. 21, s. 27 and s.  28 in  detail.  Under s. 21 the Collector makes  a  declaration stating  therein  his  decision, inter alia,  on  the  area, description  and  full  particulars of  the  land  which  is delimited  as surplus land.  Under sub-s. (2) the  Collector notifies this area, and under sub-s. (4) after a lapse of  a

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certain  time  the Collector takes possession  of  the  land which  is delimited as surplus.  The effect of thus  -taking possession,  in  brief, is that "the surplus land  shall  be deemed  to  be  acquired ’by the State  Government  for  the purposes of the Act and shall accordingly vest in the  State Government." Section 27 directs distribution of surplus land in  the order of priority set out in sub-ss. (2),  (3),  (4) and  (5).   For  instance, sub-s. (2) gives  priority  to  a tenant who was rendered landless because the person to  whom the  surplus land belonged had resumed land from his  tenant for personal cultivation under any tenancy law.  Sub-s.  (5) provides :               "(5)  Thereafter all surplus  land  (including               surplus land which has not been granted  under               sub-section (2) or (3) or (4) shall be offered               in the following order of priority, that is to               say,-               (i)   a  person  from whom any land  has  been               resumed   by   his   landlord   for   personal               cultivation  under any tenancy law and who  in               consequence   thereof   has   been    rendered               landless, provided that such person is a resi-               dent of the village in which the surplus  land               for  distribution is situate, or  within  five               miles thereof;               (i-a) serving members of the armed forces, and               ex-servicemen-               (i-b)  a  joint farming society or  a  farming               society, the members of which answer to any of               the following descriptions, namely :-               (i)   serving members of the armed forces,               (ii)  ex-servicemen,               (iii) agricultural labourers,               (iv)  landless persons, or               (v)   small holders;                                    717               Provided that the majority of members of  such               society  are  serving  members  of  the  armed               forces or ex-servicemen;               (ii)  a joint farming society, the members  of               which  answer  to  the  one  or  more  of  the               following descriptions, namely :-               agricultural labourer or               landless person or               small holder;               (iii) a farming society, the members of  which               answer  to  the one or more of  the  following               descriptions, namely               agricultural labourer or               landless person or               small holder-,".               Section  28  which is the  subject  matter  of               special attack provides               "28(1)  Where any land held by  an  industrial               undertaking is acquired by, and vests in,  the               State  Government under section 21, such  land               being  land  which  was  being  used  for  the               purpose of producing or providing raw material               for  the  manufacture  or  production  of  any               goods,   articles   or  commodities   by   the               undertaking,  the State Government shall  take               particular care to ensure that the acquisition               of  the  land does not  affect  adversely  the               production and supply of raw material from the               land to the undertaking.

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             (2)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               section  27, but subject to any rules made  in               this  behalf, for the purpose of  so  ensuring               the  continuance  of the supply  of  such  raw               material to the undertaking, and generally for               the  full  and efficient use of the  land  for               agriculture and its efficient management,  the               State Government-               (a)   may,  if  it is in the opinion  of  that               Government   necessary   for   ’the    purpose               aforesaid  (such  opinion being  formed  after               considering  the  representation  of   persons               interested therein) maintain the integrity  of               the  area so acquired, in one or more  compact               blocks; and               (b)   may,   subject   to   such   terms   and               conditions    (including    in     particular,               conditions which are calculated to ensure  the               full and continuous supply of raw material  to               the  undertaking, at a fair price), grant  the               land,               718               or  any  part  thereof,  to  a  joint  farming               society  (or a member thereof)  consisting  as               far as possible, of-               (i)   persons  who had previously leased  such               land to the undertaking,               (ii)  agricultural labour (if any) employed by               the undertaking on such land,               (iii) technical or other staff engaged by  the               undertaking  on such land, or in  relation  to               the production of any raw material,               (iv)  adjoining  landholders  who  are   small               holders,               (v)   landless persons               Provided that, the State Government may- (a)  for  such period as is necessary for the setting up  of joint  farming societies as aforesaid, being not  more  than three  years in the first instance (extensible to a  further period  not  exceeding two years) from the  date  of  taking possession  of the land, direct that the land  acquired,  or any  part thereof, shall be cultivated by one or more  farms run or managed by the State, or by one or more  corporations (including a company) owned or controlled by the State; (b)  grant  to  the  landlord so much of  the  surplus  land leased  by him to the undertaking, which together  with  any other land held by him does not exceed the ceiling area (but if  the landlord be a public trust and and-major portion  of the income from the land is being appropriated for  purposes of education or medical relief, grant the entire land to the public trust) on condition that the landlord, or as the case may  be,  the  public  trust lease the land  to  a  farm  or corporation   described   in  clause  (a)   aforesaid,   and thereafter,  in the case of a landlord (not ’being a  public trust)  that  he  becomes  a member  of  the  joint  farming society,  and in the case of a public trust, that  it  lease the land to a joint farming society.               (3)   The State Government may provide that,-               (a)   for the breach of any term or  condition               referred to in clause (b) of sub-section  (2),               or               (b)   if  the  landlord to whom  the  land  is               granted fails to lease the land to the farm or               corporation  or to become a member of a  joint               farming society; or

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             (c)   if it considers after such inquiry as it               thinks fit, that the production and supply  of               raw material to                                    719               the undertaking is not maintained at the level               or  in  the  manner  which,  with  proper  and               efficient   management   it   ought   to    be               maintained, or               (d)for  any other reason it is undesirable  in               the   interest  of  the  full  and   efficient               cultivation  of  the  land,  that  the   joint               farming  society should continue to  cultivate               the land,               the  grant shall, after giving  three  months’               notice of termination thereof and after giving               the  other  party  reasonable  opportunity  of               showing  cause,  be terminated, and  the  land               resumed.  Thereafter, the State Government may               make such other arrangements as it thinks  fit               for  the  proper cultivation of the  land  and               maintenance  of the production and  supply  of               raw material to the undertaking." Regarding the first point raised by the learned counsel  for the appellant, it seems to us that the High Court was  right in holding that Art. 31B does protect the impugned Act  from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental  rights. There  is  no  doubt that Art.  31B  should  be  interpreted strictly.   But  even  interpreting it  strictly,  the  only requirement which is laid down by Art. 3 1 B is that the Act should be specified in the Ninth Schedule.  Now the question arises  whether the impugned Act has been specified  in  the Ninth Schedule or not.  It is true that what is mentioned in entry 34 of the Ninth Schedule is "The Maharashtra  Agricul- tural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII  of 1961)" which may be referred to as  the  Principal Act,  and  no mention is made of the Amending  Act,  namely, Maharashtra  Act  XIII  of 1962.  Ordinarily if  an  Act  is referred  to by its title, it is intended to refer  to  that Act  with  all the amendments made in it upto  the  date  of reference.   For  instance, the Constitution refers  to  the General  Clauses  Act,  1897, in  Art.  367.   This  Article provides  that "unless the context otherwise  requires,  the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and  modifications  that may be made therein  under  Article 372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the  Legislature of the Dominion of India." If the contention of the  learned counsel for the appellant is accepted it would mean that for the  purposes of the interpretation of the Constitution  the General  Clauses Act, as origiually enacted in  1897,  would alone  be taken into consideration. :We can  hardly  imagine that  this  was the intention of  the  Constitution  makers. Further,  when one refers to the Code of Civil Procedure  or the  Criminal  Procedure Code or the Indian Penal  Code  one ordinarily  means  to refer to them as amended up  to  date. There is no reason why this ordinary manner of referring  to Acts 720 should  not  be borne in mind while interpreting  the  Ninth Schedule. It  is  true that some amending Acts are  mentioned  in  the Ninth Schedule apart from the principal Acts.  For  example, the  Madras Estate (Abolition and Conversion into  Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras Act XXVI of 1948) is mentioned in item  9, while  the  Madras Estates (Abolition  and  Conversion  into

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Ryotwari)  Amendment  Act, 1950 (Madras Act 1  of  1950)  is mentioned in item 10.  Further item 20 specifically mentions the  West  Bengal Land Development and  Planning  Act,  1948 (West Bengal Act XXI of 1948), as amended by West Bengal Act XXIX of 1951.  But then there are many other Acts which  had been  amended  before  they  were  inserted  in  the   Ninth Schedule, and we can hardly imagine that Parliament intended only to protect  the Acts a,% originally passed and not  the amendments made up to the date of their incorporation  in-to the  Ninth Schedule.  The reason for this express  insertion of  certain amending Acts seems to be that some States,  out of abundant caution, recommended that their amending Acts be specifically  inserted  in the Ninth Schedule.  It  is  true that   for  some  purposes  an  amending  Act  retains   its individuality,  a-, observed by Jagannadhadas, J.,  in  Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd.(2) :               "In  the  present case what we  are  concerned               with  is  not the meaning  of  any  particular               phrase  or  provision  of the  Act  after  the               amendment  but  the  effect  of  the  amending               provisions in their relation to and effect  on               other  statutory provisions outside  the  Act.               For  such  a  purpose  the  amendment   cannot               obviously  be treated as having been  part  of               the  original Act itself so as to  enable  the               doctrine to be called in aid that a later  Act               overrides an earlier Act." These  observations, however, do not lead to the  conclusion that  when  an  Act is referred to by its title  it  is  not intended to include the amendments made in it. Accordingly  we must overrule the first submission  made  by the learned counsel for the appellant and hold that Art. 31B protects  the impugned Act including the amendments made  in it  upto  ’the  date of its  incorporation  into  the  Ninth Schedule.  The impugned Act cannot, therefore, be challenged on  the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31  of  the Constitution.   We,  accordingly agree with the  High  Court that  s. 28 which was originally’ held by the High Court  to violate  Art. 14 of the Constitution is now protected  under Art.  31B from attack on the ground that it  infringes  Art. 14. (1)  (19561 S. C. R. 603, 614.                             721 Coming to the second point, the learned counsel merely  men- tions the point.  He says that there was no majority for any particular  ratio  as  five  Judges  held  the   Seventeenth Amendment  to be ,Void because it contravened Art.  13  (2), but  by  applying the doctrine of  "prospective  overruling" they  declared  that their decision would  not  affect  ’the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment.  Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, on the other hand did not apply the doctrine of "prospective   overruling",  but  held  S.  3  (2)  of   the Seventeenth Amendment to be bad.  The other five Judges held that the Seventeenth Amendment was a valid amendment of  the Constitution.  We are, however, bound by the result  arrived at  by this Court in that decision and the result  that  the Seventeenth  Amendment  is valid is binding on us.   We  may mention that Mr. Mani, appearing for one of the interveners, also  raised this point but ultimately asked for  permission to be allowed to withdraw the point. Coming  to  the  third point, the learned  counsel  for  the appellant contends that S. 28 is a law with respect to entry 52  of  List 1, and therefore beyond the competence  of  the State Legislature.  The entry reads thus : "52.   Industries,  the  control of which by  the  Union  is

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declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the  public interest." He  points out that one of the industries specified  in  the Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951  (LXV  of  1951) is "sugar".  He says  that  the  whole object  of  S. 28 of the impugned Act with regard  to  lands held by industrial undertakings who were producing sugarcane was to ensure the production of sugarcane and its supply  to the  sugar factories and this object falls  squarely  within entry 52, List 1. In the alternative he urges that the State Legislature  had  no  authority to  legislate  adversely  on matters falling within item 52.  There is no doubt that  the impugned  Act,  apart from S. 28, is a law with  respect  to entry 18 of List 11 and entry 42 of List III.  These entries read as follows :               "Entry 18, List 11               Land, that is to say, rights in or over  land,               land   tenures  including  the   relation   of               landlord  and  tenant, and the  collection  of               rents, transfer and alienation of agricultural               land, land improvement and agricultural loans;               colonization.               Entry 42, List III               Acquisition and Requisition of property."               It  is not seriously disputed that apart  from               s.  28 the rest of impugned Act is a law  with               respect  to entry 18, List.I and II  entry  42               List 111. 722 It  is  not  necessary  to consider whether  S.  28  can  be sustained  -on  the  ground  that  it  is  an  ancillary  or subsidiary matter to the law made under entry 18 List II and entry 42, List In, for, in our -opinion, s. 28 falls  within entry 35 list II, which reads : "Works,  lands and buildings vested in or in the  possession of the State." It  will be noticed that s. 28 only deals with  lands  which have  vested in the State.  There cannot be any  doubt  that the  State  Legislature  is competent  to  enact  provisions regarding  the production and supply of raw  materials  from land  which  has vested in ,the State and for the  full  and efficient use of such land and its ,efficient management. Coming  now to the last point, the learned counsel  for  the ,appellants  urges  that  by  virtue  of  Art.  251  of  the Constitution  s.  28  can no longer be effective  as  it  is repugnant  to the Defence -of India Act and the  Rules  made thereunder.  He says that under S. 3 (2) (26) of the Defence of  India  Act, 1962, the Central Government is  enabled  to make  orders  providing  for  "the  control  of  agriculture (including  the cultivation of agricultural land and  ,crops to be raised therein) for the purpose of increasing the pro- duction  and  supply  of  foodgrains  and  other   essential agricultural  products." By notification dated  October  30, 1963, the Government of Maharashtra made an order whereby it "reserved  each of the areas specified in column (3) of  the Schedule   hereto  annexed  for  the  factory   respectively specified against it in column (2) thereof", and made  other provisions regarding the purchase and -export of  sugarcane. In the Schedule the following areas were made reserved areas for the appellant, the Godavari Sugar Mills -Limited :               "Areas  comprised  within the  limits  of  the               following talukas.               (i)   Kopergaon of Ahmednagar District.               (ii)  Shrirampur of Ahmedabad District." This order was made by the Government of Maharashtra in  the

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exercise  of  its powers under r. 125-B of  the  Defence  of India Rules. The learned counsel is right that to the extent valid orders made  under  the Defence of India Rules  conflict  with  the provisions in s. 28, the orders would override s. 28 of  the impugned  Act.   But  it has not been shown  to  us  on  the material  available  here how the order  dated  October  30, 1963, is in conflict with s. 28.  The order ’first  reserves certain  areas for the factories mentioned in the  Schedule, and then prohibits the working of certain power crushers and :also  prohibits the export of sugarcane from  the  reserved areas                             723 except  in accordance with a permit issued by the  Collector of  the  District.   It further prohibits  the  purchase  of sugarcane  for  crushing or for manufacture of gur,  gul  or jaggery by a khandsari unit or by a crusher not belonging to a grower or body of growers of sugarcane except under and in accordance with a permit issued by. the Collector.   Section 28,  inter  alia, is concerned with ensuring the  supply  of sugarcane to the factories and ensuring that the-persons  to whom  the land is granted also supply it at fair price.   It seems to us that the provisions of S. 28 can stand  together with the order dated October 30, 1963.  In our opinion there is no force in the point raised by the learned counsel. In the result Civil Appeal No. 694 0 19 7 is dismissed.  The other  appeals  (Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of  1966)  are allowed, judgment of the High Court, insofar as it  declared s.  28 void, set aside and the petitions out of which  these appeals arose dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs in all the appeals. V.P.S. C.A. No. 694 of 1967 dismissed other appeals allowed. 724