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PETITIONER: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MRS. KAMAL SUKUMAR DURGULE AND ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/11/1984

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA TULZAPURKAR, V.D. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) VARADARAJAN, A. (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR  119            1985 SCR  (2) 129  1985 SCC  (1) 234        1984 SCALE  (2)793

ACT:      Constitution of India, 1950:      (i) Articles  14, 19  (1) (f)  and 31-Act  passed by  a State Legislature-No  guideline for  exercise of  discretion provided-Neither proper  classification  nor  provision  for notice to affected persons made-Constitutional validity of.      (ii) Entries  18, 64  and 65  of List  II-Whether State Legislature competent  to pass  the Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition  of   Unauthorised   occupation   and   Summary Eviction) Act, 1975.      Maharashtra Vacant  Lands (Prohibition  of Unauthorised occupation and  Summary Eviction)  Act 1975, ss. 2(f), 3, 4, 4A, 4B  read with  Maharashtra Vacant  Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorised occupation  &  Summary  Eviction)  (Service  of Notice)  Rules   1975-Constitutional   validity   of-Whether guidelines   for    exercise   of    discretion   &   Proper classification and  provision  notice  to  affected  persons provided in  the  Act-Rules  framed  subsequently  regarding provision of  notice to  affected persons-Whether  cures the unconstitutionality of the Act.

HEADNOTE:      The   Maharashtra.   Vacant   Lands   (Prohibition   of Unauthorised occupation  and Summary  Eviction) Act, LXVI of 1975 passed  by the  State of Maharashtra was amended twice- first by  Act No  XXXVII of 1976 and later by Act No. VlI of 1977. Section  2 (f) as amended retrospectively by the First Amendment Act  divides "Vacant  land" into  four categories: (1) lands  which are  in fact  vacant, that  is to  say, not built upon;  (V lands  on which  structures have been or are being constructed  otherwise than in accordance with any law regulating the construction of such structures and which the Competent Authority  may specify  and declare  to be  vacant lands by announcing by beat of drum or other suitable means; (3) lands  specified in  the Schedule  to the  Act, and  (4) lands included in the Schedule by the State Government by an order amending  the Schedule.  Section 3  provides  that  no person shall  occupy or enact any shelter enclosure or other structure on  such land  for the  purposes of  residence  or

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otherwise without  the express  permission of  the Municipal Corporation and  also prohibits  any person  to collect from the occupier of such vacant land any amount by way 130 of rent  or compensation  in relation  to  the  unauthorised occupation  of  such  vacant  land  while  it  empowers  the government to  collect or  receive from the occupier of such vacant land  such reasonable  amount by way of penal charges as may be determined till such time as the structure erected in contravention  of the  provisions of  s.3 is removed from the land.  Section 4  empowers the  government  to  evict  a person occupying  any  vacant  land  in  an  urban  area  in contravention of  the provisions  of s.  3. Section 4A deals with permission for renovation of structures on vacant lands as a  temporary measure in certain circumstances. Section 4B lays down mode of recovery of dues of financial institutions which render assistance for renovation of structures.      The respondents  were owners  of some  plots of land in Bombay.  The   plots  were   assessed  to   non-agricultural assessment and  to Property  tax  by  the  Bombay  Municipal Corporation The  respondents had  constructed buildings of a Permanent nature on the plots and the same had been provided with essential  civic amenities  like water and electricity. The appellants-State  Government &  Municipal Corporation of Bombay called upon the respondents to demolish the buildings since they were constructed without the requisite permission of  the   Bombay  Municipal  Corporation.  The  respondent’s request to  regularize, the  unauthorised  construction  was also rejected  because  the  Government  was  considering  a proposal for acquisition of the said land for the purpose of an industrial  estate. The  respondents then  approached the Special Land Acquisition officer requesting that the land be released from  acquisition.  The  Land  Acquisition  officer informed the  respondents that  the said  plots of  land had been released  from  acquisition  by  a  notification  dated September 14,  1964. But,  later on,  the said plots of land were declared by the Competent Authority as "vacant land" in exercise of  the powers  conferred upon  it by Section 2 (f) (b)  of   the  Maharashtra   Vacant  Lands  (Prohibition  of Unauthorised occupation  and Summary  Eviction) Act  LXVI of 1975.      The respondents  challenged before  the High  Court the constitutional validity  of the  Act  and  the  legality  of orders passed  thereunder The High Court declared the Act as violative of  the provisions of the Constitution and allowed their writ petitions      In the  appeals to this Court, the appellants contended that the  infirmity, if  any, from which the Act suffered in its  inception   has  been  cured  by  the  passing  of  the Maharashtra  Vacant   Lands  (Prohibition   of  Unauthorised occupation and  Summary Eviction) (Service of Notice) Rules, 1979 in  as much  as the  affected person  is given a notice before passing  an order  under section  2 (f)  (b) or under section 4(1)  of the Act and that the Competent Authority is further required  to consider any objections submitted to it by the  affected person. On behalf of the respondents it was argued (1)  that at  the Act violates the fundamental rights conferred upon  them by  Art. 14.  19(1)(f) and  51  of  the Constitution; (11)  that the  State Legislature  lacked  the Legislative competence  to pass  the Act  and (III) that the Act  delegated  excessive  and  uncanalised  powers  to  the Executive to pass orders. 131      Dismissing the appeals, ^

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    HELD: 1.1  It is  evident that the expression ’land’ in Section 2  (f) of  the Act  means plots of land with defined boundaries which  are generally  recognized for  revenue and survey purposes.  Section 2  (f) (b) requires two conditions to be  satisfied in  order that a land can be described as a vacant land;  Firstly,  there  has  to  be  an  unauthorised structure on  the land and secondly, the Competent Authority has, by  an order  in writing,  to specify  and declare that land to be a vacant land [143 D.E]      1.2 Section 2 (f) (b) suffers from the vice in that, it treats all  persons  alike  irrespective  of  how  they  are situated  in   the  matter   of  their  involvement  in  the construction of  unauthorised structures  and their interest therein. Classification requires division into classes which are marked  by common  characteristics. Such division has to be founded upon a rational basis and it must be directing at subserving the  purposes of the statue.Section 2 (f) (b) and the other  cognate provisions of the Act make no distinction at all  between owners  of the  lands  who  have  themselves constructed unauthorised  structures  and  those  others  on whose lands unauthorised structures have been constructed by trespassers The  latter  class  of  owners  who  are  silent spectators to  the forcible and lawless deprivation of their title to their property have been put by the Act on par with trespassers who,  taking law  into their own hands, defy not merely private owners but public authorities. [146 G-H; 1 47 A]      1.3. Section 2(f) (b), also, suffers from the infirmity of according  equal treatment  to unequals.  Take  a  simple example: A  plot of  land may be vacant in the true sense of the term, that is to say, wholly unbuilt upon. Another, plot of land  may  have  a  small  structure  built  upon  it  in accordance with  the Municipal  rules and  regulations.  The first plot  of land  attracts drastic  provisions of the Act merely by  reason of  the fact  that nothing  has been built upon it  at all,  while the  second plot of land is entirely outside the  scope of  the Act for the reason that some tiny structure is standing thereon. Such a classification betrays lack of rationale [147 B-C]      2.1. The  Act confers  upon the Competent Authority the discretion to declare a land as a vacant land without laying down any  guidelines to  control that  discretion. Competent Authority has  the freedom to pick and choose lands on which there are  unauthorised structures  and declare some of them as vacant  lands and  leave other  lands similarly  situated untouched. [143 E]      2.2. The  Act does  not also  provide for any safeguard against the  arbitrary exercise  of the discretion conferred upon the  Competent Authority  to declare a land as a vacant land. It  does not contain any provision whatsoever which is directed at ensuring the public health and sanitation or the peaceful life  of the  inhabitants of the concerned locality Indeed, nothing is farther removed from the true purpose and object of  the Act  than these considerations. The last item in the  Schedule to  the A.t  includes all  public roads and highways  in   Greater  Bombay.  These,  surely,  cannot  be regarded as  constituting a  grave danger  to public health, sanitation or  peaceful life  of the  citizens. It  is clear from the Statement of objects and Reasons that 132 the evil  which was  sought to be remedied by the ordinance, which was  later replaced  by the  Act, was  not  danger  to public health  or sanitation  or to the peaceful life of the inhabitants of  the Metropolis  of Bombay,  but, the  danger posed by the construction of unauthorised structures, is the

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evil which  the Act seeks to remedy. [144 H; 143 H; 144 A-B; G]      2.3. The Act does not prescribe any procedure which the Competent Authority  is required to adopt before declaring a land as  vacant land.  There is  no  provision  in  the  Act requiring  the  Competent  Authority  to  observe  even  the rudimentary norms  of  natural  justice  before  making  the statutory declaration.  The Authority is not obliged to give notice to  anyone and  it need  not hear  any person  who is likely  to   be  affected  by  the  declaration.  The  State Government too,  is under  no obligation  to follow  any set procedure prior  to amending  the Schedule  so as to include new lands  therein. The power conferred by Sections 3(1) and 4(1) of  the Act  is similarly  uncontrolled and  arbitrary. [145 B-Dl      2.4. In  the instant  case,  massive  encroachments  on private properties  have led  to the  virtual deprivation of the title  of rightful  owners of  those properties  The Act penalises such  owners for no fault of theirs and, that too, without giving  them an  opportunity to  be heared. The fact that the  power to  make the requisite declaration under the Act is  vested in  officers of  the higher echelons makes no difference to  this position  and is not a palliative to the prejudice which is inherent in the situation. [145 F-G]      3.1. It  is impossible  to understand the scheme of the Schedule to the Act or to discover any rational basis behind it ii  difficult to understand as to why certain lands which are under  acquisition for  the purposes  of the Maharashtra Housing Board  and Bombay  municipal Corporation  have  been included in  the Schedule and other lands similarly situated have not  been so  included  Some  of  the  entries  in  the Schedule show  that unauthorised  structures could  not have been possibly  constructed on the lands mentioned therein By and large,  the Schedule is divorced from the true object of the Act . [147 E-F]      3.2. No  criterion or standard is laid down in order to enable the  State Government  to determine objectively as to which lands  can be  added to the Schedule. The power to add to the  Schedule is  in the  nature or  a legislative  power which, in  the very  nature of  things cannot  stipulate for service of  notice to the persons affected by the amendment. This  power  of  amendment  of  the  Schedule  is  not  even conditioned by the fact that the lands added to the Schedule must have  unauthorised  structures  standing  thereon.  The State a  Government is  free to pick and choose any land and put  it   in  the   Schedule  This  kind  of  conferment  of uncanalised discretion is strawn all over the Act. [147 G-H; 148 A]      3.3. It  is therefore  clear  that  each  part  of  the definition of  ’vacant land’  in section  2(f) of the Act is violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. The Act had to satisfy the requirements of Art.  19   (1)  (f)  so  long  as  it  was  a  part  of  the Constitution. [148 B-C] 133      (4) It  may be noted that until the Competent Authority passes an  A  order  under  section  4(l)  calling  upon  an occupier  to   vacate  a  land,  even  a  trespasser  or  an unauthorised occupier  can continue  to be  in possession of the eland.  lf he  is granted  permission to occupy the land under section  3(1), he  cannot be  evicted at  all, for the simple reason  that the order of eviction under section 4(1) can be  passed only  if a  person is in occupation of a land contrary to  the provisions  of section 3. Even the eviction of a  trespasser from  the land  can afford no solace to its

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rightful  owner   because,  the   Act  doesn’t  contain  any provision whereby  the land  can be returned to him after it is freed from unauthorised occupational If the owner himself has erected  an unauthorised  structure, the  Act  does  not provide as  to what  is to  happen to  the land  after he is evicted therefrom [148 D-F]      (5) The  Statement of  objects and Reasons of the First Amendment Act  shows that  the provision for levying penalty was introduced into the Act in order that occupants of lands on which  there were  unauthorised structures  and, who  are allowed to  continue in  possession of the structures do not continue to occupy those lands without payment of any amount at all  to public  authorities. It  appears that  even after forfeiting the  structures consequent  upon the  passions of ;U1 order  under section 4(l), the State government has been recovering  compensation  from  unauthorised  occupants.  It seems  quite  incongruous  that  while  the  true  owner  is prevented from  taking legal  proceeding to recover any rent or compensation  from persons  who had  trespassed upon  his land, the  State Government  can recover  penal charges from the trespassers.  Moreover, the  Statement  of  objects  and Reasons  of   the  Second   Amendment  Act  shows  that  the Government  had   carried  out   substantial   environmental improvements on  vacant lands and had sponsored a scheme for building semi-permanent  houses thereon.  They  intended  to give to  the occupants of such structures security of tenure subject only  to the  condition of regular repayment by them of the  loans given  by the financial institutions. The true owners of  lands are  totally  ignored  in  this  scheme  of things, even  if they  are victims  and not  the authors  of unauthorised constructions. [14811; 149A-B; F-G]      (6) The  unconstitutionality of the Act cannot be cured by the  framing of  the Rules  made three  and a  half years after the  Act was  passed. Besides,  the Rules only provide for a  notice to  be given  and objections  to be considered before the  passing of an order under sections 2 (f) (b) and 4(l). They do not make a similar provision before permission is granted  or refused  under section  3(1) of the Act. But, even, the  Rules do  not lay  down any  guidelines  for  the exercise of  the discretition  which is  conferred upon  the Competent Authority  by section  2(f) (b) or section 4(1) of the Act. [146E-F]      (7) The  Act does  not violate  the provisions  of Art. 31(1) of  the Constitution  as it  then stood.  It does  not provide for  transfer of  ownership of  vacant lands  to the State or  to a corporation owned or controlled by the State; nor does  it vest  in the  State the  right of  the owner or occupier of vacant lands to recover rent or compensation for use and occupation of such lands. [150A-B]      (8) The Act does not amount to a measure of requisition and is not 134 bad for  the reason that it provides for requisition without payment of compensation. It is straining the language of the Act to  hold  that  it  provides,  directly  or  indirectly, requisition of  private property  the Act  does not transfer the right  to possession  of vacant  lands to the State, its agents or  its instrumentalities. Therefore the Act does not offend against  the  provisions  of  Article  31(2)  of  the Constitution as  it then  stood Since  that Article  is  not attracted, no  question can  arise of  the invalidity of the Act on  the ground  mentioned in  Article 31(5), namely that the Act had not received the assent of the President. [150C- D]      (9) In so far as the question of legislative competence

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is concerned,  the High  Court was right in holding that the State Legislature  had the  competence to pass the Act under Entries 18, 64 and 65 of List 11 [150C-D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal Nos.  386, 529 & 532 of l98O.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  the 8th  February, 198() of  the Bombay  High Court  in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 1340 of 1977, 141 of 1977 and 1535 of 1976.      IN C.A. 386 OF 1980.      Dr. L.M. Singhvi, O.P. Rana, R.P. Vyas, M.N. Shroff and Abhishek Manu Singhvi for the Appellant.      K.K.  Singhvi,   Anil  Gupta   and  Brij  Bhushan,  for Respondent.      lN CIVIL APPEAL No. 529 AND 532 OF l98O.      Harish Salve,  J.B. Dadachanji  and D.N. Mishra for the Appellants in C.A. 529.      S.B. Bhasme,  S.S. Khanduja  and A.K.  Galati  for  the Respondent in C.A. 529 of 1980.      Y.H. Mocdala  B.P.  Singh  and  Ranjit  Kumar  for  the Respondent in CA. 532 of l98O.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHANDRACHUD,  C.J.   These  appeals  by  the  State  of Maharashtra arise  out of  a judgment dated February 8, 1980 of the  High Court  of Bombay  in a  group of writ petitions which were  filed under  Article 226 of the Constitution. By those writ  petitions, the  petitioners, who are respondents herein, challenged  the validity  of the  Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition  of Unauthorised  occupation and  Summary Eviction) Act,  LXVl of  1975 and  the legality  of  certain orders passed thereunder. We will refer to the aforesaid 135 Act as "the Act". The Act replaced an ordinance, bearing a A similar title,  which was  promulgated by  the  Governor  of Maharashtra on November 11, 1975. The Act was amended twice, first by  Act No.  XXXVII of 1976 and then by Act No. VII of 1977. We  will refer  to these  two these  two Acts  as ’the First Amendment Act’ and the ’Second Amendment Act’.      Several writ  petitions were  filed in  the Bombay High Court to  challenge the  validity of  the Act and the orders passed under  it,  the  facts  being  broadly  or  the  same pattern.  In   order  to   understand  the   nature  of  the controversy in these appeals, it would be sufficient for our purpose to  set out  the facts  in one  of those  petitions, namely Writ  Petition No.  1340 of  1977. The petitioners in that petition are the owners of a plot of land which is part of survey  No. 154, Bandra, Greater Bombay admeasuring about 1100 square  meters. Though  the  petitioners  had  obtained possession of the plot in about . 1964 under an agreement of sale, they  became owners thereof under an agreement of sale dated September  20, 1974.  The plot  is  assessed  to  non- agricultural assessment  and to  property tax  by the Bombay Municipal Corporation.  There are  four chawls consisting of 31 one-room  tenements and  a two-storeyed  building  having four rooms  on each  floor on the plot. These buildings were constructed by  the petitioners  between 1964  and 1970. The two-storeyed  structure   is  in   the  occupation   of  the petitioners while  the one-room  tenements have been let out by  them.  These  structures  having  been  put  up  by  the petitioners without  the requisite  permission,  the  Bombay Municipal Corporation  called up  them to demolish the same. Thereupon, the  owners of various plots of land comprised in

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Survery No.  154 formed  an Association  through, which they requested  the   Standing  Committee   of  Bombay  Municipal Corporation to regularise the constructions. The Association was, however, informed that its request could not be granted because, the  Government was  considering a proposal for the acquisition of  the land  for the  purpose of  an industrial estate. The  Association then  approached the  Special  Land Acquisition officer  requesting that  the land  be  released from acquisition.  The Land Acquisition officer informed the Association that  Survey  No  154  had  been  released  from acquisition by a notification dated September 14, 1964.      It would appear from the contentions of the petitioners in the  aforesaid writ  petition that  there  are  two  main tarred roads,  two tarred  by-lanes, two  Municipal  Primary Schools,one High School 136 and one  Municipal dispensary  in the area comprised in Plot No. 154.  Besides, the  head office  of the Central Consumer Co-operative  Society   is  also  situated  in  one  of  the buildings situated  on that  plot  of  land.  The  structure standing on  the plot  are alleged  to  be  of  a  permanent nature. In  any event, it seems clear that they are provided with essential  civic amenities  like water and electricity. The land  belonging to  the petitioners  was declared by the Competent Authority  as "Vacant  Land" in  exercise  of  the powers conferred upon it by section 2 (f) (b) of the Act.      The constitutionality  of the Act was challenged by the respondents on  the ground  that it violates the fundamental rights conferred  upon them by Articles 14, 19(1) (f) and 51 of  the   Constitution,  that  the  Legislature  lacked  the legislative competence  to pass  the Act  and that,  the Act delegated excessive  and uncanalised powers to the Executive to pass orders under its provisions.      The long  title of  the Act shows that it was passed in order to prohibit unauthorised occupation of vacant lands in urban areas  in the  State of Maharashtra and to provide for summary eviction  of persons from such lands and for matters connected therewith.  According to  the preamble of the Act, it had become necessary to take certain measures because the number of  unauthorised occupants  on vacant  lands in urban areas was increasing rapidly and was causing grave danger to public health and sanitation and to the peaceful life of the inhabitants of these areas.      The  Act   was  applicable   to  the  entire  State  of Maharashtra but,  in the first instance, it was brought into force in the Bombay Metropolitan Region on November 11, 1975 which was  the date  on which the ordinance was promulgated. The Act  confers power  on the State Government to bring its provisions into  force in  such other  urban areas as may be specified by a notification. Later, the Act was brought into force in  the urban areas of Solapur, Aurangabad, Nagpur and Kolhapur.      Sections 3  and 4  of the Act around which a large part of the argument revolves read thus:      "3. Prohibition against unauthorised Occupation of vacant land.         (1) No person shall, on or after the appointed date,      occupy any vacant land or continue in occupation of any      vacant land 137      in any  urban area or erect any shelter or enclosure or      other A  structure on  such land  for the  purposes  of      residence or  otherwise without  the express permission      in  writing   of  the  Municipal    commissioner  in  a      corporation area,  of the  Chief officer in a municipal

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    area and  elsewhere, of  the Collector,  or  except  in      accordance with  any law for the time being in force in      such urban area.           (2) No person shall on or after the appointed date      abet any  person in  occupying any  vacant land  or  in      continuing to occupy such land in any urban area, or in      erecting any  shelter, enclosure  or other structure on      such land for the purposes of residence or otherwise in      contravention of  the provisions of sub-section (1), or      shall receive  or collect  from the  occupier  of  such      vacant  land   any  amount   whether  by  way  of  rent      compensation  or  otherwise  or  shall  in  any  manner      whatsoever operate  in  relation  to  the  unauthorised      occupation of such vacant land.        Provided that, the State Government or any officer or      authority specified  by it in this behalf, shall have a      right to  receive or  collect from the occupier of such      vacant land  such reasonable  amount by  way  of  penal      charges as  may be  determined, by  general or  special      order, by  the State  Government, till such time as the      structure erected in contravention of the provisions of      sub-section (1)  is removed  from the  land. Payment of      any such  amount shall  not create  or  confer  on  the      unauthorised occupant  any right  of occupation of such      land or  structure. Such  amount if  not paid on demand      shall be  recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. The      amount so  collected shall,  as  far  as  possible,  be      utilised for  purposes  connected  with  the  eviction,      rehabilitation  and   improvement  of   conditions   of      unauthorised occupants of vacant lands." "4. Power  of Competent  Authority  to  evict  persons  from unauthorised occupation of vacant lands.        (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for      time being in force, if the Competent Authority, either      on application  or suo motu, has reason to believe that      any person  is occupying  any vacant  land in  an urban      area in  contravention of  the provisions of section 3,      it may by 138      order require  such person to vacate the land forthwith      or by  certain time  intimated to  such person,  and to      remove all property therefrom, and if such person fails      to comply  with the  order to  vacate the  land and  to      remove all  property therefrom,  he  may  be  similarly      evicted from  such land by the Competent Authority, and      any property  which may be found thereon may be ordered      by the  Competent Authority  to be  forfeited  to  such      authority as State Government may by general or special      order specify  and be removed from the vacant land. For      the purposes  of  eviction  and  removal  of  any  such      property, the Competent Authority may take, or cause to      be taken  such steps and use, or cause to be used, such      force, and  may take  such  assistance  of  the  Police      officers as the circumstance of the case may require.      Explanation-For the  avoidance of  doubt, it  is hereby      declared that  the power  to take steps under this sub-      section includes  the power  to enter  upon any land or      other property whatsoever.         (2) The  order of  eviction of  any person  from any      vacant land  or forfeiture  of any  property therein or      any property  therefrom under  sub-section (1) shall be      final and  conclusive,  and  shall  not  be  called  in      question in any Court.         (3) A  person who  is found to be on any vacant land      belonging to,  or vesting  in,  another  person  shall,

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    unless  the   contrary  is   proved  by   him  to   the      satisfaction of  the Competent  Authority, be deemed to      be in  occupation of  such vacant land in contravention      of the provisions of section 3."      Sections 4-A, 4-B and 4-C were inserted into the Act by the Second Amendment Act. Those sections read thus:-       "4-A. Permission for renovation of structure on vacant lands a temporary measure in certain circumstances.         (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 3      and 4,  where any  occupier of  a structure on a vacant      land, in  respect of  which penal charges are collected      from hi under section 3, or any occupier is by an order      made under  sub-section (1)  of section  4 required  to      vacate any vacant 139      land  and   to  remove   all  property  (including  any      structures)  A   therefrom,  desires  to  renovate  the      structure at  his  risk  and  expense  as  a  temporary      measure, he  may seek  the previous  permission of  the      Controller of  Slums  to  do  so.  On  receipt  of  any      application for  such permission,  if the Controller or      Slums is,  after such  inquiry as he deems fit to make,      satisfied that  the structure  is  not  fit  for  human      habitation and  the proposed renovation is necessary to      make it  so fit  temporarily, he  may, subject  to such      conditions  as   he  may   impose  grant  the  required      permission.         (2) Where  any structure  is renovated in accordance      with the  permission granted under sub-section (1), the      Competent Authority shall not evict the occupier of the      structure  so   renovated.  till   such  time   as  the      Controller of Slums may specify .      Provided that  if, in  the opinion of the Controller of      Slums, occupier  has at  any time committed a breach of      any of  the conditions  subject to which the permission      was granted,  he may  cancel the permission granted and      direct the Competent Authority to take necessary action      against the  occupier under section 4 forthwith for his      eviction and forfeiture and removal of his property. 4-B. Recovery  of  dues  of  financing  institutions,  which render assistance for renovation of structures.        (1) Where an occupier of any structure referred to in      section 4A has availed of an y financial assistance for      renovation  of   the  structure   from  any   financing      institution recognised  by the State Government in this      behalf; the  Controller of Slums may, at the request of      the financing  institution, collect  on behalf  of that      institution the amount of loan advanced to the occupier      by that  institution in  such instalments  and at  such      intervals, and  remit the  amount so  collected to  the      institution in  such manner,  as may be directed by the      State Government.         (2) If any such occupier fails to pay any amount due      to the financing institution on or before the due date,      the Controller  of Slums  may send  to the Collector, a      certificate  under  his  hand  indicating  therein  the      amount which is due 140      to the  financing institution. Thereupon, the Collector      or any  officer authorised  by him  shall  recover  the      amount due as an arrear of land revenue:         Provided that  no such  certificate shall be sent to      the Controller,  unless the  occupier has  been  served      with a  notice by  the Controller of slums calling upon      him to pay the amount due by a specified date.

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4-C. Powers  of controller of Slums under sections 4A and 4B exercisable by authorised officer also.         For the  purposes of section 4A and section 4A, "Con      troller of  Slums" includes  any officer subordinate to      him, who  is authorised  by  him  in  writing  in  that      behalf."        Section  5 of  the Act  prescribes  the  penalty  for contravention of  the provisions  of  Section  3(1)  or  for failure to  comply with  an  order  made  by  the  Competent Authority under  section 4  or for obstructing the Competent Authority in  the exercise of any power conferred upon it by the Act. The penalty extends to imprisonment for a period of three years  and fine. Section 8 of the Act provides that no court shall  have jurisdiction  to entertain any proceeding, civil or  criminal, in respect of the eviction of any person from any  vacant land  under the  Act or  in respect  of any order made or action taken by the Competent Authority in the exercise of  the powers conferred by the Act or to grant any stay or  injunction in respect of such order or action. This section further  provides if any suit or other proceeding in respect of  the eviction  of any person from any vacant land is pending  on the  appointed date  in any  court, it  shall abate.      The expression  "Vacant Land"  is defined  in section 2 (f) of  the Act. The original definition was replaced by the First Amendment Act after which the section reads as follows .         "2 (f)-’vacant land’, in relation to any urban area,      means-        (a)     all lands  in such area, whether agricultural           or non. agricultural, which are vacant and are not           built upon on the appointed date; 141        (b)     all lands in such area on which any structure           has been   or  is being constructed otherwise than           in  accordance   with  any   law  regulating   the           construction of  such structure    and  which  the           Competent Authority  may, from time to time, by an           order in writing, specify and declare to be vacant           lands by  announcing by  beat  of  drum  or  other           suitable means  on or  in  the  vicinity  of  such           lands, and the declaration so made shall be deemed           to be  notice to  all those who are occupying such           lands that  all such  lands shall  be vacant lands           for the purposes of this Act;      and includes, in particular, all lands specified in the      Schedule to this Act.         The State  Government may,  from time to time, by an      order, published  in the  Official Gazette  amend  that      Schedule by  adding thereto any land or lands specified      in that order or by modifying or transferring any entry      in that Schedule."        On  December 3,  1971 a Proclamation of Emergency was issued by  the President  of India  under Article 352 of the Constitution on  the ground  that a  grave emergency existed whereby the  security of  India was  threatened by  external aggression. Another  proclamation of  Emergency  was  issued under the  same Article  on June 25, 1975 on the ground that the  security   of  India   was   threatened   by   internal disturbance. On June 27, 1975, the President issued an order under Article 359 (1) suspending the right to move any Court for the  enforcement of  the fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14,  21, and  22 of the Constitution for the period during which  the above  two Proclamations of Emergency were in force. On August 1, 1965, the Constitution (Thirty-eighth

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Amendment) Act,  1977 was  passed  whereby,  clause  1A  was inserted in  Article  359  with  retrospective  effect.  The ordinance which  preceded the  Act in  the instant  case was passed on  November 11,  1975 while  the Act  was passed  on December 24,  1975. As  stated earlier,  the Act  came  into force in  the Bombay  Metropolitan Region with retrospective effect from November 11, 1975.      On January  8, 1975,  the  President  of  India  issued another order  under  Article  359(1)  of  the  Constitution suspending the right of any person to move any Court for the enforcement of  any of  the fundamental  rights conferred by Article 19  of the  Constitution for the period during which the said two proclamations of emergency 142 were in  force. The First Amendment Act was passed on August 3, 1976 while the Second Amendment Act was passed on January 25, 1977.      The Proclamation  of Internal  Emergency was revoked by the  President   of  India  on  March  21,  1977  while  the proclamation of  External Emergency was revoked on March 27, 1977.      On  April  30,  1979,  the  Constitution  (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,  1978 was  passed. By  section 2 (a) (ii) of the said Act. sub-clause (f) of clause (i) of Article 19 was omitted  from   the  Constitution   and,  by  section  2(b), consequential amendments  were made in clause (5, of Article 19. By  section 8  of the  said Act,  Article 31 was omitted from the Constitution. By section 34, a new chapter, namely, Chapter IV, headed "Right to Property", was inserted in Part XII of the Constitution, containing Article 30O-A.      As a result of these constitutional provisions, the Act would be  void and would cease to have effect from March 27, 1977 if  it infringes  the fundamental  rights conferred  by Articles 14  and 19  of the  Constitution. If  it  infringed Article 31  (1) of  the Constitution  on the ground that the provisions of  Article 19  (1) (f)  were violated,  the  Act would be  void and would cease to have effect from March 27, 1977. If the State Legislature had no legislative competence to pass  the Act  or the  Act infringed  the  provisions  of clauses 2 or 3 of Article 31, the Act would be void from its inception. Putting  it  briefly,  the  Act  or  any  of  its provisions would  be void  or would cease to have effect, as the case  may be,  from diverse  dates  depending  upon  the violation of  the particular  Article  or  Articles  of  the Constitution involved herein.      Since the  statutory concept of vacant land’ as defined in Section 2 (f) of the Act permeates the entire Act and is, as  it  were,  the  quintessence  of  the  Act,  respondents concentrated  their   attention  in   the  High   Court   on challenging the  vires and legality of that definition. They succeeded in  that challenge for the wighty reasons given by the High  Court, which  we adopt,  except  with  some  minor variations. Indeed,  if the  draftsman were  to give  to the framing of  the Act  even a  part of  the care  and  concern bestowed upon  it by  the High Court, though not at the same length, many  an impediment in upholding the validity of the Act could  have been  cleared without much difficulty. If we were to  deal again with the manifold challenges made to the validity of the Act, we will be repeating, more 143 or less, what the High Court has said. Therefore, we propose to dwell  upon some  of the  fundamental objections to which the Act  is open  and some  of the  more serious infirmities from which its provisions suffer.      Coming  first  to  the  definition  of  ’vacant  land’,

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Section 2  (f)  as  amended  retrospectively  by  the  first Amendment Act divides vacant lands into four categories: (1) lands which  are in  fact vacant,  that is to say, not built upon; (2)  lands on  which structures have been or are being constructed  otherwise  than  in  accordance  with  any  law regulating the construction of such structures and which the Competent Authority  may specify  and declare  to be  vacant lands by announcing by beat of drum or other suitable means; (3) lands  specified in  the Schedule  to the  Act; and  (4) lands included in the Schedule by the State Government by an order amending  the Schedule.  It is  evident, despite  some needless controversy  upon that  question in the High Court, that the expression ’land’ in Section 2 (f) of the Act means plots of  land with  defined boundaries  which are generally recognised for revenue and survey purposes. Section 2(f) (b) requires two conditions to be satisfied in order that a land can be  described as a vacant land; Firstly, there has to be an unauthorised  structure on  the land  and  secondly,  the Competent Authority  has, by an order in writing, to specify and declare that land to be a vacant land.      The  Act  confers  upon  the  Competent  Authority  the discretion to declare a land as a vacant land without laying down  any   guidelines  to   control  that  discretion.  The Competent Authority has the freedom to pick and choose lands on which  there are unauthorised structures and declare some of them  as vacant  lands and leave other similarly situated untouched. The  second recital in the preamble to the Act on which  reliance   is  placed  by  the  State  Government  as affording a  guideline to the Competent Authority for making a declaration  that a  certain land  is a vacant land cannot serve that purpose. That recital reads thus:      "AND WHEREAS  the number  of unauthorised  occupants on      vacant lands  in the  urban  areas  in  the  State  was      rapidly increasing  and was causing grave danger to the      public health  and  sanitation  and  peaceful  life  of      inhabitants of such areas."      The Act does not contain any provision whatsoever which is 144 directed at ensuring the public health and sanitation or the peaceful life  of the inhabitants of the concerned locality. Indeed, nothing is farther removed from the true purpose and object of  the Act  than these considerations. The last item in the  Schedule to  the Act  includes all  public roads and highways  in   Greater  Bombay.  These,  surely,  cannot  be regarded as  constituting a  grave danger  to public health, sanitation or peaceful life of the citizens.      The circumstances  which led  to the passing of the Act are mentioned in the Statement of objects and Reasons to the Ordinance which are as follows;      "It was  found that  the vacant lands in Greater Bombay      and  similar  other  urban  areas  were  rapidly  being      unauthorisedly occupied by squatters and traffickers in      lands.  The  different  laws  and  various  authorities      constituted under  these laws,  as  well  as  different      procedures laid  down by  these laws,  did  not  permit      immediate demolition  of unauthorised  huts or  prevent      the growth  of  unauthorised  structures.  The  lengthy      procedure  laid   in  the   laws  also   prevented  the      authorities from  taking immediate preventive action. A      law which  would  simplify  the  procedure  and  reduce      possibilities of litigation, and adequately arm the law      enforcing  authorities   such  as  Municipal  officers,      Police officers, Revenue officers and other officers of      Government Department to demolish the unauthorised huts

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    and houses  was found  in mediately necessary. Further,      it was  also necessary  to take  drastic  penal  action      against those  who construct  unauthorised hutments  or      colonies of  temporary sheds,  and traffic in lands and      such structures  or recover  rents by  letting out such      structures."      It is clear from this Statement that the evil which was sought to  be remedied  by the  ordinance, which  was  later replaced by  the Act,  was not  danger to  public health  or sanitation or to the peaceful life of the inhabitants of the Metropolis of  Bombay. The  danger posed by the construction of unauthorised  structures is  the evil which the Act seeks to remedy.      The Act does not also provide for any safeguard against the arbitrary  exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Competent Authority  to declare  a land as a vacant land. It is true that abuse of 145 power is  not to  be assumed  lightly but, experience belies the  expectation   that  discretionary   powers  are  always exercised fairly  and objectively.  In  fact,  instances  of discriminatory declarations  made by the Competent Authority were cited  in the High Court to which according to the High Court, no satisfactory answer was given in, the return filed on  behalf  of  the  State  Government.  The  Act  does  not prescribe any  procedure which  the Competent  Authority  is required to  adopt before declaring a land as a vacant land. There is  no provision  in the  Act requiring  the Competent Authority to  observe even  the rudimentary norms of natural justice  before   making  the   statutory  declaration.  The Authority is  not obliged  to give  notice to  anyone and it need not hear any person who is likely to be affected by the declaration.  The   State  Government,   too,  is  under  no obligation to follow any set procedure prior to amending the Schedule so  as to  include new  lands  therein.  The  power conferred by  Sections 3(1) and 4(1) of the Act is similarly uncontrolled and  arbitrary. Indeed,  the hall-mark  of this ill-conceived legislation  is; "No  notice and  no hearing". There can  be cases,  though their  category  ought  not  be enlarged by  Courts, wherein  failure to  afford to  hearing before an  adverse decision  is rendered may not necessarily vitiate that decision. But, in cases like those before us, a hearing preceding  a decision  is  of  the  essence  of  the matter. It  is notorious  as the  Statement of  objects  and Reasons of  the ordinance shows, that, in Bombay, open lands have been trespassed upon by professional slumlords who have become a  law into  themselves. Perhaps,  they rise  to  the occasion by  pandering to  political needs and pressures but that is  beside the  point. Massive encroachments on private properties have  led to the virtual deprivation of the title of rightful  owners of  these properties.  The Act penalises such owner  for no  fault of  theirs and,  that too, without giving them  an opportunity  to be  heard. The fact that the power to  make the  requisite declaration  under the  Act is vested  in   officers  of   the  higher  echelons  makes  no difference to  this position  and is not a palliative to the prejudice which is inherent in the situation.      The judgment of the High Court cites a glaring instance of the  arbitrary and  undesirable consequences which follow upon orders  which are passed unilaterally, that is, without hearing the  parties affected  by these  orders. One  of the petitioners before  the High  Court was the owner of a hotel called Nakesh  Punjab Hotel.  He held various licences which authorised him to run the hotel. There was a dispute between him and the Revenue Authorities as to the

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146 increase in the quantum of assessment, whereupon he obtained an interim  injunction from the City Civil Court, Bombay. In the meanwhile,  the Competent Authority issued a Declaration under Section  2(f)(b) of the Act declaring the plot of land on which  the hotel  stood as  a vacant land. Within a short time thereafter, the hotel was demolished.      It was urged on behalf of the State Government that the infirmity, if  any, from  which  the  Act  suffered  in  its inception has  been cured  by the passing of the Maharashtra Vacant Lands  (Prohibition    of Unauthorised occupation and Summary Eviction)  (Service of Notice) Rules, 1979. By these Rules, before  issuing any  order under  Section 2(f)(b)  or under Section  4(1) of  the Act,  the Competent Authority is required to serve a written notice upon any person likely to be affected  by such  order, calling  upon him to show cause within such period as may be specified in the notice why the pro  posed   order  should  not  be  issued.  The  Competent Authority is  further required  to consider  any  objections submitted to  it  by  any  such  person  within  the  period specified in  the notice.  Rule 3(2) provides for service of such  notices.   We  are   unable   to   accept   that   the unconstitutionality of  the Act  is cured  by the framing of the Rules  made three  and a  half years  after the  Act was passed. Besides,  the Rules  only provide for a notice to be given and  objections to be considered before the passing of an order under sections 2(f)(b) and 4(1). They do not make a similar provision  before permission  is granted  or refused under section  3(1) of  the Act.  But, what  is  of  greater importance is  that, even  the Rules  do not  lay  down  any guidelines for  the exercise  of  the  discretion  which  is conferred upon the Competent Authority by section 2(f)(b) or section 4(1) of the Act.      Section 2(f)(b)  suffers from yet another vice in that, it treats  all persons  alike irrespective  of how  they are situated  in   the  matter   of  their  involvement  in  the construction of  unauthorised structures  and their interest therein. Classification requires division into classes which are marked  by common  characteristics. Such division has to be founded  upon a rational basis and it must be directed at subserving the  purposes of the statute. Section 2(f)(b) and the other  cognate provisions of the Act make no distinction at  all   between  owners   of  lands  who  have  themselves constructed unauthorised  structures  and  those  others  on whose lands unauthorised structures have been constructed by trespassers. The  latter class  of  owners  who  are  silent spectators to the forcible and lawless deprivation of 147 their title  to their  property have  been put by the Act on par with   trespassers  who, taking law into their own hand, defy not merely private owners but public authorities.      Section 2(f)(b),  also, suffers  from the  infirmity of according  equal   treatment  to  unequals.  Take  a  simple example: A  plot of  land may be vacant in the true sense of the term,  that is to say, wholly unbuilt upon. Another plot of land  may  have  a  small  structure  built  upon  it  in accordance with  the Municipal  rules and  regulations.  The first plot  of land  attracts drastic  provisions of the Act merely by  reason of  the fact  that nothing  has been built upon it  at all,  while the  second plot of land is entirely outside the  scope of  the Act for the reason that some tiny structure is  standing  thereon.  a  Such  a  classification betrays lack of rationale.      By the  second part  of the definition of ’vacant land’ in section  2(f) of  the  Act,  vacant  land  "includes,  in

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particular, all lands specified in the Schedule to the Act". The Schedule  includes various ’lands’ which are built upon, like the  B.E.S.T. Depot  (Entry 73),  the Health  Centre at Nawabwadi (Entry  75), the  Pumping Station  at  Vallabhbhai Patel Nagar  (Entry 82), the School in Mulund Village (Entry 130) and,  last but  not the  least, all  land  occupied  by public roads and highways in Greater Bombay (Entry 1555). It is impossible to understand the scheme of the Schedule or to discover any  rational basis behind it. It is also difficult to understand  as to  why  certain  lands  which  are  under acquisition for  the purposes  of  the  Maharashtra  Housing Board  and   the  Bombay  Municipal  Corporation  have  been included in  the Schedule and other lands similarly situated have not  been so  included. Some  of  the  Entries  in  the Schedule show  that unauthorised  structures could  not have been possibly constructed on the lands mentioned therein. By and large,  the Schedule is divorced from the true object of the Act.      The concluding  part of section 2(f) of the Act confers power upon  the State  Government to amend the Schedule from time to  time by an order published in the official Gazette. This power  includes, inter alia, the power to add ’any land or lands’  to the Schedule. No criterion or standard is laid down in  order to  enable the  State Government to determine objectively as  to which lands can be added to the Schedule. The power  to add  to the  Schedule is  in the  nature of  a legislative power  which, in  the  very  nature  of  things, cannot stipulate  for  service  of  notice  to  the  persons affected by  the amendment.  This power  of amendment of the Schedule is 148 not even conditioned by the fact that the lands added to the Schedule must have unauthorised structures standing thereon. The State Government is free to pick and choose any land and put  it   in  the  Schedule.  This  kind  of  conferment  of uncanalised discretion is strawn all over the Act.      Thus, each  part of  the definition of ’vacant land’ in section 2(f)  of the  Act is  violative of the provisions of Articles  14  and  19(1)(f)  of  the  Constitution.  Article 19(1)(f) has now lost its relevance after the passing of the Constitution (Forty-fourth  Amendment) Act,  1978  by  which clause (f)  was deleted.  But the  Act had  to  satisfy  the requirements of  that clause so long as it was a part of the Constitution.      It may be relevant at this stage to consider as to what is the  ultimate fate  of lands which are declared as vacant lands under  section 2(f).  Until  the  Competent  Authority passes an  order under section 4(1) calling upon an occupier to vacate  a land,  even a  trespasser  or  an  unauthorised occupier can continue to be in possession of the land. If he is granted permission to occupy the land under section 3(1), he cannot  be evicted at all, for the simple reason that the order of eviction under section 4(1) can be passed only if a person is in occupation of a land contrary to the provisions of section  3. Even  the eviction  of a  trespasser from the land can afford no solace to its rightful owner because, the Act does  not contain  any provision whereby the land can be returned  to   him  after  it  is  freed  from  unauthorised occupation. If the owner himself has erected an unauthorised structure, the  Act does not provide as to what is to happen to the land after he is evicted therefrom.      By the  provisio to  section 3(2) which was inserted by the First  Amendment Act,  power is conferred upon the State Government or,  an authority  specified in  that behalf,  to receive and  collect from  the occupiers  of vacant  lands a

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reasonable  amount  by  way  of  penal  charges  as  may  be determined by the State Government Such penal charges can be recovered until  such time  as the  structure erected on the land on contravention of section 3(1) of the Act is removed. The Statement  of objects and Reasons of the First Amendment Act  shows  that  the  provision  for  levying  penalty  was introduced into  the Act in order that occupants of lands on which  there  were  unauthorised  structures  and.  who  are allowed to  continue in possession of the structures, do not continue to occupy 149 those lands  without payment  of any amount at all to public authorities. It  appears  that  even  after  forfeiting  the structures consequent  upon the  passing of  an order  under section 4(1),  the  State  Government  has  been  recovering compensation from  unauthorised occupants.  It seems  to  us quite incongruous  that while  the true  owner is  prevented from  taking  legal  proceedings  to  recover  any  rent  or compensation from  persons who had trespassed upon his land, the State  Government can  recover penal  charges  from  the trespassers.      By the  Second Amendment  Act, a  new section  4-A  was inserted in  the Act.  That section  provides  that  if  any occupier of  a structure  on a  vacant land  from whom penal charges are  collected under  section 3,  or if any occupier who is  required by  an order  made under  section  4(1)  to vacate any vacant land, desires to renovate the structure at his risk  as a  temporary  measure,  he  may  apply  to  the Controller  of  Slums  for  the  requisite  permission.  The Controller is empowered to grant the permission after making such inquiry  as he  deems fit,  if he is satisfied that the structure is  not fit  for human habitation and the proposed renovation is  necessary to  make the  structure temporarily fit. Once  such permission  is granted  and the structure is renovated, the Competent Authority is powerless to evict the occupier of  the structure until such time as the Controller of Slums  may specify.  By  section  4-13,  which  was  also inserted by  the Second  Amendment Act, financial assistance for renovating structures can be made available by financial institutions recognised  by the  State Government.  In cases where such financial assistance is availed of, the financial institutions can request the Controller of Slums to collect, on their  behalf, the  amounts  of  loans  advanced  to  the occupiers. The  Statement of  objects  and  Reasons  of  the Second Amendment  Act shows  that the Government had carried out substantial environment improvements on vacant lands and had sponsored  a scheme  for building  semi-permanent houses thereon. They  intended to  give to  the occupants  of  such structures security  of tenure subject only to the condition of regular  repayment by  them of  the loans  given  by  the financial institutions.  The true owner of lands are totally ignored in  this scheme  of things, even if they are victims and not  the authors  of unauthorised  constructions. It was not disputed  in the  High Court,  nor before us, that for a period of  more than  four years  that the  Act has  been in force, not  a single unauthorised and forcible occupier of a vacant land owned by a private person was evicted, nor was a single plot of land encroached upon restored to its rightful owner. 150      We are  in agreement  with the  High Court that the Act does not  violate  the  provisions  of  Art.  31(1)  of  the Constitution. It  does not provide for transfer of ownership of vacant  lands to  the State  or to a corporation owned or controlled by  the State;  nor does it vest in the State the

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right of  the owner  or occupier  of vacant lands to recover rent or compensation for use and occupation of such lands.      We are,  however, unable to accept the view of the High Court that  the Act  amounts to a measure of requisition and is bad  for the  reason that  it  provides  for  requisition without  payment   of  compensation.  It  is  straining  the language of  the Act  to hold  that it provides, directly or indirectly, for  requisition of  private property.  The  Act does not transfer the right to possession of vacant lands to the State,  its agents  or its instrumentalities. Therefore, the Act  does not  offend against  the provisions of Article 31(2)  of  the  Constitution.  Since  that  Article  is  not attracted, no  question can  arise of  the invalidity of the Act on  the ground  mentioned in Article 31(S), namely, that the Act had not received the assent of the President.      In so  far as the question of legislative competence is concerned we  uphold the  finding of  the High  Court to the extent that the State Legislature had the competence to pass the Act under Entries 18, 64 and 65 of List II.      Since the Act is, in any event, violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution, it  is  unnecessary  to  consider  the question whether,  in so  far as  it violated Article 19 (l) (f), it  revived on  the deletion  of that  Article  by  the Constitution (Forty-fourth  Amendment) Act. 1978. We express no opinion on the question whether the doctrine of ’eclipse’ applies both the pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws or whether  that doctrine  applies to  pre-Constitution laws only.      For these  reasons, which  are substantially similar to the reasons  given by the High Court, we affirm the judgment of the  High Court  and dismiss these appeals with costs. We quantify the costs in each appeal at rupees two thousand.      We would  like to  point out  before we  close that the object of  the state  legislature in  passing  the  Act  was unquestionably  laudable.   It  is   unfortunate  that   the legislation has  traveled far  beyond that object. The State Government has  failed in  these proceedings not because the legislature lacks  the legislative  competence to  pass  the Act  mainly   because  the   provisions  of   the  Act   are discriminatory. 151 The Act  was passed during the period of Emergency when some of A  the safeguards  available under  Chapter  111  of  the Constitution  were   suspended  on  the  revocation  of  the Emergency, the  Act ought  to have  been amended  or, better still, a new legislation ought to have been introduced so as to comply  with the provisions of the Constitution. We trust that, in  the light  of our judgment and the judgment of the High Court, the State Legislature will introduce a carefully conceived legislation  on the  subject at an early date. The slumlords,  who   have  trespassed  on  public  and  private properties, must  be evicted  and expeditious steps taken to prevent them  exploiting any  further the helpless member of the community  who are  virtually at  their mercy.  Not only have these  defiant  law-breakers  constructed  unauthorised structures on  private and  public properties but, as stated in the  objects and  Reasons of  the  Act,  they  have  been collecting extortionate  rents  from  the  tenants  of  such properties, Earlier the State Government acts the better. M.L.A                                     Appeals dismissed. 152